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Introduction
One sure-fire way to write an unsuccessful book is to try to make 
everyone happy. Because I had hoped to write a successful book, I 
started out by making a number of choices which I thought would 
make at least a few people unhappy. First, I chose to write a book 
promoting Martin Heidegger’s existential conception of science. Second, 
I chose to write a book promoting the sociology of scientific knowledge 
(SSK). Third, I chose to argue that the accounts of science presented 
by SSK and Heidegger are, in fact, largely compatible, even mutually 
reinforcing. Hence, my choice of title: Science as Social Existence. In this 
book, I combine Heidegger’s early view of science as a form of existence 
with SSK’s view of science as a social activity. Through this combination, 
both accounts turn out to be more vital and interesting than they may 
have been when left to themselves. The book thus presents a tale of 
intellectual friendship between two perhaps unlikely companions. Of 
course, no friendship, no matter how promising, will please everyone. 
But this one happens to please me, and I hope that it will please you too.
SSK emerged in the 1970s, predominantly in the Science Studies Unit 
at the University of Edinburgh. The ‘Edinburgh School’ introduced what 
they called the ‘strong programme’ in SSK. This signalled a dramatic 
step beyond what was now, retrospectively, identified as the ‘weak 
programme’ in the sociology of science. The weak programme focussed 
mainly on institutional studies of the scientific community: how scientists 
were organised into groups; and the social relationships which existed 
between them. The actual products of scientific activity — theories 
and facts — and the means by which they are produced — techniques 
and methods — were excluded from sociological analysis. These were 
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thought to form the hard centre of science, the rational core, which 
sociology was not meant to touch.
In the 1970s, SSK practitioners began to touch this core. This disturbed 
some people. In the view of critics, SSK was undermining the rationality 
of science by addressing its conceptual and methodological core in 
sociological terms. Effectively, this meant that scientific rationality 
was being treated, through and through, as a social phenomenon, a 
phenomenon necessarily dependent for its legitimacy on local social 
and historical circumstances. Critics of SSK urged that this was wrong-
headed, and they educed diverse intellectual arguments to support 
their view. Perhaps more importantly, however, these critics felt it was 
wrong: their distaste was not just intellectual, it was also moral — it 
came from the gut. For SSK practitioners, none of this appears to have 
been surprising. They saw their critics as harbouring a quasi-religious 
desire to preserve the alleged ‘sacredness’ of scientific rationality 
against the secularising impulses of a self-consciously naturalistic 
and methodologically empiricist social science. As social scientists 
who set out to study science itself, SSK practitioners were determined 
to treat scientific rationality in wholly secular terms, as a completely 
natural phenomenon, produced by instinctively gregarious, historically 
embedded, and fundamentally biological creatures.
A proper disciplinary history of these events has yet to be written. 
My own suspicion is that SSK practitioners have tended to overplay 
the secularisation angle, no doubt because this bolsters their own self-
presentation as hard-boiled scientific naturalists. Accusing your critics 
of theological tendencies is, at least in the current Euro-American 
academic context, a good way to score a few rhetorical points. In 
my view, however, questions about the sacred or secular nature of 
knowledge are, at base, questions about what it means to be a human 
being. To claim that scientific knowledge draws its authority from a 
source which transcends local social and historical circumstances is to 
make a substantive claim about human beings as the producers and 
carriers of that knowledge. Likewise for the contrasting claim, that the 
authority of scientific knowledge cannot be extricated from the social 
and historical circumstances in which that knowledge is produced and 
sustained. In the first case, some aspect of the human being — an aspect 
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tied to knowledge — is thought to transcend its local circumstances. In 
the second case, such transcendence is deemed impossible.
For the critics, SSK’s claim that there is nothing transcendent 
about scientific knowledge seems to make no sense. In their view, this 
amounts to a rejection of the objectivity of science. If the authority of 
knowledge is necessarily tied to local circumstances, then how does one 
explain the universal validity of, for example, simple rules of logic like 
those for deduction? From the critics’ perspective, SSK practitioners 
appear to be rejecting the objectivity of logic and other unquestionably 
reliable techniques of knowledge production. Here, it may be useful 
to distinguish between descriptions and explanations of objectivity. If 
we consider our experience of objective knowledge production — for 
example, deducing from ‘All humans are mortal’ and ‘Socrates is 
human’ the conclusion ‘Socrates is mortal’ — then we seem to be faced 
with a procedure which cannot but be objective, regardless of local 
circumstances. The objective validity of deduction feels universal, as if 
it, necessarily, holds everywhere and at all times. In other words, it has 
normative force. This is a description of our experience — or, one may say, 
the phenomenology — of deductive inference. SSK does not dismiss this 
phenomenological description as false, but seeks to explain it without 
recourse to the notion that human knowers, when they engage in 
deductive reasoning, transcend their local circumstances. Hence, it is at 
the level of explanation, not description, that the dispute fundamentally 
operates. Whereas the critics seek to explain the normative force of 
deduction in terms of a transcendent feature of human cognition, SSK 
practitioners seek to explain it in wholly local and naturalistic terms. 
In the former case, our compulsive feeling that deduction must be 
objectively valid is the result of its transcendent nature. In the latter 
case, this feeling of compulsion, of logical necessity, is instead viewed 
as the result, in necessary part, of one’s embeddedness in a particular 
social context, a context in which one learns and is afterward under 
recurring pressure to experience deduction, without deliberation, as an 
objectively valid technique of knowledge production. Normative force 
is thus social force rather than transcendental force.
Based on their radically different conceptions of what it means to 
be a human knower, these competing positions seem to lack sufficient 
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common ground for their differences to be resolved through rational 
discussion. At least, the often acrimonious and mostly unproductive 
debates which have erupted with varying intensity over the last four 
decades would seem to suggest as much. I will have little more to 
say about this conflict in what follows. My own view is that, as more 
rigorously naturalistic models of human knowing continue to gain 
credibility across the disciplines, the original intellectual and moral 
motivations driving SSK will be largely vindicated. There is, however, 
another conflict, more central to my interests, which this first conflict 
helps to illuminate. This is a conflict between SSK practitioners and 
those in the slightly younger interdisciplinary field of science studies 
who argue that SSK did not go far enough in its rejection of past 
transcendental models of the scientific knower. Indeed, according to 
this line of criticism, the conception of the scientific knower promoted 
by SSK is still a transcendental conception. The only difference is that 
this knower is no longer viewed as an individual person, but has instead 
been replaced by society as a whole. On this reading, it is not, ultimately, 
the individual but society which develops and sustains knowledge of 
the natural world.
Central to this line of criticism is the claim that SSK trucks in a strong 
theoretical dichotomy between society, on the one hand, and nature, 
on the other. By allegedly taking this dichotomy for granted, SSK 
practitioners are said to gather all the activity relevant to knowledge 
production on the society side, leaving the nature side thoroughly 
inert or passive and, as a consequence, completely unnecessary for 
explanations of scientific knowledge production. But, so the science 
studies critics continue, it seems patently absurd to claim that nature 
plays no role in our knowledge of it. Such a claim amounts to a form of 
sociological idealism, where knowledge is explained solely in terms of 
the realm of ideas created and sustained by society, with the concrete 
reality of the natural world being left entirely out of the picture.
Interestingly, this criticism has much in common with the earlier 
criticism. In the earlier case, the worry was that SSK, by insisting that all 
knowledge must be explained in terms of local circumstances, fails to 
capture the universality of some well-established scientific knowledge 
claims. In other words, on this model, all that scientific knowledge ends 
up ultimately pointing to are the local social and historical situations 
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which gave rise to and continue to sustain it. It does not, and cannot, 
point to the objective reality which exists independently of those 
situations. This too, then, is an accusation of a kind of idealism, where 
historical and sociological circumstances are placed front and centre, 
while the actual natural reality which science is purportedly meant to 
study is left to languish by the wayside. In the view of the first critics, 
the solution to this idealism is transcendence. Only by reference to an 
aspect of human cognition which transcends local circumstances can we 
explain how science succeeds in producing objective accounts of nature.
The more recent science studies critics employ a different strategy 
in response to SSK’s alleged idealism. Like SSK, they too reject 
transcendence. From their perspective, to invoke transcendence is 
to offer an implausible solution to a pseudo-problem created by the 
dichotomous separation of society and nature. Rather than trying to 
resolve this supposed problem, they argue, we should simply reject 
the society-nature distinction which gave rise to it. No dichotomy, no 
problem. These critics propose that society and nature not be treated 
as fundamental resources in explanations of knowledge, but instead 
as topics which are themselves in need of explanation. As we will see 
later, their preferred alternative method is to explain society and nature 
in terms of the allegedly more fundamental concept of ‘practice.’ The 
idea is that stabilised phenomena like society and nature arise from the 
dynamic heterogeneity of ongoing practical activities which constitute 
the very fabric of existence. To remain stuck at the level of the society-
nature distinction is to ignore practice as providing a more fundamental 
level on which to base explanations of scientific knowledge production.
My brief here is not to give a detailed account of, much less an 
extended critical commentary on, this alternative to SSK, although I will 
give it some further attention in Chapters Two and Three. For the time 
being, I would like to emphasise that this rejection of the society-nature 
distinction is intimately related to a more general critique of modernity 
which has been characteristic of this theoretical wing of science studies. 
In this context, the term ‘modernity’ is meant to pick out that aspect 
of our cultural condition which has given rise, above all, to ecological 
disasters. The connection between concrete ecological catastrophe and 
the abstract theoretical separation of society and nature seems to be that 
this abstract concept, in consequential part, enables human beings to 
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view nature as a passive medium, devoid of intrinsic value and so freely 
available for manipulation in accordance with human imagination 
and intentions. By rejecting this distinction, these theorists hope to 
contribute to a reformulation of humanity’s relationship with the rest 
of the natural world, a reformulation in which the threat of ecological 
catastrophe will be dramatically diminished.
As critics of modernity, these science studies theorists follow an 
intellectual path which had been cleared by scholars working earlier in 
the twentieth century, one of the most prominent of whom was Martin 
Heidegger. Yet, as we will see, an influential stream in practice-based 
accounts of science, while acknowledging a debt to Heidegger’s earlier 
critique of modernity, also criticises Heidegger for not having gone far 
enough. In this respect, Heidegger is admonished for much the same 
reason that science studies scholars also admonish SSK. In both cases, 
an innovative step forward is acknowledged, but then immediately 
rebuked for nevertheless still falling firmly within the circle of an 
untenable modernist ideology.
One of my main objectives in this book is to demonstrate that these 
criticisms of SSK and Heidegger, despite their influence, are in fact 
largely mistaken. Indeed, both SSK and Heidegger have much more 
to offer a practice-based approach to science than has been allowed 
for by their critics. A key issue in this dispute is the methodological 
question of how best to address the conceptual problems generated by 
the modern theoretical separation of society and nature. This was, in 
fact, a question which, in a somewhat more abstract form, preoccupied 
Heidegger for much of his life. However, he responded to it in a 
dramatically different way than have many prominent science studies 
scholars. While the latter have counselled the rejection of the society-
nature distinction, Heidegger instead advised its deconstruction. To 
this end, he spent much energy attempting to trace the history of this 
distinction back to its earliest conceptual manifestations. One principle 
guiding this methodology was Heidegger’s conviction that human 
beings are fundamentally historical creatures. Hence, our present 
actions, including our conceptual acts, are inextricably bound together 
with the history of thinking and doing which informs the community 
to which we belong. For this reason, Heidegger was preoccupied 
with an intellectual excavation of the European intellectual tradition. 
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Science studies scholars who counsel the rejection of the society-nature 
distinction seem, in contrast, less convinced of the historical dependency 
of our thinking, believing instead that such traditional structures as 
the society-nature distinction may simply be sidelined in favour of 
radically new, historically unprecedented, intellectual tools. Once again, 
we see that an intractable theoretical dispute about knowledge may be 
rephrased as a fundamental disagreement about what it means to be a 
human being. The science studies scholars in question seem to believe 
that human beings can, at least in some aspect, liberate themselves from 
history. For Heidegger, in contrast, human existence is, before anything 
else, historical. From Heidegger’s perspective, it follows that science, 
as a form of human existence, must also be a fundamentally historical 
phenomenon. As a result, Heidegger’s largely philosophical account of 
science turns out to be highly compatible with the methods and goals 
of many historians of science. This compatibility with the history of 
science is yet another characteristic which Heidegger’s conception of 
science shares with SSK.
One consequence of deconstructing the society-nature distinction is a 
recognition that it is but one special instance of a more general distinction 
between mind and body, or, in more theoretical terms, subject and 
object. It is towards this general distinction that both Heidegger, mainly 
in work preceding the Second World War, and more recent science 
studies scholars have directed most of their critical energy. In historical 
terms, the main lineage of the subject-object distinction emerges from 
the work of the seventeenth-century philosopher, René Descartes, as 
well as its subsequent formal elaboration in the eighteenth-century 
writings of Immanuel Kant. As we will see, Heidegger’s deconstruction 
of this distinction involves a substantial critique of both Descartes 
and Kant. This deconstruction furthermore pushes Heidegger into a 
detailed engagement with the ancient Greek philosophers Plato and 
Aristotle. In Heidegger’s view, the seventeenth-century subject-object 
distinction did not spring from nothing, but instead grew out of a 
specific set of intellectual possibilities introduced by ancient Greek 
thinkers. Heidegger’s goal was to trace the roots of the distinction back 
through the history of philosophy, with the intention of disclosing 
new — potentially liberating — possibilities which were left latent in the 
work of earlier practitioners. His method is thus a deeply historical one, 
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one which acknowledges the inescapably historical nature of our forms 
of understanding, and one which also views history as a dynamic and 
heterogeneous means by which to overcome the potentially threatening 
limitations of the more orthodox, familiar, and often taken-for-granted 
threads of the European intellectual tradition.
SSK practitioners share Heidegger’s desire for an alternative to the 
intellectual orthodoxy, an alternative which more accurately depicts 
the conditions of lived experience. Hence, they too adopt a critical 
stance towards the orthodox subject-object distinction, challenging, 
in particular, the individualism presupposed in its model of human 
subjectivity. As I will argue, however, SSK’s challenge to individualistic 
models of the subject nevertheless leaves crucial aspects of the modern 
subject-object distinction intact. As a consequence, SSK practitioners 
have remained vulnerable to attacks from their allegedly more radical 
competitors in science studies, who exploit SSK practitioners’ residual 
adherence to the subject-object distinction in promoting their own, 
quite different, accounts of scientific practice. I wish to demonstrate that 
SSK may be defended against these attacks through its combination 
with Heidegger’s deconstruction of the subject-object distinction, as 
well as with his phenomenological analysis of the basic structures of 
human subjectivity. In turn, I wish to also demonstrate that Heidegger’s 
theoretical position may be rendered more concrete, interesting, and 
useful through combination with empirical studies and theoretical 
insights already extant in the SSK literature. This will give grounds for 
my claim that SSK and Heidegger’s early existential phenomenology 
present not just complementary but also mutually reinforcing models 
of the way scientists get things done.
Before moving into a summary of the chapters which follow, I should 
emphasise one last time that the goal of this book is a constructive 
combination of Heidegger’s early existential conception of science 
with the sociology of scientific knowledge. In order to stay focussed on 
this goal, I have chosen, with some significant exceptions, to minimise 
critical engagement with the large secondary literature which has arisen 
in response to the works of both SSK practitioners and, more especially, 
Heidegger. This restriction has allowed me the freedom to develop my 
argument in a more straightforward and streamlined fashion, with the 
result being, I trust, of greater benefit to a majority of the book’s readers. 
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Yet, I should also note that, particularly in the case of Heidegger, by 
sticking almost exclusively to primary texts, I have ended up with 
an interpretation which is sometimes at odds with the established 
scholarship. This is not what I had expected, but the outcome has, I 
must admit, been cause for some excitement. I hope that readers, in 
retracing my path through these texts, will also experience some of that 
same excitement.
Chapter One begins with a nod to the so-called ‘science wars,’ a 
heated intellectual dispute which took place in the 1990s. One battle 
in this multifaceted dispute was over the purported idealism of SSK 
practitioners. This charge of idealism was motivated by SSK’s alleged 
philosophical scepticism about the existence of the external world. 
The assumption underlying this criticism was that science entails the 
existence of the external world, and so scepticism on that count amounts 
to an assault on the legitimacy of science. However, as I demonstrate, 
SSK practitioners have almost never denied the existence of the external 
world. On the contrary, they have often educed arguments against 
external-world scepticism, and they have usually insisted that a belief in 
the existence of the external world is central to SSK’s method of social-
scientific explanation. Nevertheless, I argue that SSK practitioners’ 
attempts to deflect external-world scepticism are less successful than 
they could be, and hence that their method continues to be vulnerable 
to sceptical attack. The goal is not, however, to develop a more robust 
solution to the problem of the external world, but instead to question 
the very intelligibility of that problem. I suggest that external-world 
scepticism presupposes a specific model of human subjectivity, one 
in which the subject is separated from the world, a world external to 
it, and so it must then build a bridge to this external world in order 
to grasp it as an object of knowledge. In other words, external-world 
scepticism presupposes the fundamentality of the modern subject-object 
distinction. Although SSK practitioners have sought, in various ways, 
to shake off the more troublesome aspects of this distinction, I argue 
that they nevertheless have remained committed to it at a basic, tacit 
level. This commitment is evinced by their acceptance of external-world 
scepticism as a legitimate problem of knowledge. I attempt to help SSK 
out of this bind by combining it with Heidegger’s phenomenology of the 
subject as ‘being-in-the-world.’ I suggest that by adopting Heidegger’s 
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alternative account of subjectivity, SSK practitioners will no longer be 
vulnerable to the threat of external-world scepticism, since they will no 
longer be wedded to the model of subjectivity which fuels that threat.
In Chapter Two, I address the question of ‘realism’ which emerges 
from the preceding discussion. Heidegger’s diagnostic response to 
external-world scepticism is accompanied by an explicit rejection of 
both realism and idealism as legitimate theoretical positions. However, 
I argue that a ‘minimal realism’ may still be drawn from Heidegger’s 
considerations. Heidegger affirms that things are, that they exist, 
independently of subjects, but rejects any attempt to determine what 
they are independently of subjects. This distinction between that-
being and what-being gives grounds for minimal realism. It allows us 
to accept the core realist doctrine of independent existence (thatness), 
without also committing to the doctrine of independent essence 
(whatness). I then demonstrate that Heidegger’s minimal realism is 
remarkably compatible with SSK’s ‘residual realism,’ which affirms 
the independent existence of an external world, but rejects the claim 
that scientific truths are determined by that world. This compatibility 
can be further strengthened through the work already done in Chapter 
One: relieving SSK of its vestigial commitment to the orthodox 
model of subjectivity, and equipping it instead with Heidegger’s 
alternative. With this combination in place, I go on to consider Joseph 
Rouse’s criticisms of SSK and Heidegger. Rouse argues that both are 
committed to a theory-dominated account of science, and he instead 
promotes a practice-based account of science. I argue that Rouse has 
misunderstood Heidegger’s account of science, not least because he 
overlooks Heidegger’s distinction between that-being and what-being, 
existence and essence. Furthermore, although Rouse’s criticisms of 
SSK do have some merit, I demonstrate that they are also marred by 
misinterpretation. Finally, Rouse’s meritorious criticisms of SSK can 
also be deflected once SSK has been combined with Heidegger. Indeed, 
I conclude that this combination — along with the minimal realism 
accompanying it — offers a more coherent and serviceable basis for a 
practice-based account of science than does Rouse’s alternative.
Chapter Three continues to develop the implications of minimal 
realism, largely through a discussion of the high-profile debate between 
the pioneering SSK practitioner, David Bloor, and the influential 
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science studies scholar, Bruno Latour. At the centre of their dispute 
is the Kantian concept of the thing-in-itself, a thing to which we can 
attribute independent existence, but about whose independent qualities, 
or essence, we can know nothing. This concept is presupposed by 
minimal realism, and also by SSK. Latour attacks it as incoherent, and 
consequently rejects SSK as an unfit method for science studies. I begin 
by first reviewing Rae Langton’s commentary on Kant’s thing-in-itself. 
Langton argues that this concept follows from an acknowledgement 
of the finitude of human knowledge. To recognise the existence of 
things-in-themselves is to admit our inevitable ignorance in the face of 
nature. This recognition manifests itself in the humility we feel in our 
encounters with the natural world. I then turn to the Bloor-Latour debate. 
In Latour’s view, Bloor’s endorsement of the thing-in-itself fits hand 
in glove with his allegedly uncritical adoption of the Kantian subject-
object distinction. Latour rejects this distinction, and the concept of the 
thing-in-itself along with it. Nature, on Latour’s alternative account, 
does not outstrip our power to know it, but is itself a wholly constructed 
phenomenon, one constituted in a field of continuously circulating 
practices. As in the case of Rouse, Latour exploits weaknesses in SSK’s 
treatment of the orthodox subject-object distinction. And, as in the 
case of Rouse, I argue that SSK, once combined with Heidegger, can 
successfully counter Latour’s criticism. Indeed, Heidegger deconstructs 
the Kantian subject-object distinction, reformulating the thing-in-itself 
in a way commensurate with his own model of the subject. Crucially, the 
thing-in-itself correlates with the ‘affectivity’ of the subject. We know the 
thing exists because it affects us, because we experience that it is, even 
if we may fail to grasp what it is. Heidegger argues that this peculiar 
experience is marked by a feeling — an affective state — of anxiety. 
His reformulation of Kant preserves human finitude and humility, but 
rejects the Kantian notion of transcendence. It also preserves minimal 
realism. I conclude with a brief survey of clinical studies of anxiety 
which seem to provide empirical support for a belief in the thing-in-
itself, as reformulated in the context of minimal realism.
Chapter Four begins a transition to themes more typical of the history 
of science. I start with a review of Heidegger’s phenomenological 
history of logic, wherein logic is construed as the science of thinking. 
In Heidegger’s view, this history is inextricably entwined with the 
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history of the modern subject-object distinction, in particular, and the 
history of scientific subjectivity, more generally. He reads the history of 
logic as growing out of earlier attempts to understand the fundamental 
relation between thinking and things. This was viewed, above all, as an 
intentional relation, a relation manifest in the subject’s experience of its 
being directed towards things. This relation then came to be construed 
in the modern era as one between a propositionally structured mental 
substance, on the one hand, and a property-bearing physical substance, 
on the other. Heidegger locates the original impulse of logic in Plato’s 
claim that ‘the good’ guides thinking in its directedness towards 
things. Aristotle then formalised this idea by modelling thinking on 
the proposition, with the good now being denoted by the copula (‘is’), 
which combines subject and predicate in an intelligible sentence. This 
move marks the beginning of logic as the formalising study of thinking. 
Heidegger argues that Descartes later shifted the organising principle 
of intelligibility from the ‘is’ to the subject position of the proposition, 
above all, to the first-person singular subject, ‘I.’ Kant then submits the 
Cartesian ‘I’ to a phenomenological critique, disclosing its content in 
terms of rules of reason. These rules guide thinking in its directedness 
towards things, ensuring that the relation is a ‘good’ one, productive 
of intelligibility and understanding. According to Heidegger, this 
history traces the way in which the informal and implicit rules guiding 
thinking were first identified, and then formalised as a set of explicit 
rules governing the structure of thought. He calls this formalisation 
process ‘thematisation.’ Heidegger then offers his own contribution to 
this history, arguing that the soil from which logic grows is thoroughly 
historical, that the rules directing thinking are rooted in a shared 
tradition, in the subject’s inescapable ‘being-with-others.’ This move, 
I argue, allows for a powerful point of contact between Heidegger’s 
phenomenology of logic and the sociology of logic. Indeed, SSK 
practitioners also emphasise the rootedness of formal logic in the 
informal rules of a shared tradition. Moreover, they have developed this 
insight to a far greater extent than did Heidegger. Here, the combination 
of SSK with Heidegger allows us to strengthen and expand on — to 
more thoroughly thematise and articulate — Heidegger’s somewhat 
rudimentary considerations. At the same time, I argue that Heidegger 
provides grounds for a non-propositional, naturalistic account of 
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intentionality which can help assuage the worry of SSK practitioners 
that intentionality, as a philosophical concept, conflicts with the 
naturalism of their own research methodology.
Chapter Five shifts focus from the history of formal science to the 
history of natural science, including medicine. In doing so, it builds 
on the argument from the previous chapter that science is a process 
of thematisation in which informal and indeterminate knowledge 
is thematised and articulated in a more formal and determinate way. 
This raises a concern, however, because it suggests that scientists only 
discover what they already know. Both SSK and Heidegger attribute 
a circularity to scientific reasoning. Yet, I argue, this circularity is not 
vicious. Indeed, it was already recognised by the second-century Greek 
physician, Galen of Pergamon, and became a topic of concentrated 
interest for physicians at the University of Padua during the Renaissance. 
These physicians argued that a determinate knowledge of the informal 
rules governing their medical practice could be articulated through 
an incremental process of working with things. The movement from 
informal to formal knowledge is thus an importantly empirical one. 
According to Heidegger, this process was carried over into the early-
modern period, but not without radical transformation. He argues 
that, in this period, the rules guiding empirical thinking and doing 
were ‘mathematicised,’ that is, consolidated as a coherent set of basic 
principles, which Heidegger described as a ‘basic blueprint’ governing 
scientists’ understanding of the thingness (whatness) of things. This 
process of mathematicisation grew from a ‘reciprocal relation’ between 
empirical work with things, on the one hand, and the metaphysical 
projection of the thingness of things, on the other. I thus argue that 
Heidegger offers an account of early-modern science which combines 
both mathematical and empirical elements, comparing his account to 
the respective metaphysical and empiricist accounts of the historians of 
science Alexandre Koyré and Peter Dear. For Heidegger, the emergence 
of early-modern science was neither an exclusively metaphysical nor an 
exclusively empirical event, but instead a radical transformation in the 
reciprocal relation between metaphysics and experience. I argue that 
this was, above all, a transformation in the role played by Aristotelian 
‘final causes’ in early-modern natural philosophy. This challenges the 
historiographic commonplace that final causes were abolished from 
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the new natural philosophy, a claim often supported by pointing 
to the alleged breakdown of the Aristotelian art-nature distinction. 
Extrapolating from Heidegger’s work, I argue that there was no such 
breakdown, and that the art-nature distinction, as well as final causes, 
despite seventeenth-century rhetoric to the contrary, remained central 
to early-modern scientific practice. Indeed, both concepts figure as key 
resources in Heidegger’s mathematical explanation for the emergence 
of early-modern science.
In Chapter Six, I undertake a discussion of the emergence of early-
modern experimental philosophy, especially as exemplified in the work 
of Robert Boyle. I challenge SSK practitioner Steven Shapin’s attempt to 
insulate Boyle from mathematical culture, arguing instead that Boyle 
was a mathematical philosopher in Heidegger’s sense. First, however, 
I review Heidegger’s claim that Newton’s First Law is a formalisation 
of Galileo’s mathematical conception of the thing as being ‘left entirely 
to itself.’ This conception provided the metaphysical blueprint for 
what I dub the Galilean First Thing, and I argue that, for Heidegger, 
the First Thing provided a condition of possibility for the early-modern 
experiment. This metaphysical blueprint emerged through its reciprocal 
relation with empirical experience. Drawing on recent work in the history 
of science, I develop this point through a discussion of late Renaissance 
and early-modern artisanal culture, with an emphasis on the uniform 
manufacture of pure metals. These metallurgical manipulations, I 
suggest, may have encouraged experimenters’ metaphysical conception 
of the thing as a uniform and autonomous First Thing. On this basis, 
I propose that the fundamental aim of the early-modern experiment 
was to release things from environmental interference in order to let 
them be what they, essentially, are — that is, instances of the First 
Thing. This essential image thus operates as the final cause towards 
which physical things are naturally disposed, and towards which 
experimental manipulations seek to artfully direct them. I find support 
for these claims in Shapin and Simon Schaffer’s classic SSK study of 
Boyle, focussing on Boyle’s dispute with Francis Line. I demonstrate that 
Boyle’s response to Line can be explained by attributing to Boyle a tacit 
commitment to the First Thing, as the blueprint or final cause guiding 
his experimental practice. I furthermore locate the difference between 
Boyle and Line in the fact that Boyle was committed to such a blueprint 
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while Line was not, that Boyle experienced nature in terms of a uniform 
model while Line experienced it in a less unified, more heterogeneous 
way. This conclusion lends support to Heidegger’s claim that the early-
modern period saw experience as increasingly consolidated under a 
single ‘world picture.’ I conclude by comparing this claim with Bloor’s 
observation that scientific knowledge is governed by ‘social imagery,’ 
that is, by images of society construed as a whole. On the one hand, 
Bloor’s work suggests ways in which Heidegger’s concepts of ‘world 
picture’ and ‘basic blueprint’ might be rephrased and further developed 
in a more sociological idiom. On the other hand, Heidegger’s claim that 
these concepts apply only to the early-modern period and later suggests 
that Bloor’s concept of ‘social imagery’ may prove useful only within a 
limited historical range.
Chapter Seven does double duty, first, as an unsystematic review 
of key themes from the preceding chapters, and, second, as a roughly 
sketched roadmap for future work. Here, I will discuss only the latter. 
Up to this point, my discussion of Heidegger will have been largely 
restricted to his work from the 1920s and 1930s. During this period, in 
my view, he is centrally concerned with the phenomenology of scientific 
subjectivity. Later, in the late 1940s and the 1950s, his attention shifts to 
more critical meditations on the dangers posed by scientific thinking to 
society in general. Indeed, he argued in the 1950s that modern science 
prepares the way for a comprehensive technologisation of society. I 
begin by reviewing Heidegger’s friendship, from the mid-1930s until 
his death in 1976, with Carl von Weizsäcker, a noted physicist who had 
studied under Werner Heisenberg and Niels Bohr. Von Weizsäcker was 
convinced that Heidegger’s analysis of subjectivity could help him to 
address conceptual problems resulting from the rejection, by the new 
physics, of the orthodox subject-object distinction. However, he also 
believed that Heidegger’s own search for a solution was handicapped by 
Heidegger’s superficial understanding of the new physics. Heidegger 
attributed the technologisation of society to what he called ‘enframing,’ a 
phenomenon which Heidegger felt limited the existential possibilities of 
the subject. Von Weizsäcker affirmed Heidegger’s concept of enframing 
as an outgrowth of modern science, but insisted instead that it offered 
new, potentially liberating possibilities for humankind, especially 
in the form of systems theory, or cybernetics. While von Weizsäcker 
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advocated for deeper engagement with cybernetics, Heidegger 
attempted to reconceptualise the thing in a way which radically 
departed from its conceptualisation by modern science. I argue that 
Heidegger’s considerations may be usefully translated into the terms 
of an interactionist social theory, as commended by SSK pioneer, Barry 
Barnes. Enframing is thus viewed as a social phenomenon, constituted 
in the historically contingent interactions of naturally gregarious 
subjects. On von Weizsäcker’s reading, in contrast, enframing is a system 
which organises autonomous subjects into a social whole. While the 
interactionist emphasises the subject over the system, the cyberneticist 
emphasises the system over the subject. I naturally opt for the former 
method, and conclude the chapter, and the book, by arguing for a 
strong compatibility between Heidegger’s attention to the affectivity of 
the subject, on the one hand, and Barnes’s interactionist attention to the 
internal emotional dynamics of ‘status groups,’ on the other. From this 
perspective, von Weizsäcker’s commitment to enframing evinces his 
membership in a status group whose interpersonal dynamics enforce 
that commitment at an emotional level. A concentrated research focus 
on the emotional dynamics governing scientific status groups flows 
naturally from the arguments advanced throughout this book. The book 
thus sketches a road forward for those intrepid science studies scholars 
keen to produce innovative and exciting new work.
Chapter One  
 
The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, 
Phenomenology, and the Problem of 
the External World
1. Introduction
A leading contributor to the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), 
Harry Collins, invites us to consider the following parable.
A scientist, a philosopher, a sociologist of scientific knowledge and 
a science warrior are aloft in a balloon. The balloon begins to deflate. 
The scientist says: ‘A micro-meteorite might have punctured the 
envelope — do we have any sticky tape?’ The philosopher says: ‘My 
inductive propensities convince me that if the balloon deflates we will 
fall to earth — I must work out the rational basis for this belief.’ The 
sociologist says: ‘I wonder how they’ll reach a consensus about the cause 
of our deaths.’ The science warrior says: ‘Told you so — there is an 
external reality!’1
No prize for guessing the odd person out here. The science warrior’s 
non sequitur seems itself to be strangely disconnected from reality. 
For who among the other passengers challenged the existence of an 
1  Harry M. Collins (1999), ‘The Science Police,’ Social Studies of Science 29(2), 287–94 
(p. 287).
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external world? The answer is: no one. If, however, we instead ask 
who the science warrior believes to have challenged the existence of an 
external world, then we get a different answer. In this case, the culprit is 
the sociologist of scientific knowledge. And yet, the real peculiarity of 
the so-called ‘science wars,’ which erupted in the 1990s, is not so much 
that science warriors accused sociologists of denying the existence of 
an external world. We know, after all, that the first casualty in war 
is truth. The real peculiarity is just how many otherwise reasonable 
scholars imbibed this falsehood and hence felt compelled to also pick 
up the cudgel.
It has been common for philosophers, in particular, to think of SSK 
practitioners as radical sceptics who dismiss the very idea that nature 
has a role to play in the formation of scientific knowledge. The heat of the 
science wars only heightened their passion, and some of them became 
full-fledged warriors themselves. Philip Kitcher, for example, charged 
sociologists of science with a ‘global skepticism,’ because they ‘inscribe 
on their hearts’ the dogma that ‘no system of belief is constrained by 
reason or reality.’ Christopher Norris alleged that members of the 
‘Edinburgh school’ in SSK ‘routinely deny […] the existence of a real-
world (mind- and belief-independent) physical domain.’ John Norton 
claimed that SSK endorses a ‘complete scepticism’ which rejects any 
role for evidence in scientific research.2
Strikingly, the natural scientists among the science warriors were 
more circumspect in their criticism. Indeed, the physicists Alan Sokal 
and Jean Bricmont, who distinguished themselves by their enthusiasm 
to serve repeatedly on the front line, only characterised SSK as 
‘ambiguous in its intent.’ On the one hand, SSK practitioners appear 
to endorse a ‘general’ or ‘radical’ scepticism. On the other hand, they 
claim to be pursuing a genuinely scientific research programme.3 Sokal 
and Bricmont argue that these two positions cannot be held together, 
2  Philip Kitcher (1998), ‘A Plea for Science Studies,’ in A House Built on Sand: Exposing 
the Myths about Science, ed. by Noretta Koertge (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 
pp. 32–56 (pp. 46, 44); Christopher Norris (1997), Against Relativism: Philosophy of 
Science, Deconstruction and Critical Theory (Oxford: Blackwell), p. 314; John D. Norton 
(2000), ‘How We Know about Electrons,’ in After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend, ed. by 
Robert Nola and Howard Sankey (Dordecht: Kluwer), pp. 67–97 (p. 72).
3  Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont (1998), Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ 
Abuse of Science (New York: Picador), pp. 92, 89.
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because a general scepticism about the existence of an external world 
is unscientific: ‘if one wants to contribute to science, be it natural or 
social, one must abandon radical doubts concerning the viability of 
logic or the possibility of knowing the world through observation 
and/or experiment.’4 If SSK practitioners claim only that sociological 
principles must play a role in any causal explanation of scientific beliefs, 
regardless of whether we evaluate those beliefs as true or false, rational 
or irrational, then Sokal and Bricmont write that they would have ‘no 
particular objection.’5 However, if they furthermore insist that only social 
causes may enter into such an explanation, then Sokal and Bricmont say 
they would strenuously disagree.
Fortunately, SSK practitioners have never made anything more than 
the first claim, so the apparent ambiguity in their intent dissolves, and 
Sokal and Bricmont may thus rest content that SSK defends a theory of 
science to which they would, by their own admission, have no particular 
objection. Indeed, Barry Barnes, a co-founder of SSK’s Edinburgh 
School, has more recently written that SSK, ‘[c]ontrary to what at one 
point was widely claimed by commentators and critics indifferent to 
what we had set down in print, […] nowhere denies the existence of an 
external world.’6
Sokal and Bricmont draw a helpful distinction between ‘specific 
scepticism’ and ‘radical scepticism.’7 One may have, they say, legitimate 
doubts about a specific theory, but one should not use general sceptical 
arguments to support those specific doubts. For example, one may 
legitimately doubt a theory of evidence which explains evidential 
force by reference to a mind- and belief-independent world, but one 
should not try to support such doubt with a global scepticism about 
the very existence of that world. This distinction is helpful because it 
exposes the source of difference in the respective reactions to SSK of the 
scientists, Sokal and Bricmont, on the one hand, and the philosophers, 
on the other. SSK casts doubt not on the idea of evidence, as such, but 
instead on specific philosophical theories of evidence which insist that 
4  Sokal and Bricmont (1998), Fashionable Nonsense, p. 189.
5  Sokal and Bricmont (1998), Fashionable Nonsense, p. 90.
6  Barry Barnes (2011), ‘Relativism as a Completion of the Scientific Project,’ in The 
Problem of Relativism in the Sociology of (Scientific) Knowledge, ed. by Richard Schantz 
and Markus Seidel (Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag), pp. 23–39 (p. 26 n. 3).
7  Sokal and Bricmont (1998), Fashionable Nonsense, p. 189.
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evidential force must be explained in exclusively non-naturalistic and/
or non-social terms. Since Sokal and Bricmont, as natural scientists, 
have no vested interest in these particular philosophical theories, 
they can treat naturalistic and sociological explanations of evidence 
as unobjectionable. The philosopher warriors, in contrast, were 
largely trained and continue to work in a tradition deeply invested in 
individualistic and/or transcendental theories of evidence, and so their 
reaction to SSK has understandably been less relaxed. Furthermore, 
these philosophers have apparently had a hard time recognising the 
difference between their own specific theories of evidence and a general 
belief in the existence of an external world. Hence, they have tended 
to mistake a specific scepticism targeted at the former for a global 
scepticism also encompassing the latter.
Returning to Collins’s parable, we see that philosophers are often 
in the business of working out the rational basis for the acceptance of 
belief. Sociologists, in contrast, seek to explain consensus concerning 
the acceptability of belief. These two approaches are closely related, and 
their proximity explains the friction between them. Both philosophers 
and sociologists investigate the reasons for accepting a belief.8 For the 
sociologist, this entails describing the social negotiations through 
which reasons come to be agreed on. For the philosopher, in contrast, 
the focus is on the rational rules determining such agreement. Where 
the sociologist speaks of social negotiations, the philosopher speaks of 
rational rules. It is precisely on the question of how social negotiation 
and rational rules relate to one another that the two sides part company, 
for the sociologist insists that the validity of rules is a matter of social 
8  This point has not always been appreciated. Jim Brown, for example, alleges that 
SSK practitioners refuse to admit reasons into their causal accounts of knowledge, 
writing that, for prominent SSK practitioner David Bloor, ‘reasons simply aren’t 
causes’ (James Robert Brown (2001), Who Rules in Science? An Opinionated Guide 
to the Science Wars (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), p. 151). However, 
Brown also admits that ‘Bloor does not say this in so many words, but it is clearly 
implicit in all that he does’ (p. 150). In fact, Bloor has explicitly affirmed the 
importance of reasons, and called for their sociological analysis (David Bloor (1984), 
‘The Sociology of Reasons: Or Why “Epistemic Factors” Are Really “Social Factors,”’ 
in Scientific Rationality: The Sociological Turn, ed. by James Robert Brown (Dordecht: 
Reidel), pp. 295–324.). Barry Barnes has also written that ‘there is no necessary 
incompatibility between reasons and causes as explanations’ (Barry Barnes (1974), 
Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), p. 
70). The real bone of contention between Brown and SSK is not whether reasons 
can be causes but whether reasons can be analysed in naturalistic and sociological 
terms.
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negotiation, while the philosopher typically insists that it is not. In other 
words, the sociologist endorses, and the philosopher rejects, the view 
that rationality is a necessarily social phenomenon.
In the natural sciences, the reasons grounding a belief include the 
evidence educed in its favour. Empirical data, produced and selected 
using rational methods, may count as evidence in support of that belief. 
The job of the philosopher is to work out the rational basis for a scientific 
belief by demonstrating the rationality of the methods by which the 
evidence for it was educed. Only if those methods are deemed rational 
can one feel confident that the data successfully represents the world 
as it really is. Hence, from the philosopher’s perspective, according 
to which the rational and the social must be strictly separated, the 
sociologist’s attempt to model rational method in sociological terms is 
viewed as an attack on the ability of science to produce authoritative 
representations of the natural world. If scientific methods are stripped 
of their authority, then scientific beliefs will lose their purchase on the 
world. The result will be a global scepticism about the existence of an 
external world — that is, a world existing external to, or independently 
of, the system of beliefs and methods partly constitutive of the scientific 
enterprise. But SSK practitioners are not global sceptics. They do not 
reject science’s authority to successfully represent an external world. 
They instead reinterpret that authority in sociological and naturalistic 
terms. For those philosophers whose confidence in science is heavily 
invested in a non-sociological and/or non-naturalistic conception 
of its methods and results, this reinterpretation is both objectionable 
and antiscientific. Hence, they mistake SSK practitioners’ rejection 
of their specific philosophical conception of scientific authority for 
a more sweeping, global rejection of the authority of science, as such. 
Taking scientific method to be an instrument of theory, David Bloor, 
another co-founder of SSK’s Edinburgh School, writes that ‘[i]t is not 
theories but theorists who generate the evidential force of experimental 
results.’9 Bloor does not reject evidence; he rather advises its sociological 
reinterpretation.
9  David Bloor (2003), ‘Skepticism and the Social Construction of Science and 
Technology: The Case of the Boundary Layer,’ in The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, 
ed. by Steven Luper (Aldershot: Ashgate), pp. 249–65 (p. 262). Together with David 
Edge, Bloor has also argued that something can count as evidence only within an 
agreed on theoretical framework. An account of the social processes through which 
such agreement is reached is thus a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for 
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It is not clear that philosophers’ worries about the allegedly 
antiscientific and objectionable nature of SSK also reflect the worries of 
scientists. Returning to our physicist warriors, Sokal and Bricmont, we 
find that they do not share the philosophers’ need to rationally ground 
the belief in an external world. Indeed, Sokal and Bricmont even declare 
global scepticism ‘irrefutable,’ which implies that the philosophers are, 
from a scientific point of view, wasting their time in attempting such 
a refutation.10 These physicists have no particular interest in justifying 
the authority of science by working out its rational basis, much less in 
ensuring that that rational basis is strictly protected from sociological 
study. They simply take it for granted that science rationally represents 
the world, and they get on with their research. Hence, there is, from their 
point of view, nothing particularly antiscientific, nor, as we saw above, 
otherwise objectionable, about SSK’s move to introduce sociological 
categories into naturalistic explanations of scientific rationality.
As we will see in this chapter, SSK practitioners find themselves 
stuck somewhere between scientists and philosophers on these issues. 
As social scientists, they too are inclined to simply ignore the threat 
of global scepticism, taking for granted that their methods rationally 
represent the world, and so just getting on with their research. On the 
other hand, as social epistemologists, they also show signs of wanting 
to construct a global account of scientific knowledge which reveals 
its ineliminably social elements. The tension between these two goals 
has sometimes created confusion and conflict in SSK’s ranks over the 
question of its relationship to scepticism.
I will not seek in this chapter to further defend SSK against the science 
warriors’ erroneous accusations of global scepticism. I will instead 
take up the more interesting challenge of strengthening SSK’s genuine 
but underdeveloped anti-sceptical orientation. First, I will outline the 
confusions and conflicts among SSK practitioners regarding scepticism; 
I will then identify the root cause of those confusions and conflicts; 
finally, I will suggest a resolution to these difficulties by drawing from 
the existential phenomenology of Martin Heidegger.
any adequate theory of evidence (David Bloor and David Edge (2000), ‘Knowing 
Reality through Society,’ Social Studies of Science 30(1), 158–60 (p. 159)).
10  Sokal and Bricmont (1998), Fashionable Nonsense, p. 189.
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Although SSK practitioners have often represented their research 
as being committed to some form of scepticism, there is no consensus 
among them on what precisely underpins this commitment. Indeed, 
in some cases there is outright disagreement. This is most evident in 
their divergent attitudes towards the challenge presented by external-
world scepticism. One camp defends an explicitly realist position 
regarding the existence of an external world, while the other camp 
shows no interest at all in defending such realism. I will argue that 
this disagreement is largely superficial. My argument turns on the 
idea, taken from Heidegger, that external-world scepticism is an 
epistemological problem which leaves unexamined a number of 
important metaphysical presuppositions. The most important of these 
presuppositions is that our experience of things is best interpreted in 
terms of a fundamental ontological distinction between a ‘subject’ and 
an ‘object.’ On this interpretation, the subject experiences itself as a 
discrete, cognising agent seeking access to the world experienced as 
an external object. The question of how such access may be achieved 
is often referred to as the ‘problem of knowledge,’ a core concern 
of orthodox epistemology. Crucially, the legitimacy of this problem 
presupposes the validity of the subject-object distinction. As we will 
see, a commitment to this distinction, and hence to the intelligibility of 
the question of access, is the engine driving external-world scepticism. 
In treating external-world scepticism as a legitimate threat, to which 
a response must be made, SSK practitioners of all stripes demonstrate 
their shared ontological commitment to the subject-object distinction. 
As a consequence, they are at perpetual risk of attack by the external-
world sceptic. Their internal dispute over how to properly respond to 
the sceptic is a symptom of their residual adherence to an orthodox 
model of subjectivity, a model which asserts the fundamental 
separation of subject and object, mind and world.
After thus diagnosing the shared conceptual ailment of SSK 
practitioners, I will turn to the work of Martin Heidegger for a suitable 
treatment. In response to external-world scepticism, Heidegger launched 
a phenomenological inquiry into the basic ways in which a cognising 
subject experiences its relation to the world. He conceptualised this 
experience in existential terms as an experience of ‘being-in-the-world.’ 
On Heidegger’s account, the most basic form of being-in-the-world 
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is an experience of immersed involvement in a world of work.11 The 
epistemological problem of how the subject gains access to an external 
world is neutralised once one recognises that subject and world were 
never separated in the first place. The chapter will conclude with the 
suggestion that, by adopting Heidegger’s existential phenomenology, 
SSK practitioners can overcome the conflicts and confusions which 
have, until now, rendered their position vulnerable to sceptical attack.
2. Scepticism and SSK
Central figures in SSK have clearly emphasised the importance of 
scepticism for their work. Reflecting on the issue in his 1974 book, 
Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory, Barry Barnes writes that ‘the 
epistemological message of the work […] is sceptical.’ Harry Collins 
has likewise applied ‘philosophical scepticism’ explicitly in his own 
research, and Steven Shapin has declared pointedly that ‘SSK is […] 
a form of scepticism.’12 Yet, although Barnes, Collins, and Shapin have 
made striking use of sceptical techniques in their work, they have 
not offered any substantial reflections on scepticism as a method of 
sociological analysis. David Bloor has proven more forthcoming. His 
pioneering work in the methodology of SSK explicitly discusses and 
extensively builds on sceptical techniques. Given these credentials, it 
is noteworthy that Bloor offers a somewhat more guarded assessment 
11  The word ‘involvement’ is a standard, if imperfect, translation for Heidegger’s word 
Bewandtnis. In fact, one may argue that no single English word adequately translates 
Bewandtnis. Nevertheless, for present purposes, ‘involvement’ sufficiently captures 
the relevant meaning. Note, however, that Bewandtnis also carries a connotation 
of ‘directedness,’ which will prove central in later discussions. In Chapter Four, 
for example, I will translate Bewandtnis as ‘assignedness.’ In Chapter Five, I will 
introduce a highly specific, philosophically charged translation of Bewandtnis as 
‘end-directedness.’
12  Barnes (1974), Scientific Knowledge, p. 154; Harry M. Collins (1992), Changing Order: 
Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 
p. 3; Shapin (1995), ‘Here and Everywhere: Sociology of Scientific Knowledge,’ 
Annual Review of Sociology 21, 289–321 (p. 314). Benoît Godin and Yves Gingras reveal 
the striking parallels between Collins’s position and the scepticism of Montaigne 
and Sextus Empiricus, a comparison which Collins describes as ‘delicious’ (Benoît 
Godin and Yves Gingras (2002), ‘The Experimenter’s Regress: From Skepticism to 
Argumentation,’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 33(1), 133–48; Harry M. 
Collins (2002), ‘The Experimenter’s Regress as Philosophical Sociology,’ Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Science 33(1), 153–60 (p. 153)).
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of SSK’s relation to scepticism than do Barnes, Collins, and Shapin. 
Rather than identifying SSK as a form of scepticism, Bloor draws a clear 
line between the two while at the same time stressing their productive 
interaction.
Scepticism will always find the sociology of knowledge useful and 
vice versa. But there are profound differences between the two 
attitudes. Sceptics will try to use the explanation of a belief to establish 
its falsehood. […] The conclusion will be a self-defeating nihilism or 
inconsistent special pleading. It is only an epistemological complacency, 
which allows us to feel that we can explain without destroying, that can 
provide a secure basis for the sociology of knowledge.13
Bloor rejects an identification of SSK with scepticism because SSK 
seeks to explain scientific knowledge whereas scepticism is, in his view, 
corrosive of all such explanatory attempts. According to Bloor, if SSK 
were itself a form of scepticism, then it would end up undermining its 
own explanatory project.
There appears, then, to be a significant disagreement between Barnes, 
Collins, and Shapin, on the one hand, and Bloor, on the other, over 
SSK’s relation to scepticism. However, this apparent disagreement may 
be resolved by introducing a distinction between ‘radical scepticism,’ 
on the one hand, and ‘mitigated scepticism,’ on the other.14 Radical 
scepticism is as Bloor describes it: a persistent acid of relentless doubt 
which dissolves any and all claims to knowledge. It endeavours to push 
us into a state of complete disbelief, leaving us without any signposts 
by which to take our bearings in the world. Mitigated scepticism, on 
the other hand, attempts to absorb the full impact of sceptical doubt 
without having to thereby relinquish all claims to knowledge. It relies 
on a distinction between knowledge in an absolutist and a relativist 
sense. Mitigated sceptics agree with radical sceptics that knowledge 
in the first sense is impossible, but they also argue that knowledge 
in the second sense is both possible and defensible. Hence, mitigated 
scepticism is not corrosive of belief in general; rather, it isolates and 
rejects the specific belief that knowledge, as such, must necessarily rest 
13  David Bloor (1991 [1976]), Knowledge and Social Imagery, 2nd edn (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press), p. 82.
14  I have taken the term ‘mitigated scepticism’ from Richard H. Popkin (1979), The 
History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkley: University of California Press).
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on an absolute foundation, that is, a foundation which transcends any 
and every contingent social and historical circumstance.
Thus, when Bloor proposes that we exercise ‘epistemological 
complacency’ in the face of the sceptic’s challenge, he is specifically 
concerned with radical scepticism. What Bloor proposes is not so 
much a direct defence against the sceptic as it is a strategy whereby the 
sceptic is simply ignored. He appears to hold that certain of our beliefs 
must be taken for granted, regardless of whether or not we can ground 
those beliefs in a way which satisfies the sceptic. Here Bloor seems to 
agree with Ludwig Wittgenstein, who observed that, when it comes to 
following the rules which guide thinking, just because a rule may lack a 
rational ground, this does not necessarily mean that we have no right to 
follow it.15 In such cases, writes Wittgenstein, we follow the rule blindly. 
The philosopher Paul Boghossian describes this as a ‘blind entitlement’ 
to follow a rule or to assert a belief.16 For example, as we shall see in the 
next section, Bloor claims that we are blindly entitled to assert a belief 
in the existence of the external world, and so scepticism regarding this 
belief should be met with a deliberate complacency.
When Barnes, Collins, and Shapin, on the other hand, urge that SSK 
be understood as a form of scepticism, they are specifically concerned 
with mitigated scepticism. According to them, SSK is sceptical because 
it rejects an understanding of knowledge in terms of absolute truth. 
This does not mean that knowledge becomes impossible, but only that it 
can never be rendered certain in an absolutist sense. For Barnes, Collins, 
and Shapin, SSK can be sceptical and yet still affirm the possibility of 
knowledge by accepting a more modest, or mitigated, conception of 
truth and validity.
The apparent disagreement between Barnes, Collins, and Shapin, 
on the one hand, and Bloor, on the other, thus turns out to be largely 
superficial. In their respective assessments of the relationship between 
SSK and scepticism, each side has a different brand of scepticism in 
15  Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958), Philosophical Investigations, 3rd edn, trans. by G. E. M. 
Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), §219.
16  Paul A. Boghossian (2006), Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press), p. 99. Bloor has deflected Boghossian’s attempt to 
use blind entitlement against the sociology of knowledge (David Bloor (2007), 
‘Epistemic Grace: Antirelativism as Theology in Disguise,’ Common Knowledge 
13(2–3), 250–80 (pp. 259–61)).
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mind. In fact, both sides endorse a mitigated scepticism which stands 
opposed to an attitude characteristic of those whom Bloor calls ‘believers.’ 
Believers, he writes, ‘conflate the common currency of talk about the 
true and the good with specific theories of the real and ultimate nature 
of the True and the Good.’17 In other words, believers reach beyond the 
realm of everyday experience in order to make absolutist claims about 
the nature of knowledge and reality. For this reason, they might also be 
described as fundamentalists, or dogmatists.18 The benefit of scepticism 
for SSK has been its role in revealing the dogmatism at the heart of 
epistemic absolutism. SSK accepts the general sceptical claim that 
absolute knowledge is impossible, but rejects the radical sceptic’s more 
thoroughgoing conclusion that knowledge, as such, is impossible. As 
Bloor remarks in the passage cited earlier, the radical sceptic’s conclusion 
amounts to a self-defeating nihilism or an inconsistent special pleading. 
Indeed, it would seem that the radical sceptic helps herself to the very 
absolutism she is bent on destroying. It turns out, then, that to reject 
epistemic absolutism is also to reject a fundamental premise motivating 
the radical sceptic’s own position. This is precisely what SSK does. The 
result is a mitigated sceptical position which endorses a non-absolutist 
theory of knowledge.
3. SSK and External-World Realism
SSK’s rejection of radical scepticism is perhaps most evident in SSK 
practitioners’ affirmation of the existence of an external world. In fact, 
they appear almost unified in asserting that a belief in the existence 
of an external world is a necessary condition for social life.19 Shapin 
writes that such a presumption is ‘common sense,’ and ‘a precondition 
for communication.’ Barnes, Bloor, and John Henry claim that ‘people 
everywhere’ make reference to an external world, and that their 
mastery of ‘the realist mode of speaking’ serves them with ‘marvellous 
17  David Bloor (1998), ‘A Civil Scepticism,’ Social Studies of Science 28(4), 655–65 (p. 
657).
18  Cf. Barry Barnes and David Bloor (1982), ‘Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology 
of Knowledge,’ in Rationality and Relativism, ed. by Martin Hollis and Steve Lukes 
(Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 21–47 (p. 46).
19  As we shall see, Harry Collins is an exception warranting the qualified phrase 
‘almost unified.’
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efficiency.’ They recommend that such realism be accepted as the 
standard for the sociology of knowledge. Bloor, for his part, asserts 
that ‘we are all instinctive realists,’ and that socialisation would be 
impossible in the absence of an external world. Barnes claims that ‘we 
are obliged to presuppose an external world in order to act and interact.’20 
It seems clear, then, that SSK is strongly committed to the minimal 
realist doctrine that an external world exists independently of our 
interpretations and practices. This is made all the more evident in SSK 
practitioners’ consistent efforts to defend themselves against charges of 
idealism. Indeed, Barnes, Bloor, and Henry even reserve the final lines 
of their book-length introduction to SSK for a repudiation of the claim 
that theirs is ‘an idealist sociological account which denies the existence 
of an external world,’ and they spend considerable time elsewhere in 
the book divorcing themselves from the ‘methodological idealism’ of 
the allegedly renegade SSK practitioner, Harry Collins. In addition, 
Bloor has offered his own lengthy defence of SSK against the charge of 
idealism.21
The locus classicus for SSK’s position on realism is Barnes’s 1992 paper, 
‘Realism, Relativism and Finitism.’ Here, Barnes too is motivated by the 
need to secure SSK’s realist credentials against charges of idealism. He 
begins by arguing that sociological relativists have been typically, but 
unjustifiably, lumped together with idealists because orthodox realists 
commonly exaggerate the minimum criteria which one must meet in 
order to be counted a legitimate realist. Not only do orthodox realists 
require that an external world exist independently of our interpretations 
and practices, they also claim that we can know specific features of that 
world independently of those interpretations and practices.22 Barnes 
20  Steven Shapin (1994), A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-
Century England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 29, 30; Barry Barnes, 
David Bloor and John Henry (1996), Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis 
(London: Athlone), pp. 88, 205 n. 3; David Bloor (1996), ‘Idealism and the Sociology 
of Knowledge,’ Social Studies of Science 26(4), 839–56 (p. 845); Barry Barnes 
(1992a), ‘Relativism, Realism and Finitism,’ in Cognitive Realism and Social Science, 
ed. by Diederick Raven, Lietke van Vucht and Jan de Wolf (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction), pp. 131–47 (p. 139).
21  Barnes, Bloor and Henry (1996), Scientific Knowledge, pp. 202, 13–15, 75–76; Bloor 
(1996), ‘Idealism and the Sociology of Knowledge,’ passim.
22  Stathis Psillos argues that this second claim is ‘a basic philosophical presupposition 
of scientific realism’ (Stathis Psillos (1999), Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks 
the Truth (London: Routledge), p. xix). Ian Hacking disparages this claim with the 
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argues that this ambitious claim, quite apart from its plausibility, is 
simply unnecessary if all one wishes to do is affirm the existence, as 
such, of the external world. And this is all Barnes’s relativistic realist 
wishes to do. The result is a minimal form of realism which recognises 
the independent existence of the external world while also declining 
to attribute any independent, or inherent, properties to that world.23 
Although it is less ambitious than the more robust position of many 
scientific realists, Barnes’s modest, or, as he calls it, ‘residual,’ realism 
appears nonetheless sufficient to deflect the charge of idealism.
Problems arise, however, when Barnes attempts to justify this 
position. Under the heading ‘Justifications for a Residual Realism,’ he 
writes that ‘[t]here is nothing empty in the assertion that an external 
independent reality exists, underlying appearances. It is an assertion 
which does real work in a variety of contexts both in science and in 
philosophy.’24 Note Barnes’s endorsement, in this passage, of the ancient 
distinction between appearance and reality, a distinction which has 
played a central role in historical debates between idealists and realists. 
The idealist typically claims that appearances are the only things we 
can know exist, while the realist claims that we can also know that an 
external world exists and that it underlies appearances. Yet, note too 
that Barnes does not actually argue for the existence of the external 
world, but only for the utility of the assertion that such a world exists: 
asserting the existence of an external world has proven an effective 
strategy in diverse scientific and philosophical contexts. This agrees 
with Barnes, Bloor, and Henry’s statement, cited above, that people 
everywhere use the realist mode of speaking with marvellous efficiency. 
Barnes makes this point forcefully with respect to explanations for 
changes in knowledge, arguing that ‘primitive causal inputs from an 
external reality may operate on us so that we change our knowledge.’ 
deliberately unpleasant name ‘inherent-structurism’ (Ian Hacking (1999), The Social 
Construction of What? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), p. 83).
23  For this reason, Shapin would seem wrong to ascribe a ‘robust realism’ to SSK 
in general (Steven Shapin (1995), ‘Here and Everywhere: Sociology of Scientific 
Knowledge,’ Annual Review of Sociology 21, 289–321 (p. 315)). He furthermore 
appears to endorse the second, stronger, claim of the orthodox realist when he 
writes that ‘the external world […] has a determinate structure’ (Steven Shapin 
(1994), A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press), p. 4).
24  Barnes (1992a), ‘Relativism, Realism, and Finitism,’ p. 137.
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The external world is the source of primitive, ‘unverbalized’ causes for 
‘dissatisfaction’ with existing knowledge, and hence provides ‘incentives’ 
for changing that knowledge. Barnes favourably contrasts this position 
with idealism, which he argues cannot plausibly explain changes in 
knowledge. Specifically, he claims that idealists, because they eschew 
the concept of the external world, are unable to rationalise a ‘sense of 
failure.’25 The point seems to be that idealists have no way of explaining 
how one becomes dissatisfied with the state of one’s knowledge and 
hence no way of explaining how one becomes motivated to change that 
knowledge. Leaving aside the question of whether or not Barnes has 
offered a fair description of the idealist’s position, it should be clear 
that this is not an argument for the existence of the external world, but 
only for the efficaciousness of realist talk about the external world 
as compared with idealist strategies allegedly forbidding such talk. 
Hence, it is commensurate with Barnes’s position that the distinctions 
between realism and idealism, and between reality and appearance, 
are distinctions made within the realm of discourse, and that, as such, 
they can tell us nothing about the discourse-independent existence 
of the external world. Barnes thus fails to provide a justification for 
external-world realism which accords with the realist’s own minimal 
ontological commitments. In fact, he even concludes his discussion 
with an admission of this failure, thus leaving the issue unresolved.26 
As a result, Barnes leaves the door open for a sceptical construal of his 
position as a form of linguistic idealism.
Yet perhaps this need not trouble the SSK practitioner. Although 
Barnes has not successfully answered the sceptic’s challenge to 
25  Barnes (1992a), ‘Relativism, Realism, and Finitism,’ pp. 137–38.
26  Barnes (1992a), ‘Relativism, Realism, and Finitism, p. 139. Note that, some years 
earlier, Barnes had written: ‘I am not a realist, but an instrumentalist and a relativist’ 
(Barry Barnes (1981), ‘On the “Hows” and “Whys” of Cultural Change (Response 
to Woolgar),’ Social Studies of Science 11(4), 481–98 (p. 493)). Yet, even back then, he 
enthusiastically endorsed ‘a realist mode of speech’ as ‘a marvellous instrument’ 
(Barnes (1981), ‘On the “Hows” and “Whys,”’ p. 493). In these earlier passages, 
Barnes seems to want to distance himself from the robust realism characteristic of 
scientific realists. Only later did he develop a more nuanced perspective, introducing 
the relativistic, or ‘residual,’ form of realism which is my primary interest here, and 
which I will discuss more thoroughly in Chapter Two. More on the topic of SSK and 
realism can be found in Jeff Kochan (2008), ‘Realism, Reliabilism, and the “Strong 
Programme” in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge,’ International Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science 22(1), 21–38.
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external-world realism, it may be that the failure lies not so much with 
his attempted justification as with the fact that he had even attempted 
to provide one. A more effective response to the sceptic may be found in 
Bloor’s epistemological complacency. As cited above, Bloor holds that 
‘we are all instinctive realists,’ Barnes that ‘we are obliged to presuppose 
an external world in order to act and interact,’ and Shapin that external-
world realism is ‘a precondition for communication.’ If it were true that 
external-world realism is a matter of instinct or obligation, a necessary 
condition for social existence, then one might well wonder if radical 
scepticism about the external world is really worth the candle. Barnes, 
Bloor, and Henry make clear that their external-world realism is of a 
‘naive’ sort, that it is, above all, a ‘common-sense’ kind of realism.27 If 
this were indeed the case, then deliberate complacency with respect to 
the sceptic’s challenge would surely be the most reasonable strategy. 
This is, however, far from the case.
External-world realism is neither as naive, nor as commonsensical, 
as it may at first seem. Not only does it take for granted the ancient 
distinction between appearance and reality, it also presupposes a 
particular model of the subject. Consider the sentence with which the 
philosopher Thomas Nagel begins his discussion of external-world 
scepticism: ‘If you think about it, the inside of your mind is the only thing 
you can be sure of.’28 As Nagel goes on to show, from this starting point 
the problem of justifying the existence of an external world naturally 
flows. For if the only thing that self-evidently exists is the inside of one’s 
own mind, then it must follow, not only that there is likely to be an 
outside with respect to one’s mind, but that the existence of this outside 
is not itself self-evident but in need of proof. The question of whether 
or not such a proof can be given forms the nucleus of external-world 
scepticism. These distinctions between mind and world, between an 
inside and an outside to one’s own consciousness, between appearance 
and reality, between subject and object, together form a bundle of closely 
related and mutually supportive conceptual demarcations which are 
deeply rooted in the modern intellectual tradition. We thus seem to 
have at hand an explanation for the strange and apparently widespread 
27  Barnes, Bloor and Henry (1996), Scientific Knowledge, pp. 88, 205 n. 3.
28  Thomas Nagel (1987), What Does It All Mean? A Very Short Introduction to Philosophy 
(New York: Oxford University Press), p. 8.
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tendency, at least among academically trained scholars, to conceive of 
the physical world as a specifically external world. This tendency seems 
to be motivated, in significant part, by the prior, tacit interpretation of 
our own subjectivity as constituting an internal world, a world of the 
mind. The notion of an external world, a world out there, and the notion 
of an inside to our mind, a world in here, are thus as inextricably bound 
together as, say, the inside and outside of a glass bulb. On this model, 
the mind — as the seat of our experience — is like the interior of a sealed 
bulb, an autonomous substance existing in isolation from the bulb’s 
exterior. The external-world sceptic accepts and exploits the glass-bulb 
model, challenging the credibility of modern epistemologies which 
claim that the interior of the bulb can access the exterior, that the mind, 
whether individual or collective, can penetrate the barrier separating it 
from the external world so as to achieve knowledge of that world. If this 
diagnostic model is correct, then it would seem that the struggle to meet 
the challenge of the external-world sceptic was lost even before it began. 
For if all one can be certain of is the ‘inside’ of one’s own mind, and if 
the world is construed as being both external to and independent of that 
mind, then one will never succeed in proving beyond doubt that such 
a world exists. Indeed, Barnes has also endorsed what he calls ‘external 
realism,’ the position that our knowledge is of ‘something out there,’ but 
he also admits that this position ‘cannot be justified.’29
Yet, following Bloor’s strategy of epistemological complacency, 
if the intellectual conventions represented by the glass-bulb model 
were found to be wholly commonsensical, if not entirely naive, then 
the external-world realist may still claim a blind entitlement to these 
conventions even in the absence of rational justification. In other words, 
if we felt obliged to accept the glass-bulb model, if we felt ourselves 
under a powerful compulsion to adopt this model as a precondition for 
communication, if such acceptance were a matter of primitive instinct 
rather than of conscious deliberation, then we may well be justified 
in responding to the sceptic’s challenge with nothing more than a 
complacent wave of the hand.
29  Barry Barnes (2004), ‘On Social Constructivist Accounts of the Natural Sciences,’ in 
Knowledge and the World: Challenges beyond the Science Wars, ed. by Martin Carrier, 
Johannes Roggenhofer, Günter Küppers and Philippe Blanchard (Berlin: Springer), 
pp. 105–36 (pp. 111, 119; emphasis added).
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However, the glass-bulb model represents just one, albeit 
powerful, thread in the modern intellectual tradition. Well-established 
and increasingly influential alternatives to this model exist in the 
comparatively recent movements of American pragmatism and 
European phenomenology. What is more, these alternatives have 
already begun to earn a respected place within the broader field of 
science studies. As a consequence, science studies scholars can no 
longer take external-world realism for granted as a self-evidently valid 
position, nor can they reasonably respond to the sceptical challenge 
to this position with complacency. As a consequence, SSK is neither 
rationally justified in nor blindly entitled to maintain its commitment 
to external-world realism.
4. Phenomenology and the ‘Natural Attitude’
In the remainder of this chapter, and, indeed, in all subsequent chapters, 
I will explore the benefits of combining SSK with the existential 
phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. My aim in this chapter is to 
demonstrate that Heidegger’s early analysis of subjectivity can provide 
SSK with an effective response to the challenge posed by the external-
world sceptic.
SSK is certainly no stranger to the methods of phenomenology. 
Indeed, several SSK practitioners have made significant use of the 
phenomenological concept of ‘natural attitude,’ that is, the idea that 
our conscious beliefs always presuppose a more fundamental, tacitly 
held attitude which must already be in place before we can even 
begin to make sense of our experiences, much less communicate those 
experiences to others. So, for example, within the context of scientific 
practice, Barnes, Bloor, and Henry describe the claim that an experiment 
proved a theory because the theory is true as ‘a very natural attitude to 
adopt. […] Indeed, it is the natural attitude.’30 Yet, as they point out, the 
reasoning behind such an attitude is clearly invalid. The truth of the 
theory is explained by the success of the experiment, and the success 
of the experiment is explained by the truth of the theory. This kind of 
reasoning is most common with very well-established scientific theories, 
30  Barnes, Bloor and Henry (1996), Scientific Knowledge, p. 30.
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for example, electron theory. Barnes, Bloor, and Henry emphasise that 
it is wholly natural to explain the success of Robert Millikan’s famous 
oil-drop experiment, which first measured the electron charge in the 
early 1910s, by reference to the truth of electron theory. Yet, Millikan’s 
experiment is also accepted as an important confirmation of that theory. 
It turns out, then, that the natural attitude with respect to electron theory 
is not logically valid. However, this observation is not meant to discredit 
our belief in the truth of electron theory. On the contrary, it is consistent 
with this attitude that we are, under ordinary circumstances, blindly 
entitled to such a belief even if we cannot logically justify it. In other 
words, under such circumstances we have a right to be epistemically 
complacent about the truth of electron theory.
However, Barnes, Bloor, and Henry argue that the sociologist of 
knowledge is not working under ordinary circumstances, and hence 
she should not take the natural attitude for granted. As opposed 
to the physicist, who immerses herself in the practice of science, the 
sociologist’s goal is to stand back from such practice in order to analyse 
how and why it works. Rather than adopting a natural complacency 
with respect to the truth of well-established theories, the SSK practitioner 
will instead thematise this complacency in an attempt to illuminate the 
important role it plays in the smooth operation of physical science. In 
the terminology of the phenomenologist, Barnes, Bloor, and Henry 
are recommending that the sociologist ‘bracket’ the scientist’s natural 
attitude, that is, deliberately disengage from it, in order to more 
effectively analyse its structure. They suggest that it be turned from a 
resource into a topic for analysis.
SSK practitioners have also employed the phenomenological notion 
of natural attitude in the context of knowledge about the external world. 
Shapin, for example, declares that external-world realism is a direct 
consequence of the natural attitude.31 However, rather than bracketing 
this attitude in order to illuminate its structure and the role it plays 
in social life, he simply takes it for granted, treating it as if it were a 
universal and inescapable fact of human experience. As a result, Shapin 
leaves unaddressed the sceptical threat to SSK’s affirmation of external-
world realism, as well as the ontological distinction between subject 
and object which gives rise to that threat. Collins likewise characterises 
31  Shapin (1994), A Social History of Truth, pp. 28–31.
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the natural attitude as an attitude ‘taken to the external world in the 
normal way of things.’ However, he rejects this attitude, using instead 
a ‘philosophical scepticism’ designed to initiate the methodological 
‘derailment of the mind from the tracks of common sense.’32 In other 
words, unlike Shapin, Collins adopts a form of external-world scepticism. 
Yet, as a consequence, he nevertheless joins Shapin in tacitly reaffirming 
the bundle of distinctions which are represented and reinforced by the 
glass-bulb model. This has led to some confusion on the part of both 
Collins and his critics. Most importantly, Collins fails to distinguish 
sufficiently between external-world realism and realism as such. Thus, in 
recommending the suspension of belief in the external world, he in fact 
ends up going much further, arguing that ‘all description-type language 
should be treated at the outset as though it did not describe anything 
real.’ What Collins means, of course, is that language should not be taken 
to describe anything outside the social world. Indeed, he also writes that 
‘[i]t is in the social world that the social scientist […] should find reality 
persuasively located.’33 He calls this the natural attitude of the social 
scientist, and contrasts it with the natural attitude of the physical scientist, 
wherein the existence of a reality external to the social world is affirmed. 
Collins thus applies the term ‘reality’ in two quite distinct ways without 
always signalling this difference to his readers. In the context of the social 
sciences, the term refers to the interior of the intersubjective, social world. 
In the context of the natural sciences, the term refers beyond the social 
world to an external natural world. These applications of the term are 
consistent with idealism and realism respectively, and in both cases the 
glass-bulb model of subjectivity is taken for granted.
We are now in a position to shed further light on the long-standing 
dispute between Collins, on the one hand, and Barnes, Bloor, and Henry, 
on the other. As mentioned in the previous section, Barnes, Bloor, and 
Henry take Collins to task for eschewing external-world realism and 
espousing a form of idealism instead. Yet, as we have now seen, both 
sides are equally wedded to the glass-bulb model. This model is taken 
for granted by both, and it silently informs their respective arguments. 
It thus figures as a central background assumption, a key element in 
the natural attitude governing their respective positions. By failing 
32  Harry M. Collins (1982), ‘Special Relativism — The Natural Attitude,’ Social Studies 
of Science 12(1), 139–43 (p. 140); Collins (1992), Changing Order, p. 1.
33  Collins (1992), Changing Order, p. 174; Collins (1982), ‘Special Relativism,’ p. 141.
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to recognise that they hold this attitude in common, each side has 
misunderstood the nature and depth of its disagreement with the other. 
This is evident in the fact that Barnes’s justification for external-world 
realism is largely consistent with the natural attitude Collins endorses 
on behalf of the social scientist. Collins argues that, for the social scientist, 
the term ‘reality’ takes its meaning from the social world. Similarly, 
Barnes justifies the social scientist’s use of realist talk on the basis of 
the manifest utility of such talk in various scientific and philosophical 
contexts. There is, it seems, no substantial difference between these 
two positions. On the other hand, there does appear to be an important 
disagreement between the two sides with respect to the question of how 
seriously one should take external-world scepticism. Collins does take 
it seriously, and is thus willing to give up the idea of a world existing 
independently of our interpretations and practices. Barnes, Bloor, and 
Henry, in contrast, choose not to treat external-world scepticism as a 
serious threat, and Bloor advises that it be met with complacency. I have 
suggested that complacency does not provide an effective response to the 
external-world sceptic. Indeed, as Collins’s own work shows, a clearly 
articulated commitment to external-world realism appears incidental to 
the production of successful SSK research. Nevertheless, Barnes, Bloor, 
and Henry strongly insist on rejecting the sociological idealism implied 
by Collins’s method. In their desire to distance themselves from the taint 
of idealism, Barnes, Bloor, and Henry reaffirm external-world realism 
even in the absence of appropriate justification, relying instead on an 
ultimately unconvincing strategy of epistemological complacency.
Both sides of this dispute see no alternative between external-world 
realism, on the one hand, and sociological idealism, on the other. The 
narrowness of their vision is conditioned by their tacit adherence to a 
contingent bundle of conceptual distinctions represented by the glass-
bulb model. This model is itself a central element in the natural attitude 
characteristic of these SSK practitioners, and, as such, the cause of 
some of their more persistent conceptual difficulties. I suggest that 
these difficulties may be solved by bracketing the glass-bulb model, 
by declining to take it for granted, and thus disengaging from it in 
order to better understand its role in modern theoretical practice. With 
this goal in mind, I now turn to the early phenomenological work of 
Martin Heidegger.
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5. The Phenomenology of Subjectivity in 
Heidegger’s Being and Time
So far, this chapter has largely focussed on a specific problem of 
knowledge, namely, the problem of how one can know that the external 
world exists. The concern has thus been an epistemological one. Yet, 
as we have also seen, in asking this epistemological question, certain 
ontological assumptions are also implicated. In particular, in asking 
‘How is knowledge of an external world possible?’ the existence of 
a knower is being tacitly asserted. Furthermore, as long as the focus 
of enquiry lies solely on the epistemological question, ontological 
questions about the nature or ‘being’ of this knower — about the 
fundamental subjectivity of the subject — remain unasked. Under such 
circumstances, the enquiry both relies on and persistently reaffirms a 
prior, tacit understanding of the ontological structure of the subject. I 
have introduced the glass-bulb model in order to make this structure 
more explicit.
In his 1927 book, Being and Time, Martin Heidegger holds the 
orthodox model of the subject up to scrutiny, and seeks to explain it 
in terms of a more fundamental phenomenological model. The chief 
obstacle for such an alternative model is the self-evident character 
of the received view. Heidegger argues that, as long as the orthodox 
model is taken for granted, the fundamental ‘phenomenal content’ 
[phänomenale Bestand] of the subject — our basic experience of our own 
subjectivity — remains hidden. In this section, we will review some 
key aspects of Heidegger’s account of this phenomenal content, and in 
the next section we will consider the ways in which he brings these to 
bear on the challenge posed by external-world scepticism.34
Heidegger attempts to loosen up intuitions about the self-evidence 
of the orthodox model of the subject by tracing its early-modern 
34  Martin Heidegger (1962a [1927]), Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and 
Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell), p. 72 [46]. (Following scholarly convention, 
page numbers in square brackets refer to the original 1927 German edition of 
Being and Time.) The German word Bestand is a nominalisation of the verb bestehen, 
which can mean ‘to exist,’ ‘to persist,’ or ‘to consist in.’ It lacks the connotation of 
‘being contained within something’ characteristic of the English word ‘content.’ In 
Heidegger’s view, the subject is not a receptacle containing cognitive content; it is a 
self-aware, cognitively structured form of existence.
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instantiation back to early sources in ancient philosophy and late 
Renaissance Christian theology.35 In the former case, ancient Greek 
philosophers, most notably Aristotle, defined the subject as zōon logon 
echon, later interpreted to mean ‘animal rationale,’ that is, a living thing 
capable of reason. The first difficulty Heidegger notes is that the subject 
is here construed as a thing, a substance of some kind. The second is 
that this substance-subject is then endowed with a power of reason the 
nature of which is left no less obscure than the ontological structure of the 
compound entity taken as a whole. In the case of Renaissance theology, 
the ancient Greek definition becomes entangled with the Old Testament 
doctrine that human beings were created in the image of God, and the 
later Christian doctrine that human beings possess exceptional powers 
enabling them to transcend the physical realm. Here, Heidegger quotes 
two sixteenth-century claims: Johannes Calvin’s claim that, in virtue of 
such faculties as reason, the human may ‘ascend beyond [earthly life], 
even unto God and eternal felicity,’ and Huldrych Zwingli’s assertion 
that the human being is ‘born somewhat closer to God, is something 
more after his stamp.’36 Heidegger argues that these historical influences 
provide the departure point for early-modern interpretations of 
subjectivity. Although the modern notion of transcendence seems to 
have now lost its theological connotations, the assumption that humans 
may somehow reach beyond their finite incarnation as earthly things 
remains an enduring, if often implicit, theme up to the present day.
Heidegger thus locates in the prevailing attitude towards knowledge 
a self-evident description of the subject as a created thing, or creature. 
This creature possesses a superior power of reason which distinguishes 
it from other created things and allows it to transcend the finite 
conditions of its material existence. Heidegger argues that the dominant 
focus has been on the structure of this creature’s essential relation to 
reason, as well as with the transcendent nature of this relation, while 
35  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, pp. 74–75 [48–49].
36  Quoted in Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 74–75 [49]. The sources are 
Johannes Calvin’s Institutio I, XV, Section 8, first printed in 1536, and Huldrych 
Zwingli’s Von der Klarheit des Wortes Gottes (Deutsche Schriften I, 56), first printed 
in 1522. Heidegger’s biblical reference is to Genesis 1:26. The English translations 
appear in the corresponding endnotes, Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 490, 
notes vii and ix.
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the creature’s existential status as a thing has been taken for granted.37 
His phenomenological move is to bracket this existential status and so 
submit the phenomenal content of the subject to systematic investigation.
Underpinning Heidegger’s analysis is a distinction between 
existence and essence. He argues that the essence of the subject lies in its 
existence, that existence takes priority over essence.38 He furthermore 
reserves the term ‘existence’ specifically for subjects, and introduces 
the term ‘presence-at-hand’ (Vorhandenheit) to designate the existence 
of everything else. This latter distinction is grounded, in significant 
part, in two naturally occurring grammatical distinctions: first, subjects 
are referred to as ‘who,’ while everything else is referred to as ‘what’; 
second, only in addressing these subjects does one use a personal 
pronoun (‘I am,’ ‘you are,’ ‘we are,’ etc.).39 The subject is thus a person, 
while all other entities are things. Heidegger uses the commonplace 
German term ‘Dasein’ as a general label for the person-subject. He 
emphasises that Dasein is not a thing, substance, or object; it is an 
accumulation of end-directed, or intentional, actions: ‘The person is no 
Thinglike and substantial Being. […] Essentially the person exists only 
in the performance of intentional acts, and is therefore essentially not an 
object.’40 In undertaking a phenomenological analysis of the existential 
structure of the subject, Heidegger aims to unsettle the historically 
entrenched tendency to conceptualise it by analogy to things, with the 
unevenness of the analogy being smoothed over by the introduction of 
an incorporeal faculty of reason.
Heidegger begins his analysis of the subject by exposing one of its 
fundamental existential structures, namely, ‘being-in-the-world.’ This 
term refers to a unitary phenomenon which can be analysed in terms 
of three constitutive elements, the most important of which are, for 
37  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 75 [49].
38  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, pp. 67 [42], 68 [43]. With this, Heidegger inverts 
the relation between existence and essence introduced by medieval Christian 
metaphysicians on the basis of the Biblical doctrine of creation. For them, God adds 
existence to those things whose essence God has determined in advance.
39  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, pp. 67 [42], 71 [45], 68 [42].
40  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 73 [47–48]. Note also Heidegger’s qualified 
remark that a person becomes present-at-hand only following her death (Heidegger 
(1962a), Being and Time, p. 281 [238]).
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the present discussion, ‘being-in’ and ‘world.’41 ‘Being-in’ describes a 
fundamental relation between subject and world. Heidegger urges that 
this relationship should not be misunderstood as a case of one thing’s 
being in another, like, for example, water in a glass. To do so would 
be to conceive of both subject and world in corporeal terms, as things 
which are present-at-hand. Yet, such a misunderstanding is natural, 
writes Heidegger, especially in such cases where the being-in relation 
is conceived in terms of the subject’s knowledge of the world. Here, the 
subject is construed as an autonomous, isolated substance, the world 
as an external object, and knowledge thus as a relation between two 
things, a subject-thing and an object-thing. As a consequence, the 
fundamental relation between subject and world is obscured, because 
subject and world are not things. It must be emphasised, however, that 
Heidegger does not dismiss the orthodox subject-object distinction as 
a false account of the subject’s relation to the world; rather, he points 
out that this account, whatever its merits, is a derivative picture 
resulting from an insufficiently critical analysis of subjectivity. It is, in 
other words, a ‘founded mode’ of being-in, that is, a mode of being-in 
which subsists only through its dependence on a more fundamental 
level of being-in-the-world. By obscuring the phenomenal basis of the 
subject’s relation to the world, the substance ontology underpinning 
the orthodox subject-object schema recapitulates the very model of 
knowledge which Heidegger aims to bracket and then submit to 
rigorous phenomenological analysis.42
Heidegger writes that being-in-the-world may be experienced 
in a variety of different ways, for example, as ‘having to do with 
something, producing something, attending to something and looking 
after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it 
go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, 
discussing, determining…’ All of these are experiences of being-in, and 
they all have, as their basis, ‘concern,’ a term Heidegger uses to denote 
the subject’s active involvement with entities in the world, whether those 
entities are persons or things. In contrast to such involvement, Heidegger 
also considers ways in which the subject’s being-in can manifest a 
41  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 78–79 [53]. The third element is Dasein’s 
‘average everydayness.’
42  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, pp. 87 [60], 86 [59].
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deficiency of concern: ‘[l]eaving undone, neglecting, renouncing, taking 
a rest.’43 He argues that such deficient modes of concern are constitutive 
of the kind of knowledge which emerges, step-wise, through the 
passive observation of things. First, the subject ‘holds back’ from its 
active involvement with entities, and, as a result, is able to encounter 
them solely in the way that they look. Only through a deficiency of 
involvement can the subject just look at something, and nothing more. 
Second, pure looking then becomes ‘thematising’; an entity is addressed 
and considered, thereby becoming an object of perception. Third, 
perceiving is a form of interpretation, and hence becomes a ‘making 
determinate.’ Fourth, what has been perceived and made determinate 
may now be expressed in propositional terms, that is, it may become the 
fixed subject matter for a knowledge claim.44 Heidegger stresses that this 
step-wise process is a continuous one in which the subject’s experience 
of being-in-the-world goes through successive modifications, from 
a basic concernful involvement with entities to a derivative ‘at arm’s 
length’ observation and interpretation of entities as the determinate 
subject matter of propositional statements. Hence, the process should 
not be misunderstood as one whereby a subject produces internal 
representations which are then somehow brought into agreement 
with externally present entities. Such a misunderstanding ignores the 
phenomenal content exposed in the existential analytic of the subject, 
and reasserts the orthodox subject-object distinction as ontologically 
foundational. Indeed, even in those cases where the subject does no 
more than represent or think about entities, that is, even when it fails to 
physically engage with them, it is still in the world with those entities, 
it still has being-in as its basic structure. As Heidegger remarks, ‘the 
perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one’s 
booty to the “cabinet” of consciousness after one has gone out and 
grasped it.’45 There is no ‘returning’ because there was never a ‘going 
out’ in the first place.
43  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 83 [56–57].
44  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, pp. 88–89 [61–62]. I read step two in conjunction 
with Heidegger’s later statement that ‘Thematizing Objectifies’ (Heidegger (1962a), 
Being and Time, p. 414 [363]).
45  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 89 [62].
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The modifications leading from immersed involvement to 
propositionally structured thinking are expressed phenomenologically 
in what Heidegger calls a ‘change-over’ in the subject’s understanding 
of the world. Because the change-over from involvement to 
propositional thinking is specifically a change in the subject’s mode 
of understanding, it follows that this change presupposes the prior 
existence of understanding in general. Moreover, Heidegger argues 
that the new mode of understanding ushered in by such a change-over 
has the potential to develop itself autonomously, and thereby to take 
over as the dominant attitude governing the subject’s existence.46 Thus, 
for example, as immersed involvement gives way to propositional 
thinking, the understanding implicit in such thinking, of the world 
as an external object and the subject as a discrete set of internally 
organised representations, may come to dominate the subject’s 
way of understanding both itself and its relation to the world. As a 
consequence, the subject may mistake this new mode of understanding 
for a foundational one, thereby accepting that all investigations into 
the structure of subjectivity will finally be intelligible only against the 
backdrop of the prevailing subject-object distinction. In this case, the 
subject’s basic state of being-in-the-world, its involved immersion in 
that world, falls into obscurity behind the suddenly pressing problem 
of what epistemic properties a substance-subject must possess in order 
to gain access to, and hence knowledge of, a world from which it would 
be otherwise separated. The irony, of course, is that this critical problem 
takes for granted a model of the subject which itself derives from a 
more fundamental mode of subjectivity. Propositional knowledge 
of the world cannot figure into a causal explanation of our immersed 
involvement in the world, because propositional knowledge depends 
for its very possibility on the fact of such involvement.47
46  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, pp. 200 [158], 161 [123], 90 [62].
47  Note that the historians of science Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison deliberately 
adopt the derivative model of subjectivity in their 2010 book, Objectivity: ‘Because the 
word “subjectivity” is currently used to refer to conscious experience and its forms 
across cultures and epochs (“Renaissance subjectivity,” “modern subjectivity”), 
we should make clear that we use the term historically: it refers to a specific kind 
of self that can first be widely conceptualized and, perhaps, realized within the 
framework of the Kantian and post-Kantian opposition between the objective and 
the subjective’ (Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison (2010), Objectivity (New York: 
Zone Books), p. 199). Given this qualification, there would seem to be no prima facie 
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6. Heidegger’s Response to External-World 
Scepticism
So far, I have argued that the dispute between external-world realists 
and sociological idealists unfolds against the backdrop of their shared 
acceptance of a bundle of distinctions represented by the glass-bulb 
model. These conceptual distinctions lie at the root of an apparently 
intractable philosophical problem, namely, the problem of ‘epistemic 
access.’ This problem is variously couched in terms of how the mind 
achieves access to the world, how an epistemic agent breaks through 
appearances and grasps onto reality, and, perhaps most familiarly, how 
a subject gains epistemic access to an object. All of these variants take 
for granted a disjuncture between an inside and an outside, and thus 
address the question of how this disjuncture might be overcome and 
knowledge thereby achieved. The external-world sceptic may therefore 
be interpreted as challenging the claim that a subject can gain access to 
a world from which it is separated and which exists independently of 
that subject. As we saw in the last section, Heidegger provides grounds 
for arguing that the glass-bulb model, implicitly deployed by external-
world realists, idealists, and sceptics alike, takes for granted a specific 
model of the subject, a model which fails to capture the phenomenal 
content of the subject’s basic experience of its own subjectivity. In other 
words, the model incorporates an unanalysed presupposition that 
propositional thinking is a basic existential state of the subject (Dasein). 
Heidegger responds by arguing that such thinking is a founded mode of 
the subject’s being-in-the-world, that it is the result of a post hoc change-
over from the subject’s phenomenologically more original existential 
state of immersed involvement.
When Heidegger turns specifically to the challenge posed by 
external-world scepticism, he applies this same analysis. His argument 
is brief: ‘[t]he question of whether there is a world at all and whether 
its Being can be proved, makes no sense if it is raised by Dasein as 
conflict between their analysis and the one offered by Heidegger. Hence, I now 
withdraw my previous criticism of their analysis (see Jeff Kochan (2015b), ‘Putting 
a Spin on Circulating Reference, or How to Rediscover the Scientific Subject,’ 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 49, 103–07 (p. 105 n. 3)).
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Being-in-the-world; and who else would raise it?’48 Heidegger observes 
that the question of epistemic access, of whether or not one can know 
that the external world exists, can only make sense if one has already 
accepted the conceptual distinctions at play in what I call the glass-bulb 
model. His aim here is not to challenge the truth or falsity of assertions 
made about the existence of the external world; it is, rather, to point out 
that such judgements can only be made about assertions which have 
already been recognised as intelligible. Heidegger argues that the realm 
of intelligibility in which the concept of the external world makes sense 
is a derivative one resulting from a change-over in the way the subject 
understands itself and its world. That this mode of understanding may 
appear self-evident, that it may have become the prevailing attitude 
governing our modern self-understanding, is a consequence of our 
having mistaken the glass-bulb model for a fundamental representation 
of our basic existential state. Heidegger does not so much refute the 
external-world sceptic as point out the derivative, superficial nature of 
her purportedly fundamental challenge.
Just as he had earlier argued that propositional thinking is a founded 
mode of the subject’s being-in, Heidegger now argues that such 
thinking is also ‘a founded mode of access to the Real,’ and, furthermore, 
that it is only through this derivative mode of understanding that an 
analysis of reality becomes possible. The idea seems to be that only once 
our understanding has changed over to a propositionally structured 
thinking does it become possible for us to interpret the world as ‘Reality,’ 
which for Heidegger also means ‘substantiality.’ Two steps are involved 
in this process. First, with the change-over in its mode of understanding, 
the subject begins to encounter the real in a new way, that is, in terms of 
‘beholding’ (das anschauende Erkennen, ‘visual cognition’).49 Second, as 
this beholding, this pure looking which holds back from involvement, 
comes to dominate the subject’s way of relating to entities in the world, 
it begins to take over as the subject’s prevailing mode of understanding 
that world. It is under these circumstances, argues Heidegger, that we 
begin to interpret the world, as a whole, in terms of substantiality, as 
reality. We see here the emergence, once again, of those derivative 
phenomena represented in the glass-bulb model. The subject’s holding 
48  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, pp. 246–47 [202].
49  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, pp. 245–46 [201–02].
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back from immersed involvement in the world, so as to then step back 
and visually examine its surroundings, leads to a perceived separation 
between subject and world. Mistaking this separation for a fundamental 
structure in its basic relation to the world, the subject then faces the 
vexing question of how it may overcome this separation, of how we 
may, in general, achieve access to a world which we now understand to 
lie beyond our reach. Heidegger therefore takes the problem of reality, 
precisely because it is the problem of whether or not an external world 
exists, to rise out of our failure to recognise being-in-the-world as a 
central aspect of our fundamental existential state. He writes:
The ‘problem of Reality’ in the sense of the question whether an external 
world is present-at-hand and whether such a world can be proved, 
turns out to be an impossible one, not because its consequences lead to 
inextricable impasses, but because the very entity which serves as its 
theme, is one which, as it were, repudiates any such formulation of the 
question.50
The subject’s failure to understand its fundamental relation to the world 
as one of being-in means that it also fails to understand the basic structure 
of the world itself. As it is led astray by the conceptual distinctions 
represented by the glass-bulb model, the subject begins to see the world 
as a thing standing outside of itself, and this world-thing subsequently 
gets buried in an epistemological problematic which first puts the 
world’s existence into question and then demands that its existence 
be proved. Heidegger reckons that this epistemological problematic, 
the ‘problem of Reality,’ lies at the heart of the protracted dispute 
between realists and idealists, and he criticises both sides for having 
mistaken their derivative understanding of world for an ontologically 
foundational one. Both sides fall short, Heidegger claims, because 
neither has brought sufficiently to light the basic phenomenal content 
of the subject. Both have, in other words, given too much attention to 
epistemology and not enough to phenomenological ontology.
Heidegger provides clear grounds for distinguishing his own position 
from both realism and idealism, as he understands them.51 With respect 
to realism, he fully agrees with the realist’s claim that there is a world in 
50  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 250 [206].
51  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, pp. 250–52 [206–08].
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which things exist, in the sense of being present-at-hand. However, he 
argues that realism goes too far when it interprets the world itself as a 
present-at-hand thing, that is, in terms of a reality existing independently 
of the subject. On the basis of this misinterpretation, Heidegger 
furthermore argues, the realist makes the additional problematic claim 
that a proof of the existence of the world is both necessary and possible. 
Heidegger does not follow the realist down this road because for him 
the world is not a present-at-hand thing separate from the subject. As 
regards idealism, Heidegger is in full agreement with the idealist’s 
claim that reality cannot be understood on the model of the present-at-
hand thing, noting that, with this insight, idealism has an advantage in 
principle over realism. Where idealism goes astray, Heidegger claims, 
is when it makes the psychologistic supposition that reality must reside 
‘in the consciousness’ of a subject. Heidegger observes that, so long as 
this claim leaves unexamined the phenomenal content of consciousness 
itself, it will fail to advance a properly articulated concept of reality.
Placed against the backdrop of the orthodox subject-object distinction, 
Heidegger’s analysis of the errors of realism and idealism would seem 
to be as follows. The realist errs in construing the world as an object 
distinct from a subject, and then also in employing the term ‘reality’ to 
denote the ‘objecthood’ of a subjectless world. In contrast, the idealist 
errs in ignoring the phenomenal content of the subject, satisfying herself 
with the largely privative claim that the subject is not an object. She 
then assimilates reality to this ill-defined subjectivity, and, in the worst 
case, declares it a manifestation of the interior structures of a worldless 
subject. According to Heidegger, then, realism and idealism both come 
up short because neither has recognised being-in-the-world as one of 
the subject’s fundamental ontological structures.
In this chapter, one of my chief aims has been to elucidate 
Heidegger’s response to the external-world sceptic. However, it also 
seems appropriate, in the present context, to very briefly highlight 
another crucial aspect of Heidegger’s proposed alternative to the bundle 
of concepts employed by the external-world realist and idealist alike, 
and so also exploited by the sceptic. A more extended discussion will 
follow in Chapter Two. The crucial aspect in question is Heidegger’s 
distinction between reality and the real. Recall Heidegger’s claim that 
propositional thinking is a founded mode of access to the real, and that 
it is only through this derivative mode of understanding that the reality 
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of the real may be grasped as an object of analysis. This suggests that the 
real may be encountered in a more fundamental way, one which does 
not entail an accompanying concept of reality. Heidegger’s idea seems to 
be that, when the real is interpreted in terms of reality, it is encountered 
as an object, with reality signifying its objecthood. The reality of the 
real is thus the objecthood of the object. Yet, as we have seen, for 
Heidegger entities are encountered as objects only following a change-
over in the subject’s being-in-the-world from immersed involvement 
to the detached thematisation and determination characteristic of 
propositional thinking. Heidegger argues that the being of entities, what 
they are, depends on the way in which they are understood by the subject, 
but that the existence of those entities, the brute fact that they are, is not 
dependent on the subject’s understanding. He furthermore asserts the 
more specific proposition that, while reality depends on the subject’s 
understanding of being, the real does not.52 In this way, Heidegger 
prepares the conceptual ground on which to assert that the real exists 
independently of the subject’s understanding. Indeed, for Heidegger, 
the term ‘the real’ appears to signify independently existing entities. In 
Chapter Two, I will suggest that this feature of Heidegger’s analysis 
provides the basis for a minimal form of realism which both escapes 
Heidegger’s critique of external-world realism, as explicated above, 
and proves amenable to SSK’s own minimal realist commitments. In 
the meantime, let us consider how Heidegger’s response to the external-
world sceptic might bear on the responses made to the sceptic by the 
SSK practitioners surveyed earlier in this chapter.
7. A Heideggerian Critique of SSK’s Response to 
External-World Scepticism
The principal response of SSK to the external-world sceptic is to eschew 
the requirement that a belief in the existence of the external world must 
be absolutely justified. SSK practitioners accept the sceptical argument 
that absolute knowledge is impossible, but reject the more radical 
conclusion that knowledge, as such, is impossible. Instead, they endorse 
a mitigated form of scepticism which allows room for a non-absolutist, 
or relativistic, conception of knowledge.
52  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 255 [212].
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It should be clear that, from the standpoint of Heidegger’s own 
response to the external-world sceptic, the distinction SSK practitioners 
draw between absolute and relative knowledge is somewhat beside 
the point. Both absolutist and relativist approaches remain firmly 
rooted in an epistemological problematic which takes for granted the 
intelligibility of the sceptical challenge; they differ only in the strategies 
they deploy when addressing that challenge. Heidegger argues that the 
intelligibility of external-world scepticism entails the prior acceptance 
of a set of conceptual distinctions which I have represented with the 
glass-bulb model. As argued earlier, SSK practitioners take this model 
for granted even while they reject an absolutist notion of knowledge. As 
a consequence, they accept as foundational what is, in fact, a derivative 
conceptualisation of the subject’s relation to the world, one which does 
not sufficiently recognise that one of the subject’s basic existential states 
is being-in-the-world. Only following a change-over in understanding, 
in which the subject retreats from its original immersed involvement in 
the world, does it begin to view its access to the things around it as an 
epistemological problem, that is, a problem of whether or not, as well as 
how, one may come to know such things in their reality.
The dispute between Barnes, Bloor, and Henry, who assert the 
existence of the external world, and Collins, who rejects the existence 
of such a world, can be re-examined in this light. Because they each 
either affirm or deny the possibility of knowledge of the external 
world, both sides reveal their shared acceptance of the intelligibility 
of such a possibility, and thus their tacit reliance on the glass-bulb 
model. The ensuing debate, though it has produced insights of genuine 
epistemological interest, remains ontologically adrift insofar as both 
sides have failed to expose and clarify the basic phenomenological 
experience of the subject as such. Collins’s idealism may have an 
advantage over the realism of Barnes, Bloor, and Henry, since it 
acknowledges that there is no sense in speaking of the world as a 
thing existing independently of the subject’s understanding. However, 
because Collins leaves the ontological structure of this understanding 
unexamined, he is unable to articulate a sufficiently clear account of the 
relation between subject and world. As a consequence, he has chosen 
instead to develop a method in which the world, as well as the things 
in it, are simply left out of the picture. In contrast, Barnes, Bloor, and 
 491. SSK, Phenomenology, and the Problem of the External World
Henry preserve the important insight that things exist independently 
of the subject’s way of understanding them, but they then abrogate this 
insight by interpreting the world itself as an object, a present-at-hand 
thing, which exists independently of the subject. They must then face 
the intractable problem of how to justify the claim that the subject can, 
in fact, know that this world, as well as the things within it, actually 
exists.
I have already argued that the justifications they have offered are 
insufficient. They assert that a belief in the existence of the external 
world is a presupposition which must necessarily precede any action 
taken within that world. Yet such arguments only serve to underwrite 
a realist mode of discourse rather than to establish the existence of the 
external world. Moreover, as Heidegger points out, when one asserts 
the need for such a presupposition, one tacitly affirms the derivative 
notion of the subject as worldless. After all, if one had already recognised 
being-in-the-world as belonging the subject’s basic existential state, 
then one would not feel obliged to presuppose the existence of the 
external world.53 The same goes for Bloor’s strategy of epistemological 
complacency. This strategy takes for granted the epistemological 
problematic and responds to it by recommending complacency. 
Such a strategy makes sense only if one has already agreed with the 
external-world sceptic that subject and world are separated, and that 
the subject can only achieve knowledge of, or gain epistemic access to, 
this world by overcoming that separation. Bloor expresses his belief 
that such knowledge is possible, but responds with complacency to 
the sceptic’s demand for a justification of that belief. Heidegger argues 
that such a strategy, because it fails to render transparent the subject’s 
basic ontological structure, treats the subject as a wordless thing which 
must first assure itself, somehow, of a world. As such, the strategy 
is itself an expression of a founded mode of understanding, a mode 
in which the glass-bulb model is taken for granted, and hence one in 
which a derivative mode of understanding is mistaken for one in which 
the fundamental ontological relation between subject and world is 
originally revealed.54
53  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 249 [205–06].
54  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 250 [206].
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8. Conclusion
This chapter has been concerned with the threat posed to SSK by external-
world scepticism. Although SSK practitioners have made effective use 
of sceptical techniques in their analyses of scientific knowledge, their 
methods are best seen, not as sceptical, but as advocating a mitigated 
response to the radical sceptical claim that knowledge of the external 
world is impossible. With the exception of Collins, SSK practitioners 
have attempted to advance a minimal realist position which asserts the 
existence of an external world without also feeling obliged to meet the 
sceptic’s demand that such an assertion be absolutely justified. I have 
argued that they have not been successful. The key obstacle preventing 
SSK practitioners from developing a defensible realist position is their 
preoccupation with epistemological, at the expense of ontological, 
issues. Indeed, despite the long dispute between the realist and idealist 
wings of SSK, both sides have failed to adequately address the way 
in which their taken-for-granted ontological commitments inform the 
content of their epistemological arguments. I have used Heidegger’s 
phenomenological analysis of the subjectivity of the subject to expose 
the nature of those commitments.
A phenomenological analysis of the subject’s basic state of being-in-
the-world reveals that external-world scepticism makes no sense as a 
fundamental challenge to the subject-world relation. External-world 
scepticism depends for its dialectical force on a derivative understanding 
of that relation, a conceptualisation of it in terms of a distinction between 
subject and object. The weakness at the heart of SSK’s responses to the 
external-world sceptic is its tacit adherence to the metaphysical image of 
the subject which underpins the orthodox subject-object schema.55 It is 
only within the epistemological problematic generated by this schema 
that external-world scepticism becomes intelligible and so comes to 
threaten the realist ambitions of SSK. If SSK practitioners wish to avoid 
the debilitating challenge posed to their work by the external-world 
sceptic, then I recommend that they divest themselves of their residual 
commitment to orthodox ontology and adopt the position advanced 
55  In Chapter Three, I will give detailed attention to the way Bloor attempts to 
transform, without wholly rejecting, the Kantian version of the orthodox subject-
object distinction.
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by Heidegger. Yet, this recommendation comes with a worry. If SSK 
were to adopt a Heideggerian ontology, which is openly critical of both 
realism and idealism, would it not lose the grounds for its realism? 
In this chapter, I have already suggested that Heidegger, despite his 
abnegation of realism, nevertheless provides the basis for a minimal 
realist doctrine which both escapes his own criticism and is compatible 
with the main tenets of SSK’s realist commitments. It lies with Chapter 
Two to make good this claim.

Chapter Two  
 
A Minimal Realism for  
Science Studies
1. Introduction
One of the most ridiculed concepts in Heidegger’s work is his ‘question 
of being.’ An unlikely collection of critics, ranging from the philosopher 
Simon Blackburn to the science studies scholar Bruno Latour have 
exercised considerable rhetorical flair in roundly repudiating the 
significance of this question. Blackburn pokes fun at those who ‘flutter 
around the flame of Being.’ Latour lampoons Heidegger’s ‘epigones 
[who] do not expect to find Being except along the Black Forest 
Holzwege,’ and he burlesques their alleged claim that ‘[w]e are keeping 
the little flame of Being safe from everything, and you, who have all 
the rest, have nothing.’1 For the incorrigibly counter-suggestive, like me, 
such enthusiastic denunciations from on high encourage the thought 
that Heidegger’s question of being may warrant close attention after all. 
Indeed, as I hope to demonstrate in this chapter, Heidegger’s question 
yields resources for a minimal realism compatible with the social 
constructivism of science studies.
1  Simon Blackburn (2004), ‘Lights! Camera! Being!’ New Republic (February 23); Bruno 
Latour (1993), We Have Never Been Modern (Harvard: Harvard University Press), 
pp. 65, 66. I discuss Latour’s criticism in Jeff Kochan (2010b), ‘Latour’s Heidegger,’ 
Social Studies of Science 40(4), 579–98 (pp. 587–88).
© Jeff Kochan, CC BY 4.0   http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0129.02
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Heidegger’s question of being can be more fully described as the 
question of the meaning of being. The words ‘meaning’ and ‘being’ 
may raise expectations that the question will lead us into deep and 
mysterious philosophical waters, but, in fact, we may profitably 
address it on the most superficial and mundane of levels. The word 
‘being’ translates the German infinitive sein, which can be more strictly 
rendered as ‘to be.’ Hence the German sentence ‘Alle wollen glücklich 
sein’ means ‘Everybody wants to be happy.’ Note that, unlike the other 
terms in this sentence, the verb ‘to be’ does not refer to anything. Its role 
is rather to bind together and give an overall meaning to the sentence. 
The word ‘being’ should, therefore, not be mistaken for the name of an 
entity, or thing. As Heidegger writes, ‘[t]he Being of entities “is” not 
itself an entity.’2 If ‘being’ names anything at all, then it names the way 
in which things gather together and so acquire meaning. According to 
Heidegger, this is an ontological event with a temporal structure. The 
question of the meaning of being thus motivates an enquiry into the 
way meaning takes place as this temporal event. Heidegger’s question 
is not ‘What meaning does “being” have?’ Meaning is not a thing being 
possesses. The question is rather ‘How does “being” mean?’ Meaning 
is an event, something being does. Grammatically, the phrase ‘the 
meaning of being’ is similar in structure to the phrase ‘the thrill of a 
lifetime.’ The thrill is not the property of a lifetime, because a lifetime 
is not a thing with properties. A lifetime is a historical-existential space 
wherein thrills can happen. Likewise, being is a historical-existential 
space wherein meaning can happen.
Heidegger observes that, because the word ‘being’ and its cognates 
play such a ubiquitous role in our language, we tend simply to take 
them for granted, without giving them a second thought. Yet, he 
argues, useful insights may be won by turning ‘being’ from a taken-for-
granted resource into a topic for investigation. One such insight will be 
especially crucial for this chapter: the polysemy of ‘being.’ The word 
‘being’ carries connotations of both existence and essence. By attaching 
the name of a thing to the verb ‘to be,’ one may then say of the thing that 
it is, or what it is, or both. As will be discussed later, Heidegger marks 
2  Martin Heidegger (1962a [1927]), Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and 
Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell), p. 26 [6]. (Following scholarly convention, 
page numbers in square brackets refer to the original 1927 German edition of Being 
and Time.)
 552. A Minimal Realism for Science Studies
this as a distinction between the ‘that-being’ and the ‘what-being’ of 
a thing, a move which furthermore distinguishes between the thing’s 
existence and its essence. We have already encountered this lattermost 
distinction in Chapter One.
The distinction between existence and essence, between the that-
being and the what-being of a thing, is an ancient one, and it also 
features prominently in several of Heidegger’s works. Nevertheless, 
the distinction has been largely overlooked by those writers concerned 
with explicating Heidegger’s views on science and realism. One such 
writer, Joseph Rouse, stands out as being both a highly regarded 
expositor of Heidegger’s philosophy of science, on the one hand, and 
a key contributor to theoretical debates in science studies, on the other. 
The latter half of this chapter will give focussed attention to his work 
on both counts. Two other writers, while not having bridged between 
Heidegger and science studies to the same degree as Rouse, also bear 
mentioning: Trish Glazebrook and Dimitri Ginev.3 Like Rouse, neither 
Glazebrook nor Ginev have recognised the important role played by 
Heidegger’s distinction between existence and essence. Glazebrook 
has come the closest, correctly observing that Heidegger was vexed 
by the problem of how a worldly thing may be acknowledged to 
exist independently of the subject when its intelligibility nevertheless 
depends on that subject. As we will see, Heidegger uses the distinction 
between existence and essence to solve this problem, recognising the 
independent existence of a thing while maintaining the necessary 
dependence of its essence, construed broadly to include its core meaning 
or basic intelligibility, on the subjectivity of the subject. Glazebrook, in 
contrast, argues that Heidegger solves this problem by differentiating 
between a thing and its being, what is conventionally called the 
‘ontological difference.’4 But this cuts the knot in the wrong place. The 
distinction between independent existence and dependent essence is a 
3  There is an extensive literature more generally addressing the topic of Heidegger 
on realism and science. However, a discussion of it would carry us too far beyond 
the narrow scope, and specific goals, of the present chapter. Curious readers may 
consult the Appendix at the end of this chapter (p. 106).
4  Trish Glazebrook (2012b), ‘Why Read Heidegger on Science?,’ in Heidegger on Science, 
ed. by Trish Glazebrook (Albany: SUNY Press), pp. 13–26 (p. 20); Trish Glazebrook 
(2001a), ‘Heidegger and Scientific Realism,’ Continental Philosophy Review 34(4), 361-
401 (p. 368). The ontological difference is the difference, mentioned earlier, between 
being and entities.
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distinction in the being of a thing, not between a thing and its being: 
‘it is precisely the two of them that make up the structure of being.’5 
As will be explained below, this distinction stems from the difference 
between a thing’s existing but meaning nothing, and its existing and 
meaning something. By picking up the wrong distinction, Glazebrook 
is forced to grapple with a range of deep paradoxes, and it is not clear to 
me that she succeeds in resolving them. For example, on the one hand, 
she argues that ‘for Heidegger, it is an incoherent demand to make of 
realists that they hold the independence thesis.’ On the other, she also 
argues that Heidegger was a ‘robust scientific realist.’6 As I will argue, 
the independence thesis is the basic doctrine of realism, including 
scientific realism, and Heidegger was a realist just because he accepted 
this doctrine. He was, however, not a scientific realist; he was what I call 
a ‘minimal realist.’ Glazebrook’s account of Heidegger’s realism is an 
undoubtedly complex and difficult one. I commend my own account as 
a simpler, more modest, and more useful alternative.
This chapter begins with an explication of Heidegger’s early existential 
conception of science. Heidegger introduced this conception as an 
alternative to the dominant logical conception, which views science as a 
conceptual system. He thus draws attention to the concrete, existential 
structures of scientific practice which are necessary for more abstract, 
theoretical reflection. Theory needs method, and method is concretely 
enacted in the world. Although Glazebrook is aware of this aspect of 
Heidegger’s account of science, she nevertheless repeatedly attributes 
to him the view that science is a ‘conceptual scheme.’7 She shares this 
tendency with both Rouse and Ginev, but whereas Glazebrook attributes 
the position without criticism, the other two treat it as evidence for 
Heidegger’s failure to have fully embraced scientific practice, and hence 
to have entirely freed himself from the orthodox trappings of a theory-
dominant view of science.8 Ginev credits Rouse with this criticism, 
5  Martin Heidegger (1982a [1975]), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. by Albert 
Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), p. 78.
6  Glazebrook (2001a), ‘Heidegger and Scientific Realism,’ pp. 386, 361.
7  Glazebrook (2012b), ‘Why Read Heidegger on Science?,’ pp. 20, 21; Glazebrook 
(2001a) ‘Heidegger and Scientific Realism,’ pp. 377, 381, 382, 389.
8  Dimitri Ginev (2005), ‘Against the Politics of Postmodern Philosophy of Science,’ 
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19(2), 191–208 (p. 199); Dimitri Ginev 
(2011), The Tenets of Cognitive Existentialism (Athens OH: Ohio University Press) pp. 
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which is based on the claim that the ‘mathematical projection of nature,’ 
which Heidegger located at the heart of modern science, is an inherently 
theoretical phenomenon. I will argue, to the contrary, that Heidegger 
introduced the mathematical projection as an existential phenomenon 
which serves as a condition of possibility for both theory and practice 
in the sciences.9 Once again, Glazebrook comes the closest to my own 
view when she writes that Heidegger’s strategy ‘is not to establish a 
secure bridge between praxical involvement and theoretical analysis, 
but rather to trace both back to being-in-the-world.’ This strikes me as 
largely correct.10 Although scientific theory is necessarily enabled by 
practice, Heidegger resisted the urge to explain it reductively in terms 
exclusively of practice. This challenges the widespread view in science 
studies that theory can be unproblematically reduced to practice. By 
simply collapsing one side of the theory-practice divide into the other, 
the basic motivations which originally gave rise to and justified that 
divide are left hopelessly obscure. I will not, in this chapter, make 
any satisfying attempt to clear up this obscurity. Such an attempt will 
come later in Chapter Five, when we consider the relation between 
mathematical and empirical modes of scientific existence. Meanwhile, 
in this chapter, by at least drawing attention to this obscurity, I hope to 
begin undermining the unreflective business-as-usual attitude of many 
contemporary practice theorists towards the theory-practice divide.
Under the flag of a ‘practical hermeneutics of science,’ Rouse has 
been most enthusiastic about clearing the deck of theory and raising 
in its place an account of science based solely on the notion of practice. 
In the process, he has not only criticised the early Heidegger for 
allegedly retreating back into a theory-dominant account of science, 
but proponents of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) as 
well. In the former case, Rouse’s misconstrual of Heidegger’s concept 
5, 103; Joseph Rouse (1987a), Knowledge and Power: Toward a Political Philosophy of 
Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), p. 103.
9  I also makes this argument, with slightly more detail, in Jeff Kochan (2015a), 
‘Scientific Practice and Modes of Epistemic Existence,’ in Debating Cognitive 
Existentialism, ed. by Dimitri Ginev (Leiden: Brill Rodopi), pp. 95–106.
10  Glazebrook (2001a), ‘Heidegger and Scientific Realism,’ p. 386. Unfortunately, 
Glazebrook seems to immediately lose grip on this insight when, on the same page, 
she concludes that ‘the difference between theory and practice [is] the difference 
between two kinds of practice.’ She credits Rouse, in part, for having influenced her 
on this point.
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of mathematical projection, as referring to a theoretical rather than 
an existential phenomenon, leads him to exaggerate the extent to 
which Heidegger asserted the independence of theory from practice. 
Transfixed as he is by the theory-practice divide, Rouse fails to realise 
that a refusal to collapse theory into practice does not necessarily evince 
a counter-desire to collapse practice into theory. In the latter case, Rouse 
also exaggerates the commitment of SSK to a theory-dominant account 
of science, but he makes a good point that SSK remains debilitated 
by a vestigial commitment to a problematic theory of knowledge. I 
examined this vestigial commitment in Chapter One, suggesting there 
that SSK could overcome this epistemological problematic by adopting 
key aspects of Heidegger’s existential phenomenology. In this chapter, 
I apply a similar strategy in order to defend SSK against Rouse’s 
criticisms. On this basis, I conclude that Rouse’s attempt to undermine 
SSK is not successful.
The gist of my argument is that Rouse’s practice-based account of 
science poses no threat to the minimal realism which I draw out of 
Heidegger’s work and recommend for science studies. Indeed, Rouse’s 
attempts to close the door on realism appear unsuccessful even in the 
case of his own practical hermeneutics of science. As I will demonstrate, 
despite his theoretical attempts to keep the realist’s basic independence 
thesis at bay, a close look at the way Rouse concretely articulates 
that theory reveals his own informal and unreflective commitment 
to that very thesis. The incoherent relationship between Rouse’s 
theory and practice springs from his failure to recognize Heidegger’s 
distinction between existence and essence. I suggest, then, that the 
practical hermeneutics commended by Rouse is best replaced with an 
existential phenomenology of science, because the latter is better able to 
accommodate the basic realist doctrine of independent existence.
Minimal realism is thus not a repudiation of practice and a flight 
back into theory. It is instead a recognition that theory and practice 
are phenomenologically distinct ways of actualising the range of 
possibilities opened up by the form of existence Heidegger dubbed the 
‘mathematical projection of nature.’ Ginev criticises Rouse for not paying 
adequate attention to the existential basis, and especially the existential 
specificity, of science, and he deplores Rouse’s consequent tendency 
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to uncritically assimilate science into the broader cultural sphere in 
which it is embedded. According to Ginev, one can abandon a theory-
dominant account of science while still viewing science as a unique and 
specifiable form of existence, one distinct from other forms of cultural 
existence.11 As far as the minimal realist is concerned, this suggests 
that science may get at the real, at independently existing things, in 
ways characteristically distinct from the other forms of existence also 
enabled by our history and culture. This is an important point, which 
ultimately leads to political questions about the relationship between 
science and the broader social sphere. I will briefly comment on this 
in the concluding section of this chapter, and again in Chapter Seven 
of this book. For the time being, let us focus on the issue of realism 
and science, beginning with a discussion of Heidegger’s existential 
conception of science, then exploring the significance of this conception 
for SSK, and finally defending the resultant account of minimal realism 
from the challenge posed to it by Rouse’s practical hermeneutics of 
scientific practice.
2. Heidegger’s Existential Conception of Science
In his 1927 book, Being and Time, Heidegger distinguishes between a 
‘logical’ and an ‘existential’ conception of science.12 The logical account 
understands science according to the representation of nature it produces, 
and the validity of this representation is itself defined as having been 
established on the basis of a coherent body of interconnected true 
propositions. On this account, then, science is taken to be a conceptual 
scheme. On the existential account, in contrast, science is understood 
to be a mode of existence, a way of being-in-the-world, which brings to 
light things for theoretical understanding. It is important to emphasise 
that these two conceptions of science are not opposed to one another. 
Heidegger commits himself to an existential conception of science, but 
he does not, in doing so, reject the logical conception as wrong or absurd. 
On the contrary, the existential account is meant to explain how the 
11  Ginev (2005), ‘Against the Politics of Postmodern Philosophy of Science,’ p. 103.
12  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 408 [357].
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logical account is possible; it seeks to reveal the existential conditions 
necessary for the emergence of the theoretical attitude presupposed in 
the logical account. By undertaking a phenomenological investigation 
into the mode of existence which makes science possible, Heidegger 
shifts attention from science construed as a body of concepts and formal 
logical rules to science construed as an ongoing, goal-oriented human 
activity. In other words, he focuses on what scientists do, and also on 
the way they must experience and understand their relation to the 
world in order to do what they do.
By emphasising the actions of scientists, Heidegger would seem to 
adopt an approach similar to the one generally prevailing in science 
studies. Bloor, Barnes, and Henry, for example, write that ‘[f]or the 
scientist the world is the object of study; for the sociologist it is the scientist-
studying-the-world that is the object.’13 Yet Heidegger also stresses that 
he is primarily concerned neither with the historical development of 
science, nor with the particular goal-directed activities of scientists 
working in specific contexts. Hence, Heidegger’s existential conception 
of science cannot be straightforwardly assimilated to the view of science 
favoured by SSK practitioners. Indeed, one crucial difference is that 
Heidegger, unlike Barnes, Bloor, and Henry, does not conceptualise 
the scientist-studying-the-world as an object. The reasons for this have 
already been covered in Chapter One. Rejecting a view dating back as 
far as Aristotle, Heidegger argues that the subject (Dasein), including 
the scientific subject, should not be conceptualised in fundamental 
terms as a thing, substance, or object. The subject is, rather, existence. 
By undertaking a phenomenological analysis of the basic existential 
structures of the subjectivity of the subject, Heidegger attempts to 
counteract the traditional metaphysical tendency to construe persons 
as special instances of a more general ontological category of ‘thing.’ In 
reserving the term ‘existence’ exclusively for the subject, and in order 
to guard against the subject’s being conflated with a thing, Heidegger 
refers to the existence of things as ‘presence-at-hand’ (Vorhandenheit). 
His existential conception of science thus focuses on the activities of 
scientists, rather than on bodies of scientific knowledge, because such 
activities provide a necessary basis for scientific subjectivity, for the 
13  Barry Barnes, David Bloor and John Henry (1996), Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological 
Analysis (London: Athlone), p. 30.
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particular mode of existence within which scientific knowledge is 
produced and sustained.
Heidegger calls the ground state of the subject’s elemental being-in-
the-world ‘circumspective concern.’ This is what, in Chapter One, was 
referred to as immersed involvement. Determining the conditions of 
possibility for the theoretical attitude involves analysing the existential 
conditions under which theoretical thinking emerges from a basic 
everyday state of immersed involvement in a world. As discussed in 
Chapter One, Heidegger analyses this emergence in terms of four steps, 
which lead from immersed involvement to propositionally structured 
thinking. First, one holds back from immersed involvement so as to 
merely look at things, and no more. Second, pure looking becomes a 
thematising in which things are encountered as objects of perception. 
Third, perception interprets things so as to determine their properties. 
Fourth, determinate objects become the subject matter for propositional 
knowledge claims. Heidegger calls this transformation in the way 
things in the world are experienced a ‘change-over’ in the subject’s 
mode of understanding. The phenomenological analysis of this change-
over plays a central role in Heidegger’s existential conception of science, 
and thus merits detailed examination.
Heidegger presents the change-over as a transition from an 
experience of things as ‘ready-to-hand’ to an experience of them as 
‘present-at-hand.’ Things that are, in this context, present-at-hand are 
those encountered once one holds back from involvement with a thing 
and begins to interpret it as an object with determinable properties. 
In this context, then, a present-at-hand thing is called an ‘object.’ In 
contrast, things which are ready-to-hand are called ‘equipment,’ that is, 
things encountered in a basic existential state of immersed involvement 
in a world. On this account, the world in which one is always already 
immersed and involved is a world of equipment, what Heidegger also 
calls a ‘work-world.’14 He observes that, when we are absorbed in this 
work-world, our attention is not focussed on the equipment we use; 
rather, it is focussed primarily on the work.15 For example, when one 
signs one’s name, one does not focus on the pen in one’s hand or the 
paper on which one signs, but on the act of signing. Similarly, when 
14  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 101 [71].
15  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 99 [69].
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a cyclist rides along a busy street, her attention is focussed not on her 
bicycle but on the task of cycling. Both pen and bicycle are, in these cases, 
experienced as things ready-to-hand, as equipment the significance of 
which lies in the task towards which it is, at that moment, being put. 
Pieces of equipment are put to use in an activity, but the activity is not 
about them. They are not the theme of the activity, much less its object. 
They are not, in other words, the topic of the activity, but a resource 
enabling that activity.
In clarifying how the change-over in understanding gets going, 
Heidegger must explain how a basic state of everyday immersed 
involvement could come to be disturbed or interrupted. He must, in 
other words, give some account of how one comes to leave behind this 
basic state, how one comes to hold back from involvement and begins 
to instead experience a thing as the theme of one’s activity, and so as 
its object. This problem can be usefully contrasted with the problem 
of the external world, discussed in Chapter One. There the difficulty 
was to explain how a subject may gain access to a world from which 
it remains fundamentally separated. The solution demands an account 
of how the subject breaks free from the finite limits of its own internal 
state by building an epistemic bridge over to the external world which, 
in turn, exists in fundamental ontological separation from that subject. 
Traditionally, it is said to do this through the exercise of a transcendent 
reason. In the case of Heidegger’s existential phenomenology, in 
contrast, the question of how the subject gains access to the external 
world never arises, because subject and world were never separated 
in the first place. In the former case, the problem is to explain how a 
basic deficiency in the subject’s relation to the world may be overcome 
through the transcendent power of reason. In the latter case, the problem 
is to explain how one’s basic existential absorption in a work-world may 
suddenly become deficient, how one might abruptly withdraw from 
the everyday work-world in which one is normally immersed. Only 
through this sudden deficiency in one’s workaday relation to things can 
the change-over get going.
Heidegger addresses this problem by considering what happens 
when a ‘breakdown’ occurs in the smooth functioning of the subject’s 
workaday world, when the circumspective concern characteristic of 
one’s most immediate involvement with equipment becomes disturbed 
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or interrupted. As a result of such an equipmental breakdown, 
‘[t]he presence-at-hand of entities is thrust to the fore.’16 One situation 
in which a breakdown may occur is when, in the course of everyday 
activity, something vital is suddenly found missing. In an obvious 
sense, the missing thing is not ready-to-hand; indeed, it is not ‘to hand’ 
at all. However, insofar as the readiness-to-hand of some other thing 
may depend on the missing thing, this other thing now loses its familiar 
readiness-to-hand and begins to obtrude as something present-at-hand. 
For example, my office door is ready-to-hand when there is a key to open 
it. If, however, I have forgotten my key, the door suddenly loses much of 
its equipmental significance, or meaning. If it is Sunday morning, when 
the administration is normally absent, then the readiness-to-hand of the 
door recedes still further. I encounter the door as ever more useless, a 
mere obstacle confounding the smooth running of the workaday context 
in which I normally find myself. If, furthermore, I have a flight leaving 
that morning, and my flight tickets and passport are locked in my office, 
then the door may lose entirely its significance as something ready-to-
hand. I now encounter it in its brute existence, as a useless thing which 
just stands there confounding my travel plans. As Heidegger writes:
The more urgently [Je dringlicher] we need what is missing, and the 
more authentically it is encountered in its un-readiness-to-hand, all 
the more obtrusive [um so aufdringlicher] does that which is ready-to-
hand become — so much so, indeed, that it seems to lose its character of 
readiness-to-hand. It reveals itself as something present-at-hand and no 
more, which cannot be budged without the thing that is missing. The 
helpless way in which we stand before it is a deficient mode of concern, 
and as such it uncovers the Being-just-present-at-hand-and-no-more of 
something ready-to-hand.17
The sudden breakdown in the equipmental context of a work-world, 
which follows from the discovery that something vital to our operations 
in that world has gone missing, jars our attention from absorption in the 
task at hand, suddenly bringing forward the presence-at-hand of what 
is normally experienced as ready-to-hand.
Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of breakdowns in 
circumspective concern demonstrates how a deficiency can suddenly 
16  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 107 [76].
17  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 103 [73].
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appear in the subject’s basic relation to a work-world, and hence also 
how its understanding of things as ready-to-hand may begin to change 
over to an understanding of things as present-at-hand within the world. 
In this first step, I encounter things as ‘being-just-present-at-hand-and-
no-more.’ In some cases, the change-over may go no further than this: 
the overworked department head may suddenly appear in the hallway 
with a master key, allowing me to carry on with my travel plans. Yet, 
in other cases, one’s understanding, rather than reverting back to a 
basic existential state of circumspective concern, may change over to a 
new mode of understanding through a process which Heidegger calls 
‘thematising.’ This process is central to his existential conception of 
science.
We have already encountered Heidegger’s concept of thematising in 
summarising the four-stage change-over from immersed involvement 
to the theoretical attitude. After immersed involvement switches to 
a state of pure looking (stage one), a thing becomes thematised as 
an object of perception (stage two). Indeed, Heidegger emphasises 
that: ‘Thematizing Objectifies.’18 The change-over marks a shift from 
understanding a thing in the world as ready-to-hand to understanding it 
as present-at-hand, as an object. This is a shift in the existential structure of 
understanding, a structure Heidegger calls ‘projection.’19 He argues that 
only on the basis of a projection do we encounter a thing as meaningful: 
‘The primary projection of the understanding of Being “gives” the 
meaning.’20 The projection may thus be understood as providing the 
background of intelligibility against which things come to be perceived 
as objects with determinate properties (stage three), and thence as 
the subject matter for propositional knowledge claims (stage four). It 
should be noted, however, that the projection, as the basic structure of 
understanding, is present even when no change-over occurs; it resides 
just as much in the undisturbed practical understanding characteristic 
of immersed involvement in a work-world. Whether one understands a 
thing as ready-to-hand or as present-at-hand within-the-world, such an 
understanding will always have the structure of a projection.21
18  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 414 [363].
19  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, pp. 185 [145].
20  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 372 [324–25].
21  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 371 [324].
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Heidegger argues that scientific understanding is structured on 
the existential level by a particular kind of projection. The existentially 
decisive feature of science is, in his view, neither empirical observation 
nor mathematical modelling, but rather ‘the way in which Nature herself 
is mathematically projected.’22 This mathematical projection determines 
the range of possible ways in which nature may be intelligibly 
experienced, and so understood, both at the practical and the theoretical 
level. It furthermore serves as the existential source from which the 
logical conception of science draws its own currency. In the context 
of scientific activity, the change-over from immersed involvement to 
a theoretical conception of nature is a shift in the existential structure 
of the mathematical projection. According to Heidegger, within the 
scope of intelligibility opened up by this projection, pure looking shifts 
specifically towards a perception of things as objects which can be 
quantitatively determined in terms of such general categories as motion, 
force, location, and time. Only on the basis of this kind of projection 
can the scientist discover something like a ‘fact’ which may then be 
set up as part of an experimental investigation.23 Heidegger suggests 
that this mathematical grounding of factual science was possible only 
because researchers recognised that there are, in principle, no bare facts. 
Science projects the factuality of things in terms of categories amenable 
to quantitative analysis. Furthermore, it does this in such a way that the 
measurability of those things is disclosed as an a priori feature of their 
being. Heidegger thus argues that the existential conditions of possibility 
for the empirico-mathematical sciences are manifest in the projection 
of nature as being essentially measurable in a fixed, quantitative sense. 
After these conditions have been fulfilled, the horizon within which 
the subject is able to intelligibly encounter things limits the possible 
ways in which things may be discovered within the world. Heidegger 
writes that the aim of thematising is ‘to free the entities we encounter 
within-the-world, and to free them in such a way that they can “throw 
themselves against” a pure discovering — that is, in such a way that 
they can become “Objects.”’24
22  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, pp. 413–14 [362].
23  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 414 [362].
24  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 414 [363].
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Once there has been a disturbance in our immersed involvement with 
things as ready-to-hand, it becomes possible for that non-deliberative 
involvement to change over into thematising, and hence for us to begin 
experiencing things as objects rather than as equipment. Heidegger 
emphasises that the change-over in our understanding, from non-
deliberative use of a thing in the course of everyday activity, at the one 
extreme, to thematising and then making propositional assertions about 
that thing, at the other, is marked by a number of intermediate steps. 
As thematising begins to objectify a thing, that thing acquires a more 
determinate meaning; it comes to be experienced as an object whose 
properties are an increasingly well-defined and stable subject matter 
for assertions, and thus better fitted to the propositional structure of 
theoretical and logical modes of understanding. Heidegger also calls 
this a process of articulation: ‘thematizing modifies and Articulates 
the understanding of Being.’25 By articulating the meaning of a thing in 
propositional terms, thematising may also affect the way we understand, 
and hence practically engage with, that thing. Heidegger furthermore 
warns that the intermediate stages of the thematising process cannot 
be understood in terms of the theoretical statements which emerge 
only at the conclusion of the process without dramatically perverting 
the meaning of those stages. Both these intermediate stages, as well as 
the theoretical assertions they finally constitute, have their ‘source’ in 
a circumspective, or practical, form of interpretation.26 For this reason, 
Heidegger argues that logic is rooted in existence.27 The more general 
conclusion to be drawn from this is that the logical conception of science, 
which views science as a coherent body of true propositions, has its 
own original source in a specific existential mode of understanding 
structured by the mathematical projection of nature.
The final implication of Heidegger’s existential conception of 
science is that to construe science in purely theoretical terms, as a body 
of logically organised true propositions, as a conceptual scheme, is to 
ultimately misunderstand its significance as a human enterprise. He 
emphasises that scientific concepts cannot be understood independently 
25  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 415 [364].
26  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 201 [158].
27  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 203 [160]. This claim will be given more 
detailed attention in Chapter Four.
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of scientific method, and that ‘theoretical research is not without a 
praxis of its own.’28 Unsurprisingly, then, his account of science gives a 
central and consequential place to scientists’ practical manipulation of 
equipment:
Reading off the measurements which result from an experiment often 
requires a complicated ‘technical’ set-up for the experimental design. 
Observation with a microscope is dependent upon the production 
of ‘preparations.’ Archaeological excavation, which precedes any 
Interpretation of the ‘findings,’ demands manipulations of the grossest 
kind. But even in the ‘most abstract’ way of working out problems 
and establishing what has been obtained, one manipulates equipment 
for writing, for example. However ‘uninteresting’ and ‘obvious’ such 
components of scientific research may be, they are by no means a matter 
of indifference ontologically.29
Indeed, equipmental manipulations play an integral role in the 
thematising process which gives rise to theoretical knowledge. It is not 
just linguistic practices but also concrete material practices which serve to 
more precisely articulate the meaning of the things taken up as a subject 
matter for science. To say that the instruments and material practices of 
a science are, in part, constitutive of its theoretical and logical content is 
to make a strong ontological claim about the interdependence of theory 
and practice. Yet interdependence is not identity. While theory cannot 
be understood independently of the linguistic and material practices 
which constitute it, it is clear that, for Heidegger, theory and practice 
remain different modes of scientific understanding. He views them as 
distinct but related existential modalities within which the intelligibility 
of things becomes possible.
Heidegger thus appears to suggest that the emergence of a new 
theoretical form of understanding, especially as exemplified historically 
in the development of mathematical physics, marks the emergence of 
a new ontological condition, a new form to human existence wherein 
the subject understands itself as a mental substance and the things 
surrounding it as objects with quantifiably determinable properties. 
In this process, the subject’s own subjectivity likewise becomes 
increasingly modelled in accordance with the proposition: scientific 
28  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 409 [358].
29  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 409 [358].
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knowledge is propositionally structured knowledge. Heidegger’s 
existential conception of science thus challenges the priority of the 
logical conception of science as propositionally structured theory, and 
seeks to reverse that priority by emphasising the concrete existential 
conditions on which theoretical knowledge ultimately depends. But 
this is not a reduction of theory to practice; it is the recognition that, 
although practical and theoretical behaviour are ontologically distinct, 
and although the latter emerges in a change-over from the former, each 
represents a distinct mode of the same existential projection of nature. 
Theory is distinct from, but not ontologically independent of, practice. 
Where the line between the two should be drawn, however, is a question 
Heidegger does not, and perhaps could not, answer. Indeed, he openly 
lamented that ‘it is by no means patent where the ontological boundary 
between “theoretical” and “non-theoretical” behaviour really runs!’30 
That there is indeed a boundary running between them is, however, 
something he did not doubt.
3. Getting at the Real
In Chapter One, we briefly considered the way in which Heidegger 
differentiates his existential analytic of the subject from both realism 
and idealism. With the above discussion of Heidegger’s existential 
conception of science now also behind us, it will be worthwhile to 
return to his comments on realism and idealism and considering them 
in greater depth.
Heidegger superficially agrees with the realist that things within-
the-world are present-at-hand, in the sense that they exist. However, he 
criticises the realist for conceptualising the presence-at-hand of things 
in strictly epistemological terms, as the ‘objecthood’ of independently 
existing objects of knowledge. This conceptualisation takes it for 
granted that propositional thinking is itself a fundamental mode of the 
subject’s existence, that the subject’s relation to a thing within-the-world 
is fundamentally that of a substance-subject examining an independent 
object. Hence, Heidegger describes realism as the belief that ‘the way 
to grasp the Real is by that kind of knowing which is characterized 
30  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 409 [358].
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by beholding [das anschauende Erkennen].’31 Yet, as we saw in the 
previous section, such knowing (or cognising) emerges from a change-
over in the subject’s understanding of things from things ready-to-hand 
to things present-at-hand, and so, for this reason, Heidegger goes on 
to question whether our ‘primary access’ to the real, that is, to existing 
things, can be suitably captured by the traditional epistemological 
conception of knowledge as rooted in the observational powers of a 
substance-subject positioned vis-à-vis an object.32 Indeed, he argues 
instead that perceptual examination presupposes thematisation. The 
central failing of realism, according to Heidegger, is that it asserts the 
independent reality of objects while simultaneously projecting that 
reality as part of an objectifying thematisation which depends for its 
possibility on the subject’s existence. In this regard, Heidegger views 
idealism as the more successful position, since it affirms the ontological 
dependency of objects on our understanding of them. In other words, 
idealism rejects the realist claim that our knowledge of objects within-
the-world provides evidence for the independent existence of the real as 
such. However, Heidegger dismisses the conclusion which the idealist 
then draws from this insight: that the real must therefore exist only in 
consciousness, that it must be constituted solely by the subject.33 On 
Heidegger’s account, neither realism nor idealism offers a defensible 
position because they both remain entangled in the epistemological 
problematic, and hence they both fail to recognise the ontological basis 
for that problematic in the subject’s own existence. As he puts it, realism 
and idealism ‘can exist only on the basis of a neglect: they presuppose a 
concept of “subject” and “object” without clarifying these basic concepts 
with respect to the basic composition of Dasein itself.’34
Although Heidegger offers his existential analytic of the subject as 
an alternative to both realism and idealism, in this section I will argue 
that Heidegger’s position is nevertheless compatible with a ‘minimal’ 
form of realism. I contrast this minimal realism with the ‘robust’ realism 
typically espoused by scientific realists. The difference between these 
31  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 246 [202].
32  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 246 [202].
33  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 251 [207].
34  Martin Heidegger (1985), History of the Concept of Time, trans. by Theodore Kisiel 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press), pp. 222–23.
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two doctrines becomes clear once we recognise that robust realism is 
comprised of two distinct theses. The first thesis declares that things can 
exist independently of our own existence, that they are not the products 
of our interpretations, theories, or practices. The second thesis makes 
the more complex assertion that the determinate properties of these 
things, including their relational or structural properties, can also exist 
independently of our own existence. Robust realism affirms both the 
first and the second thesis, while minimal realism affirms only the first 
thesis. I will call this first thesis the ‘basic independence thesis.’ As we 
will see in the next section, this twofold account of realism has striking 
similarities with SSK practitioner Barry Barnes’s account of ‘double-
barrelled’ realism.
That Heidegger’s existential conception of science is compatible with 
the basic independence thesis can be seen in his careful discrimination 
between reality, on the one hand, and the real, on the other. He writes, 
for example, that ‘Being (not entities) is dependent on the understanding 
of Dasein; that is to say, Reality (not the Real) is dependent on care,’ 
with care being a fundamental existential structure in the subjectivity 
of the subject. He furthermore emphasises the dependency of reality on 
the subject when he says of reality that ‘ontologically it has a definite 
connection in its foundations with Dasein, the world, and readiness-to-
hand.’ Finally, he argues that, when entities are conceived as a ‘context 
of Things (res),’ by which he means a context of ‘substances,’ the being 
of those entities acquires the meaning of ‘Reality,’ or ‘substantiality.’35 
Again, the idea is that things can be held distinct from the way in which 
they are experienced and conceptualised by the subject, including 
their conceptualisation as property-bearing substances. In short, one 
may interpret Heidegger as arguing that reality depends on the 
subject’s understanding. In the absence of such understanding, there 
can be no reality. However, the real, in contrast, is independent of 
the subject’s understanding, and hence may exist in the absence of 
such understanding. Note, furthermore, that Heidegger is careful to 
distinguish the independent existence of the real from the assertion of its 
independent existence.
35  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, pp. 255 [212], 245 [201].
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Of course only as long as Dasein is (that is, only as long as an understanding 
of Being is […] possible), ‘is there’ [gibt es] Being. When Dasein does not 
exist, ‘independence’ ‘is’ not either, nor ‘is’ the ‘in-itself.’ In such a case 
this sort of thing can be neither understood nor not understood. In such 
a case even entities within-the-world can neither be discovered nor lie 
hidden. In such a case it cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said 
that they are not. But now, as long as there is an understanding of Being 
and therefore an understanding of presence-at-hand, it can indeed be 
said that in this case entities will still continue to be.36
The point here is that, in the absence of the subject, there would be 
nobody around to assert the independent existence of the real. The 
real could thus not be understood to exist independently of the subject 
because, in such a case, understanding itself would be absent. However, 
in the context of the current discussion, where there is understanding, it 
becomes possible to assert that the real does indeed exist independently 
of our understanding, and furthermore that it will continue to so exist 
even once we, and hence our understanding, are gone. The assertion that 
the real exists independently of the subject, and even the fact that it so 
exists, entails the existence of the subject, but the independent existence 
of the real does not.
This issue may be further illuminated by introducing a distinction 
between a thing’s existence and its intelligibility. There is, according 
to Heidegger, an internal relation between the subject’s being-in-the-
world, on the one hand, and the intelligibility of the real, on the other. 
Only things disclosed within the context of the subject-world relation 
may be encountered as intelligible. In other words, intelligibility can 
be a feature only of things within-the-world; a thing without-the-world 
cannot be understood by the subject, and, for this reason, it cannot be 
intelligible.
In Being and Time, Heidegger explores two phenomenologically 
distinct ways in which we may encounter the real as intelligible: either 
in terms of ‘readiness-to-hand’ (Zuhandenheit, or ‘equipmentality’), 
or in terms of ‘presence-at-hand’ (Vorhandenheit). In the former case, 
equipment is that with which we are involved in our workaday dealings 
in the world. In the course of our ongoing immersed involvement 
with equipmental things, we understand the world as a work-world, 
36  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 255 [212].
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a totality of interrelated equipment available for our use. In the latter 
case, substances, or objects, are those things about which we concern 
ourselves when we take up a spectator’s position in the world. Through 
our encounters with things as objects of observation, we may thus 
develop an understanding of the world as an object-world, a totality 
of substance with thematically determinable properties. According to 
Heidegger, the world encountered in this second way is what realists 
refer to as ‘reality.’ Realists thus violate the basic independence thesis 
insofar as they identify the real, as such, with the way it is encountered 
‘in reality,’ that is, in the world constituted by a particular mode of the 
subject’s projective understanding.
From this it should be clear that to distinguish the existence of the 
real from its intelligibility is to assert that the real may exist without the 
world, which is just to say, without the subject. This assertion forms the 
basis for the minimal realism which I suggest is present in Heidegger’s 
early work. The assertion is most powerfully evinced in Being and Time, 
in the different ways in which Heidegger uses the term ‘present-at-
hand,’ and in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, with the distinction 
he draws between the existence and essence of a thing. Let us now 
consider the evidence from these two texts.
That Heidegger uses the term ‘present-at-hand’ in different ways has 
often been overlooked by commentators, and this has led to significant 
confusion over his intentions in Being and Time. One influential example 
of such confusion, present in the work of Joseph Rouse, will be 
addressed later in this chapter. In the meantime, it should be noted that 
Heidegger himself did not articulate these different uses as explicitly as 
he might have, and so responsibility for the subsequent confusion must 
lie, in some considerable part, at his own feet. Possibly the best study 
seeking to clarify these tricky exegetical matters comes from Joseph Fell, 
who detects at least four distinct senses for the term ‘present-at-hand’ in 
Heidegger’s early work. Only two of these need worry us here.37 In the 
first case, a thing is encountered as present-at-hand following a local 
37  Joseph P. Fell (1989), ‘The Familiar and the Strange: On the Limits of Praxis in the 
Early Heidegger,’ in Heidegger and Praxis, ed. by Thomas J. Nenon (The Southern 
Journal of Philosophy 28, Spindel Conference Supplement), pp. 23–41. Of the two 
other senses, the first is an ‘improper’ sense in which all entities, including the 
subject, are referred to as present-at-hand things. Obviously, this is not a use to 
which Heidegger puts the word. The second is a sense in which all referentiality 
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breakdown in the subject’s workaday world. In the second case, the 
term denotes those things which have been thematised as objects. In 
the first case, one encounters the real as something which exists but 
which cannot be understood, something which lacks intelligibility. In 
the second case, one encounters the real as something which both exists 
and is intelligible. We have already met both of these modes of being 
present-at-hand in the previous section. According to Heidegger’s 
phenomenological description of equipmental breakdowns, when I 
stand desperate and discombobulated in front of my locked office 
door, I experience the door deficiently as a thing ‘just-present-at-hand-
and-no-more.’ In contrast, when I encounter a thing thematically, as 
an object of perception, and hence also as the potential subject matter 
for a propositional assertion, I experience it as possessing ‘a definite 
character in its being-present-at-hand-in-such-and-such-a-manner.’38 
These two ways in which the real can be present-at-hand — as either 
present-at-hand-in-such-and-such-a-manner or present-at-hand-and-
no-more — correspond, respectively, to things present-at-hand within-
the-world and things present-at-hand without-the-world. The second 
is phenomenologically available only when there is a deficiency in our 
understanding, a breakdown in the subject-world relation. Under these 
circumstances, we can still say that the thing exists, but we cannot say 
what it is. When such a deficiency occurs, the real can still be experienced 
as something which exists, but it lacks any determinate character by 
which we could make sense of it.
This crucial distinction is a central outcome of Heidegger’s enquiry 
into the ‘question of being,’ that is, into the meaning of the infinitive 
verb ‘to be’ and its cognates. In Being and Time, Heidegger lists a number 
of ‘prejudices and presuppositions which are constantly reimplanting 
and fostering the belief that an inquiry into Being is unnecessary.’39 One 
such prejudice is the assumption that the meaning of ‘being’ is self-
evident. He notes that ‘[w]henever one cognizes anything or makes 
an assertion, whenever one comports oneself towards things, even 
towards oneself, some use is made of “Being”; and this expression 
fails and the world as a whole becomes unintelligible. Attention will be given to 
this underappreciated use of ‘present-at-hand’ in the latter part of Chapter Three.
38  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 200 [158].
39  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 22 [2–3].
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is held to be intelligible “without further ado,” just as everyone 
understands “The sky is blue,” “I am merry,” and the like.’40 Heidegger 
resists the impulse to treat the meaning of ‘being’ as self-evident. One 
important observation he makes is that the word ‘being’ is polysemic. 
In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, a set of lectures he delivered in 
1927, the same year in which Being and Time was published, Heidegger 
identifies at least two basic meanings for the term ‘being’ — existence 
and essence — and he argues that both belong to the being of a thing. 
Furthermore, the existence of a thing answers to the question of whether 
it is, and its essence answers to the question of what it is.41 Two years later, 
in a 1929–1930 lecture course, Heidegger would restate the whether and 
what of a thing in terms of a thing’s ‘that-being’ and ‘what-being.’42 In 
most cases, these two meanings will combine in a single proposition: 
‘The sky is blue’ tells us both that there is a sky, that it exists, and that it 
has the property, the whatness or quidditas, of being blue.
The distinction between existence and essence is an ancient one. 
Indeed, Heidegger points out that its roots can be traced back to the 
biblical notion of a divine Creator: ‘The ancient distinction runs thus: 
Since every entity that is actual comes from God, the understanding of 
the being of entities must ultimately be traced back to God.’43 This ancient 
doctrine was transformed by medieval Christian metaphysicians into the 
idea that entities exist only as the creatures of God, that is, as produced. 
Hence, essence — as pure potentiality in the ‘mind’ of God — takes 
priority over existence — as God’s idea made actual. Echoing Plato, 
the philosopher Charles Kahn has offered an apt description of this 
doctrine: ‘existence now tends to be thought of as the final push into 
actual being provided by the Demiurge, as He sends things forth from 
His pre-cosmic workshop of logical possibilities.’44
As we saw in Chapter One, Heidegger reversed this ontological 
order in his existential analysis of the subject. For him, ‘[t]he essence 
40  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 23 [4].
41  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, pp. 78, 88.
42  Martin Heidegger (1995a [1983]), The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, 
Finitude, Solitude, trans. by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press), p. 331.
43  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 81; translation modified.
44  Charles H. Kahn (1966), ‘The Greek Verb “To Be” and the Concept of Being,’ 
Foundations of Language 2, 245–65 (p. 264).
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of Dasein lies in its existence.’45 We can now see that Heidegger made 
a similar move with respect to present-at-hand things, that is, things 
which exist but are not subjects, insofar as he took their existence to also 
be phenomenologically prior to their essence. However, such things 
are unlike the subject in that their essence does not lie in their own 
existence; it lies rather in the world as constituted by the existence of 
the subject. Hence, the essence of such things depends on our existence, 
but their existence does not. It is important to note that Heidegger does 
not so much reject the ancient productionist metaphysics as challenge 
its Christian interpretation. As the source of essence and meaning, 
human beings now assume the role of creator. Yet, notwithstanding 
such fictional things as Don Quixote or Daffy Duck, neither of which 
is present-at-hand, human beings do not produce things ex nihilo. 
Indeed, drawing from a pre-Christian productionist metaphysics, the 
early Heidegger argues that when something is produced it is always 
produced from something else; the notion of production thus always 
presupposes the prior existence of some material: ‘If we bring to mind 
productive comportment in the scope of its full structure we see that 
it always makes use of what we call material, for instance, material 
for building a house. On its part this material is in the end not in turn 
produced but is already there.’46 From this observation, Heidegger draws 
the more general conclusion that, when considering any productive 
activity, ‘matter’ necessarily arises as a basic phenomenological 
concept.47 The subject discovers this indeterminate material in use as 
equipment ready-to-hand, or the subject may step back and observe it 
as an object present-at-hand. In either case, the material is experienced 
as something within-the-world, as ‘intraworldly.’ Yet Heidegger also 
makes it clear that this material, which he also calls ‘nature,’ does not 
depend on the subject for its existence:
[I]ntraworldliness does not belong to nature’s being. Rather, in commerce 
with this entity, nature in the broadest sense, we understand that this 
entity is as something extant, as an entity that we come up against, to 
which we are delivered over, which on its own part already is. It is, even 
if we do not uncover it, without our encountering it within our world. 
45  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 67 [42].
46  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 115.
47  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 116.
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Being within the world devolves upon this entity, nature, solely when it is 
uncovered as an entity.48
So as to leave no doubt that this indeterminate thing, nature, can 
exist independently of subjectivity and world, Heidegger repeats the 
point several more times: ‘[n]ature can also be when no Dasein exists’; 
‘[n]ature can also be without there being a world, without a Dasein 
existing.’49 My argument in this section has been that Heidegger’s 
concepts of pure extantness or existence, of presence-at-hand without-
the-world, of indeterminate matter, and of independent nature can all 
be read as various attempts to get at ‘the real,’ that is, at that which 
exists independently of our theoretical and practical activity. Together, 
they provide a richly articulated argument in defence of the basic 
independence thesis, and hence for the position I call ‘minimal realism.’
In the next section, we will return to a discussion of the sociology 
of scientific knowledge. Specifically, I aim to show that SSK’s oft-
overlooked endorsement of realism is importantly similar to the 
minimal realism I have now drawn out of Heidegger’s early texts. By 
exploiting these similarities, it becomes possible to free SSK’s realism 
from the difficulties arising from its lingering adherence to the ontology 
implicit in the orthodox subject-object distinction. In the next but one 
section, I will then demonstrate the virtues of minimal realism in critical 
comparison with an influential, alternative interpretation of early 
Heidegger’s philosophy of science, that of Joseph Rouse.
4. A Phenomenological Reformulation  
of SSK’s Residual Realism
As discussed in Chapter One, SSK practitioners are often criticised 
by their opponents for allegedly subscribing to sociological idealism. 
The underlying premise driving such criticism seems to be that social 
constructivism is incompatible with realism. There is a puzzle here, 
however, as leading SSK practitioners have consistently insisted on 
their credentials both as social constructivists and as realists. For them, 
the two positions are not mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, there can be 
48  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 169; translation modified.
49  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 170, 175.
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no doubt that social constructivists do reject something that scientific 
realists hold dear. So, what is it? Barry Barnes provides an answer. He 
suggests that realism, as it is usually defined in the literature, is actually 
a ‘double-barrelled’ realism, that is, a combination of two distinct 
claims: (1) that an external reality exists independently of our beliefs 
and theories; and (2) that the truth of specific beliefs and theories is 
determined by that reality.50 Barnes claims that most realists in the 
philosophy of science take both of these claims for granted, but that the 
first alone provides sufficient grounds for claiming the credentials of a 
realist. It is this first claim which many SSK practitioners accept, making 
them adherents to a position which Barnes dubs ‘residual realism.’ He 
argues that residual realism is compatible with social constructivism.
Barnes’s distinction immediately recalls the distinction I drew in 
the previous section between two theses: the independent existence of 
nature; and the independent existence of the determinate properties or 
structures of nature. I called the first of these the ‘basic independence 
thesis’ and defined minimal realism as a position which affirms this first 
thesis while rejecting the second. Barnes’s first claim appears almost 
identical with the basic independence thesis, and thus his residual 
realism would seem very close to my minimal realism. Indeed, at 
one point in his discussion, Barnes even describes residual realism as 
‘minimal realism.’51 Yet, there is an important difference between the 
two. Barnes’s residual realism asserts the independence of an ‘external 
reality.’ Minimal realism, in contrast, asserts the independence of an 
indeterminate and undifferentiated nature. As we have seen, there is an 
important conceptual difference between the notion of an indeterminate 
nature and the notion of an external reality: the latter implies a theoretical 
commitment not found in the former. This is a commitment to what, in 
Chapter One, I called the glass-bulb model. Because he takes the glass-
bulb model for granted, Barnes’s residual realism has more in common 
with standard forms of realism than does minimal realism.
Heidegger argues that the orthodox realist asserts the independence of 
reality while unwittingly projecting that reality as part of an objectifying 
50  Barnes (1992a), ‘Relativism, Realism and Finitism,’ in Cognitive Realism and Social 
Science, ed. by Diederick Raven, Lietke van Vucht and Jan de Wolf (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Transaction), pp. 131–47 (p. 132).
51  Barnes (1992a), ‘Relativism, Realism and Finitism,’ p. 133.
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thematisation which itself depends on the subject’s being-in-the-world. 
‘Reality’ is thus a concept whose meaning derives from our picture of the 
world as a totality of objects standing in ontological separation from a 
cognising subject. On this basis, the traditional realist must now explain 
how the ontological divide between subject and object may be crossed, 
how one may transit from the inside to the outside of the glass bulb, how, 
in short, knowledge of the external world is possible. The prevailing 
tendency of orthodox realists is to root knowledge of the external world 
in the observational powers of the subject. Underlying this tendency is the 
assumption that the subject is itself a special sort of object, a substance with 
an added perceptual power which gives it access to the objects populating 
a world beyond itself. Heidegger, of course, rejects the primacy of this 
epistemological model, analysing it in existential-phenomenological 
terms as depending on a more basic subject-world relation in light of 
which the epistemological problematic no longer carries force. In this way, 
as we saw in Chapter One, Heidegger is able to short-circuit sceptical 
doubts about the existence of an external world by deconstructing the 
premises uncritically adopted by the sceptic and traditional realist alike. 
As we also saw in Chapter One, many SSK practitioners, Barnes included, 
join traditional realists in uncritically adopting those premises, and so 
they are perpetually vulnerable to sceptical attack.
My argument in this section is that SSK need only defend the basic 
independence thesis in order to achieve its goals. This thesis is what 
remains once one has stripped Barnes’s first claim — that an external 
reality exists independently of our beliefs and theories — of the additional 
theoretical premises to which it also needlessly commits itself. Because 
SSK practitioners have failed to sufficiently recognise the contingency 
of those premises, thus tacitly accepting the fundamentality of the glass-
bulb model, they end up defending an unnecessarily robust position 
which renders their approach ineluctably vulnerable to sceptical attack. 
It must be emphasised, however, that, in recommending that SSK 
practitioners trade their theoretically-loaded residual realism for a more 
phenomenologically modest minimal realism, I am not suggesting that 
the orthodox subject-object distinction should simply be abandoned 
as a useless bit of conceptual confusion. Indeed, one can easily agree 
that the style of thought which takes this distinction as its foundation 
has produced valuable results. The point is that this style of thought, 
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despite its success in specific areas, has proved incapable of defending 
itself against sceptical doubt. Indeed, it may well be that the inescapable 
possibility of such doubt is an inherent feature of that very style. If 
the orthodox distinction were accepted as the conceptual bedrock for 
our way of understanding ourselves and the world in which we live, 
then we would need to simply accept sceptical doubt as an inevitable 
feature of our very existence. But neither this distinction nor the 
ontological presuppositions underlying it form the conceptual bedrock 
of our understanding, and hence they need not ground our conviction 
that nature exists independently of our theories, interpretations, and 
practices. If we wish only to defend the indubitability of the basic 
independence thesis, then there is no reason why we should also 
saddle ourselves with the more onerous, and probably fruitless, task 
of defending the indubitability of an allegedly fundamental distinction 
between subject and object.
Yet this is just what David Bloor has attempted to do. He argues that 
the received subject-object distinction, once freed from individualism, 
is a foundational concept, and he does this on the basis of a theory of 
reference. In his view, ‘[r]eference is an intentional state demanding 
intentional, conceptual and propositional content, that is, things which 
require an explanation of their normativity and objectivity.’52 Bloor 
naturally favours a sociological explanation of the normativity and 
objectivity of such content. For him, reference is a collective achievement 
made possible by social interaction. This sociological theory of the 
normativity and objectivity of conceptual content is a central pillar 
of SSK. Bloor furthermore claims that reference is an intentional state 
demanding intentional, conceptual, and propositional content. For the 
purposes of the present analysis, whether that content is best explained 
in collectivist or individualist terms is beside the point. In the remainder 
of this section, the meaning of the term ‘subject’ should thus be treated 
as neutral between the terms ‘group’ and ‘individual.’
The principal problem with Bloor’s theory of reference is that he 
takes it to apply, not just to objects within the world, but to the world as 
such. He writes of ‘genuine reference to an external reality.’53 In addition, 
52  David Bloor (2001), ‘What Is a Social Construct?,’ Facta Philosophica 3, 141–56 (p. 
148).
53  Bloor (2001), ‘What Is a Social Construct?,’ p. 149.
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he seems to think that knowledge of an external reality is a necessary 
condition for reference to particular objects. Yet, from the perspective 
of existential phenomenology, Bloor has got things backwards. In fact, 
knowledge of particular objects is a necessary condition for referring 
to the world, as such, as an external reality. Only once we have 
experienced things within-the-world as objects, and hence as distinct 
from a subject, can we then conceptualise the world itself as a reality 
which stands externally to a subject; only under these conditions does 
reference to an external reality become possible. Furthermore, reference 
to an object depends on a specific existential mode of being-in-the-
world. We can refer to objects only because we are already in the world; 
the subject-world relation is ontologically prior to an encounter with 
things within-the-world as objects. Thus Bloor is right that acceptance 
of the subject-object distinction is entailed by the claim that an external 
reality exists, but he is wrong that this claim must be endorsed out 
of necessity. That he believes we cannot help but accept this claim is 
implied in his assertion that ‘we are all instinctive realists.’54 But the 
belief in an external reality is not hardwired into our brains; it is the 
result of a change-over in the subject’s mode of understanding, a change 
from immersed involvement with things to a thematising projection of 
things, and then of the world itself, as objects of knowledge standing 
in separation from an autonomous subject. Belief in an external reality 
thus presupposes the diagnostic model of the glass bulb.
The key point here is that the subject-object distinction is a modification 
of the more fundamental subject-world relation. Moreover, this second 
relation is internal; there can be no world which exists independently of 
the subject. The implication is that the subject-object relation is thus also 
an internal relation; there can be no object which exists independently 
of the subject. However, this is not to say that nothing at all exists 
independently of the subject. As Heidegger writes, ‘[n]ature can also be 
without there being a world, without a Dasein existing.’55 Hence, nature 
should not be confused with the world, including the world projected 
thematically as an external reality. Yet this is what Bloor does. He writes 
that ‘nature, in our ordinary way of thinking, is the object of knowledge, 
the thing that is known, while science is the knowledge we have of it, our 
54  David Bloor (1996), ‘Idealism and the Sociology of Knowledge,’ Social Studies of 
Science 26(4), 839–56 (p. 845).
55  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 175.
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theories about it and our description of it.’56 Bloor appeals to our ‘ordinary’ 
way of thinking in order to maintain a strict distinction between nature 
and its scientific description, between an object of cognition and its 
conceptualisation by a cognising subject. Yet it is not clear why we should 
accept Bloor’s implicit assumption that ordinary thinking demands 
acceptance of the subject-object distinction, that is, the theory-laden view 
that nature itself is an object of observation. It seems more ‘ordinary’ to 
say that nature is just that which exists independently of our descriptions 
and theories. This is precisely what is claimed in the basic independence 
thesis of minimal realism, and it has the advantage of avoiding the sorts 
of sceptical problems inevitably attracted by a foundational commitment 
to the subject-object distinction. As long as Bloor insists on calling nature 
an object, on conceiving of it in terms of one side of the subject-object 
schema, as long as he takes the glass-bulb model for granted, he cannot 
comfortably maintain the independence thesis that is basic to any genuine 
realist position. However, as soon as he gives up conceptualising nature 
as an object, he can no longer include nature, as such, under the umbrella 
of his theory of reference, because under that theory reference is always 
reference to an object, to a thing present-at-hand within-the-world.
There are some signs that Bloor has recognised this lattermost problem. 
In remarkable coincidence with Heidegger’s comments on production, 
Bloor observes that the idea of construction has connotations of ‘building 
and making’: ‘What is built, must be built from something: construction 
needs materials. Despite the claims of critics, the very term precludes the 
idea that “everything is constructed.”’57 Moreover, in discussing Kuhn’s 
account of scientific discovery, Bloor writes: ‘The scientist must come to 
realise that something is the case, and what is the case. There must be 
some generalised awareness of novelty and also a conceptualisation 
of the novelty.’58 At first, the scientist only encounters nature as pure 
extantness, as an indeterminately existing thing, and hence as something 
which escapes conceptualisation. According to Bloor’s theory of reference, 
when a thing cannot be conceptualised, it cannot be an object of reference 
56  David Bloor (2004a), ‘Sociology of Scientific Knowledge,’ in Handbook of Epistemology, 
ed. by I. Niiniluoto, M. Sintonen and J. Woleński (Dordecht: Kluwer), pp. 919–62 (p. 
942).
57  David Bloor (2003), ‘Skepticism and the Social Construction of Science and 
Technology: The Case of the Boundary Layer,’ in The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, 
ed. by Steven Luper (Aldershot: Ashgate), pp. 249–65 (p. 263).
58  Bloor (2001), ‘What Is a Social Construct?,’ p. 150.
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or intention. The scientist’s encounter thus cannot be characterised as an 
epistemic one, as an act of knowing or believing, but only as a ‘generalised 
awareness’ of the thing’s brute existence. Only by thematising the thing, 
only by interpreting its brute existence in the context of a world of pre-
structured anticipations, can the scientist make sense of that thing, and 
only then can she begin to form concepts about the thing’s essence, about 
what it is. Here, then, Bloor seems poised to limit the application of his 
theory of reference, and hence also his commitment to the subject-object 
distinction, so as to accommodate the phenomenological observation that 
we are able to experience nature in its brute state of indeterminate and 
undifferentiated existence. In other words, Bloor seems ready to accept 
the basic independence thesis of minimal realism.
Yet, Bloor then appears to lose his nerve. He writes that ‘[t]he pure 
“empiricist” encounter with the world corresponds roughly to the that.’59 
By modelling experience of nature in orthodox empiricist terms, Bloor 
appears to slip back into the problematic embrace of the subject-object 
distinction. As a consequence, he conflates a generalised awareness of 
nature in its brute existence for a conceptualisation of it in terms of an 
external world. He suggests that
[t]he typical empiricist interrogation of a knowledge claim (to find out 
exactly what the claimants saw, heard, smelled, tasted, and touched) can 
be thought of as providing the raw materials out of which concepts are 
constructed. Notice that what is at issue here are sensory processes, that 
is, psychological and physiological causes of belief. […] The causal story 
begins with observations not observation reports.60
Bloor assimilates the ‘raw materials’ of experience to objects of 
observation because he takes for granted the idea that the human being 
is a substance-subject which gains epistemic access to an external reality 
through ‘sensory processes.’ On this model, the subject is treated as an 
object distinguishable from other objects by its possession of a special 
power of perception. Observation, then, is meant to pierce the glass bulb 
separating the subject from the external world. The sceptic, of course, 
could not be happier with this particular arrangement.
59  Bloor (2001), ‘What Is a Social Construct?,’ p. 150.
60  Bloor (2001), ‘What Is a Social Construct?,’ p. 153.
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The obstacle blocking SSK practitioners’ unambiguous endorsement 
of the basic independence thesis is their tacit adherence to the glass-bulb 
model. Their reason for securing this schema at the centre of their social 
theory of knowledge is an admirable one: they wish to reconcile social 
constructivism with realism by holding fast the distinction between 
nature, on the one hand, and descriptions of nature, on the other. 
Unfortunately, they believe that this task entails a commitment to the 
fundamentality of the subject-object distinction. But such a commitment 
is unnecessary for, and indeed contrary to, their ultimate goal. As I 
hope to have shown thus far, once a distinction has been made between 
nature and world, the subject-object distinction can be set aside while 
still preserving the distinction between nature and its description. In 
other words, the basic independence thesis can be maintained without 
recourse to the orthodox subject-object schema. By accepting this thesis, 
and by thus trading in their residual realism for a minimal realism 
rooted in existential phenomenology, SSK practitioners would preserve 
their coveted distinction between nature and its description, and hence 
also be able to more effectively assert their credentials as both realists 
and social constructivists.
One implication of the present argument is that Heidegger’s own 
early philosophy is compatible with the social constructivism favoured 
by SSK practitioners. This is a suggestion I am happy to accept. However, 
as we will see in the next section, the philosopher Joseph Rouse has 
presented a different interpretation of Heidegger, to the effect that 
the latter’s early philosophy instead motivates a social constructivism 
in which no place at all can be found for a realist position, not even a 
minimal one. This presents a powerful challenge to the interpretation 
being elaborated here, and so we must give it careful consideration.
5. Rouse on Heidegger and Realism
Joseph Rouse is arguably the most prominent figure in science studies 
to have made positive use of Heidegger’s early philosophy of science. 
In his 1987 book, Knowledge and Power, where he laid out the basic 
architecture of his reading of Heidegger, Rouse combines Heidegger’s 
hermeneutics — the study of thinking as interpretation — with his 
phenomenology of practice in order to craft what Rouse calls a ‘practical 
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hermeneutics of science.’61 This practical hermeneutics treats science as 
a collection of interrelated interpretative practices, rather than as an 
abstract system of concepts and theories. These interpretative practices 
are exemplified by material activities in the scientific laboratory. Rouse 
thus accepts Heidegger’s existential conception of science, and attempts 
to further elaborate it by exploring the constitutive role played by 
material practice in relation to concrete modes of scientific existence.
Rouse argues that Heidegger’s hermeneutics was motivated by the 
question of ‘how it is that anything shows up at all.’ According to him, 
Heidegger answered this question with the argument that the subjects 
for whom things ‘show up’ must have certain characteristics, the 
foremost among them being their membership in a ‘self-adjudicating 
community.’62 Members of a self-adjudicating community recognise 
one another on the basis of their shared ways of responding to a 
common environment. Rouse thus argues that Heidegger’s word 
for the subject, Dasein, denotes the communal state of being ‘socially 
and behaviorally self-adjudicating interpreters.’63 In other words, the 
subjectivity of the subject is enmeshed in the intersubjective realm of 
a community of subjects. Heidegger calls this the subject’s ‘being-with,’ 
and he argues that, like being-in-the-world, it is a fundamental aspect 
of the subjectivity of the subject.64 On this construal of Heidegger, Rouse 
concludes that, if anything is to ‘show up at all,’ then it must show up for 
a self-adjudicating interpretive community. Furthermore, because this 
community is defined in terms of practical, as opposed to theoretical, 
acts of interpretation, it is on the basis of practical rather than theoretical 
interpretive acts that things ‘show up.’ Rouse locates these practical acts 
in the material practices of the sciences, with particular emphasis on 
61  The present discussion draws, in part, from Jeff Kochan (2011a), ‘Getting Real with 
Rouse and Heidegger,’ Perspectives on Science 19(1), 81–115, which offers a more 
detailed critique of Rouse’s practical hermeneutics of science in the context of his 
interpretation of Heidegger. Anna de Bruyckere and Maarten Van Dyck have tried 
to defend Rouse against this critique (Anna de Bruyckere and Maarten Van Dyck 
(2013), ‘Being in or Getting at the Real: Kochan on Rouse, Heidegger and Minimal 
Realism,’ Perspectives of Science 21(4), 453–62). However, their argument crucially 
depends on the false claim that I treat existence as the ‘property’ of a thing. My 
view is that a thing must exist in order to have a property. Properties constitute the 
essence (whatness), not the existence (thatness), of things.
62  Rouse (1987a), Knowledge and Power, p. 73.
63  Rouse (1987a), Knowledge and Power, p. 73.
64  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 149 [114].
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laboratory practices. For him, the laboratory is the principal site where 
things ‘show up’ in the sciences.
There is, however, a tension in Rouse’s reading of Heidegger, a 
tension which does not exist in Heidegger’s own work. On the one hand, 
Rouse is concerned with the conditions which make it possible for a thing 
to ‘show up at all.’ On the other hand, he describes those conditions as 
interpretive conditions, that is, as the social and behavioural conditions 
which enable a community to successfully interpret a thing. The tension 
is this. The conditions enabling something to ‘show up at all’ would 
seem to be existence conditions, that is, the conditions which enable a 
thing to exist at all. This is indeed how Rouse often presents them. Yet, 
conditions of existence are not the same as conditions of interpretation, 
for it seems clear that a thing must exist before it can be interpreted. 
Interpretation thus presupposes existence. Hence, to run existence 
and interpretation together, as Rouse does, is to court conceptual 
incoherence.
Rouse attempts to resolve this conflict, and so to escape the threat of 
incoherence, by assimilating existence to meaning. He writes that ‘there 
is no fact of the matter about whether things that cannot intelligibly 
be encountered within a meaningful world exist or do not exist.’65 And 
he endorses the ‘invocation of meaning as the arbiter of […] existence 
conditions for things.’66 On this view, existence presupposes meaning. 
Hence, Rouse reverses the apparently common-sense claim that 
interpretation presupposes existence. For him, interpretation does not 
presuppose existence, it presupposes meaning. And meaning is, in his 
view, the condition of possibility for existence.
This position may allow Rouse to dodge the charge of incoherence, 
but at what cost? The claim that meaning precedes existence would seem 
to contradict common sense. Moreover, by making existence dependent 
on interpretation, Rouse effectively abandons the core realist doctrine 
of independent existence. Existence now means existence relative to 
an interpretive community. It must also be noted that Rouse’s position 
fails to reflect Heidegger’s own view of these matters. Indeed, as this 
chapter has already demonstrated, Heidegger offers a different way 
of resolving the conflict. Contrary to what Rouse claims, Heidegger’s 
65  Rouse (1987a), Knowledge and Power, p. 160.
66  Rouse (1987a), Knowledge and Power, p. 162.
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hermeneutics of the subject is not driven by the question of how things 
show up at all, but rather by the question of how things show up as what 
they are. A key aspect of Heidegger’s position, overlooked by Rouse, is 
his distinction between the that-being and what-being of a thing, that 
is, between its existence and its essence. Rouse is partly right that, 
for Heidegger, the being of a thing depends on its being meaningful, 
because Heidegger does argue that the what-being, or essence, of a thing 
depends on its being either practically or theoretically interpreted by a 
self-adjudicating community. But the that-being of the thing does not 
depend on its being so interpreted. A thing may exist without meaning 
anything at all, without being intelligible for a community.
Although Rouse shows no awareness of Heidegger’s distinction 
between existence and essence, he does recognise that Heidegger’s 
work includes elements which resist the use to which Rouse would like 
to put it. Principal among these is Heidegger’s concept of ‘change-over,’ 
which, as discussed earlier in this chapter, describes the transformation 
in understanding of a thing from its being ready-to-hand to its being 
present-at-hand within-the-world. According to Rouse, the concept 
of change-over marks Heidegger’s vestigial attachment to a theory-
dominant account of the scientific enterprise. He thus rejects it as a 
retrograde move betraying Heidegger’s otherwise laudable commitment 
to a practical hermeneutics of science which gives pride of place to 
material practice.67 Indeed, according to Rouse, ‘the theory-dominant 
perspective that Heidegger still retains […] reduces experiment to 
a merely incidental practice in science.’68 Even though Heidegger, as 
we saw above, offers some examples of the material practice of science, 
Rouse dismisses these as ‘research practices that are only associated 
with theoretical cognition’ rather than being constitutive of it.69 He thus 
concludes that, on Heidegger’s allegedly retrograde account, material 
67  Rouse (1987a), Knowledge and Power, p. 74.
68  Rouse (1987a), Knowledge and Power, p. 79.
69  Rouse (1987a), Knowledge and Power, p. 76. I criticises this statement in more detail in 
Kochan (2011a), ‘Getting Real with Rouse and Heidegger,’ p. 105. Denis McManus 
also challenges the veracity of Rouse’s statement (Denis McManus (2012), Heidegger 
and the Measure of Truth: Themes from his Early Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press), p. 66 n. 60). Elsewhere, McManus has also carefully examined the complex 
relationship between the ‘theoretical’ and the ‘practical’ in Heidegger’s early work 
(Denis McManus (2007), ‘Heidegger, Measurement and the “Intelligibility” of 
Science,’ European Journal of Philosophy 15(1), 82–105).
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practice ‘neither has “a life of its own” apart from theory nor makes a 
distinctive cognitive contribution.’70
Rouse views this alleged circumstance not only as an affront 
to his practical hermeneutics of science, he also asserts that the 
phenomenological concept of the change-over, which is meant to 
provide existential grounds for Heidegger’s account of scientific theory, 
is unpersuasive. He has repeated this assertion several times over many 
years: ‘Heidegger never does indicate what makes for this sudden leap 
to a new way of looking at things’; ‘Heidegger is disturbingly vague 
about how this changeover can occur’; ‘Heidegger does not describe how 
the practical tasks of science (experiment, instrumental manipulation, 
theoretical problem solving and calculation) are connected to the 
disclosure of things as present-at-hand’; ‘Heidegger merely asserted 
such a changeover without an adequate phenomenological description 
of how it occurred’; ‘Heidegger merely asserted such a changeover 
without adequately describing it.’71 The problem with this repeated 
assertion is that Rouse has never developed it into a proper argument 
explaining why Heidegger’s in fact not insignificant description of 
the change-over fails to meet Rouse’s own standards of adequacy.72 In 
fact, it turns out that Rouse’s standards are ill-suited for measuring 
70  Rouse (1987a), Knowledge and Power, p. 98.
71  Joseph Rouse (1985), ‘Science and the Theoretical “Discovery” of the Present-at-
Hand,’ in Descriptions, ed. by Don Ihde and Hugh J. Silverman (Albany: SUNY 
Press), pp. 200–10 (p. 203); Rouse (1987a), Knowledge and Power, p. 75; Joseph Rouse 
(1998), ‘Heideggerian Philosophy of Science,’ in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
vol. 4, ed. by Edward Craig (London: Routledge), pp. 323–27 (p. 324); Joseph Rouse 
(2005a), ‘Heidegger and Scientific Naturalism,’ in Continental Philosophy of Science, 
ed. by Gary Gutting (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 123–41 (p. 131); Joseph Rouse (2005b), 
‘Heidegger’s Philosophy of Science,’ in A Companion to Heidegger, ed. by Hubert L. 
Dreyfus and Harrison Hall (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 173–89 (p. 181).
72  Nor has Rouse addressed any of the secondary literature which affirms the 
adequacy of Heidegger’s description of the change-over and, in some cases, 
substantially elaborates on it. See, for example: Rainer A. Bast (1986), Der 
Wissenschaftsbegriff Martin Heideggers im Zusammenhang seiner Philosophie (Stuttgart-
Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog Verlag, pp. 139-62; Robert Brandom (1983), 
‘Heidegger’s Categories in Being and Time,’ Monist 6(3), 387–409 (pp. 403–04); Joseph 
J. Kockelmans (1985), Heidegger and Science (Lanham: The Center for Advanced 
Research in Phenomenology and The University Press of America), pp. 118-38; 
William McNeill (1999), The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of 
Theory (Albany: SUNY Press), pp. 72–92; Tibor Schwendtner (2005), Heideggers 
Wissenschaftsauffasung: Im Spiegel der Schriften 1919-29 (Frankfurt: Peter Lang), pp. 
50-86; Hans Seigfried (1980), ‘Scientific Realism and Phenomenology,’ Zeitschrift für 
philosophische Forschung 34, 395–404 (passim).
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the adequacy of Heidegger’s description, because they are based on a 
misunderstanding of what role the concept of the change-over is meant 
to fulfill.
Rouse writes that ‘it is not at all clear in [Heidegger’s] account how 
one can get from a breakdown of practical involvement to the theoretical 
attitude. But once this happens, the ordinary functional contextuality of 
things gets replaced by the “mathematical projection of Nature.”’73 The 
standard of adequacy which Heidegger fails to meet thus demands an 
explanation of how a breakdown in our immersed involvement with a 
ready-to-hand nature can change over to a mathematical projection of a 
present-at-hand nature, a ‘decontextualised theorising’ which allegedly 
eliminates the ontological significance of material practice in the 
sciences. According to Rouse, Heidegger identifies the mathematical 
projection of nature with a decontextualised theorising and claims that 
‘[w]hen we understand theorizing, we have understood what is essential 
about science.’74 Rouse’s Heidegger thus defines science as a theory-
driven mathematical projection of nature in which thing show up as 
fully decontextualised and present-at-hand.
In his reading of Heidegger, Rouse appears to take for granted a 
fundamental distinction between theory and practice, an assumption he 
shares with more orthodox philosophers of science. However, whereas 
these philosophers usually seek to reduce the epistemic significance 
of practice to that of theory, Rouse argues for the reverse: he wants to 
reduce theory to practice. Furthermore, because he detects a resistance 
to his preferred direction of reduction in Heidegger’s work, Rouse 
assumes that Heidegger must then belong to the orthodox camp, that he 
must be intent on reducing practice to theory. But there is an alternative 
possibility: namely, that Heidegger does not accept the distinction 
between theory and practice as a fundamental one. That Rouse has 
foisted a foreign distinction onto Heidegger is evinced by his elision 
of Heidegger’s concept of the mathematical projection of nature with a 
theoretical stance towards nature. Because Heidegger seeks to explain 
science in terms of the mathematical projection, Rouse concludes that 
he must also be seeking to explain science reductively in terms of theory.
73  Rouse (1987a), Knowledge and Power, p. 75.
74  Rouse (1987a), Knowledge and Power, p. 96.
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But Heidegger does not hold the distinction between theory 
and practice to be a fundamental one, and he does not identify the 
mathematical projection of nature with theory. In fact, as already 
discussed, Heidegger argues that the mathematical projection 
provides the existential condition of possibility for both scientific 
theory and practice. The distinction between the two is therefore not 
fundamental, but instead derives from their shared existential basis in 
the mathematical projection of nature. They are, so to speak, two sides 
of the same existential coin.75
Rouse’s misunderstanding on this point appears to have arisen from 
his failure to recognise Heidegger’s distinction between the existence 
and essence of a thing, and, more specifically, between a thing present-
at-hand without-the-world and a thing present-at-hand within-the-
world. This is the distinction between a thing which exists, but is not 
intelligible, and a thing which exists and is also intelligible. Hence, 
when Heidegger writes that, in the mathematical projection, ‘something 
constantly present-at-hand (matter) is uncovered beforehand,’ he 
means something present-at-hand in the first sense. When brute 
matter is uncovered in this projection, our basic understanding is 
directed towards ‘those constitutive items in it which are quantitatively 
determinable (motion, force, location, and time).’ The mathematical 
projection thus serves as a basic template which directs us to experience 
an independently existing nature as something essentially amenable 
to quantitative analysis. Heidegger writes that ‘[o]nly “in the light” of 
a Nature which has been projected in this fashion can anything like a 
“fact” be found and set up for an experiment regulated and delimited 
in terms of this projection.’76 Hence, the mathematical projection is 
a condition of possibility for the scientific experiment as such. The 
readiness-to-hand of things in experimental practice presupposes 
the essential measurability of physical phenomena. Moreover, when 
there is a change-over in understanding, and those same ready-to-
hand things become thematised as present-at-hand objects within an 
75  Robert Crease also notes Rouse’s failure to understand Heidegger on this point: ‘In 
effect, what Rouse has done is taken the traditional priority of theory over praxis 
and stood it on its head, when what is needed is a rethinking of that relation’ (Robert 
P. Crease (1993), The Play of Nature: Experimentation as Performance (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press), p. 193 n. 43).
76  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 414 [362].
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experimental work-world, their essential determination as measurable 
does not change, but rather becomes articulated as the subject matter 
for theoretical representation. Hence, the mathematical projection is 
likewise a condition of possibility for theory as such.
The change-over thus marks a shift in experience within the range 
of possible understandings of nature opened up by the mathematical 
projection. The thing with which we were working now becomes a thing 
about which we concern ourselves. It shifts from being a resource for 
our activity to being the topic of our activity. This is, as we have seen, 
a process of objectification. Heidegger writes that the ‘Being which 
Objectifies and which is alongside the present-at-hand within-the-
world, is characterized by a distinctive kind of making-present.’77 With this, 
Heidegger makes it clear that, whereas the mathematical projection 
correlates with independently existing nature — present-at-hand 
without-the-world — the objectifying, or thematising, process enabled 
by that projection, and which itself enables theory, correlates with things 
present-at-hand within-the-world. It is this crucial distinction which 
Rouse has failed to recognise. He mistakenly identifies the mathematical 
projection of nature with the scientific theorising which it enables, 
because he has not spotted the distinction Heidegger draws between a 
thing present-at-hand without-the-world and a thing present-at-hand 
within-the-world. He thus identifies the former with the latter, and 
thereby eliminates the conceptual space Heidegger had deliberately left 
open in his existential account of science for an independently existing 
nature.
As we have seen, Rouse assimilates existence to meaning in order 
to avoid the threat of incoherence facing his practical hermeneutics of 
science. He argues that interpretation is constitutive of existence, and 
thus rejects the common-sense belief that interpretation presupposes the 
existence of the thing interpreted. Giving up this common-sense belief 
is the price Rouse pays to protect his hermeneutics of scientific practice. 
Yet, as we have also seen, Heidegger allows for an alternative to Rouse’s 
practical hermeneutics which does not sacrifice this belief, and which 
thus preserves the core realist doctrine of independent existence. But 
there is also a further reason to prefer Heidegger’s account. It seems that 
77  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 414 [363].
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Rouse’s commitment to an abstract theory of universal hermeneutics 
has led him to ignore the concrete evidence which plays against that 
same theory. Indeed, this evidence can be found even in Rouse’s own 
practice. His theoretical commitments conflict with the basic norms 
of intelligibility governing the very language he uses to articulate 
his theory. Avoided in theory, the threat of incoherence nevertheless 
re-emerges in practice.
Rouse’s theoretical conviction that existence presupposes 
interpretation is clearly expressed in the following statement: ‘what 
exists depends on the field of meaningful interaction and interpretation 
within which things can be encountered.’78 Here, Rouse argues that 
interpretation is the condition of possibility for existence. A thing can 
only exist — can only ‘show up at all’ — within a field of meaning and 
interpretive practice. The relation of a thing to an interpretative practice 
is thus one of existential dependency. Yet Rouse immediately betrays 
this theoretical conviction in another statement, which only makes 
interpretation the condition of a thing’s being present in a particular 
way: ‘the possible ways a thing can be depends on the configuration of 
practices within which they become manifest.’79 Now the configuration 
of practices, which are for Rouse constitutive of meaning, is no longer 
the condition of possibility for a thing’s existence, as such, but instead 
for the range of possible ways in which it may show up as what it is. 
Rouse’s emphasis has subtly shifted from identifying meaning with the 
that-being of a thing to identifying it with the what-being of that thing. 
The question being answered is no longer one of how things show up at 
all, but instead of how things show up as the bearers of the properties 
which manifest their essence, their way of being. This question is the 
same one as asked by Heidegger, and it can be answered without 
assimilating existence to meaning, and hence without threatening the 
doctrine of independent existence. This, I would suggest, is a more 
common-sense way of speaking about the relation between meaning 
and existence. Indeed, it is a way of speaking about that relation which 
natural language powerfully compels us to adopt, and so it is not 
surprising that Rouse quietly slides back into it.
78  Rouse (1987a), Knowledge and Power, p. 160.
79  Rouse (1987a), Knowledge and Power, p. 160–61.
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Rouse nevertheless insists on tacking close to his theoretical 
commitments with the further claim that 
[b]elonging to the realm of possible determinations open within our 
practices is constitutive of a thing’s being a thing at all. But this claim 
is just to say that having determinate properties, and interacting with 
other things in ways we must take account of, is a necessary condition 
for a thing to be.80 
Rouse admits that ‘[t]his point is difficult to recognise,’ but suggests 
that it can be made clear with an example of a case where ‘thinghood’ 
is in question.81 He offers an example from the history of laboratory 
practice in biochemistry.
The case involves what biochemists eventually came to recognise as 
thyrotropin releasing hormone, or TRH.82 Rouse writes that the name 
‘TRH’ was originally used to designate ‘whatever was physiologically 
active […] in certain chromatographically isolated fractions of the 
hypothalami of sheep or pigs.’ He notes that, at that early stage, 
biochemists did not know if TRH denoted ‘a thing rather than an unstable 
artifact.’ According to Rouse, the difference between an unstable 
artefact and a thing is that a chemical structure can be attributed to the 
latter. Once biochemists succeeded in attributing a chemical structure to 
what Rouse also refers to as ‘the stuff in the fractions,’ that stuff was no 
longer an unstable artefact but manifest itself as a genuine ‘substance.’ 
Hence, Rouse distinguishes between an ‘unstable artifact’ and ‘stuff,’ on 
the one hand, and a ‘thing’ and a ‘substance’ on the other, arguing that 
only the latter can be properly recognised as candidates for existence. 
What he refers to as ‘the complex of practices that had developed over 
a hundred years of biochemistry’ comprises the existence conditions 
for the thing called TRH. For Rouse, the ‘crucial point’ is this: ‘not to 
show up in the ways that allow something to count as an x (in this 
case, as a chemical substance) is not to be a thing at all.’ Yet it then 
becomes something of a puzzle what the terms ‘unstable artifact’ and 
‘stuff’ are meant to refer to if not to something which exists. It would 
seem more coherent to say that the terms refer to a thing about which 
we can say that it is but not what it is, because what it is has not yet 
80  Rouse (1987a), Knowledge and Power, p. 163.
81  Rouse (1987a), Knowledge and Power, p. 163
82  Rouse (1987a), Knowledge and Power, p. 163f.
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been determined by the biochemists treating it as the subject matter for 
their investigation. It is thus not the existence of the thing which is in 
question, but its determinate properties. Contrary to what Rouse claims, 
the determination of those properties is not constitutive of that thing’s 
being a thing at all, but rather of its being an object, a property-bearing 
substance, a thing present-at-hand within-the-world.
In this case, then, Heidegger’s distinction between existence and 
essence provides a better resource for explaining what transpired than 
does Rouse’s theoretical commitment to unfolding configurations 
of interpretive practice. On top of that, Heidegger’s more moderate 
position also allows us to comfortably accommodate the core realist 
doctrine of independent existence. The threat posed to minimal realism 
by Rouse’s practical hermeneutics of science has thus been defused. 
A practical hermeneutics of science will reveal its full worth only 
within the constraints of a phenomenology of scientific practice which 
recognises the independent existence of nature.
6. Minimal Realism and Scientific Practice
Rouse’s critique of Heidegger’s existential account of science attempts to 
separate the social constructivist elements in Heidegger’s hermeneutics 
of subjectivity from the phenomenological elements supporting 
his minimal realism. Rouse adopted Heidegger’s description of 
the subject in terms of ‘socially and behaviorally self-adjudicating 
interpreters’ — what Heidegger called the subject’s elemental being-
with-others — but failed to follow him in also accepting the doctrine 
of independent existence. This position was based on the reading of 
Heidegger which Rouse presented in his 1987 book, Knowledge and 
Power. Since the appearance of that book, however, Rouse has distanced 
himself not only from realism, but also from social constructivism, and 
especially from SSK. Indeed, he has more recently argued that ‘[s]ocial 
constructivism and realism are […] vampires, the philosophical undead 
that still haunt our concepts and interpretations of nature, culture, 
and science.’83 This chapter has already detected minimal life-signs in 
realism, enough to still count it among the living. In what follows, I will 
83  Joseph Rouse (2002a), ‘Vampires: Social Constructivism, Realism, and Other 
Philosophical Undead,’ History and Theory 41, 60–78 (p. 63).
94 Science as Social Existence
likewise argue that Rouse’s report of the death of SSK is also greatly 
exaggerated.
Rouse’s criticism of the social constructivist view of science is 
strikingly similar to his criticism of Heidegger’s existential account of 
science. As he did with Heidegger, Rouse also charges SSK practitioners 
with espousing a theory-dominated view of science. From Rouse’s 
perspective, then, SSK poses a threat to his practice-based philosophy 
of science. As we will see, SSK does indeed pose such a threat, not 
because it is theory-dominated (it need not be), but because it insists 
that scientific practices can be usefully studied in sociological terms.
A key entry point for Rouse in his critique of SSK is Richard Rorty’s 
claim that ‘[n]atural science [is not] a natural kind.’84 According to Rouse, 
natural science is not a natural kind because the products and norms of 
scientific investigation are historically variant, and also vary both across 
and within scientific disciplines. In other words, Rouse rejects the claim 
that there is ‘an essence of science or a single essential aim to which 
all genuinely scientific work must aspire.’85 The specific problem with 
SSK, he writes, is its insensitivity to the heterogeneity of the sciences. 
SSK practitioners act on the ‘mistaken assumption […] that scientific 
knowledge belongs to a single kind similar or distinguishable in kind in 
any interesting way from other kinds.’86
Rorty’s argument that natural science is not a natural kind was meant 
to undercut essentialist solutions to the demarcation problem, that is, 
the problem of distinguishing genuine science from pseudoscience, 
astronomy from astrology, for example. The argument thus carries no 
weight against SSK, which holds that knowledge, as such, is a social 
and historical phenomenon and so any criterion demarcating scientific 
from other kinds of knowledge must itself be socially and historically 
contingent rather than essential. Indeed, Barnes, Bloor, and Henry write 
that ‘demarcation criteria must be regarded as conventional, and their 
application in all cases as situated human action,’ and they explicitly 
84  Joseph Rouse (1996a), Engaging Science: How to Understand Its Practices Philosophically 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press), p. 243; brackets original. Cf. Richard Rorty (1991), 
‘Is Natural Science a Natural Kind?,’ in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Philosophical 
Papers, vol. 1), by Richard Rorty (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press), pp. 
46–62.
85  Rouse (1996a), Engaging Science, p. 242.
86  Rouse (1996a), Engaging Science, p. 243.
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treat the pseudoscientific status of astrology from this non-essentialist 
perspective.87 Rouse’s complaint seems to lie with the fact, not that SSK 
practitioners treat science as an essentially unique epistemic kind, but 
that they treat it as a kind at all. What Rouse disapproves of is SSK’s 
claim that science is an epistemic kind which, like all other epistemic 
kinds, is amenable to sociological explanation: ‘the vocabulary of 
social interaction (interests, negotiations, and so on) is supposed to 
hold the key to an adequate understanding of scientific work.’88 Rouse 
thus joins other critics in attributing to SSK the doctrine that sociology 
‘can (potentially) account fully for the epistemic outcomes of scientific 
practices.’89 And, along with those other critics, Rouse’s attribution turns 
out, in crucial cases, to be a misattribution. For example, Rouse has David 
Bloor claiming, first, that the same kinds of causal explanation should 
be applied symmetrically to both true and false beliefs, and, second, that 
‘only sociological explanations could plausibly satisfy this demand.’90 
The first attribution is correct, and the second incorrect. The ‘kinds’ of 
causal explanation to be symmetrically applied may include sociological, 
psychological, biological, ecological, or any other naturalistic sort. As 
Bloor states in the locus classicus of his position, ‘[n]aturally there will 
be other types of causes apart from social ones which will cooperate 
in bringing about belief.’91 The importance of sociological explanations 
attaches specifically to the normative conditions concerning belief 
formation, an issue central for understanding knowledge but certainly 
not the only such issue. Contrary to what Rouse alleges, then, social 
constructivists do not all claim that sociological explanation can account 
‘fully’ for the epistemic outcomes of scientific practice. Some, like Bloor, 
argue only that a complete explanatory account of science must include 
sociological elements. Such elements are necessary, but not sufficient, 
for an explanation of science.
An initially more plausible criticism is Rouse’s claim that SSK 
practitioners treat science as a ‘theoretically coherent domain,’ and 
‘mistakenly take the unity and theoretical integrity of “scientific 
87  Barnes, Bloor and Henry (1996), Scientific Knowledge, pp. 142, 141.
88  Rouse (1996a), Engaging Science, p. 244.
89  Rouse (1996a), Engaging Science, p. 244; emphasis added.
90  Rouse (1996a), Engaging Science, p. 9.
91  David Bloor (1991), Knowledge and Social Imagery, 2nd edn (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press), p. 7.
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knowledge” for granted.’92 This is the charge, mentioned above, that SSK 
practitioners deploy a theory-dominant view of science. It may well be 
that this criticism applies to some social constructivists. As before, I will 
here concentrate on crucial exceptions among proponents of SSK.
Barry Barnes has written that a ‘theory is a cluster of accepted 
concrete applications.’93 This looks like a definition of theory in terms 
of practice. The concrete applications Barnes refers to are ‘problem 
solutions’: ‘particular concrete scientific achievement[s].’94 Barnes, 
appropriating Kuhn, also calls them ‘paradigms,’ and writes that the 
‘most satisfactory way of describing scientific knowledge is simply 
as a repertoire of paradigms.’ He furthermore argues that ‘[t]o speak 
instead of an abstract pattern of concepts and beliefs, or statements, can 
be seriously misleading.’95 Nevertheless, Barnes goes on to do just that, 
albeit with clear qualification. He writes:
It is always possible to reify the verbal component of a culture as a 
conceptual fabric, a structure made up of generalisations which connect 
concepts into a single integrated whole. It is true that something is lost 
by reducing linguistic activity to an abstract verbal pattern in this way. 
But the reification is irresistibly convenient, and harmless enough if its 
limitations are constantly borne in mind.96
It would be tedious to trawl through the works of Barnes and his SSK 
colleagues with the goal of judging whether they have ‘constantly 
borne in mind’ the limitations of this methodologically motivated 
reification. Suffice it to say here that Barnes’s comments cast serious 
doubt on Rouse’s blanket allegation that SSK practitioners uncritically 
view scientific knowledge as an integrated theoretical whole. Yet, those 
comments also suggest an explanation for how critics may come to 
think otherwise. Just because a writer has constantly borne in mind 
the limitations of their method, it need not follow that their readers are 
92  Joseph Rouse (2002b), How Scientific Practices Matter: Reclaiming Philosophical 
Naturalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), p. 144 n. 7; Joseph Rouse (1999), 
‘Understanding Scientific Practices: Cultural Studies of Science as a Philosophical 
Program,’ in The Science Studies Reader, ed. by Mario Biagioli (London: Routledge), 
pp. 442–56 (p. 451).
93  Barry Barnes (1982), T. S. Kuhn and Social Science (London: Macmillan), p. 124.
94  Barnes (1982), T. S. Kuhn and Social Science, p. xiv.
95  Barnes (1982), T. S. Kuhn and Social Science, p. 18.
96  Barnes (1982), T. S. Kuhn and Social Science, p. 71.
 972. A Minimal Realism for Science Studies
also constantly aware of, and hence manage to avoid, the incumbent 
dangers associated with the writer’s own use of that method.
The problem is particularly acute in the case of Rouse’s interpretation 
of Harry Collins, who, as we saw in Chapter One, rejects a role for 
external-world realism in SSK. Using a passage from Collins and Steven 
Yearley, Rouse tries to undermine the credibility of social constructivists 
by arguing that they reify, not just the practices of the natural sciences, 
but also the very sociological concepts they themselves use to explain 
the natural sciences. The passage in question reads: ‘We provide 
a prescription: stand on social things — be social realists — in order 
to explain natural things. The world is an agonistic field (to borrow 
a phrase from Latour); others will be standing on natural things to 
explain social things.’97 For Rouse, by distinguishing between ‘social 
things’ and ‘natural things,’ and then setting the two in opposition, 
Collins and Yearley erroneously ‘presume the unity of each’ when those 
unities, as well as their opposition, should better have been the subject 
of critical deconstruction.98 He furthermore characterises the passage as 
‘presum[ing] that the social “world” and the natural “world” constitute 
relatively autonomous domains whose articulated descriptions then 
need to be brought into an appropriate relation to one another.’99 As 
a consequence of this interpretation, we are now suddenly confronted 
with a version of the traditional epistemological problem, encountered 
in Chapter One, of how the world of the knower or knowers — the world 
of the subject — makes contact with the world of the knowable — the 
world of the object. Indeed, Rouse suggests that SSK practitioners 
harbour a ‘vestigial commitment to epistemology.’100
Rouse is making two good points here, but if they are to be properly 
appreciated they must be separated from the misleading aspects of 
his argument. To that end, it is important to understand the broader 
context from out of which Rouse has plucked the above passage from 
97  Rouse (1996a), Engaging Science, pp. 244–45. Cf. Harry M. Collins and Steven 
Yearley (1992), ‘Journey into Space,’ in Science as Practice and Culture, ed. by Andrew 
Pickering (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 369–89 (pp. 382–83).
98  Rouse (1996a), Engaging Science, p. 245.
99  Rouse (2002b), How Scientific Practices Matter, p. 136. A version of this criticism of SSK 
is repeated in Joseph Rouse (2015), Articulating the World: Conceptual Understanding 
and the Scientific Image (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), p. 323.
100  Rouse (2002b), How Scientific Practices Matter, p. 134.
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Collins and Yearley. The two sentences immediately preceding it state: 
‘Our world is populated, we admit it, by philosophically insecure 
objects, such as states of society and participant’s comprehension. But 
all worlds are built on shifting sands.’ The third sentence following the 
passage states: ‘We see the attractiveness of the idea of a comprehensive 
theory, but in its absence, life, although imperfect, is interesting.’101 On 
this basis, Collins and Yearley can hardly be charged with an uncritical 
reification of the world into distinct and autonomous social and 
natural domains. Their appeal to the concept of ‘social reality’ is, as 
they clearly state in the passage quoted by Rouse, a ‘prescription,’ and 
they furthermore emphasise that this is an ‘insecure’ methodological 
recommendation made in full consciousness of the ‘shifting sands’ on 
which it rests. In further contrast to Rouse’s claims about SSK, Collins 
and Yearley also clearly disavow the idea of a comprehensive theory, 
choosing instead to proceed imperfectly over shifting sands in a world 
which they nevertheless take to be of unceasing interest. This choice 
resonates with Barnes’s own admission that the reification of concrete 
practices as an abstract conceptual fabric is irresistibly convenient from 
a methodological perspective, and harmless enough if its limitations are 
constantly borne in mind. Collins and Yearley explicitly acknowledge 
those limitations, and Rouse is wrong to suggest otherwise.102
On the other hand, Rouse is right to find some reason for worry here. 
With this we come to the first of his two good points. Rouse worries that 
SSK practitioners, by using particular social categories as resources in 
their explanations of science, will forego the opportunity to topicalise 
the contingencies of those resources. Within those contingencies, he 
fears, there may lie unresolved political tensions. There is no doubt that 
this is a genuine worry, and that the potential problems it responds to 
can be very great. There is, however, also no doubt that Barnes can be 
easily read as expressing this worry when he warns us of the limitations 
which accompany reification. There is also no doubt that the same 
worry may be fairly read into Collins and Yearley’s observation that 
states of society and participant’s comprehension are philosophically 
101  Collins and Yearley (1992), ‘Journey into Space,’ p. 382.
102  Carol Steiner describes this passage from Collins and Yearley as an ‘echo’ of 
Heidegger’s existential conception of science (Steiner (1999), ‘Constructive Science 
and Technology Studies,’ p. 602).
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insecure. There thus appears to be little genuine disagreement between 
Rouse and SSK on this point. Accordingly, SSK practitioners should 
not object to having their explanatory resources topicalised and the 
social and historical contingencies of those resources exposed. They 
may sometimes find themselves surprised or even embarrassed in the 
process, but they will recognise such outcomes as consistent with their 
own methodology and so should accept them as contributions to the 
greater good. However, SSK practitioners may well object to being told 
by critics that they must perform this act directly on themselves if they 
wish to maintain the credibility of their field. For they will rightly suspect 
that this demand, when pushed too far, surreptitiously threatens the 
very possibility of their practice. As Bloor has observed: ‘Nobody can 
turn every resource into a topic without finishing up with topics which 
they have no resources for tackling.’103 If all the explanatory resources 
of SSK must be turned into topics before the critic will be satisfied, then 
clearly the critic’s satisfaction depends on sociological explanation 
finally becoming impossible. It is hard to believe that Rouse would 
seriously want to place such a strong demand on SSK practitioners, not 
least because the same demand could easily be turned against his own 
attempt to explain science in terms of ‘practice,’ ‘meaning,’ and ‘being,’ 
categories the legitimacy of which he apparently takes for granted. For 
example, as we saw in the last section, Rouse neglects the distinction 
between essence and existence, which was prompted by Heidegger’s 
‘question of being,’ and so he mistakenly takes the assimilation of 
essence to meaning to also encompass existence. The point is thus a 
perfectly general one, applying to any explanatory enterprise, including 
Rouse’s own practical hermeneutics.104
Let us turn now to Rouse’s second good point. He argues that SSK 
practitioners still harbour a vestigial commitment to epistemology, 
and especially to an underlying presupposition that the problem of 
knowledge is one of explaining how a subject may acquire knowledge of 
103  David Bloor (1999a), ‘Anti-Latour,’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 30(1), 
81–112 (p. 92).
104  Rouse has more recently defended himself against this very kind of criticism, 
arguing that his method ‘must proceed from “in the thick of the human situation.”’ 
Hence: ‘It is one thing to look at particular social practices […] with “the cold eye 
of a stranger”; […] It is another thing altogether to try doing so for social practices 
[…] generally’ (Rouse (2015), Articulating the World, p. 168).
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an independently existing external object. I naturally recognise this point 
as a good one, since I introduced it myself in Chapter One. I represented 
the problem with the glass-bulb model. Unlike Rouse, however, I view 
this problem as an opportunity, not to banish SSK practitioners into 
the wasteland of the philosophical undead, but to invite them into the 
verdant valley of existential phenomenology.
I have argued that the intelligibility of external-world scepticism 
depends on a prior, often tacit, acceptance of the glass-bulb model. 
To recognise external-world scepticism as a genuine epistemological 
problem, in need of some kind of solution, is to have already adopted an 
ontological image of the subject as a discrete and worldless substance-
subject. I furthermore argued that SSK practitioners, despite their 
sometimes vigorous disagreements over how best to address this 
problem, are agreed with respect to the existence and intelligibility 
of the problem. This is because they all subscribe, to some significant 
degree or other, to the glass-bulb model which fuels that problem. I 
proposed not a solution, but a dissolution of this problem through 
the replacement of the glass-bulb model with Heidegger’s existential 
concept of the subjectivity of the subject as being-in-the-world. Because 
being-in-the-world belongs to the basic existential structure of the 
subject, we never need to face the problem of how it gains epistemic 
access to that world. In my view, adopting Heidegger’s concept adds 
philosophical strength to SSK, without significantly compromising its 
methodology or its goals. Indeed, as I have now argued in this chapter, 
the proposed combination is even compatible with the minimalist 
realism of many SSK practitioners because Heidegger, too, accepted 
the core realist doctrine of independent existence. This combination 
can succeed, in good part, because these social constructivists are able 
to accept, with dignity, Heidegger’s claim that human existence is 
phenomenologically grounded in our immersed involvement with and 
alongside other entities in the world. Rouse is blind to the possibility of 
this combination, because he misattributes a theory-dominated account 
of science to both Heidegger and SSK. In this and the previous section, I 
have traced the errors in Rouse’s interpretations, and hence shown that 
his criticisms against both parties do not succeed. The road thus remains 
clear for my proposed combination of SSK and Heidegger’s existential 
conception of science. Furthermore, I have argued that this proposal, 
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in contrast to Rouse’s practical hermeneutics of science, can readily 
accommodate the core realist doctrine of independent existence. The 
proposed account provides the basis, in other words, for a minimally 
realist social constructivism about science.
7. Conclusion
I ended the introductory section of this chapter by noting Ginev’s criticism 
of Rouse for not having paid adequate attention to the existential basis, 
and especially the cognitive specificity, of science. Ginev’s criticism was 
inspired by Heidegger’s existential conception of science. We have now 
seen that the core of this conception is the mathematical projection of 
nature, a term Heidegger used to denote the existential conditions which 
make science possible in both its practical and theoretical modalities. As 
a consequence of this projection, an independently existing nature comes 
to be understood a priori as something receptive to quantitative analysis. 
Given that the mathematical projection lies at the core of Heidegger’s 
existential conception of science, it is ironic that Ginev follows Rouse in 
treating it as evidence for Heidegger’s alleged dependency on a theory-
dominant view of science. Indeed, Ginev even charges Heidegger with 
‘mathematical essentialism,’ having apparently missed the point that 
Heidegger displaces the phenomenological priority of mathematical 
essence by explaining it in terms of the existential conditions which 
make it possible.105 Heidegger’s position might thus be better described 
as one of ‘mathematical existentialism.’
As we have seen, Rouse, too, criticises essentialist accounts of science, 
drawing on Rorty’s claim that ‘natural science is not a natural kind’ 
105  Ginev (2011), Tenets of Cognitive Existentialism, p. 5. A more detailed criticism of 
Ginev, and Rouse, on this point may be found in Kochan (2015a), ‘Scientific 
Practice and Modes of Epistemic Existence.’ In a response to this criticism, Ginev 
has asserted that Heidegger never used existential conditions as an explanatory 
resource, and that his alleged mathematical essentialism was meant to be sui generis, 
‘untranslatable,’ arising from ‘something like a “mysterious act”’ (Dimitri Ginev 
(2015), ‘The Battle for Mathematical Existentialism and the War of the Heideggerian 
Succession: Rejoinder to Kochan,’ in Debating Cognitive Existentialism, ed. by Dimitri 
Ginev (Leiden and Boston: Brill Rodopi), pp. 168–93 (p. 187). I disagree with Ginev, 
but, if he were right, then I would readily admit to demystifying Heidegger’s 
existential conception of science so as to make it a more interesting and useful 
explanatory resource for science studies scholars.
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to do so. Rorty’s concern was to block attempts to demarcate science 
from pseudoscience — astronomy from astrology, for example — by 
attributing to science an absolute and unique essence. I have argued that 
this criticism fails when set against SSK practitioners, because they too 
reject the idea that science has an absolute essence. That is why they call 
themselves social constructivists. Rouse tries, however, to further press 
the case by criticising SSK for treating science as a ‘kind’ fully amenable 
to sociological explanation. I have shown that this argument is also not 
successful. SSK practitioners only argue that sociological categories 
are necessary, not that they are sufficient, for a complete explanatory 
account of science. In order to be sufficient, such an account may also 
have to include psychological, biological, and physical categories, and 
it should also include a place for an independently existing nature. SSK 
practitioners are thus realists in this minimal sense.
Rouse’s argument is also unsuccessful against Heidegger. He 
alleges that Heidegger propounded an essentialist account of science in 
terms of theory: the genesis of scientific objects can be fully explained 
by reference to a mathematically structured conceptual scheme. This 
argument fails, first, because Heidegger did not view science primarily 
as a conceptual scheme but instead as a form of existence, and, second, 
because Heidegger did not claim to fully explain the genesis of scientific 
objects by reference to scientific modes of existence. Similar to SSK 
practitioners, Heidegger argued that these modes are responsible only 
for the essence of objects, not for their existence. Hence, Heidegger is 
also a realist in this minimal sense. Rouse misses this crucial moment 
in Heidegger’s account of science, because he neglects Heidegger’s 
distinction between the what-being and that-being, the essence and 
existence, of a thing.
As already mentioned, Ginev also criticises Rouse’s effacement of 
the cognitive specificity of science, that is, his tendency to uncritically 
assimilate science to the broader sphere of cultural life in which it is 
necessarily embedded. This is the flip-side of the demarcation problem. 
Ginev’s worry is not that non-scientific practices will penetrate the 
cognitive boundaries of scientific culture, thereby corrupting that 
culture. His worry is rather that science will permeate out into the 
broader culture, with the result that social life in general will become 
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‘totally instrumentalized.’106 According to Ginev, this threat follows 
from Rouse’s mistaken assumption that anti-essentialism about 
science entails the rejection of its cognitive specificity. Yet, as Ginev 
points out, one may distinguish between scientific and non-scientific 
cultures, without recourse to essentialism, by recognising the existential 
specificity of scientific practice. The two spheres of culture are thus to 
be distinguished in existentialist rather than essentialist terms.107 This 
move mirrors Heidegger’s own displacement of an essentialist account 
with an existentialist account of science. It also mirrors Heidegger’s 
identification, in some of his later work, of modern science with 
instrumental rationality. It is not clear, however, that this is an entirely 
apt characterisation of modern scientific practice. In any case, it remains, 
for present purposes, to consider how an account of the existential 
specificity of science may play against the distinction Rouse attempts to 
draw between SSK, on the one hand, and what he calls ‘cultural studies 
of scientific knowledge,’ on the other.108
Rouse includes feminist science studies within the realm of cultural 
studies of scientific knowledge, and this will be our focus here. In 
comparing feminist science studies with SSK, Rouse notes many 
important similarities between them, as well as some differences of both 
a technical and a fundamental nature. The main technical difference is 
that SSK practitioners have largely neglected issues of gender in their 
empirical and methodological work. This is true, and unfortunate. Yet, 
as Rouse argues, this neglect may only reflect an incomplete application 
of SSK’s methods. In principle, that method may ‘leave ample room for 
a full appreciation of the significance of gender relations as a social 
explanans for the content of scientific knowledge.’109 Hence, Rouse 
106  Ginev (2005), ‘Against the Politics of Postmodern Philosophy of Science,’ p. 198; 
Ginev (2011), The Tenets of Cognitive Existentialism, p. 102.
107  Ginev (2005), ‘Against the Politics of Postmodern Philosophy of Science,’ p. 202; 
Ginev (2011), The Tenets of Cognitive Existentialism, p. 108.
108  Rouse (1993), ‘What Are Cultural Studies of Scientific Knowledge?,’ Configurations 
1(1), 57–94 (passim).
109  Joseph Rouse (1996b), ‘Feminism and the Social Construction of Scientific 
Knowledge,’ in Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of Science, ed. by L. H. Nelson 
and J. Nelson (Dordecht: Kluwer), pp. 195–215 (p. 196).
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moves to bracket this difference, turning his attention instead to what 
he considers the key fundamental difference between the two fields.
That difference hinges on Rouse’s claim that SSK practitioners 
propound an ‘epistemological’ account of scientific knowledge. To view 
science in this way means to treat it as a definite ‘kind,’ or object of study, 
which may be surveyed as a ‘totality,’ for example, as a coherent and 
determinate system of representations, a conceptual scheme.110 Hence, 
in distinguishing feminist science studies from SSK, Rouse writes that 
‘feminist scholars conceive of “knowing” as concretely situated, and 
as more interactive than representational. Knowledge is not merely 
a propositional attitude (belief or acceptance) toward some ideal or 
abstracted propositional content, but a relationship between knower and 
known.’111 The nub of Rouse’s argument, then, is his accusation that SSK 
trades on a reified picture of science which abstracts it from the concrete 
level of situated interaction favoured by feminist science studies. As I 
have argued in this chapter, this accusation flies wide of the mark. SSK 
practitioners may deliberately reify scientific practice in the interests of 
convenience, but their core methodological commitment is to a picture 
of science as a heterogeneous and shifting field of interaction which is 
nevertheless amenable to sociological analysis. Rouse’s attempt to drive 
a substantive methodological wedge between feminist science studies 
and SSK is thus not successful. This is not to say that there do not remain 
important differences of orientation between these two fields, but these 
differences are of a technical rather than a fundamental nature. There 
is no reason, in principle, why the two fields cannot enter into greater 
cooperation with one another.
Indeed, Rouse’s analysis even suggests, perhaps unwittingly, that 
feminist science studies, like SSK, is methodologically predisposed 
towards the minimal realist position I have commended in this chapter. 
He writes that ‘[f]eminist science studies have […] often been explicitly 
concerned with different ways in which knowers might interact with 
objects of knowledge.’112 Although Rouse means to distinguish feminist 
110 Joseph Rouse (1996b), ‘Feminism and the Social Construction of Scientific 
Knowledge,’ pp. 198, 199.
111 Joseph Rouse (1996b), ‘Feminism and the Social Construction of Scientific 
Knowledge,’ p. 203.
112  Joseph Rouse (1996b), ‘Feminism and the Social Construction of Scientific 
Knowledge,’ p. 204.
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science studies from SSK with this observation, he could, in fact, have 
just as well made it of SSK. As we will see in Chapter Three, it is with 
explaining the difference between distinct ways of understanding 
a commonly encountered nature that SSK practitioners have often 
concerned themselves. Moreover, in a passage cited earlier in this 
chapter, Bloor writes that ‘nature, in our ordinary way of thinking, is 
the object of knowledge, the thing that is known, while science is the 
knowledge we have of it, our theories about it and our description of 
it.’113 I have already critiqued Bloor’s phrase ‘object of knowledge,’ and 
those remarks could also be applied to the phrase ‘objects of knowledge’ 
in the passage from Rouse. More to the point is that, in both passages, 
science is presented as an activity distinct from, but directed towards, an 
independently existing nature. When epistemic groups disagree in their 
theoretical and practical attitudes towards nature, when they interact 
with nature in different ways, we can make sense of this disagreement, 
in part, by looking to the existential differences present between their 
distinct orientations towards nature. Such existential differences may 
be located within the cultures of science, but they may also mark a 
distinction between scientific and non-scientific cultural orientations 
towards nature. As Ginev reminds us, all science may be cultural, but 
not all culture is scientific. There would, of course, also be other ways 
of understanding such differences, ways which seek to prohibit all 
reference to an independently existing nature. As Rouse’s own example 
illustrates, however, this kind of prohibition, while possible in theory, is 
difficult to maintain in practice. It is really much easier to simply accept 
minimal realism as the norm for science studies, and then to get on with 
one’s research.
113  Bloor (2004a), ‘Sociology of Scientific Knowledge,’ p. 942.
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Chapter Three  
 
Finitude, Humility, and the  
Bloor-Latour Debate
1. Introduction
Commenting on the minimal realism outlined in Chapter Two, some 
people have said that they find it very ‘Kantian,’ and expressed worry 
that it may be vulnerable to the dreaded Kantian ‘two-world problem.’ 
Minimal realism can indeed be justifiably described as ‘Kantian,’ but 
only in a highly qualified sense. In this chapter, I will present a detailed 
account of those qualifications. I will also defend minimal realism 
against the charge that it is vulnerable to the two-world problem. This 
defence will unfold as an intervention into the spirited 1999 debate 
between David Bloor and Bruno Latour, a debate which may well be 
one of the most dramatic dust-ups in the short history of science studies. 
The two-world problem was, I will argue, a central point around which 
this debate turned.
The two-world problem rests on the idea that there is, on the one 
hand, a world of appearance, and, on the other hand, a real world 
which underlies that appearance. The problem is enlivened by the 
further idea, attributed to Kant, that all we can know are appearances, 
that the real world underlying those appearances is something about 
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which we can know nothing. The problem is: if we have no knowledge 
of the real world, then how can we know that it exists? The two-world 
problem is thus a version of the sceptical problem about the existence 
of the external world, to which we gave detailed attention in Chapter 
One. The Kantian version of this problem is usually articulated in 
terms of two distinct kinds of object, ‘phenomena’ and ‘noumena.’ 
The phenomena are the appearances, the things we can know. The 
noumena are the real things which underlie those appearances, the 
things we cannot know. Kant called a noumenon, the real thing about 
which we can know nothing, the ‘thing-in-itself.’ The problem thus 
becomes: if we cannot know anything about the thing-in-itself, then 
how can we know that it exists?
In Chapter One, I argued that external-world scepticism relies on a 
tacit acceptance of the glass-bulb model. The subject is trapped inside 
a glass bulb, and must find a way to burst through the barrier, thereby 
gaining access to the external world. We can now see that the glass-
bulb model similarly grounds the two-world problem. Phenomena lie 
inside the bulb; things-in-themselves lie outside of it. How do we break 
out of the bulb, pushing past phenomenal appearances and grabbing 
hold of the thing-in-itself? How, indeed, when we have already been 
told that the thing-in-itself is something of which we can never grab 
hold, something which we can never know? One begins to wonder 
what the point ever was of positing the existence of the thing-in-itself. It 
seems like an idle wheel, spinning uselessly in imaginary space, never 
connecting with anything important or real.
But this is the wrong way to think about the thing-in-itself. The 
thing-in-itself is not a figment of philosophical imagination. It is real, 
and it does indeed connect with other things. In her commentary on 
Kant, Rae Langton has argued this point with clarity and force. The next 
section will summarise the most important parts of her argument. In a 
nutshell, there are not two worlds in Kant, but only one; so there are not 
two distinct kinds of object, but only one. As Langton reads Kant, this 
single object can be known in two different ways: either imperfectly, 
by humans, or absolutely, by God. The thing-in-itself is the object as 
it can be known only by God. It marks the limits of human epistemic 
power. For Langton, then, the thing-in-itself signifies the fact of our own 
inherent finitude vis-à-vis an infinitely powerful God. She suggests that, 
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for Kant, the appropriate response to this fact of human finitude was to 
adopt an attitude of epistemic humility.
Langton’s commentary provides a nice entry point into the Bloor-
Latour debate. Latour first paints practitioners of the sociology of 
scientific knowledge (SSK) as beholden to a Kantian concept of the 
thing-in-itself, then sets this image up in terms of the two-world 
problem, and finally submits SSK to what are, at root, standard sceptical 
criticisms. Bloor attempts to deflect Latour’s criticisms by arguing that 
acceptance of the concept of the thing-in-itself need not entail a further 
commitment to the two-world thesis. In making this argument, Bloor 
moves his account of the thing-in-itself closer to the one-world thesis, 
transforming Kant’s transcendental and individualistic account into a 
naturalistic and sociological one. This naturalistic strategy leads to a 
potential problem, however, as Langton’s commentary necessarily ties 
the concept of the thing-in-itself to the existence of a transcendent God, 
a supernatural and omniscient knower. Here Heidegger can come to 
Bloor’s aid. In fact, Heidegger had much to say about the Kantian thing-
in-itself, and he also firmly rejected the two-world thesis. However, in 
contrast to Langton, he conceptualised human finitude, not against the 
image of an omniscient God, but against the notion of a nature which 
necessarily slips free from our attempts to know it once and for all. As 
we will see, this move is compatible with Bloor’s own account, and 
even provides further resources for strengthening his defence of SSK 
against Latour’s challenge. The argument of this chapter thus reinforces 
and extends the combination of SSK and existential phenomenology 
pursued in Chapters One and Two. Furthermore, by recognising a 
role for an independently existing nature, Heidegger’s account is also 
compatible with minimal realism. In the penultimate section of this 
chapter, I suggest an account of Heideggerian, in contrast to Kantian, 
humility: that is, an attitude of humility which arises, not in response 
to our finitude vis-à-vis an infinitely powerful God, but in response to 
the inevitable finitude of our epistemic powers when confronted with 
the insuperability of an independently existing nature. I commend this 
as a suitable attitude for a minimally realist approach in science studies.
Before moving into the argument of the chapter, it may be worth 
addressing a potential confusion on one point. It is important to 
carefully distinguish between the epistemic finitude to be discussed 
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here and the doctrine of ‘finitism’ common in the SSK literature. They 
are not the same, though they are closely related. Bloor writes that 
‘finitism is probably the most important single idea in the sociological 
vision of knowledge.’1 In my view, if SSK practitioners wish to protect 
their realist credentials, then finitude should also be counted among 
their most important ideas.
Finitism is the view that the correctness of an act of concept 
application is not determined by absolute standards. As Barry Barnes 
writes, every such act is ‘open-ended and revisable’: ‘[n]othing in the 
nature of things, or the nature of language, or the nature of past usage, 
determines how we employ, or correctly employ, our terms.’2 What 
determines correct usage is, rather, the community of language users. 
Having been taught to which birds I should apply the word ‘duck,’ I 
may err by going on to apply it to a goose. I will then be corrected. The 
standard according to which I am corrected is a community standard; it 
is a social convention belonging to a tradition of language users. Hence, 
the standard is not absolute but historically contingent. It may change 
over time as the community changes. Other communities, in turn, may 
have different standards for making sense of the same thing. In short, 
our power to successfully create meaning is finite in scope, because it 
is bounded by the range of possibilities made available to us by the 
historical tradition in which we necessarily find ourselves.
It will be useful to place these considerations against the backdrop 
of Langton’s argument that the Kantian thing-in-itself can be known 
in two distinct ways: one human and imperfect; the other divine and 
absolute. Here, the finitude of human thinking is defined by contrast 
to the infinite power of an omniscient God. In his naturalistic and 
sociological appropriation of Kant’s thing-in-itself, Bloor replaces God 
with society. He argues, following Émile Durkheim, that ‘God [is] really 
the social collectivity.’3 Hence, the final arbiter of right and wrong in 
acts of thinking and naming is not God, but us.
1  David Bloor (1991 [1976]), Knowledge and Social Imagery, 2nd edn (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press), p. 165.
2  Barry Barnes (1982), T. S. Kuhn and Social Science (London: Macmillan), p. 30.
3  David Bloor (1983), Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (London: Macmillan), 
p. 20.
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So much, I think, agrees with Heidegger’s own account of the thing-
in-itself. But now we come to an ambiguity in SSK’s presentation of 
finitism, one which Heidegger’s notion of finitude can help us to clear 
up. Recall, from Chapter Two, Heidegger’s distinction between the 
existence and the essence of a thing. Heidegger traced the roots of this 
distinction back to the Biblical view that all things owe their existence to 
a divine Creator. Medieval Christian metaphysicians transformed this 
doctrine into the claim that God first establishes the essence of a thing, 
and then actualises that essence by bringing the thing into existence. On 
this model, there is, strictly speaking, no independently existing thing, 
because the thing depends on God for its existence. However, because 
God does not depend on us, neither does the thing. We are thus justified 
in being realists about the thing. Now turn back to the Kantian thing-in-
itself. The ambiguity in the finitist account is this: if God is the source 
of both the essence and the existence of the thing, and if God is really 
the social collectivity, then does it not follow that society is the source 
of both the essence and the existence of the thing? If this is so, then the 
finitist account would seem incompatible with the core realist doctrine 
of independent existence. The finitism of SSK thus seems to conflict 
with its realism. As we will see, Latour forcefully exploits this apparent 
conflict in his dispute with Bloor.
Heidegger’s notion of finitude may be used to resolve this conflict 
by bringing into sharper focus the metaphysical presuppositions 
which have been left largely unexamined by the proponents of 
finitism. In doing so, we can fully complete the naturalisation of 
Kant’s transcendental account of the thing-in-itself. On this fully 
naturalised account, the social collectivity does not construct the thing 
ex nihilo; it only constructs the categories by which its members may 
make sense of that thing. The thing is thus a thing-in-itself. As such, 
it marks the extreme limit of our constructive power. It is against the 
independent existence of this thing that we come to recognise our 
basic condition as finite beings. Residual supernatural notions of an 
infinitely constructive power have no place in this recognition. With 
these considerations in mind, let us now proceed into the chapter.
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2. Kantian Humility and the Thing-in-Itself
Two distinct theses figure prominently in Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason: an epistemological thesis; and a metaphysical thesis. The 
epistemological thesis endorses an empiricist theory of knowledge, 
which states that our physical senses provide the only means by which 
to gain knowledge of the world. Furthermore, Kant specifies that our 
senses are causally affected by things, and describes this in terms of 
our ‘receptivity’ towards those things. The metaphysical thesis, in 
turn, asserts the existence of what Kant variously calls a ‘substance’ or 
‘absolute substance,’ a ‘transcendental object,’ a ‘noumenon,’ or a ‘thing-
in-itself.’ Notoriously, Kant argued that, although things-in-themselves 
exist, we cannot know them. We can only know what affects our senses, 
and things-in-themselves can do no such thing. As we saw above, 
Kant has thus been widely interpreted as positing the existence of two 
distinct and separate worlds, one which touches our senses, a world 
of appearances, and the other comprised of things-in-themselves. This 
two-worlds view has received a considerable amount of criticism since 
it was first attributed to Kant.
In her 1998 book, Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in 
Themselves, Rae Langton rejects this two-world interpretation, and offers 
an alternative interpretation of Kant’s position. She argues that, for Kant, 
there was only one world: the world of things. These things, however, 
feature two distinct, non-overlapping sets of properties: relational 
and intrinsic.4 Relational properties causally affect our senses, while 
intrinsic properties do not. Hence, employing Kant’s epistemological, 
or empirical, thesis, we can conclude that we do indeed know the 
things themselves, but only through their relational properties. Kant’s 
term ‘thing-in-itself’ refers to the thing as it is on its own, independently 
of any causal relation to a subject. The thing-in-itself is the thing as it 
exists in itself in contrast to as it exists in relation to us. In a lucid turn 
of phrase, Langton thus describes the autonomous thing-in-itself as 
‘lonely.’5 The term ‘thing-in-itself’ refers not to one kind of thing rather 
than another — to a noumenal rather than a phenomenal thing, a 
4  Rae Langton (1998), Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press), p. 12.
5  Langton (1998), Kantian Humility, p. 19.
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transcendental rather than an empirical object — but to two distinct 
ways in which one single thing may exist: either in itself or in relation 
to a knower. According to Langton, it is precisely the thing as it exists 
in itself, in isolation from us, which Kant says we cannot know. When 
Kant says that we cannot know the thing-in-itself, he means specifically 
that we cannot know it because it is autonomous and lonely, because it 
has no relation to anything beyond itself. Existing in this way, the thing 
has only intrinsic properties, properties which extend only to itself, and 
thus cannot affect our senses. Hence, although we can know that the 
thing-in-itself exists, because it is identical with the thing as it relates 
to our senses, we can never know what it is in respect of its intrinsic 
properties. As Langton writes, ‘[w]e can know that there are things 
that have intrinsic properties without knowing what those properties 
are.’6 Of course, this sounds a lot like the minimal realism I drew from 
both Heidegger and SSK in Chapter Two. However, as we shall see in 
this chapter, both Heidegger and SSK depart from Kant in a number of 
important and interesting ways. For the moment, let us focus on what 
they all have in common.
There are three things shared by Kant, Heidegger, and SSK relevant 
to the present discussion. First, all are committed to receptivity, that 
is, to the view that knowledge necessarily depends on the way things 
causally affect our senses. They all thus endorse, in one way or another, 
the empirical basis of all knowledge. Second, they are all committed to 
epistemic finitude. In other words, they accept that we are finite beings, 
and hence that there is a necessary limit to what we can know. For 
example, they all agree that we cannot gain knowledge about things-
in-themselves. Third, all three are committed, one way or another, to 
an attitude described by Langton as ‘humility.’ This is a direct result 
of their acceptance of epistemic finitude. In the case of Kant, according 
to Langton, the move from finitude to humility is mediated by Kant’s 
distinction between sensible intuition, on the one hand, and ‘intellectual 
intuition,’ on the other. Sensible intuition is a characteristic of finite 
humans, and it allows them to perceive the relational properties of 
things. Intellectual intuition, by contrast, belongs only to God, and it 
allows God to pick out the intrinsic properties of things, among which 
6  Langton (1998), Kantian Humility, p. 13.
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Kant includes things-in-themselves.7 Kantian humility must thus be 
understood as humility in the face of the absolute knowledge of a divine 
being. In the case of both Heidegger and SSK, so I argue, the move from 
finitude to humility is mediated by a rejection of absolute knowledge, 
as such, and the endorsement instead of an account of knowledge as an 
inherently contextual phenomenon, the scope of which is determined, 
in significant part, by the social and historical conditions under which 
the subject necessarily finds itself. We thus express humility, not before 
the omnipotence and omniscience of an absolute God, but before a 
natural world which constantly outstrips our best efforts to know it.
A crucial claim in the argument of this chapter is that the concept 
of an ‘intrinsic property’ is only accidentally related to the concept of a 
‘thing-in-itself.’ In other words, we can relieve the thing-in-itself of its 
intrinsic properties without threatening our belief in its independent 
existence. In my view, this claim is implicit in the positions taken up 
by both SSK practitioners and Heidegger, and it lies at the core of their 
consequential departure from Kant’s own position.
Langton attributes two fundamental claims to Kant: first, that the 
thing-in-itself must have an independent existence, that it must exist and 
be lonely; second, and most crucial for Kant, that the thing-in-itself must 
possess intrinsic properties. Langton argues that the possession by the 
thing-in-itself of intrinsic properties is consistent with its autonomous 
existence and its being lonely. Let us allow that this was Kant’s view. 
Notice, however, that the fact that these two claims are consistent with 
one another does not entail that their connection is also a necessary one. 
While the independent existence of the thing-in-itself may be consistent 
with its possessing intrinsic properties, it is also consistent with its not 
possessing any such properties. This possibility is, in my view, the one 
best suited to understanding the respective positions of Heidegger and 
SSK practitioners when it comes to the thing-in-itself.
As it turns out, Langton also entertains this as a possible view held 
by Kant, one in which the thing-in-itself is a ‘bare substratum’ without 
intrinsic properties.8 The idea is that if we cannot know the intrinsic 
properties of the thing-in-itself, then we cannot assert that those 
properties exist. Indeed, we may just as well assert that they do not exist. 
7  Langton (1998), Kantian Humility, p. 45.
8  Langton (1998), Kantian Humility, p. 29.
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The fact that such properties do not exist can then be used to explain 
why we cannot know, indeed why not even a divine agent could know, 
that they exist. Langton thinks that if Kant had held such a view, then 
‘[h]e would be guilty of no contradiction.’9 However, she then goes on 
to argue that, although this position has ‘some prima facie plausibility,’ 
there is strong evidence that Kant rejected it.10 On her reading, Kant was 
fully committed to the views that, first, ‘[i]f a substance can exist on its 
own, it must have properties that are compatible with its existing on 
its own,’ and, second, that we cannot know the intrinsic properties of 
this independently existing substance, or thing-in-itself.11 Langton cites 
the following passage from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason in order to 
support her reading: ‘Substances in general must have some intrinsic 
nature, which is therefore free from all external relations.’12
According to Langton, in this passage Kant is not saying that the 
intrinsic properties of the thing-in-itself cannot be known at all. He is, 
rather, saying that we cannot know them given our current cognitive 
endowment. Indeed, she goes on to cite another passage, wherein Kant 
refers to the thing-in-itself as something ‘of which we know, and with the 
present constitution of our understanding can know, nothing whatsoever.’13 
Langton thus concludes that, for Kant, the thing-in-itself does possess 
intrinsic, knowable, properties, but that the limited nature of our current 
cognitive abilities prevents us from gaining any knowledge of those 
properties. It would seem, then, that Kant’s commitment to the thesis 
that things-in-themselves possess intrinsic properties, unknowable by 
humans, implies a further commitment to the corresponding thesis that 
there exists a superhuman agent who is able to know such properties. 
It is difficult to imagine what else might have motivated Kant’s 
commitment to the first thesis if not his commitment to the second. It 
thus looks like Kant’s doctrine that the thing-in-itself possesses intrinsic 
properties may, at base, have been motivated by a theological doctrine 
9  Langton (1998), Kantian Humility, p. 31.
10  Langton (1998), Kantian Humility, p. 32.
11  Langton (1998), Kantian Humility, p. 19.
12  Langton (1998), Kantian Humility, p. 32; cf. Immanuel Kant (1998 [1781/1787]), 
Critique of Pure Reason, ed. and trans. by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), p. 374 (A274/B330).
13  Langton (1998), Kantian Humility, p. 32; cf. Kant (1998), Critique of Pure Reason, p. 348 
(A250).
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attesting the existence of a subject with absolute cognitive faculties, in 
a word, God.
In what follows, I shall argue that Heidegger modifies Kant’s 
doctrine of humility by rejecting the possibility of absolute, or divine, 
knowledge of the intrinsic properties of the thing-in-itself, and so also 
the possibility of the existence of such properties. For the time being, 
we should bear in mind the interrelatedness of Kant’s respective beliefs 
in the existence of intrinsic properties and the possibility of absolute 
knowledge, as this will prove crucial for our understanding of what is at 
stake in the debate between Bloor and Latour. Let us turn, then, to this 
important disagreement in the science studies literature.
3. Latour’s Attack on Social Constructivism
Latour’s condemnation of the alleged Kantianism of SSK practitioners 
is of a piece with his allegedly radical appropriation and revision of 
Bloor’s symmetry principle.14 This principle famously stipulates that the 
sociology of knowledge should be symmetrical in its style of explanation, 
that the same types of cause should be used to explain both true and 
false, rational and irrational, or successful and unsuccessful beliefs.15 
Latour argues that Bloor’s symmetry principle is, in fact, profoundly 
asymmetrical. At the root of this purported asymmetry is Bloor’s 
allegedly uncritical adoption of the Kantian subject-object distinction, 
where the ‘subject pole’ is occupied by the transcendental Ego and the 
‘object pole’ is occupied by the thing-in-itself. According to Latour, Kant 
gathered all explanatory resources around the transcendental subject, 
thereby reducing the thing-in-itself to absolute passivity.16 The result 
of this is a striking asymmetry in the way Kant treated the subject and 
object poles. In Latour’s view, by reducing the thing-in-itself to absolute 
passivity, Kant robbed it of any role in explanations of the genesis of 
scientific knowledge. All the epistemic action takes place around the 
subject pole. Latour claims that, in the field of science studies, Bloor’s 
14  Bruno Latour (1992), ‘One More Turn after the Social Turn…,’ in The Social 
Dimensions of Science, ed. by Ernan McMullin (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press), pp. 272–94.
15  Bloor (1991), Knowledge and Social Imagery, p. 7.
16  Latour (1992), ‘One More Turn after the Social Turn…,’ p. 278.
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1976 book, Knowledge and Social Imagery, stands as the ‘high-tide mark’ 
of Kantian asymmetry.17 According to Latour, Bloor has simply replaced 
the transcendental Ego at Kant’s subject pole with Durkheim’s ‘macro-
Society.’18 In this sociological version of Kant, all explanatory resources 
are now gathered around society while the thing-in-itself, or ‘Nature,’ 
remains absolutely passive.
Latour describes Bloor’s Durkheimian appropriation of Kant as 
the ‘social turn’ in science studies, and he calls for its rejection and 
replacement through ‘one more turn after the social turn.’ This further 
turn is meant to finally result in the symmetry Bloor had sought after 
but failed to achieve. In formulating this new, allegedly more radical, 
symmetry principle, Latour takes the explanatory resources away, not 
just from the object pole, but also from the subject pole. Like nature, 
society too will no longer serve as a resource in explanations of the 
genesis of scientific knowledge, but will instead stand, like nature, as 
a topic in need of explanation. Latour claims that it would be more in 
keeping with the empirical findings of science studies if both nature 
and society were to be viewed as constructed, and thus as explicable 
in terms of their constructedness. For Latour, then, the thing-in-itself 
is not an independently existing thing which necessarily rebuffs all of 
our attempts to know it. Instead, it is a wholly constructed thing, and 
we may thus come to know it by studying the processes by which it 
has come into existence. It is thus not really something existing in itself 
at all, but something which exists only in relation to us. Note that, in 
his critique of SSK, Latour has shifted the focus of analysis from the 
construction of knowledge about nature to the construction of nature as 
such. The distinction between knowledge and its object has been erased 
along with Kant’s distinction between subject and object. As we will 
see later in this chapter, this shift in emphasis marks the weak point in 
Latour’s criticism of SSK.19
Latour’s new symmetry seems to be accompanied by an implicit 
epistemological assumption, namely, that we know only what we 
17  Latour (1992), ‘One More Turn after the Social Turn…,’ p. 278.
18  Latour (1992), ‘One More Turn after the Social Turn…,’ p. 277.
19  Olga Amsterdamska had early on identified and criticised Latour’s tendency to 
elide descriptions of nature with the nature being described (Olga Amsterdamska 
(1990), ‘Surely You Are Joking, Monsieur Latour!’ Science, Technology, and Human 
Values 15(4), 495–504).
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make. He holds that we can know the thing-in-itself because we have 
participated in its production. For Latour, then, the Kantian thing-in-
itself is not really an independently existing thing. It needs us in order 
to exist, and thus is neither lonely nor autonomous. As a result, Latour’s 
new symmetry principle would appear to jettison the Kantian doctrine 
of humility, since there appears to be nothing to whose existence we 
have not contributed, nothing which lies outside the scope of our 
constructive influence, and hence nothing about which we cannot gain 
knowledge. Since the notion of the thing-in-itself just is, by definition, 
a name for what lies beyond our epistemic reach, the unrestrained 
constructivity of Latour’s proposal leads him to reject this notion, along 
with the finitude and humility it implies.
4. Bloor’s Defence of Social Constructivism
Seven years after Latour’s attack appeared in print, Bloor responded 
with a strongly worded defence, in which he rejects Latour’s claim 
that SSK practitioners are little more than ‘unreconstructed Kantians.’20 
Indeed, he argues that Durkheim’s reworking of Kantian themes allows 
for a viable naturalistic and sociological reading of Kant’s subject-object 
distinction. For Bloor, a naturalistic reading of that schema must be 
distinguished from an individualistic and transcendental reading. He 
argues that the rejection of this latter reading of the distinction does 
not necessitate rejecting it in all cases. The subject-object distinction 
may still prove useful for anti-individualistic and naturalistic analyses 
of scientific knowledge production. Understood naturalistically, the 
subject-object distinction is, according to Bloor, a ‘biological given.’21 As 
we will see, Bloor’s proposed naturalisation of the distinction marks a 
substantial departure from Kant’s original position, including Kant’s 
notion of the thing-in-itself.
While acknowledging that the thing-in-itself may refer to the 
noumenal basis of Kant’s subject-object distinction, Bloor suggests 
that it can also be employed in reference to ‘more common-sense ideas 
about the independence of the objects of nature from our ideas about 
20  David Bloor (1999a), ‘Anti-Latour,’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 30(1), 
81–112 (p. 106).
21  Bloor (1999a), ‘Anti-Latour,’ p. 107.
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them.’22 Introducing a simplified, individualistic model, he briefly 
describes a naturalistic setting in which an organism learns about its 
environment by causally interacting with it. This process, he suggests, 
involves varying degrees of active engagement and disengagement 
with the environment. These are causal and biological processes which 
do not derive from culture, but are instead presupposed by it.23 Hence, 
according to Bloor, a naturalised subject-object distinction can be 
used as a conceptual tool for explaining the way in which one part of 
nature (the organism, or subject) interacts with another part of nature 
(the organism’s environment, or object).24 Unfortunately, Bloor does 
not develop his naturalistic description beyond the individual level. 
However, if we were to extend this simplified, individualistic model to 
the more complex social level, his general idea would seem to be that 
organisms depend on one another as they engage with, disengage with, 
and otherwise learn about their environment. On Bloor’s account, then, 
there is a biologically given level of fundamental sociality which will be 
presupposed in any naturalistic account of the emergence of culture, in 
general, and science in particular.25
Bloor thus charges Latour with having failed to sufficiently 
distinguish between the historically contingent ways of formally 
articulating the subject-object distinction, on the one hand, and the 
biological and causal phenomenon which constitute the natural 
ground for that distinction, on the other. Bloor argues that Kant’s 
individualistic and transcendental presentation of the distinction may 
be both socialised and naturalised in a way which brings it more firmly 
in line with its original biological and causal foundation. On this basis, 
Bloor furthermore rejects Latour’s claim that SSK reduces the object 
pole of the distinction, that is, nature, to absolute passivity. According 
to the naturalistic construal of the subject-object distinction, the object 
pole, the thing-in-itself, is conceived as active because it exercises causal 
22  Bloor (1999a), ‘Anti-Latour,’ p. 86.
23  Bloor (1999a), ‘Anti-Latour,’ p. 86.
24  Bloor (1999a), ‘Anti-Latour,’ p. 106–07.
25  For recent work on this topic, see: Michael Tomasello (2014), A Natural History of 
Human Thinking (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), especially chpt. 4, 
‘Collective Intentionality’; and Kim Sterelny (2012), ‘Language, Gesture, Skill: The 
Co-Evolutionary Foundations of Language,’ in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society B 367, 2141–51. My thanks to Andrew Buskell for bringing this literature to 
my attention.
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agency.26 That nature is causally active is entailed by Kant’s claim 
that we can only know a thing if it can affect us. As Langton argues, 
knowledge entails receptivity. The basic idea is that we form beliefs 
about nature on the basis of our causal interaction with it. However, 
although nature plays a necessary causal role in the formation of our 
beliefs about it, it is not a sufficient cause for those beliefs. On Bloor’s 
account, the claim that a necessary but insufficient causal role must be 
played by nature is methodologically crucial, for without it we could 
not make sense of the fact that two scientists may form contradictory 
beliefs about the same natural phenomenon. This claim is, of course, 
also consistent with minimal realism.
Bloor elaborates on the necessary but insufficient causal role 
played by the thing-in-itself in the formation of scientific knowledge 
by discussing the contradictory interpretations of Robert Millikan and 
Felix Ehrenhaft in respect of the natural effects of what we now know as 
electrons.27 On the basis of the experimental data, Millikan believed that 
he had secured evidence confirming Rutherford’s electron theory. In 
contrast, Ehrenhaft, also on the basis of the experimental data, believed 
that he had secured evidence falsifying Rutherford’s theory. Bloor 
argues that, because both interpretations were based on data produced 
by natural causes, that data alone cannot explain their divergence.
If we believe, as most of us do believe, that Millikan got it basically right, 
it will follow that we also believe that electrons, as part of the world 
Millikan described, did play a causal role in making him believe in, 
and talk about electrons. But then we have to remember that (on such 
a scenario) electrons will also have played their part in making sure that 
Millikan’s contemporary and opponent, Felix Ehrenhaft, didn’t believe in 
electrons. Once we realise this, then there is a sense in which the electron 
‘itself’ drops out of the story because it is a common factor behind two 
different responses, and it is the cause of the difference that interests us.28
In the cases of both Millikan and Ehrenhaft, a complete causal explanation 
for their respective interpretations must refer to something beyond the 
thing-in-itself, the independently existing natural thing, to which they 
were equally exposed. For SSK practitioners, this ‘something beyond’ 
26  Bloor (1999a), ‘Anti-Latour,’ p. 91.
27  Bloor (1999a), ‘Anti-Latour,’ p. 93.
28  Bloor (1999a), ‘Anti-Latour,’ p. 93.
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is social causation. Only by citing both natural and social causes can 
the sociologist uncover the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
formation of the beliefs in question. Because Millikan and Ehrenhaft 
were similarly affected by nature, the difference in their respective 
interpretations must therefore be explained by a divergence in the social 
conditions influencing the formation of their respective interpretations 
of the data. This line of argument follows from what is commonly called 
the ‘underdetermination thesis.’ This thesis states that the data resulting 
from natural causes underdetermines the interpretations which arise 
in response to that data. This is just another way of saying that such 
data is necessary but not sufficient for explaining the way in which it 
is interpreted. The underdetermination thesis plays a fundamental role 
in the methodology of SSK, in particular, and of social constructivism, 
in general. Let us now turn to Latour’s response to Bloor’s defence of 
social constructivism.
5. Where the Dust Settles in the Debate
In responding to Bloor’s defence, Latour no longer argues that SSK 
treats the thing-in-itself, the object pole of the subject-object distinction, 
as absolutely passive. Instead, he argues that SSK’s underdetermination 
thesis is premised on an unacceptably impoverished view of the role 
played by objects. He criticizes Bloor for allegedly making the claim that, 
in the disagreement between Millikan and Ehrenhaft over the existence 
of electrons, the electron ‘itself’ makes ‘no difference’: ‘Now, I want 
someone to explain to me what it is for an object to play a role if it makes 
no difference.’29 Latour then goes on to argue that, for SSK, ‘electrons 
“themselves” are not allowed to cause our interpretations of them, no 
matter how much scientists engage in making them have a bearing, a 
causality, on what they (the scientists) say about them (the electrons).’30 
I will comment on Latour’s complaint in the next but one section. Note 
for now, however, that, as will be clear from the long passage from 
Bloor quoted at the end of the last section, Bloor does not claim that the 
electron ‘makes no difference’ to what Millikan and Ehrenhaft believe 
29  Bruno Latour (1999a), ‘For David Bloor … and Beyond: A Reply to David Bloor’s 
“Anti-Latour,”’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 30(1), 113–29 (p. 117).
30  Latour (1999a), ‘For David Bloor … and Beyond,’ p. 119.
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about it. His claim is, rather, that its causal effects cannot explain the 
difference between the scientists’ respective beliefs. As Bloor observes, 
Latour has ‘confused different “differences.”’31
In any case, on the basis of his interpretation of this passage, Latour 
concludes that the underdetermination thesis is an ‘absurd position’ not 
worth defending even when it is being attacked by ‘even more stupid 
enemies.’32 Latour then proceeds to rephrase Bloor’s term ‘electron 
“itself”’ as ‘electron in itself,’ allowing him to more easily identify it with 
the Kantian thing-in-itself.33 On this basis, he argues that for the SSK 
practitioner, just as for Kant, the thing-in-itself plays no other role than 
to allow one to distinguish between competing philosophical schools. 
More specifically, he claims that the thing-in-itself serves only to protect 
SSK against charges of idealism. This, in Latour’s view, is the only real 
difference it makes.
Yet, as Langton’s reading of Kant suggests, the notion of the thing-in-
itself was motivated not by Kant’s desire to deflect charges of idealism, 
but rather by his recognition that our ability to acquire knowledge of 
nature is inescapably finite. Latour thus seems to have misunderstood 
the motivation behind Kant’s position. Indeed, Latour characterises the 
thing-in-itself, not as the mark of an independently existing nature, not 
as a sign of human finitude and a reason for humility, but rather as a 
symptom of an unseemly absolutism and hubris: ‘It is through nature 
that the whole history of absolutism has been developed.’34 He thus 
proposes that the concept of nature be topicalised and deconstructed. 
Insofar as the term ‘nature’ here stands for the Kantian transcendental 
31  David Bloor (1999b), ‘Reply to Bruno Latour,’ Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science 30(1), 131–36, p. 134.
32  Latour (1999a), ‘For David Bloor … and Beyond,’ p. 117.
33  Latour (1999a), ‘For David Bloor … and Beyond,’ p. 118. Bloor’s electron passage 
has also attracted strong criticism from the philosophers of science Tim Lewens 
and Nick Tosh, though for different reasons (Tim Lewens (2005), ‘Realism and 
the Strong Program,’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56(3), 559–77; Nick 
Tosh (2007), ‘Science, Truth and History, Part II. Metaphysical Bolt-holes for the 
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge?,’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 38(1), 
185–209). I elsewhere defend Bloor against these particular criticisms (Jeff Kochan 
(2010a), ‘Contrastive Explanation and the “Strong Programme” in the Sociology of 
Scientific Knowledge,’ Social Studies of Science 40(1), 127–44). Martin Kusch offers 
a critical, if not always accurate, overview of this dispute (Martin Kusch (2018), 
‘Scientific Realism and Social Epistemology,’ in Routledge Handbook of Scientific 
Realism, ed. by Juha Saatsi (London: Routledge), pp. 261–275).
34  Latour (1999a), ‘For David Bloor … and Beyond,’ p. 127.
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object, a thing-in-itself possessing intrinsic but unknowable properties, 
this may well be good advice. However, this is not what Bloor means 
by the term ‘nature’ and, as we will see in the next section, Heidegger 
provided just the sort of topicalisation and deconstruction called for by 
Latour. I will argue that Heidegger’s conclusions tend to support Bloor 
rather than Latour.
As we have seen, Bloor maintains that the thing-in-itself, which he 
takes to be an independently existing ‘natural object,’ does not on its own 
provide sufficient grounds for explaining the interpretive disagreements 
which may arise between scientists regarding the experimental data 
related to that object. Central to Bloor’s position is his conviction that 
the resulting interpretations are underdetermined by that data. This 
conviction traces its conceptual roots, in significant part, back to Kant. 
However, in his response to Latour’s rejection of the Kantian thing-in-
itself, Bloor furthermore argues that the underdetermination thesis does 
not depend on, nor does it push us towards, viewing natural objects in 
the way Kant did.35 Bloor appears to both move towards and pull away 
from Kant.
The apparent conflict in Bloor’s attitude may be resolved once we 
recognise that he does not reject the basic common-sense impulse 
behind Kant’s notion of the thing-in-itself — belief in an independently 
existing nature — but instead follows Durkheim in formally developing 
that impulse differently than did Kant. Where Kant viewed the thing-in-
itself as a transcendental object standing opposite an individual subject, 
Bloor views it a natural object standing opposite a society of subjects. 
Bloor then argues that both nature and society make a necessary 
contribution to the development of scientific knowledge. Latour 
misreads Bloor as denying a significant causal role to nature, and, on 
that basis, he concludes that the underdetermination thesis is absurd. 
But, for Bloor, the underdetermination thesis is not absurd, because the 
causal efficacy of an independently existing nature is beyond doubt. 
Against Latour’s misplaced criticism, Bloor reasserts that ‘the richness 
of the natural world, and the complexity of the scientist’s engagement 
with it, is central to the thesis of underdetermination when properly 
understood, and hence to the Strong Program’ in SSK.36
35  Bloor (1999b), ‘Reply to Bruno Latour,’ p. 134.
36  Bloor (1999b), ‘Reply to Bruno Latour,’ p. 134.
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This is where the dust settles in the exchange between Bloor and 
Latour. I have argued that SSK’s endorsement of a modified version 
of Kant’s notion of the thing-in-itself fits hand in glove with its realist 
commitment to the independent existence of nature. Latour’s attack 
on this modified notion of the thing-in-itself may thus be viewed as a 
simultaneous attack on SSK’s realism. In Chapter Two, I promoted a 
minimal realist reading of Heidegger’s work, and suggested that this 
minimal realism bears much in common with SSK’s residual realism. 
In fact, it turns out that the realism on both sides is based, in significant 
part, on a critical appropriation of Kant’s notion of the thing-in-itself. 
Indeed, Heidegger had much to say about the Kantian thing-in-itself. I 
want to now show that attention to Heidegger on this point will help us 
to more fully illuminate some of the key points in the dispute between 
Bloor and Latour, as well as to more fully understand the ways in which 
Bloor’s notion of the thing-in-itself departs from that of Kant.
6. Heidegger and the Thing-in-Itself
In Being and Time and other writings from the late 1920s, Heidegger 
offers numerous critical comments on Kant’s thing-in-itself, in particular, 
and his subject-object distinction, more generally. Heidegger is not so 
much concerned with the distinction between subject and object as he is 
with the presuppositions Kant relies on in schematising that distinction 
as a formal structure. In Heidegger’s view, Kant grounds the distinction 
uncritically in an ontology which construes both subject and object in 
terms of substance. Heidegger’s criticism focuses especially on Kant’s 
assumption that the subject is to be understood, first and foremost, as a 
thinking substance.37 As we saw in Chapter One, Heidegger’s existential 
analysis of the subject is meant to dig beneath the orthodox notion of the 
37  Heidegger argues that Kant uncritically adopted his ontology of the subject from 
Descartes. Hence, Kant ‘failed to provide an ontology with Dasein as its theme or 
(to put this in Kantian language) to give a preliminary ontological analytic of the 
subjectivity of the subject’ (Martin Heidegger (1962a [1927]), Being and Time, trans. 
by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell), p. 45 [24]; following 
scholarly convention, page numbers in square brackets refer to the original 1927 
German edition of Being and Time). In the same period, Heidegger also comments 
that ‘Kant is still working with a very crude psychology’ (Martin Heidegger (1982a 
[1975]), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. by Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press), p. 50).
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subject as a thinking substance which seeks access to the world, bringing 
out instead the more fundamental existential state of the subject as 
already existing in the world alongside and along with other entities. 
Hence, Heidegger does not reject the subject-object distinction as such; 
he instead challenges its Kantian formulation which presupposes a 
theory-laden conceptualisation of the subject in terms of substance.
We can draw on Heidegger’s critique of Kant in order to challenge 
Langton’s Kantian claim that the thing-in-itself is necessarily an object 
with intrinsic properties. Note that this critical move does not force us 
to also reject epistemic humility, or the finitude which motivates that 
humility. Heidegger argues that the problem presented by Kant’s thing-
in-itself is not an epistemological but a metaphysical one. In Kant, the 
notion of the thing-in-itself correlates with the existence of an absolute 
knower, and so a rejection of Kant’s notion entails the corresponding 
rejection of an absolute knower.38 The move here is to repudiate the 
thing-in-itself just insofar as it correlates with an absolute thinking 
substance-subject, but not to repudiate the concept as such. The problem 
Heidegger locates in Kant is not based on the epistemic question of 
whether one could gain knowledge of the intrinsic properties of things-
in-themselves, but on the metaphysical question of whether a knower 
with the requisite absolute epistemic powers could at all exist. For Kant, 
the answer to this metaphysical question was yes, but the absolute 
knower is God not the finite human. The finite human should thus 
express humility in the face of God’s infinite epistemic power.
According to Heidegger, Kant makes a distinction between the thing-
in-itself as an object grasped by absolute understanding, on the one hand, 
and the thing-in-itself as an object grasped by finite understanding, on 
the other. The former grasps the thing-in-itself absolutely, in terms 
of the thing’s own intrinsic properties, while the latter only grasps it 
as an ‘appearance’ and remains ignorant of those intrinsic properties. 
Heidegger thus reads Kant in a similar way to Langton. Both scholars 
reject the ‘two-world’ thesis. For Heidegger, as for Langton, there are 
not two different kinds of thing in Kant, the phenomenal and noumenal, 
but rather one kind of thing understood in two different ways, either 
38  Martin Heidegger (1984a [1978]), The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. by 
Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), p. 164.
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finitely or infinitely.39 In his commentary on Kant, Heidegger wrote that 
‘the entity “in appearance” is the same entity as the entity in itself, and 
this alone. As an entity, it alone can become an object, although only for 
a finite [act] of knowledge.’ Later he emphasised, in a marginal note 
alongside this passage, that this is ‘not the sameness of the What, but 
rather the That of the X!’40 The X is the thing-in-itself, an entity about 
which we can say that it exists, but not what it is. Heidegger’s conception 
of the thing-in-itself thus draws on his distinction between existence 
and essence, that-being and what-being, which was discussed at length 
in Chapter Two.
Heidegger furthermore argues that, because Kant took the 
fundamentality of substance ontology for granted, he uncritically 
conceptualised the subject-object distinction as one between a discrete 
substance-subject, on the one hand, and a discrete substance-object, on 
the other. As a consequence, Kant was forced to address the problem 
of how the subject-substance crosses over, or transcends, the barrier 
separating it from the world conceived as object-substance, a world 
containing independently existing things. This is the problem of 
the glass-bulb model, introduced in Chapter One. For Kant, only an 
absolute or infinite subject is capable of this kind of transcendence, that 
is, of grasping independently existing things as they are in themselves. 
Because human beings are finite creatures without absolute epistemic 
powers, this kind of transcendence is closed off to us. Kant thus 
concludes that we grasp things only as they appear to us, not as they 
are in themselves.
Heidegger challenges Kant’s treatment of the subject-object 
distinction by re-interpreting Kant’s notion of transcendence. As 
we saw in Chapter One, Heidegger argues that the subject is not a 
substance condemned to an inner realm from which it must win its 
freedom in order to achieve knowledge of an external world. On the 
contrary, the subject already exists alongside and along with other 
39  Martin Heidegger, Martin (1997 [1929]), Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 5th 
edn, enlarged, trans. by Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), p. 
22; Heidegger (1984a), The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 164.
40  Heidegger (1997), Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 22; translation modified, 
brackets original. For the marginal note, see Heidegger (1997), Kant and the Problem 
of Metaphysics, p. 22 n. 1.
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entities in the world. Hence, argues Heidegger, the subject is not in 
search of transcendence; it is transcendence itself. The subject does 
not transcend its own finite limits in order to achieve contact with an 
independently existing thing-in-itself. Rather, as being-in-the-world, the 
subject already exists alongside independently existing things. Hence, 
its transcendence carries it, not towards those things, but away from 
them, towards a recognition of the projected world which provides the 
existential conditions structuring its possibilities for understanding and 
engaging with those independent things.
[W]hat Dasein surpasses in its transcendence is not a gap or barrier 
‘between’ itself and objects. But entities, among which Dasein also 
factically is, get surpassed by Dasein. Objects are surpassed in advance; 
more exactly, entities are surpassed and can subsequently become 
objects. […] [A]s transcending, Dasein is beyond nature, although, as 
factical, it remains environed by nature. […] That towards which the 
subject transcends is what we call world. […] [W]e characterize the 
basic phenomenon of Dasein’s transcendence with the expression 
being-in-the-world.41
Against Kant’s notion of the subject as a substance, Heidegger offers an 
account of the subject in terms of being-in-the-world. In this way, he 
dissolves the epistemological problem which so exercised Kant, namely, 
the problem of how an internal thinking substance may cross over to, so 
as to then grasp, an external object. This external object is Kant’s thing-
in-itself, which, according to Langton, Kant construed as a substance 
possessed of intrinsic properties.
In abandoning the Kantian construal of the thing-in-itself, Heidegger 
also abandons the corresponding notion of absolute understanding. He 
describes his rejection of this latter notion as ‘ontic atheism,’ that is, the 
repudiation of the idea that God is a substance with an infinite power 
to absolutely grasp the objects of the world in their intrinsic features.42 
By abandoning the notion of an infinitely powerful subject-substance, 
against which Kant measured the finitude of the human being, Heidegger 
suggests a reconceptualisation of the meaning of human finitude. He 
still understands finitude in terms of receptivity, but receptivity is no 
41  Heidegger (1984a), The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 166; translation modified.
42  Heidegger (1984a), The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 165 n. 9.
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longer a sign of our lamentable inability to achieve absolute knowledge. 
It is no longer a deprived state in which we find ourselves permanently 
condemned to being affected by objects whose intrinsic properties 
we can never know. In contrast to Kant, Heidegger argues that the 
subject’s finitude is not an ‘ontic’ condition, that is, not a consequence 
of its being a finite substance. It is, rather, an ontological condition, that 
is, a consequence of the finite range of possibilities available to the 
subject as a form of existence. This finite range of possibilities opens 
up a horizon in which the subject may encounter things as what they 
are. Their whatness, their essence, is circumscribed by the horizon of 
existential possibilities within which the subject is able to make sense 
of them. However, to make sense of a thing entails that that thing exists 
as something of which sense may be made. Furthermore, if we are to 
make sense of a thing, it must first affect us. We must, in other words, be 
receptive to its influence. Receptivity is thus our capacity to be affected 
by the things-in-themselves alongside which we exist in the world.
Unlike Kant, Heidegger argues that the things towards which we 
are receptive, the things which affect us, are not objects with intrinsic 
properties which lie forever beyond our ken. Indeed, for Heidegger 
objecthood is a projection rather than an affect. The objecthood of the 
object, its fundamental essence as object, is something we construct 
rather than receive. This is why, in the long quote two paragraphs 
above, Heidegger writes that only in transcending things do we come 
to perceive them as objects. A thing affects us, but our understanding 
of that thing as an object with determinate properties, our making 
sense of its whatness in terms of objecthood, is something we project 
onto the thing rather than something we receive from it. One may say 
that the whatness of a thing is underdetermined by the way in which 
it affects our senses. Heidegger’s attention to the projective element in 
our understanding highlights an aspect of Kant’s philosophy which 
carries us beyond the exposition of Langton with which this chapter 
began. Langton’s commentary focuses almost exclusively on Kant’s 
notion of receptivity, but we must now broaden the scope of our 
attention to include Kant’s notion of spontaneity. Heidegger called 
this projective spontaneity ‘construction,’ writing that ‘the explicit 
execution of the projecting, and even what is grasped in the ontological, 
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must necessarily be construction.’43 For Heidegger, then, objecthood 
lies on the constructive side of Kant’s distinction between receptivity 
and constructivity. In critical response to Kant and neo-Kantianism, 
Heidegger writes that ‘[an] entity is without a subject, but objects exist 
only for a subject that does the objectifying.’44 In other words, a thing 
becomes an object for us only when we constructively thematise it 
as such. Heidegger is making the general point that what affects our 
senses is a thing about which we may know that it is but not what it 
is. What affects us, in other words, is the thing described in Chapter 
Two, a thing which exists but lacks determinate properties: the thing-
in-itself as Heidegger now construes it. On this reading of Heidegger, 
we cannot know what the thing-in-itself is, we cannot grasp its intrinsic 
properties, not because we are finite, but because the thing-in-itself has 
no such properties. The issue here is thus not, as Langton says it was 
for Kant, the finitude of our receptivity, for even an infinitely receptive 
knower will fail to be affected by what was never there in the first place. 
The issue here is instead the finitude of our constructivity. Unlike an 
infinitely constructive knower, we do not construct the thing-in-itself 
in an act of knowing; we instead only construct the categories through 
which we are able to know it. Whereas Kantian humility is prompted by 
the finitude of our receptivity, Heideggerian humility is prompted by 
the finitude of our constructivity.
To sum up this section, the categories which enable understanding 
are projected through our constructive power. The finite number of 
categories available to us determines the limited number of ways 
in which we may make sense of things-in-themselves. This finite 
constructive project provides the basis for metaphysics, that is, the 
study of the basic ontological categories by which we come to know 
what things are. Heidegger wrote that metaphysics is grounded in 
‘the humanness of reason, i.e., its finitude.’ Metaphysical knowledge 
is, according to Heidegger, a direct consequence of our finitude, our 
inescapable mortality, rather than of our presumed ability to transcend 
that finitude, to reach, infinitely, for heaven. Because the finitude of our 
43  Heidegger (1997), Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 163.
44  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 157; translation modified.
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constructive power makes impossible a transcendent grasp of the thing-
in-itself — leaving us to be only affected by it in its brute, independent 
existence — our attention is instead pushed away from the thing-in-
itself and towards the constructive categories we must employ in 
order to make sense of it as a thing present-at-hand within-the-world. 
For Heidegger, metaphysics is nothing other than the study of these 
categories and their relations to one another. Orthodox metaphysics, 
in contrast, treats these existential categories as ontic, that is, as extant 
mental things referring to the intrinsic properties of the things we seek 
to know, rather than as ontological, that is, as the existential structures 
of being-in-the-world which enable us to know those things.
For Kant the problem of finitude springs from our failure to grasp 
things in terms of their own autonomous categories. These categories, 
the intrinsic properties of things, lie beyond the reach of our finite 
powers of construction. Not so for Kant’s absolute thinker. This divine 
subject possesses infinite powers of construction, and hence there is 
nothing which can exist beyond its reach, nothing which is autonomous 
and lonely. The absolute subject has no need for receptivity, because it 
absolutely affects things rather than being affected by them. It requires 
nothing to exist beyond itself, because when it creates, it does so like 
God, ex nihilo. On this reading, then, orthodox metaphysics lacks 
humility because it effaces the problem of finitude by seeking to grasp 
things absolutely. On such a view, the thing-in-itself is an affront to 
the infinite constructivity of an absolute subject. There is thus no room 
in orthodox metaphysics for the thing-in-itself. Heidegger argues that 
if this orthodoxy were to abandon its ‘presumption,’ by giving up its 
‘pride’ and accepting the basic existential fact of its own finitude, indeed, 
if it were to recognise ontology as springing from the very essence of 
finitude, then metaphysics will have finally found its true meaning.45 
According to him, ‘the struggle against the “thing in itself,”’ the origins 
of which he locates in German Idealism, springs from a failure to 
understand the way in which the ‘humanness of reason,’ that is, reason’s 
finitude, forms the essential core of Kant’s problematic.46
45  Heidegger (1997), Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 88.
46  Heidegger (1997), Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, pp. 171, 15.
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7. Putting the Bloor-Latour Debate to Rest
We saw earlier that Bloor attempts to preserve the common-sense 
impulse behind Kant’s version of the subject-object distinction, but he 
departs dramatically from Kant by naturalizing and socialising that 
distinction. Bloor’s reformulation of the distinction is compatible not 
only with the view that things exist independently of our knowledge 
of them, but also with the view that such things possess intrinsic 
properties existing independently of our knowledge of them. However, 
Bloor rejects the metaphysical claim that our descriptions of things, 
that is, our specification of their properties by applying concepts or 
categories to them, strictly correspond to the independent nature of 
those things. Indeed, Bloor has not endorsed the view that the thing-in-
itself possesses intrinsic properties. His position is thus also compatible 
with the view that the thing-in-itself possesses no intrinsic properties 
at all. This view, like that of Heidegger, departs significantly from the 
Kantian position as described by Langton.
Bloor’s departure from Kant is, however, left somewhat unclear 
by the fact that he continues to refer to things as ‘objects’ without 
spelling out in sufficient detail how his use of this term differs from 
Kant’s original usage. Latour seizes on Bloor’s terminology and 
submits it to strong criticism. He dismisses Bloor’s use of the term 
‘object,’ apparently without attempting to properly understand what 
Bloor means by that term. Indeed, he reads Bloor as having meant 
a Kantian substance possessed of intrinsic properties. Latour seems 
to reason that, if we are receptive to objects, then, since objects have 
intrinsic properties, we must also be receptive to those properties. 
Hence, making reference to the Millikan-Ehrenhaft controversy over 
the existence of the electron, Latour criticises Bloor for allegedly 
claiming that ‘electrons “themselves” are not allowed to cause our 
interpretations of them.’47 Now, as we saw earlier, Latour knows that 
Bloor grants electrons a necessary but insufficient causal role in the 
formation of our beliefs about them. Latour complains, however, that 
in this capacity ‘they don’t do very much.’48 Latour wants an account 
where electrons do more. Indeed, he appears to want an account where 
47  Latour (1999a), ‘For David Bloor … and Beyond,’ p. 119.
48  Latour (1999a), ‘For David Bloor … and Beyond,’ p. 117.
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electrons possess intrinsic properties, and where those properties 
both necessarily and sufficiently determine our interpretations of 
them, an account, in short, where electrons make us know them as 
what they are. Only such an account could effectively short-circuit the 
underdetermination thesis central to the methodology of SSK.
By suggesting that electrons not only necessarily but also sufficiently 
determine our interpretations of them, Latour rolls back the symmetry 
principle introduced by Bloor, reintroducing an old and familiar 
asymmetry into explanations of the truth and falsity of scientific beliefs 
and descriptions. Scientific descriptions are true when they correspond 
to the independently existing properties of the things they describe. 
False scientific descriptions, in contrast, are false because they do not 
correspond to the independent properties of the things they describe. 
As is common with Latour’s rhetorical style, he obscures this regressive 
move behind the claim that he is extending the symmetry principle in 
a radically new way, by claiming to introduce ‘one more turn after the 
social turn.’49 But it seems that Latour has made not so much a critical 
advance on Bloor’s symmetry principle as he has an obfuscating retreat 
into a more orthodox position, albeit one wrapped up in unorthodox 
terminology. It is for this reason that Bloor, in step with Harry Collins 
and Steven Yearley, has argued that ‘something remarkably like direct 
or naive realism turns up in Latour’s methodology.’50 Yet, as I will argue 
shortly, this cannot be the full story.
In the meantime, it must be acknowledged that Latour’s criticism is 
motivated by a genuine, if misplaced, worry. In Latour’s view, Bloor 
appears to place the object on the side of receptivity and its intrinsic 
properties on the side of constructivity, and, on this basis, he rightly 
wonders how an object could be separated from its intrinsic properties 
in this way. Indeed, such a position may well not even be coherent. 
But this is not Bloor’s position, because he does not require what he 
49  Elsewhere, I characterise Latour’s rhetorical strategy as one of dissimulation (Jeff 
Kochan (2010b), ‘Latour’s Heidegger,’ Social Studies of Science 40(4), 579–98). In still 
another place, I call (tongue in cheek) for yet one more turn after the Latourian turn, 
a turn which delivers us to the position being outlined here (Jeff Kochan (2015b), 
‘Putting a Spin on Circulating Reference, or How to Rediscover the Scientific 
Subject,’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 49, 103–07).
50  Bloor (1999a), ‘Anti-Latour,’ p. 94. Cf. similar criticisms of Latour in Harry M. Collins 
and Steven Yearley (1992), ‘Journey into Space,’ in Science as Practice and Culture, ed. 
by Andrew Pickering (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 369–89.
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calls ‘objects’ to have intrinsic properties. His is, admittedly, a rather 
unconventional use of the term ‘object,’ and so it is perhaps not 
surprising that Latour failed to properly understand it. According to 
Bloor’s usage, ‘object’ denotes an indeterminate material thing, one 
which exists independently of our beliefs about it, or involvements 
with it. It is the thing-in-itself, and our knowledge of its existence is 
a consequence of our receptive rather than our constructive relation 
to it. Hence, Bloor’s position does not require that objects possess 
intrinsic properties, and it is compatible with the claim that they do 
not. Indeed, as Latour’s criticism nicely brings out, Bloor’s position is 
best understood as requiring that the thing-in-itself does not possess 
any intrinsic properties at all. On this interpretation, Bloor is closer 
to Heidegger than to Kant. When Heidegger argues that we project 
objecthood in our understanding of things as objects, he means that our 
relation to objects is a constructive one. However, in contrast to Bloor, 
by ‘object’ Heidegger means a substance with intrinsic properties. This 
is the same meaning employed by Latour, and attributed to Kant by 
both Langton and Heidegger.
Heidegger’s criticism of Kant may help to throw further light on 
Latour’s own position. Indeed, despite being charged with naive realism, 
there is evidence suggesting that for Latour, too, our relation to objects 
is a constructive, or projective, one. This evidence is, however, obscured 
by the fact that Latour also espouses the view that our relation to objects 
is receptive rather than constructive. The root of the problem here may 
lie in Latour’s failure to properly distinguish between the that-being and 
the what-being of a thing, between a thing’s existence and its essence. 
An elision of these two aspects of the being of a thing may explain his 
disinclination, noted earlier, to distinguish between our constructive 
knowledge of nature and the nature we constructively know, or, put 
otherwise, between our interpretations of nature and the nature we 
interpret. This puts Latour into a similar camp to Joseph Rouse, whose 
practical hermeneutics was discussed in Chapter Two. If this diagnosis 
of the problem is correct, then it may help to resolve an apparent 
contradiction in Latour’s work. He has, for example, asserted that things, 
including those he calls ‘nonhumans,’ determine our interpretations 
of them, that our epistemic relation to them is a receptive one. Latour 
thus laments Bloor’s failure to allow the electron-nonhuman to play a 
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sufficient role in determining the difference between Millikan’s and 
Ehrenhaft’s respective interpretations of their data. This looks like a 
strong stance in favour of a robust realism. And yet, Latour also argues 
that his ‘new active nonhumans are utterly different from the boring 
inactive things-in-themselves of the realist’s plot.’51 So he appears to 
also reject realism. We need to pull the various tangled threads apart in 
order to understand what is going on here.
On the basis of a number of Latour’s statements, it would be natural 
to interpret him as affirming the view that the things we call electrons 
causally determine the categories by which we now know them. This 
suggests that the electron is an independently existing substance with 
determinate properties, that we are receptive to those properties, and 
that those properties cause our knowledge of them. We encountered 
this interpretation in Chapter One, labelling it the ‘natural attitude’ 
which both SSK and existential phenomenology treat as a topic for 
investigation. Latour appears to adopt the natural attitude as a resource 
when he asserts that electrons cause our interpretations of them. This 
was the basis for his rejection of the underdetermination thesis. Yet 
consider, more fully now, what Latour writes in his characterisation of 
Bloor’s position: ‘electrons “themselves” are not allowed to cause our 
interpretations of them, no matter how much scientists engage in making 
them have a bearing, a causality, on what they (the scientists) say about 
them (the electrons).’52 This cannot be a straightforward description of 
scientists’ receptivity towards electrons. Although he argues, on the one 
hand, that electrons cause our interpretations of them, he also argues, 
on the other, that scientists make them exercise that causation. Electrons 
make us know them as what they are, because we make them make us 
know them thus. It looks, then, like Latour’s ‘new active nonhumans’ owe 
much of their activity to humans. Electrons do not, after all, sufficiently 
determine our interpretations of them. Our epistemic relation to them 
is not sufficiently determined by our receptivity towards them, but 
only by a combination of both receptivity and constructivity. Because 
Latour’s account does not eliminate constructivity, it does not threaten 
the underdetermination thesis.
51  Latour (1992), ‘One More Turn after the Social Turn…,’ p. 284.
52  Latour (1992), ‘One More Turn after the Social Turn…,’ p. 119.
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On Latour’s account, we receive what we construct. Our 
interpretations are based on our reception of physical effects whose 
causal conditions we have played a necessary role in constructing. 
There appears to be no room here for an independently existing 
nature. In abandoning the ‘boring inactive things-in-themselves of the 
realist’s plot,’ Latour appears to have given up on realism entirely. As 
I argued in Chapter Two, this is the price paid for failing to recognise 
the distinction between the existence and essence of a thing. Like 
Rouse, Latour elides the construction of the essence of a thing with the 
construction of its existence. One may thus describe Latour’s position 
as a kind of ‘pragmatic idealism.’ Here the governing idea is that no 
thing can exist independently of our practical activities, both linguistic 
and otherwise. The independently existing thing-in-itself disappears in 
an endless cycle of interpretation, or what Latour has elsewhere called 
‘circulating reference.’53 Latour’s rejection of independent existence thus 
seems to undermine Bloor, Collins, and Yearley’s suggestion that Latour 
is a naive realist. It would be more accurate to say that naive realism is 
expressed in Latour’s rhetoric, but that his methodology pushes him 
more towards idealism. The crucial point, for the present argument, 
is that Latour’s abandonment of realism pulls the rug out from under 
his argument against underdetermination. For once one allows that no 
thing can exist independently of our relations to it, one can no longer 
intelligibly assert that an independently existing thing can sufficiently 
determine our interpretations of it. Notwithstanding agile rhetorical 
performances to the contrary, one cannot have one’s cake and eat it too.54
53  Bruno Latour (1999b), Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), p. 24. For a critique of Latour on 
‘circulating reference,’ which also addresses his rejection of Kantian epistemology, 
see Kochan (2015b), ‘Putting a Spin on Circulating Reference.’
54  One can, however, have one’s cake at one moment, and then eat it at another. In 1987, 
Latour described science as ‘two-faced’: on the one side, ‘science in the making,’ on 
the other, ‘made science.’ In a controversy, scientists speak a constructivist language, 
but, once the controversy has been settled, they speak a realist language. There 
is no contradiction, because the respective contexts of the languages are different 
(Bruno Latour (1987), Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through 
Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), p. 4). Fifteen years later, 
Latour claimed to be justified in speaking both languages, but he also seemed to 
elide the contextual difference between them (Bruno Latour (2002), ‘The Science 
Wars: A Dialogue,’ Common Knowledge 8(1), 71–79 (p. 77)). The Millikan-Ehrenhaft 
controversy is a case of science in the making, and so one would expect Latour to 
use a constructivist language when referring to it. Indeed, although he may have 
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One final point deserves mention before we finally lay the Bloor-
Latour debate to rest. The fact that Latour treats electrons as thoroughly 
constructed things would seem to support my earlier observation that 
his position offends against the Kantian doctrine of humility. For Latour, 
there exists nothing about which we cannot have knowledge, because 
we know only what we make, and all existent things depend on our 
constructive power. Here, Latour may respond that we only partially 
construct things, and so we know them only partially. But this will not 
deflect the criticism. The core realist doctrine is that of independent 
existence. Even if the thing-in-itself is only partially the result of our 
constructive power, then it does not exist independently of that power, 
and hence it cannot provide the grounds for a genuinely realist position. 
There are no ‘lonely’ things in Latour’s ontology, nothing to mark the 
finite limits of our constructive power. Latour’s argument against social 
constructivism nicely demonstrates how, when minimal realism is 
rejected, then so too is epistemic humility. I have recommended minimal 
realism as a suitable position for science studies. It follows from this 
that a minimally realist science studies should also adopt an attitude of 
epistemic humility.
8. The Humility of Science Studies
If finitude is best met with an attitude of humility, then social 
constructivism should adopt an attitude of humility. Indeed, insofar 
as minimal realism presupposes the finitude of our indigenous 
constructive powers, this realism suggests a methodological 
commitment to humility. Resisting the temptation to believe that we can 
leap beyond the natural limits of our understanding is no small matter. 
As we saw in the case of Latour, metaphysically fuelled ambition may 
override humility and derail realism. But, as we also saw in Chapter 
One, even the more restrained SSK practitioners sometimes overstep 
the boundaries of their methodological commitments and thus threaten 
their realist credentials. David Bloor, for example, observes that the 
found it rhetorically expedient to also use realist language in debating this case 
with Bloor, the inertia of his own established methodology, and the logical weight 
of his own earlier distinction between the two contexts, ultimately returns him to a 
constructivist language.
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ways in which we conceptualise our experience will always involve 
a simplification of that experience, and infers from this that nature is 
enormously complex.55 This inference seems to presuppose that the 
enormous diversity of possible ways in which human beings come to 
understand their experience of nature must somehow correspond to the 
enormous complexity of nature itself. But this attribution of a specific, 
intrinsic property to nature — complexity — seems to contradict Bloor’s 
claim that our categories of understanding do not map onto nature itself 
in this way. The trouble here is that any claim to know nature in itself 
seems to violate epistemic finitude. We are finite knowers because we 
must be affected by nature in order to gain knowledge of it. But the 
concepts we apply in making sense of our experience are constructions 
projected onto nature rather than affections received from it. This goes 
too for the concept of complexity. It seems that the only attribution 
we may make with respect to nature itself is a purely privative one. 
Nature provides no ready-made categories by which we could know 
it, because it has no determinate properties of its own. Hence, it would 
seem more accurate to describe nature as incomprehensible rather than 
as enormously complex. The tremendously diverse ways in which we 
come to understand nature is not indicative of the inherent complexity 
of nature itself, but rather of the immense richness of our nevertheless 
finite constructive power. This point would appear to agree with Bloor’s 
comment that ‘[t]here is much that has been achieved with our finite 
and contingent resources.’56
Heidegger argues that autonomous things, things left to themselves, 
‘lonely’ things, as Langton puts it, are ‘essentially devoid of any meaning 
at all.’57 From a phenomenological perspective, in an unconstructed 
experience of things we encounter those things as incomprehensible. 
We fail to make sense of them within the constructive field of finite 
interpretative possibilities available to us. What is more, Heidegger also 
suggests that things may directly assault and disrupt this constructive 
field of possibilities. In such cases, things are not just without meaning, 
but they also act against meaning, that is to say, against our ability to 
55  Bloor (1999a), ‘Anti-Latour,’ p. 90.
56  David Bloor (2007), ‘Epistemic Grace: Antirelativism as Theology in Disguise,’ 
Common Knowledge 13(2–3), 250–80 (p. 250).
57  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 193 [152].
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comprehend them. He writes, for example, that ‘natural events […] can 
break in upon us and destroy us.’58 This observation suggests that the 
things of nature may startle or shock us in a way which disrupts, or 
perhaps even destroys, our constructive power of understanding. In 
such moments, we are reduced to pure receptivity. Nature affects us we 
know not how.
Heidegger uses the German word Befindlichkeit to name our 
receptivity, our ability to be affected by an independently existing 
nature. Hence, Kant’s distinction between receptivity and constructivity 
may be viewed as resurfacing in Heidegger as a distinction between 
affectivity and constructivity. Befindlichkeit denotes the situation or state 
in which one finds oneself, as in ‘I found myself increasingly worried 
about the future’ or ‘I found myself suddenly cheered by the passing 
festivities.’ In Heidegger scholarship, the standard translation for 
Befindlichkeit is ‘state of mind,’ but Hubert Dreyfus has also translated 
it as ‘affectedness.’ I prefer to translate it as ‘affectivity.’59 Befindlichkeit 
derives from the reflexive verb sich befinden, which means ‘to be here’ 
or ‘to be located here.’ It thus has a tight connection with Heidegger’s 
word for the subject, Dasein, or ‘being here.’ Recall from Chapter One 
that, according to Heidegger, the subject always finds itself in the world; 
one of its fundamental existential features is being-in-the-world. As we 
also noted, in Chapter Two, Heidegger gives an equally fundamental 
role to being-with-others in his account of the subject. To already be in 
the world means to also already be together with other persons in that 
world. Being-in-the-world is, in other words, a fundamentally social 
phenomenon. In constructively understanding the entities — persons 
and things — with whom and alongside which it exists, the subject also 
already finds itself receptively oriented towards those entities. Hence, 
the affectivity of the subject is, for Heidegger, another fundamental 
aspect of its existence. Indeed, altogether Heidegger notes at least four 
basic existential elements of subjectivity: being-in-the-world; being-
with-others; affectivity; and constructivity (or projective understanding).
58  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 193 [152].
59  Hubert L. Dreyfus (1991b), Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being 
and Time, Division I (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press), chpt. 10. ‘Affectivity’ better 
captures the connotation of activity in Befindlichkeit.
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Let us now consider the way in which worldly things may disrupt 
the subject’s constructive attempts to make sense of them. Following 
Heidegger on this point will help us to also better understand how his 
views relate to the notion of epistemic humility. One particular shape 
taken by affectivity, one specific state of mind, to which Heidegger 
gives considerable attention, is anxiety. Heidegger writes that ‘[t]hat 
in the face of which one is anxious is completely indefinite.’60 It is not, 
however, the indefiniteness of things themselves which causes our 
anxiety, but the indefiniteness of our existence as being-in-the-world. 
Heidegger suggests that it is in the face of our own indefinite existence 
that we feel anxious. Normally, we make sense of our own existence 
through our dealings with the things and persons with which and 
with whom we share our world. According to Heidegger, when those 
dealings break down, things ‘slip away’: ‘We can get no hold on things. 
In the slipping away of beings only this “no hold on things” comes over 
us and remains.’61 The idea seems to be that, in such situations, which 
Heidegger notes happen ‘rarely enough and only for a moment,’ our 
constructive power fails to get a hold on things and determine their 
meaning, which is to say, their essence or whatness.62 As a consequence, 
we lose our ability to give meaning to the world and to our place in 
it. In situations like these, our constructive power is deflected back 
from things, and our relation to those things thus becomes entirely 
determined by our receptivity towards them.63 Heidegger observes 
that, in this forcing back of our understanding, things suddenly reveal 
themselves as strange and ‘radically other.’64
This returns us to the claim made by Joseph Fell, discussed in Chapter 
Two, that Heidegger uses the term ‘present-at-hand’ in a handful of 
distinct ways. In particular, we saw that Heidegger uses ‘present-at-
hand’ not just to denote a thing which has been thematised as an object, 
but also a thing which has suddenly become ‘unhandy’ through a local 
breakdown in a global context of practical involvements which have 
60  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 231 [186].
61  Martin Heidegger (1993a [1978]), ‘What Is Metaphysics?,’ trans. by David Farrell 
Krell, in Basic Writings, revised and expanded edn, by Martin Heidegger, ed. by 
David Farrell Krell (New York: HarperCollins), pp. 93–110 (p. 100).
62  Heidegger (1993a), ‘What Is Metaphysics?,’ p. 100.
63  Cf. Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 232 [187].
64  Heidegger (1993a), ‘What Is Metaphysics?,’ p. 103.
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otherwise remained undisturbed. As Fell writes, ‘this is the experience 
of a presentness at hand that was already there but which in my practical 
preoccupation I was simply not attending to.’65 Yet Fell also argues that 
the term ‘present-at-hand’ may refer to things in cases where there is a 
global breakdown of the significance relations which give meaning to 
things in the world.66 In such cases, the subject finds itself in a state 
of anxiety before the unintelligibility of that world, an anxiety which 
reveals the brute contingency of the categories it normally takes for 
granted when making sense of both things and other people. These 
things now lose their taken-for-granted meaning, becoming strange. I 
would like to suggest that this strange and alien thing is the thing-in-
itself as construed by Heidegger. As such, it marks the epistemic limit of 
our constructive power, and hence of our ability to make sense of, much 
less to know, nature. The thing-in-itself thus marks the boundaries of 
our finitude, and hence moves us towards humility. A breakdown 
in intelligibility, especially at the global level, thus reveals the sheer 
contingency of our categories of understanding. They no longer fix 
themselves onto things, but are instead driven back from them, an event 
which disrupts our ability to make sense of nature, which unsettles our 
taken-for-granted assumptions about what nature in itself is, and which 
may be experienced as a state of anxiety. In the last but one section, 
we saw that Heidegger describes transcendence as the surpassing of 
an independently existing nature. We can now add that, for Heidegger, 
our recognition of this transcendence, for example, our recognition that 
the objecthood of a thing is not intrinsic to it but something we project 
onto it, may be accompanied by a feeling of anxiety. The anxiety which 
may follow on our realisation of the contingency of the categories by 
which we make sense of the world is an affective recognition of our 
epistemic finitude, and hence a reason for humility.
The main point to draw out of this is that the notion of the thing-in-
itself is not, for Heidegger, a merely theoretical one. It is also the notion 
of a thing alongside which we live in the world, a thing which we may, 
if only rarely and momentarily, experience in its bare existence when 
65  Joseph P. Fell (1989), ‘The Familiar and the Strange: On the Limits of Praxis in the 
Early Heidegger,’ in Heidegger and Praxis, ed. by Thomas J. Nenon (The Southern 
Journal of Philosophy 28, Spindel Conference Supplement), pp. 23–41 (p. 31).
66  Fell (1989), ‘The Familiar and the Strange,’ p. 30.
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our customary patterns of sense-making are momentarily disturbed, or, 
more dramatically, when we find ourselves in a state of global existential 
disturbance. If Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of anxiety is 
correct, then it would seem to lend some empirical weight to the notion 
of the thing-in-itself as lacking intrinsic properties of its own, and hence 
also to the more general notion of a nature which exists independently 
of the categories we normally use to understand it.
In fact, there is clinical evidence suggesting that Heidegger’s analysis 
of anxiety offers a credible description of a genuine human experience 
which may, in some rare cases, become pathological. Russell Nieli, for 
example, argues that Heidegger is describing a radical kind of alienation 
experience, falling under the psychiatric labels of ‘derealization’ and 
‘depersonalization,’ which attracted the attention of psychiatrists and 
psychologist around the turn of the last century.67 As illustrations of 
this kind of experience, he cites representative patients’ statements from 
William James’s 1890 book, The Principles of Psychology — ‘I looked about 
me with terror and astonishment: the world was escaping from me’ — and 
Karl Jaspers’s 1913 study, General Psychopathology — ‘All objects appear 
so new and startling, I say their names over to myself and touch them 
several times to convince myself they are real.’68
For Heidegger, such unsettling experiences of the world or of objects 
are experiences of our own existence, because the meaning of things 
is a product of our constructive power, and the world, as we saw in 
Chapter One, is internally related to our existence as being-in-the-
world. Hence, Heidegger wrote that, with the alienation experienced 
in anxiety, ‘[b]eing-in enters into the existential “mode” of the “not-
at-home [das Un-zuhause],”’ and, more to the point, that ‘[i]n anxiety 
one feels “uncanny” [unheimlich].’69 This recalls Sigmund Freud’s 
1919 essay, ‘The “Uncanny,”’ where he wrote that ‘[t]he German 
word “unheimlich” is obviously the opposite of “heimlich” [“homely”], 
“heimisch” [“native”] — the opposite of what is familiar […]. The better 
orientated in his environment a person is, the less readily will he get the 
impression of something uncanny in regard to the objects and events 
67  Russell Nieli (1987), Wittgenstein: From Mysticism to Ordinary Language (Albany: 
SUNY Press), p. 17.
68  Nieli (1987), Wittgenstein, p. 24.
69  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 233 [188–89].
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in it.’70 Anxiety, then, is an affective state in which we experience the 
things around us as slipping free from the taken-for-granted categories 
by which we, in the normal course of life, constructively make sense of 
them. By marking the limit of our constructive power, anxiety brings us 
face-to-face with our own inherent finitude.
More recently, the American Psychiatric Association, while tacitly 
invoking an ontology rejected by Heidegger, has described derealisation 
as ‘the sense that the external world is strange or unreal,’ and they 
designate it as a common symptom of post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD).71 The Heidegger-influenced psychiatrist Patrick Bracken, in 
turn, argues that traumatic experiences may lead to ‘ruptured meanings’ 
which signal the disintegration of one’s world: ‘The experience of 
very frightening events can have the effect of shattering any sense of 
living in an orderly world that has inherent structures of meaning and 
order.’72 Global manifestations of this phenomenon have been noted 
especially among combat veterans. Russian psychologist Madrudin 
Magomed-Eminov writes that veterans of the Soviet war in Afghanistan 
suffered a ‘loss of meaning to life’ precipitating a general ‘existential 
crisis.’73 Bracken, for his part, cites part of the following passage from 
US Vietnam War veteran Tim O’Brien’s 1990 short story collection The 
Things They Carried.74 O’Brien writes that ‘war has the feel — the spiritual 
texture — of a great ghostly fog, thick and permanent.’ He continues:
There is no clarity. Everything swirls. The old rules are no longer binding; 
the old truths are no longer true. Right spills into wrong. Order blends 
into chaos, love into hate, ugliness into beauty, law into anarchy, civility 
into savagery. The vapor sucks you in. You can’t tell where you are, or 
why you’re there, and the only certainty is overwhelming ambiguity. 
[…] In war you lose your sense of the definite […].75
70  Sigmund Freud (1985), ‘The “Uncanny,”’ in Art and Literature, vol. 14 of The Penguin 
Freud Library, ed. by Albert Dickson (London: Penguin Books), pp. 339–76 (p. 341).
71  DSM-IV-TR (2000), Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th edn, text 
revision (Arlington: American Psychiatric Association), p. 530.
72  Patrick J. Bracken (2002), Trauma: Culture, Meaning and Philosophy (London: Whurr), 
pp. 147, 142.
73  Magomed-Eminov (1997), ‘Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders as a Loss of the Meaning 
of Life,’ in States of Mind: American and Post-Soviet Perspectives on Contemporary Issues 
in Psychology, ed. by Diane F. Halpern and Alexander E. Voiskounsky (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), pp. 238–50 (p. 239).
74  Bracken (2002), Trauma, p. 142.
75  Tim O’Brien (1990), The Things They Carried (New York: Broadway Books), p. 88.
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Similar experiences were common among soldiers during the First 
World War (1914–1918). According to the German Army Medical Service, 
613,047 German soldiers were treated during the war for ‘diseases of 
the nervous system.’76 In the decade following the war, the continued 
suffering of traumatised veterans became an issue dominating national 
debate. The affected veterans were overwhelmingly from the lower 
economic strata, and they saw themselves increasingly medicalised 
and blamed for their condition.77 Pressured from the right, the 
government’s labour ministry gradually cut pensions and health care 
to psychologically disabled veterans, causing widespread resentment.78 
It would be extraordinary if Heidegger had been unaffected by these 
events, during which period he was developing his existential account of 
anxiety. I do not mean to suggest that he deliberately shaped his account 
in response to these events, but that these events may have provided 
the social conditions in which anxiety could emerge as a compelling 
resource in the development of his phenomenology of human existence 
and his views on the independent existence of nature. I know of no 
evidence that Heidegger, who was himself exempted from combat duty 
on medical grounds, sympathised with the plight of the traumatised 
veterans, and, as Michael Zimmerman has shown, there are reasons to 
think that he emphatically did not.79 Nevertheless, in Heidegger’s hands, 
anxiety was stripped of its psychiatric meaning and reconceptualised as 
76  Doris Kaufman (1999), ‘Science as Cultural Practice: Psychiatry in the First World 
War and Weimar Germany,’ Journal of Contemporary History 34(1), 125–44 (p. 125).
77  George L. Mosse (2000), ‘Shell-Shock as a Social Disease,’ Journal of Contemporary 
History 35(1), 101–08 (pp. 103–04).
78  Jason Crouthamel (2002), ‘War Neurosis versus Saving Psychosis: Working-Class 
Politics and Psychological Trauma in Weimar Germany,’ Journal of Contemporary 
History 37(2), 163–82 (p. 165).
79  Michael Zimmerman discusses the influence exercised on Heidegger by the 
popular writings of the war enthusiast and decorated combatant Ernst Jünger 
(Michael E. Zimmerman (1990), Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, 
Politics, Art (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press), pp. 66–76). Even Jünger’s 
celebrated steely nerves had their limits, however. Recounting one battlefield 
experience, he writes: ‘after a moment’s blank horror I took to my heels like the 
rest and ran aimlessly into the night.’ Later, ‘I threw myself on the ground and 
broke into convulsive sobs’ (Ernst Jünger (1929), The Storm of Steel, trans. by Basil 
Creighton (London: Chatto & Windus), pp. 245, 246). Those whose front-line 
combat experience is merely vicarious have the privilege of celebrating the heroics 
and ignoring the horrors.
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an existential relation to an independent nature which slips free from 
the categories by which we attempt to make sense of it.
The social psychologist, James Averill, describes emotions in general 
as social constructions, and he suggests that they are thus a legitimate 
topic for the sociology of knowledge. Specifically, Averill argues that 
most standard emotions are ‘institutionalized patterns of response,’ 
which presuppose ‘highly structured cognitive systems.’80 He contrasts 
these standardised emotional responses to the responses symptomatic 
of anxiety, of which a cardinal feature is ‘cognitive disintegration.’ 
From the viewpoint of SSK, however, Averill has the relation between 
cognitive order and institutional order backwards. As Bracken rightly 
argues, it would, in fact, be better to say that highly structured cognitive 
systems presuppose institutionalised patterns of emotional response. 
Hence, when there is a significant disturbance in these institutionalised 
patterns, the result may be the kind of cognitive disintegration marked 
by a feeling of anxiety. A broken mind does not result in a broken world. 
The causal relation runs the other way around.
Heidegger viewed anxiety as a characteristic emotional response to 
disruptions in the coherence relations which normally obtain between 
ourselves and the things and persons with which and with whom we 
inhabit and share a world. This disturbance correlates with a breakdown 
in the constructive power by which we make sense of that world. When 
that failure is catastrophic, this power loses its grip on things in general 
and is thrown back onto itself. The result is a global breakdown in 
meaning, an experience wherein we encounter things-in-themselves 
in what Heidegger called their ‘empty mercilessness.’81 I have argued 
that Heidegger’s phenomenological description of such failures of 
meaning, his description of anxiety, offers a potential account of the 
way in which we may experience nature as existing independently of 
the categories by which we normally come to know and productively 
interact with it. On this account, anxiety emerges as a direct consequence 
80  James R. Averill (1980a), ‘Emotion and Anxiety: Sociocultural, Biological, and 
Psychological Determinates,’ in Explaining Emotions, ed. by Amélie O. Rorty 
(Berkley: University of California Press), pp. 37–72 (p. 68); see also James R. Averill 
(1980b), ‘A Constructivist View of Emotion,’ in Theories of Emotion, ed. by Robert 
Plutchik and Henry Kellerman (New York: Academic Press), pp. 305–39.
81  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 393 [343].
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of our epistemic finitude; it is the unsettling realisation that the basic 
categories structuring our understanding of nature do not pick out 
anything intrinsic to nature itself. Anxiety is the state in which we find 
ourselves when confronted with the existential fact of our finitude. The 
appropriate response to this inescapable existential fact is to adopt an 
attitude of epistemic humility.
9. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that the minimal realism proposed in 
Chapter Two presupposes the finitude of human reason. That an 
independent nature always exists beyond the reach of our constructive 
power, that nature itself must always slip free from all attempts to 
determine its intrinsic properties, is a basic presupposition motivating 
the core realist doctrine that things exist independently of any practical 
and theoretical interactions we may have with them. I have furthermore 
suggested that recognition of our own inherent limitations vis-à-vis 
knowledge of nature is best met with an attitude of epistemic humility.
This argument was played out in the context of the well-known 
debate between David Bloor and Bruno Latour. I have presented the 
disagreement between Bloor and Latour as a debate over the appropriate 
attitude science studies should take towards the Kantian thing-in-itself. 
The thing-in-itself stands for the independent existence of nature. Latour 
dismisses the thing-in-itself as irrelevant to explanations of scientific 
knowledge. Bloor, by contrast, consequentially modifies Kant’s 
original concept, replacing Kant’s transcendental and individualistic 
formulation with a naturalistic and sociological one. As a consequence, 
Latour’s attempt to dismiss Bloor’s social constructivism as being in 
hock to the Kantian notion of the thing-in-itself, with all of its incumbent 
difficulties, largely fails. Bloor’s treatment of the thing-in-itself is 
naturalistic and causal, and, as such, it is compatible with minimal 
realism. I have furthermore argued that Latour, for all his rhetorical 
affirmations of realism, is most coherently read as methodologically 
committed to a position of pragmatic idealism: things are constructed 
and only exist within fields of practice. On Latour’s account, minimal 
realism evaporates along with the independently existing thing-in-itself 
entailed by such realism.
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According to Rae Langton, Kant introduced the notion of the thing-
in-itself in recognition of the finitude of human knowledge. Because 
our knowledge is finite, nature will always exist independently of our 
attempts to know it. Langton suggests that this finitude provides good 
grounds for adopting an attitude of epistemic humility. I have developed 
an account of epistemic humility through a discussion of Heidegger’s 
own appropriation of Kant’s notion of the thing-in-itself. Heidegger 
reconstrues the thing-in-itself in terms of an independently existing 
and indeterminate nature which may, on occasion, deflect our attempts 
to determine what it is according to our own indigenous constructive 
powers. Heidegger’s treatment of Kant, I have suggested, is compatible 
with that of Bloor. This treatment also reveals the way in which Latour’s 
rejection of the thing-in-itself fits together with his enthusiasm for an 
unrestrained constructivism which oversteps finitude, and so undercuts 
humility, in its denial of an independently existing nature. This failure 
of humility is, perhaps, most strongly exemplified in Latour’s conviction 
that he has successfully abandoned the subject-object distinction and 
‘headed off in a different direction.’82 But this distinction is not like a 
suitcase to be dropped off at the hotel before one dashes out to see 
the sights of a new and exciting city. Neither is it just a few words to 
be summarily excised from language. It is a structure in our thinking 
which has developed over centuries and with which we must live as a 
part of our cultural inheritance. This is our condition as finite, historical, 
and social beings. The only way to gain a free relation to the subject-
object distinction, and the broader existential and conceptual structures 
which sustain it, is to trace the historical threads which weave it into the 
taken-for-granted patterns of our thinking. As we will see in Chapter 
Four, this was a task towards which Heidegger put much effort.
82  Latour (1999b), Pandora’s Hope, p. 295.
Chapter Four  
 
Things, Thinking, and the Social 
Foundations of Logic
1. Introduction
In Chapter Three, I argued that the doctrine of the independent existence 
of things, as the basis for a minimal realism, is inextricably bound up 
with the fact that human knowledge is inherently limited. The idea that 
things possess an independent existence follows from the recognition 
that our epistemic capabilities are irremediably finite. Chapter Three 
was primarily concerned with the independent existence of things. 
This chapter will be oriented more towards epistemic finitude, or more 
specifically, the finitude of what I will call ‘thinking.’ Thinking was a 
fundamental concept for Heidegger, and he meant it in the broadest 
possible sense to include not just mental activity, conventionally 
construed, but all practical acts expressing the possession of knowledge. 
Thinking is thus present not only in deliberative, propositionally 
structured actions, but also in actions which are non-deliberative 
and non-propositional in nature. On this account, ‘thinking’ means 
‘cognitive activity,’ that is, the activity of knowing. When we say that 
someone knows how to ride a bicycle in traffic, we need not claim that 
she possesses propositionally structured knowledge of bike riding, 
knowledge which she may deliberatively apply in the performance 
itself. Heidegger’s concept of thinking thus also encompasses skill. In 
© Jeff Kochan, CC BY 4.0   http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0129.04
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his view, skilled performance entails a mode of thinking which need 
not be articulable in propositional form. His concept of thinking thus 
appears similar to philosopher of science Ian Hacking’s concept of 
reasoning. Hacking also attempts to stretch the term ‘reasoning’ beyond 
its conventional usage, so as to also include the embodied aspects of 
practical action, and he explicitly acknowledges the tension which arises 
with such stretching: ‘Even my word “reasoning” has too much to do 
with mind and mouth and keyboard; it does not, I regret, sufficiently 
invoke the manipulative hand and attentive eye.’1 Hacking has more 
recently rebranded his concept of reasoning as one of ‘thinking and 
doing’ in an attempt to relieve some of this tension.2 According to 
Heidegger, thinking is always dependent on doing of some kind, and 
doing, if it manifests the possession of knowledge, must also always 
involve thinking. Theory and practice thus go hand in hand, together 
with mind and body.
This view sits at the core of Heidegger’s phenomenological project 
of explaining the logical structure of scientific thinking in terms of its 
existential foundations. As we saw in Chapter Two, Heidegger argued 
that science, as a coherent body of logically interconnected propositions, 
derives from a specific mode of existence, namely, the specific ways in 
which scientists involve themselves with things and one another, and 
the specific ways in which they come to understand their collective 
involvement with those things. In fact, Heidegger conceived of human 
existence as being fundamentally structured by the relationship between 
things and thinking, with scientific existence exemplifying a special 
mode of that relation. As we saw in Chapter One, this move provided 
him with the means by which to deflect scepticism about the existence of 
an external world. Such scepticism presupposes an image of the subject 
as contained within a glass bulb, and asserts that thinking will never 
penetrate the wall of that bulb and thus never achieve epistemic access 
to the things from which it is separated. Heidegger, argued, in response, 
that thinking is always already in relation to things, because being-in-
the-world is a fundamental structure of human existence. As we will see 
1  Ian Hacking (1992), ‘“Style” for Historians and Philosophers,’ Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science 23, 1–20 (p. 3).
2  Ian Hacking (2012), ‘“Language, Truth and Reason” 30 Years Later,’ Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Science 43(4), 599–609 (p. 601).
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in this chapter, Heidegger furthermore argued that this fundamental 
relation between things and thinking is always marked by a directedness 
of thinking towards things. This just means that thinking is a necessarily 
intentional phenomenon, that it is always a thinking about.
Heidegger’s attempt to elucidate the existential genesis of science 
as a body of logically interrelated propositions was an attempt to 
delineate the way in which the relational phenomenon of intentionality 
came to be specified as a relation between thinking, construed as 
the propositionally structured act of a mental substance, and a 
thing, construed as a property-bearing substance. Heidegger thus 
described the existential genesis of science as a historical process by 
which intentionality became increasingly specified according to the 
model of the proposition.3 According to Heidegger, this was to have 
a profound influence on the way both things and thinking came to be 
understood in the philosophical tradition. In particular, thinking itself 
came to be identified with logic, and all legitimate forms of thinking, 
including scientific thinking, were then viewed as ultimately grounded 
in logic. Heidegger noted that this conclusion leads to the circular 
argument that science, as a logically structured body of knowledge, is 
itself grounded in logic. Logic grounds logic. Heidegger’s alternative 
argument that science, and hence also logic, is grounded in the informal, 
pre-propositional structures of existence was his attempt to soften this 
circularity.
In this chapter, we will first consider Heidegger’s account of the 
historical process by which scientific thinking came to be viewed as 
ultimately governed by self-validating rules of logic, and then link this 
account to more recent work in the sociology of scientific knowledge 
(SSK). By historicising the prevailing logical picture of scientific thinking, 
Heidegger sought to loosen up intuitions about its apparent necessity, 
and thus to prepare readers for his own phenomenological alternative. 
It must be emphasised that, in doing so, Heidegger was not promoting 
an irrationalist or anti-logical theory of science. Indeed, Heidegger was 
3  In an interpretation otherwise quite different from my own, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger 
also emphasises the deeply historical nature of Heidegger’s account of science, 
with particular attention to Heidegger’s preoccupation with the material aspect of 
modern science (Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (2010b), On Historicizing Epistemology: An 
Essay (Stanford: Stanford University Press)). This material aspect will take centre 
stage in Chapter Six.
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instead motivated by a sense of distress at the failure of the orthodox 
account to provide a foundation for science as a cultural enterprise. 
In this, he was of one mind with many of his Central European 
contemporaries during the interwar period. Describing the situation in 
Weimar Germany, Paul Forman has written that such feelings of distress 
were ‘widespread among the educated middle classes, but especially 
oppressive in academia.’ These were unsettling feelings of ‘moral and 
intellectual crisis, a crisis of culture, a crisis of science and scholarship.’4 
Forman argues that Weimar intellectuals felt compelled to address the 
perceived crisis in order to maintain their own credibility, and this often 
led them to ‘repudiate the traditional methods and doctrines of [their] 
discipline.’5
A striking example of this circumstance was Heidegger’s mentor 
Edmund Husserl. Husserl sought to address what he too called ‘the crisis 
of science’ through the methods of transcendental phenomenology.6 
For him, phenomenology provided the methodological means by 
which to finally establish philosophy as a ‘rigorous science.’7 This 
rigorously scientific philosophy was meant to ground all the other 
sciences, including the scientific philosophy of the mathematical 
logicians, whose own attempts to ground science in a self-sufficient 
logic Husserl dismissed as ‘nothing but naïveté.’8 Contrasting his own 
declaredly more radical phenomenological science to the scientific 
project of mathematical logicians, Husserl contended that ‘[o]nly when 
this radical, fundamental science exists can such a logic itself become a 
science.’9 Science was thus not to be grounded in a self-sufficient logic, 
but rather in the pre-logical phenomena which Husserl sought to expose 
through the methods of his transcendental phenomenology.10
4  Paul Forman (1971), ‘Weimar Culture, Causality, and Quantum Theory, 1918–1927: 
Adaptation by German Physicists and Mathematicians to a Hostile Intellectual 
Environment,’ Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 3, 1–115 (p. 26).
5  Forman (1971), ‘Weimar Culture, Causality, and Quantum Theory,’ p. 28.
6  Edmund Husserl (1970), The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology, trans. by David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), p. 3.
7  Edmund Husserl (1965), ‘Philosophy as Rigorous Science,’ trans. by Quentin Lauer, 
in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, by Edmund Husserl (New York: 
HarperCollins), pp. 71–147.
8  Husserl (1970), Crisis of European Sciences, p. 141.
9  Husserl (1970), Crisis of European Sciences, p. 141.
10  For discussions of Husserl’s philosophy of science see: Patrick Heelan (1987), 
‘Husserl’s Later Philosophy of Natural Science,’ Philosophy of Science 54 (3), 368–90; 
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It is clear that Heidegger’s ambitions closely tracked those of his 
former mentor. Indeed, Heidegger too argued that phenomenological 
research represents ‘nothing less than the more explicit and more radical 
understanding of the idea of scientific philosophy.’11 Furthermore, 
Heidegger also described his phenomenological method as a 
‘transcendental science.’12 Yet Heidegger’s concept of the transcendental 
differed profoundly from that of Husserl. As discussed in Chapter 
Three, Heidegger rejected the Kantian notion of the transcendental 
subject, replacing it instead with the finitude of human existence as 
being-in-the-world. Because the subject is already in the world, it does 
not need to transcend its indigenous condition in order to make contact 
with that world. Indeed, on Heidegger’s account, transcendence is not 
transcendence towards things in the world, but instead away from them 
and towards the existential possibilities which inevitably structure 
our everyday projective understanding of the things as we typically 
encounter them. For Heidegger, then, phenomenology as transcendental 
science meant a scientific investigation of the structures of possibility 
giving shape to actual acts of thinking. As we will see in this chapter, 
Heidegger located the conditions of possibility for thinking, including 
logical thinking, in the finite, historical existence of human beings. 
Husserl, in contrast, urged a conception of transcendental subjectivity 
which saw the human being escaping the finite conditions of worldly 
existence on the basis of an ‘immortal’ human spirit.13 Not only did 
David Hyder and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, eds. (2010), Science and the Life-World: 
Essays on Husserl’s Crisis of European Sciences (Stanford: University of Stanford 
Press); Jeff Kochan (2011b), ‘Husserl and the Phenomenology of Science,’ Studies 
in History and Philosophy of Science 42 (3), 467–71; Joseph Rouse (1987b), ‘Husserlian 
Phenomenology and Scientific Realism,’ Philosophy of Science 54 (2), 222–32; Robert 
Sokolowski (1979), ‘Exact Science and the World in which We Live,’ in Lebenswelt 
und Wissenschaft in der Philosophie Edmund Husserls, ed. by Elisabeth Ströker 
(Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann), pp. 92–106; and Elisabeth Ströker (1997), The 
Husserlian Foundations of Science (Dordecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers). For a 
brief, and only partial, introduction to phenomenological philosophy of science, 
spotlighting the works of Husserl, Heidegger, Patrick Heelan, and Joseph J. 
Kockelmans, see: Jeff Kochan and Hans Bernhard Schmid (2011), ‘Philosophy of 
Science,’ in The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology, ed. by Sebastian Luft and 
Søren Overgaard (London: Routledge), pp. 461–72.
11  Martin Heidegger (1982a [1975]), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. by Albert 
Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), p. 3.
12  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 17.
13  Husserl (1970), Crisis of European Sciences, p. 299.
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Heidegger reject the idea of a pure and boundless reason implied in 
Husserl’s appeal to immortality, he furthermore critiqued this notion 
as a historical possibility actualised in the early-modern period only 
because thinking had already begun to view itself in propositional 
terms. In Heidegger’s view, overcoming both the philosophical 
doctrine of immortal, or infinite, reason, as well as the propositional 
model of thinking on which it is partly based, entails a deconstruction 
of the philosophical orthodoxy back to its origins in Plato. This chapter 
recounts some of the key moments in Heidegger’s deconstruction of that 
orthodoxy, framing it as an attempt to ground logic, and thus science 
in general, in the pre-propositional and ineluctably finite structures of 
human existence.
Heidegger was careful not to commit the self-defeating error of 
claiming a transcendental (in the orthodox sense) viewpoint from which 
to declare the historical contingency of thinking as such. In fact, he 
openly admitted that the ‘investigation which we are now conducting 
is determined by its historical situation […] and by the preceding 
philosophical tradition.’14 However, his reaction to this predicament 
was not a studied complacency regarding the historical origins of 
his own basic concepts. Rather, he sought to articulate a historical 
account of the contingency of those concepts by deconstructing them 
‘down to the sources from which they were drawn.’15 By analysing 
the conventionalised concepts of modern philosophy as the historical 
actualisation of a tradition construed in terms of possibilities, Heidegger 
aimed not only to demonstrate the contingency of the basic concepts of 
modern formalised logic, but also the legitimacy of his own existential 
phenomenology both as an expression of possibilities latent in the 
philosophical tradition and as being better equipped than formal logic 
to provide a defensible foundation for the sciences.
The explicit reflexivity of Heidegger’s method, his recognition that 
the legitimacy of his own concepts was also historically contingent, 
strongly resonates with SSK’s reflexivity tenet. This tenet states that 
SSK’s ‘patterns of explanation would have to be applicable to sociology 
itself […] otherwise sociology would be a standing refutation of 
14  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 22.
15  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 23.
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itself.’16 However, as we already well know from earlier chapters, the 
similarity between the two methods does not end there. Indeed, like 
Heidegger, SSK practitioners have applied their method extensively in 
an investigation of the foundations of logic. In the latter part of this 
chapter, the methods of each will be compared. Both parties embrace a 
doctrine of finitude, and hence reject the contrary notions of an immortal 
spirit, an unbounded reason, an infinite faculty of thinking, and the like. 
Both also grant priority to informal over formalised modes of thinking. 
The benefits of this comparison run in both directions. On the one hand, 
Heidegger had little to offer by way of detailed empirical illustrations 
of the contingency and informal basis of logical thinking. SSK can thus 
help to fill out Heidegger’s theoretical account with empirical studies. 
On the other hand, Heidegger’s work can help to untangle some 
conceptual knots in the sociology of logic. In particular, Heidegger’s 
phenomenological description of different modes of intentionality 
can put into SSK practitioners’ hands a non-propositional account of 
intentionality which is compatible with their own naturalistic and causal 
account of knowledge. This promises to save SSK practitioners from 
the difficulties which threaten to follow from their outright rejection 
of intentionality as a legitimate explanatory resource. Before plunging 
into this comparative work, however, let us first take an extended tour 
through Heidegger’s phenomenological history of logic.
2. Heidegger on the Unity of Things and Thinking
Heidegger argues that our concept of the thing as a property-bearing 
substance is necessarily related to our concept of thinking as possessing 
a propositional structure. The property-bearing substance, on the one 
side, and proposition-based thinking, on the other, are ‘mirror images’ 
of one another, and they share a ‘deeper lying root.’17
As discussed in earlier chapters, for Heidegger the concepts of a 
property-bearing substance and a proposition-based thinking are not 
foundational concepts, but derive from the more fundamental existential 
16  David Bloor (1991), Knowledge and Social Imagery, 2nd edn (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press), p. 7.
17  Martin Heidegger (1967 [1962]), What Is a Thing?, trans. by William B. Barton, Jr., 
and Vera Deutsch (Chicago: Henry Regnery), p. 47.
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structures of our subjectivity. In Chapter Two, we reviewed Heidegger’s 
phenomenological analysis of propositional thinking as arising from 
an interruption or breakdown in the smooth, unreflective mode of 
thinking characteristic of our normal, everyday dealings in the world. 
As we saw, this change-over of thinking from unreflective immersion to 
propositional reflection was accompanied by a corresponding transition 
in our experience of things within the world from things ready-to-hand 
to things present-at-hand, that is, to property-bearing substances, or 
objects. In Chapter Three, we discussed Heidegger’s interpretation of 
the way Kant articulated this dialectical relationship between things and 
thinking. In particular, Heidegger credits Kant with the fundamental 
insight that human thinking, as a finite faculty, entails the independent 
existence of the things to which that thinking is directed. Kant called 
this aspect of thinking, which follows from the fact of human finitude, 
‘receptivity.’ Heidegger rephrased this as Befindlichkeit, which I translate 
as ‘affectivity.’ The receptivity of thinking means that thinking is always 
a response, in one way or another, to things. In Heidegger’s terminology, 
thinking is a basic feature of Dasein’s existence, and that existence 
necessarily takes place in a world of things. There can, in short, be no 
thinking, much less any knowledge, in the absence of experience. On the 
other hand, as was argued in Chapter Two, although we are, as thinking 
beings, necessarily related to things, things do not in turn depend on 
us for their own existence. Things outstrip our ability to understand 
them, and so demonstrate our finitude. This insight provides the basis 
for minimal realism.
Heidegger analyses the relation between things and thinking in terms 
of four components, with two on each side. The two components on the 
side of the thing are its existence and its essence, and the two components 
on the side of thinking are its receptivity and its constructivity. In the 
case of the first component of each, the relation runs from the thing, as 
existent, to thinking, as receptive. In the case of the second component 
of each, the relation runs in the opposite direction, from thinking as 
constructive, to the thing as possessed of determinate properties, as 
having an essence. As we have seen, Heidegger describes this second 
relation as one of ‘projection.’ The idea is that, while the thing itself 
can exist independently of thinking, its essence, articulated in terms 
of its properties, cannot. The thing has no properties in the absence of 
projective thinking.
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We are now in a better position to understand what Heidegger 
means when he says that our concept of the thing as a property-bearing 
substance is necessarily related to our concept of thinking as possessing 
a propositional structure. His argument is that the constructive 
component of thinking must first be brought into a propositional form 
before we can begin to speak intelligibly about things as substances 
with properties. In Chapter Two, we examined the stages Heidegger 
identified in his phenomenological analysis of how thinking takes on 
propositional form in the act of thematising a ready-to-hand thing as a 
present-at-hand object. The two crucial points we may draw from this 
analysis, for present purposes, are that thinking is not fundamentally 
propositional in form, and that logic, as the science of thinking, 
provides us with an only derivative account of what thinking is. In 
other words, the formal, propositional structure of thinking is not a 
fundamental structure discovered through logical enquiry. It is rather 
a derivative structure which we construct in the course of thematising 
thinking as an object of investigation. One important implication of 
this is that truth — as correspondence between a proposition and the 
independently existing property of a substance — is a derivative form 
of truth. Truth, as correspondence, depends on a thematising project 
which simultaneously constructs thinking as a propositional act, on 
the one hand, and the thing, towards which that act is directed, as a 
property-bearing substance, on the other.
Heidegger argues that the orthodox attitude in philosophy, which 
takes formal logic as the foundation of thinking and substance ontology 
as revealing the fundamental structure of things, is not absolutely valid, 
but instead based on historically contingent presuppositions. We will 
give more detailed attention to Heidegger’s historical argument in the 
following sections. Note for the time being, however, that Heidegger 
calls the basic constructive relation of thinking to things, the inherent 
directedness of the former to the latter, ‘intentionality.’18 Hence, the 
phenomenological study of constructivity may be viewed more 
generally as the study of intentionality. The basic phenomenological 
feature of intentionality is its directedness towards something. An 
intentional act is a directed act. Heidegger often describes intentionality 
as the way in which the subject ‘comports’ itself towards things. In his 
18  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 58.
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view, the orthodox attitude in philosophy takes for granted, and relies 
on, a historically specific mode of intentionality. In Kant’s philosophy, 
this historical mode was conceptualised in terms of constructivity. 
Heidegger also refers to it as ‘productive comportment.’19
Much of Heidegger’s philosophy may be viewed as an exploration 
of the limits and the latent possibilities in the subject’s productive 
comportment towards things, or, put another way, an exploration of the 
limits and possibilities of a philosophical tradition which understands 
intentionality by analogy to production. He argues that productive 
comportment, as a fundamental but often unacknowledged concept 
in the philosophical tradition, is the source of the distinction between 
existence and essence.20 The concept of production entails the prior 
existence of material: ‘If we bring to mind productive comportment in 
the scope of its full structure we see that it always makes use of what we 
call material, for instance, material for building a house.’21 Furthermore, 
given the intimate relation between the existence and essence of things, 
on the one hand, and the receptivity and constructivity of thinking, on 
the other, we can conclude that productive comportment also provides 
a conceptual root for the relatedness of receptivity and constructivity, 
and thus for the relation between things and thinking in general. This, 
then, provides the background for Heidegger’s more narrow argument 
that the property-bearing substance and proposition-based thinking 
are mirror images, sharing with one another an underlying root. 
Intentionality provides that underlying root. It serves to unify things 
and thinking, and has been traditionally construed by philosophers on 
the model of production.
The key point here is that intentionality, as productive comportment, 
plays a unifying role in Heidegger’s explanation of the relation between 
things and thinking. Another point is that the analogy to production 
specifies the meaning of intentionality as more than mere directedness. 
On this construal, intentionality is directedness guided by a pre-existing 
standard. As Heidegger writes, ‘[a]ll forming of shaped products 
is effected by using an image, in the sense of a model, as guide and 
19  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 105.
20  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 105.
21  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 115.
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standard.’22 Putting these two points together, Heidegger’s overall 
claim is that the philosophical tradition interprets the phenomenon 
of intentionality as the experience of being guided by a pre-existing 
standard, or image, such that one’s thinking will come into proper 
relationship with the things. As we will see in the next four sections, 
Heidegger traces the historical course of this model of intentionality 
from Plato’s doctrine of the good, through Aristotle’s categorial analysis 
of the proposition and Descartes’s emphasis on the propositionally 
structured subject ‘I,’ to Kant’s phenomenological investigation of the 
imagination. This history of the concept of intentionality will, in turn, 
prepare the way for a detailed consideration, in Chapters Five and Six, of 
the emergence of early-modern mathematical and experimental science. 
But for now, let us take a look at Heidegger’s phenomenological history 
of thinking as logic.23
3. Heidegger’s Phenomenological  
History of Logic: Plato
Heidegger addresses the question of the historical relation between 
things and thinking in the context of the development of logic as 
the scientific study of thinking. By taking this approach, he aims to 
challenge the orthodox view of logic as a free-floating and ultimate 
form of thinking, one which provides the grounds for all of the other 
sciences. For Heidegger, then, the attempt to unearth the foundations of 
22  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 106.
23  For work addressing Heidegger’s views on logic in the context of late-nineteenth 
and early-twentieth century developments, see: Albert Borgmann (1978), 
‘Heidegger and Symbolic Logic,’ in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, ed. by Michael 
Murray (New Haven: Yale University Press), pp. 3–22; Steven Galt Crowell 
(1992), ‘Lask, Heidegger, and the Homelessness of Logic,’ Journal of the British 
Society for Phenomenology 23(3), 222–39; Steven Galt Crowell (1994), ‘Making Logic 
Philosophical Again (1912–1916),’ in Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in his 
Early Thought, ed. by Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren (Albany: SUNY Press), 
pp. 55–72; Thomas A. Fay (1977), Heidegger: The Critique of Logic (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff); Stephan Käufer (2001), ‘On Heidegger on Logic,’ Continental 
Philosophy Review 34(4), 455–76; Stephan Käufer (2005), ‘Logic,’ in A Companion to 
Heidegger, ed. by Hubert L Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 
141–55; Jitendranath Mohanty (1988), ‘Heidegger on Logic,’ Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 26(1), 107–35; Greg Shirley (2010), Heidegger and Logic: The Place of Lógos 
in Being and Time (London: Continuum).
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logic is simultaneously an attempt to expose the fundamental historical 
presuppositions of science as such. He argues that the essence of thinking, 
of ‘judgement,’ has been determined by logic, and more specifically by 
the proposition, since ancient times.24 By excavating logic down to its 
foundations, Heidegger seeks to challenge the perceived self-evidence 
of this determination, to expose to the light of critical reflection what 
ancient philosophers had themselves found continually disturbing and 
obscure.25
Heidegger’s historical analysis is scattered across a number of works. 
Here, I will only gather together the highlights, which should suffice to 
capture the overall trajectory of his considerations. Heidegger organises 
his history of thinking into three chapters: first, the recognition of a 
mutual relation between the thing and the propositionally structured 
thought, the latter guiding the categorial determinations of the former; 
second, the mathematical interpretation of the proposition, which 
in turn provided the basic principles of pure thinking; and third, the 
emergence of a critique of pure thinking, which follows from things 
having been determined on the basis of a propositionally structured 
thinking.26 Heidegger elaborates these three chapters of history through 
discussions of the philosophies of Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant, 
respectively. The prologue to this history, however, belongs to Plato.
Recall that Heidegger focuses his attention on the way in which 
intentionality unifies things and thinking. It does this, he says, in 
accordance with a pre-existing standard of some kind. Heidegger’s 
historical analysis traces the ways in which this pre-existing, unifying 
standard, as an implicit and inherent feature of subjectivity, has 
been recognised and articulated over the course of the philosophical 
tradition, beginning with Plato. With Plato, argues Heidegger, this 
standard was conceptualised as an image or model, the ‘look’ a thing 
has in the imagination of its producer before it is produced. This look 
underpins the philosophical meaning of Plato’s concept of the idea: ‘It 
24  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 149.
25  Martin Heidegger (1962a [1927]), Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and 
Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell), p. 21 [2]. (Following scholarly convention, 
page numbers in square brackets refer to the original 1927 German edition of Being 
and Time.)
26  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 108.
 1634. Things, Thinking, and the Social Foundations of Logic
is this anticipated look of the thing, sighted beforehand, that the Greeks 
mean ontologically by eidos, idea.’27
This ancient analogy between looking and thinking carries with 
it a connotation of illumination, for looking entails the presence of 
light — above all, the sun. Plato thus drew a comparison between visible 
things and thinkable things, arguing that sunlight is to vision what the 
idea of the good is to scientific thinking.28 According to Heidegger, Plato 
believed that the good provides an illumination by which to distinguish 
between ‘a shadow’ and ‘the real.’29 The idea of the good thus provides 
the guidance we need in order to bring our thinking into proper contact 
with the real. It is what prevents us from wandering aimlessly among 
the shadows, without hope of ever discovering truth. The key point is 
that achieving such knowledge is not simply a matter of observing an 
enormous number of things, as a naive empiricism might suggest. One 
must also be able to distinguish the epistemically good things from the 
epistemically bad ones, that is, the things which contribute to knowledge 
from those which do not.30 The good provides the standard by which 
such distinctions are made. Plato’s idea of the good thus represents the 
condition of possibility for scientific thinking. It is the a priori element in 
cognition which makes scientific knowledge, as such, possible.
On Heidegger’s reading, Plato’s account of the good, as a unifying 
standard combining things and thinking in the experience of knowing, 
is modelled on an account of production. Clearly, then, the idea of the 
good is not just one idea among many, but rather the first, or primary, 
idea. It serves to organise all the secondary ideas, the categories or 
concepts which give specific content to our understanding, into a 
unified whole. The idea of the good, writes Heidegger, lies beyond all 
other ideas, giving them the ‘form of wholeness,’ or ‘communality.’31 
He suggests that, because it plays this fundamental organising role, of 
productively forming all other ideas into a unified whole, the idea of the 
good ‘is nothing but the demiourgos, the producer pure and simple.’32 
27  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 106.
28  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 283.
29  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 285.
30  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 285.
31  Martin Heidegger (1984a [1978]), The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. by 
Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), p. 184.
32  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 286.
164 Science as Social Existence
This suggests that Plato’s account of knowledge should be read as a 
causal one. Just as the craftsperson forms matter and ideas into artefacts, 
so the idea of the good forms things and thinking into knowledge.
According to Heidegger, Plato’s importance lies in the fact that 
his conceptualisation of thinking on the model of production has 
provided the basis for all subsequent philosophical enquiry. However, 
the philosophical nature of this analogy remains obscure in his work. 
Heidegger describes Plato’s account as having a ‘mythic’ quality in 
which the philosophical point fails to fully present itself.33 The claim that 
genuine philosophical, or more generally scientific, insight may arise 
from mythical imagery would seem to challenge the orthodox view 
that science and mythology are diametrically opposed to one another. 
Indeed, Heidegger insists that mythology, like science, ‘has its basis in 
specific experiences and is anything but pure fiction or invention.’34 The 
important point here is that Heidegger viewed Plato’s mythical account 
of the foundations of knowledge as a proto-scientific account from out 
of which a more precisely determined philosophical theory could then 
be developed. According to Heidegger, it was Aristotle who would take 
the first significant step along this path.
4. Heidegger’s Phenomenological  
History of Logic: Aristotle
On more than one occasion, Heidegger calls Aristotle ‘the father of 
logic.’35 However, the fact that Aristotle has gained a pre-eminently 
authoritative place in the philosophical canon did not, writes Heidegger, 
happen as a matter of course but ‘only after arduous struggles and 
controversies’ which finally concluded in the thirteenth century.36 
Remarkably, medieval Christian theology and ancient Greek ontology 
33  Heidegger (1984a), The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 184.
34  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 234.
35  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 179; Heidegger (1962a), 
Being and Time, p. 257 [214]; cf. Martin Heidegger (2009 [1998]), Logic as the Question 
Concerning the Essence of Language, trans. by Wanda Torres Gregory and Yvonne 
Unna (Albany: SUNY Press), p. 5.
36  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 118.
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shared a common interpretation of creation in terms of production, 
but the former understood creation as production from out of nothing, 
while the latter understood it as production from ‘out of a material that 
is already found on hand.’37 Whereas for medieval theologians both 
the that-being and the what-being of a thing are produced, for ancient 
philosophers only the what-being is produced. For the Greeks, in 
other words, existence itself was not subject to creation. Consequently, 
with its assimilation into medieval theology, ancient ontology became 
reformulated in a way which obscured its original problematic, a 
circumstance which began to find correction only in the eighteenth 
century.38
According to Heidegger, Aristotle’s signal achievement was the 
introduction of a more precise formulation of the whatness of the 
thing.39 In developing this doctrine, Aristotle used as his guideline the 
Greek concept of logos.40 Heidegger writes that logos has been variously 
interpreted to mean ‘reason,’ ‘judgement,’ ‘concept,’ ‘definition,’ 
‘ground,’ and ‘relationship.’41 He notes, however, that the word logos is 
derived from the same root as legein, which means ‘to talk’ or ‘to hold 
discourse.’42 He thus suggests as a basic signification of logos the German 
word Rede, which may be translated as ‘speech.’43 The connection 
to thinking is clear. Speech is one central way in which thoughts are 
expressed or communicated. Heidegger argues that legein, discourse, or 
Rede ‘is the clue for arriving at those structures of Being which belong 
to the entities we encounter in addressing ourselves to anything or 
speaking about it.’44
One important connotation of logos, as speech, is that it functions to 
‘let something be seen,’ which means that it points something out to the 
37  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 118
38  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 118
39  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 85.
40  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 106.
41  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 55 [32].
42  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 47 [25]; see translator’s note 3, p. 47.
43  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 55 [32]; cf. Heidegger (1984a), The Metaphysical 
Foundations of Logic, p. 1.
44  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 47 [25].
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listener.45 Another important connotation of logos is that of ‘relation’ or 
‘relationship.’46 Plato’s mythological image of the good as demiurge, or 
producer, is thus an example of logos in that it points out the createdness 
of the thing, as well as the relation of unity between things and thinking. 
In contrast to Plato, however, Aristotle focussed on logos as ‘statement’ 
or ‘proposition.’ The crucial move here is from a conception of thinking 
as a collection of images to a conception of thinking as a collection of 
propositions, as speech. Heidegger describes this move as ‘decisive’: 
‘Thinking is here conceived in the sense of talking and speaking.’47 
Moreover, speaking is further specified in terms of propositions: 
‘Aristotle is the first to give the clearer metaphysical interpretation of the 
logos in the sense of the propositional statement.’48 In his attempt to treat 
the thing by analogy to the proposition, Aristotle thus takes a dramatic 
step beyond Plato. Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that Aristotle 
still adopts, without question, Plato’s image of the thing on the model 
of the product, or artefact. The proposition provided Aristotle with a 
useful model by which to more precisely determine and formalise the 
ontological structure of the thing conceived in this way.
It is because Aristotle undertook a systematic analysis of the 
proposition that Heidegger names him the father of logic. Logic, in 
this sense, is the ‘science of logos,’ the formal analysis of speech, reason, 
or thinking made possible through the instrument of the proposition.49 
Logos, as proposition, does not just point something out — as in ‘Look, 
a bird!’ — it points something out about something — as in ‘The bird 
flies.’ Logos as proposition is, in other words, a composite; it combines 
two or more things. Heidegger argues that the proposition, as a 
determination of something as something, is an expression of thinking. 
Hence, logic, as the science of logos, is also the science of thinking.50 
Furthermore, a proposition combines things in a particular way: ‘Flies 
bird the’ is not a proposition, not logos. Logic thus originates in the 
45  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 56 [32].
46  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 58 [34].
47  Heidegger (2009), Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, p. 17.
48  Martin Heidegger (2000 [1953]), Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. by Gregory Fried 
and Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press), p. 61.
49  Heidegger (1984a), Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 22.
50  Heidegger (1984a), Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 1.
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attempt to make explicit whatever it is that governs the intelligibility of 
combinations of terms within a proposition. According to Heidegger, 
Aristotle recognised that the implicit organiser in the proposition 
was being, which is rendered explicit in the term ‘to be’ as well as 
its cognate ‘is.’51 In order to be properly analysed, then, the implicit 
presence of being in the proposition ‘The bird flies’ must be made 
explicit, by reformulating the proposition as ‘The bird is flying.’ The 
general form of the proposition thus becomes ‘S is P,’ where the 
‘is’ combines two distinct terms. However, Heidegger writes that 
Aristotle furthermore observed that the ‘is’ separates as well combines. 
We cannot understand the combination of S and P unless we have 
first understood them as each signifying ontologically distinct, but 
potentially combinable, things.52 The proposition ‘The bird is flying’ 
points out that two distinct things, one material and the other motive, 
are combined in a single intelligible event.
The term ‘is’ does not signify a distinct thing in the way that the terms 
‘bird’ and ‘flying’ do. Heidegger interprets Aristotle as arguing that the 
‘is’ signifies nothing, that is, no distinct thing. Rather, it consignifies a 
relation between things, ‘a certain combining, which cannot be thought 
unless what is already combined or combinable has been or is being 
thought.’53 The ‘is’ does not point to a thing existing among other things, 
but instead to an aspect of thinking: ‘the being-combined of what is 
thought in thinking.’54 If we think of the ‘is’ as pointing out a relation, 
then we immediately see that it presupposes the existence of two or 
more relata, or things related. On the account Heidegger attributes 
to Aristotle, these relata are not mutually distinct and separate things 
existing beyond thinking, but rather the significations in thinking of 
those things. The ‘is’ in the proposition ‘The bird is flying’ does not 
combine the bird and the motion of flying. It combines the concept ‘bird’ 
and the concept ‘flying.’ Hence, Heidegger writes that in Aristotle ‘logos 
is conceived as a connecting of notions, as a conjoining of meanings, as a 
51  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 180.
52  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 182.
53  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 181: cf. Aristotle (1941a), De 
Interpretatione, trans. by E. M. Edghill, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. by Richard 
KcKeon (New York: Random House), pp. 38–61 (p. 41 [lines 16b19–25]).
54  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 182.
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binding together of concepts.’55 From this, he concludes that the starting 
point of Aristotle’s science of logos is a clarification of the precise 
concepts from out of which composite logoi of the form ‘S is P’ come 
to be organised. The starting point, in other words, is the definition of 
concepts. Aristotle’s doctrine of the concept, including its definition, 
must therefore precede his doctrine of logos as proposition.56
Aristotle thus sets about differentiating and defining types of 
concepts in order to prepare the ground for a study of the ways in 
which those concepts may be combined in a proposition. In order to 
give a precise account of the proposition, he recognised that one must 
first give a precise specification of the concepts it includes. Recall that 
for the ancient Greeks thinking is grounded in experience. Hence, for 
Aristotle the definition of a concept was closely linked to a clarification 
of the nature of the experienced thing which that concept is meant to 
signify. A more precise determination of the concept thus went hand 
in hand with a more precise determination of the whatness of the thing. 
Ontology proceeds from grammar. The science of logos provides an 
entry point for a science of being.
Aristotle’s key philosophical contribution was to narrow the focus of 
enquiry down to one particular kind of logos, the proposition. As a result, 
the subsequent course taken by ontology was powerfully conditioned 
by the range of possibilities made available by the composite linguistic 
form ‘S is P.’ Consider one consequence of this. In the Categories, Aristotle 
observes that one particular kind of concept could be represented 
only in the subject position of the proposition, never in the predicate 
position. This is the kind of concept signifying concrete individuals. 
Aristotle called such individuals ‘primary substances.’57 By further 
studying the constraints imposed by the proposition, Aristotle then 
identified another kind of concept which could, unlike the concept of 
primary substance, also be represented in the predicate position of the 
proposition. One example of a proposition in which these two kinds 
of concept are represented is ‘The shirt is white.’ Aristotle wrote that 
55  Heidegger (1984a), Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 23.
56  Heidegger (1984a), Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 23
57  Aristotle (1941b), Categoriae, trans. by E. M. Edghill, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, 
ed. by Richard KcKeon (New York: Random House), pp. 3–37 (p. 9 [lines 2a11–13]).
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the predicate ‘white’ represents the category of ‘quality,’ in this case, 
the shirt’s quality of being white.58 In saying of the shirt that it is white, 
the proposition signifies the fact that a particular whiteness is present 
in the shirt, or, more generally, that a particular quality is present in a 
particular substance. Aristotle emphasised that by ‘present in’ he does 
not mean that the whiteness is in the shirt as a part is in a whole. He 
means rather that this particular whiteness could not exist independently 
of this particular shirt.59 More generally, although a particular quality is 
ontologically distinct from the concrete substance in which it is present, 
it would not exist if it were not present in that substance.
To us, Aristotle’s point may seem rather trivial. He is simply telling 
us that the thing is a substance with qualities, or, put more broadly, with 
properties. The point Heidegger wants to make, however, is that our 
self-evident understanding of the thing as a property-bearing substance 
was the outcome of considerable intellectual effort and philosophical 
ingenuity. It is not obvious that the thing is best understood by analogy 
to the proposition. When we see a white shirt we do not see a shirt, on 
the one hand, and its being white, on the other. We see a white shirt. 
Separating the shirt into substance and property may strike one, after 
all, as a rather odd thing to do.
By analysing the thing through the composite logos of the proposition, 
Aristotle determined that the thing too is composite in its structure, and, 
more specifically, that it is a substance with distinct properties. Just as 
the ‘is’ of the proposition separates, so as to then intelligibly combine, 
concepts in accordance with specific grammatical principles, so too 
are the thing and its properties distinguished and then combined in 
accordance with specific ontological principles. In his systematic 
analysis of logos as proposition, Aristotle not only laid the foundations 
for the subsequent field of logic, he also rendered a more precise 
formulation of Plato’s obscure and largely informal notion of a unifying 
standard which serves to organise things and thinking into knowledge. 
The mythical image of the demiurge was thus replaced by the more 
systematically tractable logic of the proposition.
58  Aristotle (1941b), Categoriae, p. 9 (line 1b29).
59  Aristotle (1941b), Categoriae, p. 7 (lines 1a23–24).
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5. Heidegger’s Phenomenological  
History of Logic: Descartes
The second chapter in Heidegger’s history of things and thinking begins 
with the emergence of modern natural science.60 With the arrival of the 
early-modern period, Aristotle’s narrow focus on logos as proposition 
not only continues to guide formal enquiry into the nature of the 
thing, the philosophical consequences of this orientation are further 
strengthened and become radicalised in a profound way. Heidegger 
argues that the fundamental foundation distinguishing modern science 
from its predecessors can be located in that which ‘rules and determines’ 
the basic activities of science.61 This foundation is twofold. First comes 
what he describes as the ‘work experiences’ of modern science. This 
designates, above all, the modern scientist’s distinctive ‘direction 
and mode of mastering and using what is,’ or, put more prosaically, 
the scientist’s ‘manner of working with the things.’62 It is important 
to emphasise that Heidegger is here offering a phenomenological 
description. He seeks to pick out the distinctive and fundamental 
features of the way the modern natural scientist experiences her work 
with things. The second aspect of the foundation of modern science is 
the range of possibilities within which the scientist may meaningfully 
understand her experience of working with things. As was discussed 
in Chapter Three, the study of these possibilities in distinction from 
their concrete actualisation as the whatness of things is what Heidegger 
means by the term ‘metaphysics.’ When we transcend the things 
which normally preoccupy us, and reflect instead on the existential 
conditions determining the whatness of those things, then we are doing 
metaphysics in Heidegger’s sense. Hence, Heidegger calls this second 
aspect the ‘metaphysical projection of the thingness of things.’63 The 
idea is that, with this projection, the scientist’s experience of her work 
with things is guided by a metaphysical thinking which determines the 
thingness of those things, that is, the specific kind of whatness rendering 
them amenable to scientific understanding.
60  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 65.
61  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 68.
62  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, pp. 66, 68.
63  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 68.
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In the last section, we considered the way in which Aristotle’s focus 
on the proposition facilitated a specific metaphysical projection of the 
thingness of things as property-bearing substances. This was the first 
chapter in Heidegger’s phenomenological history of logical thinking. 
The second chapter addresses how, with the rise of modern natural 
science, the proposition becomes mathematically interpreted in a way 
which then establishes the basic principles of pure thinking, or pure 
reason. For Heidegger, a key early-modern figure exemplifying this 
next stage is René Descartes. Descartes uncritically accepted Aristotle’s 
articulation of the thing as substance, but then proceeded to radicalise it. 
He took Aristotle’s claim that substance exists independently of all else, 
that it is autonomous, and argued that God is the only substance which 
truly meets this criterion. Indeed, drawing from the medieval Christian 
notion of God as an uncreated creator who produces the cosmos from 
nothing, Descartes argued in Principles of Philosophy that God is the basis 
for all other entities: ‘We perceive that all other things can exist only by 
the help of the concourse of God.’64 Hence, the notion of production 
lying behind Aristotle’s ontological treatment of the proposition is 
transformed in Descartes from creation out of material already on hand 
to creation from out of nothing. The guiding principle which unifies 
things and thinking, represented by Plato with the mythic image of the 
demiurge, and by Aristotle in the ‘is’ of the proposition, is transplanted 
by Descartes into the subject position of the proposition, where it comes 
to signify the most perfect substance and ultimate ground of all other 
things. With this move, argues Heidegger, the conditions determining 
the thingness of the thing, and, more immediately, the substantiality 
of the substance, get buried beneath the dogmatic assumption that 
substance provides the only and ultimate basis for any knowledge 
of things.65 The nature of substance can thus no longer be clarified in 
terms of its substantiality, because questions of substantiality are now 
immediately referred back to substance. An ontology of substance, an 
enquiry into the conditions determining substance in its fundamental 
64  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 125 [92]; René Descartes (1969a), The Principles 
of Philosophy, trans. by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, in The Philosophical 
Works of Descartes, vol. 1, by René Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), pp. 201–302 (p. 239 [Principle LI]).
65  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 127 [94]; Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology, p. 124.
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whatness, thus passes outside the scope of analysis. As a consequence, 
the nature of a substance can, for Descartes, become known only 
indirectly through the study of its most enduring properties: ‘there is 
always one principal property of substance which constitutes its nature 
and essence, and on which all the others depend.’66 On the other hand, 
because substance can still provide an absolute basis for knowledge, it 
supplies Descartes with a secure means by which to build up an account 
of knowledge in terms of certainty.
In a parenthetical comment, Heidegger suggests that the priority 
given by Descartes to certainty had its historical roots in the Christian 
doctrine of salvation, especially as regards the security of the individual.67 
According to this doctrine, among created things humans are distinctive 
because their ‘eternal salvation is in question.’68 However, Heidegger 
is more concerned with the ascendency of mathematics immediately 
before and during Descartes’s lifetime. He argues that mathematics 
presented an ideal tool for those hoping to fulfill a growing cultural 
desire for certain, or absolute, knowledge.69 In particular, mathematics 
provided a template for philosophers seeking to ground knowledge 
in indubitable first principles and axioms. For example, in Rules for the 
Direction of the Mind, likely his first philosophical work, Descartes wrote 
that ‘in our search for the direct road towards truth we should busy 
ourselves with no object about which we cannot attain a certitude equal 
to that of the demonstrations of Arithmetic and Geometry.’70
Drawing from the philosophical tradition, Descartes set out to 
discover axiomatic certainty, of the kind exemplified in mathematics, 
through an analysis of the proposition. His goal was to construct 
unimpeachable axioms on the secure bedrock of absolute substance. 
For Descartes, God, being neither created nor sustained by anything 
beyond itself, was the first, ‘absolutely perfect,’ substance.71 However, 
he furthermore contended that there exist two kinds of created 
66  Descartes (1969a), Principles of Philosophy, p. 240 (Principle LIII).
67  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 99.
68  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 109.
69  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 100.
70  René Descartes (1969b), Rules for the Direction of the Mind, trans. by Elizabeth 
S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, in Philosophical Works of Descartes, vol. 1, by René 
Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 1–77 (p. 5 [Rule II]).
71  Descartes (1969a), Principles of Philosophy, p. 241 (Principle LIV).
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substance, which each exist independently of any other kind of 
created substance, and which may themselves provide a solid basis for 
indubitable, axiomatic knowledge of God’s creation.72 Descartes called 
these two kinds of substance res extensa and res cogitans, the ‘extended 
thing’ and the ‘thinking thing,’ or what are more commonly known as 
‘body’ and ‘mind.’ These two attributes, ‘extendedness’ and ‘thinking,’ 
are, according to Descartes, the principal properties constituting the 
nature of body and mind, respectively, and on which all other possible 
attributes of body and mind are themselves dependent. There was, for 
Descartes, an especially close relationship between the human mind and 
God, because both, in his view, are examples of a thinking substance.73 
He was, however, careful to maintain a strict qualitative difference 
between the two.74
Taking thinking substance as the foundational principle in his 
architectonic of certainty, Descartes determined that the fundamental 
axiom of a secure system of knowledge was the proposition ‘I think.’ 
As is well known, Descartes claimed that the indubitable truth of the 
proposition ‘I think’ entails the truth of the further proposition ‘I am.’ 
He argued that the proposition ‘I am’ is already present, implicitly, 
in the assertion ‘I think.’ According to Heidegger, an absolute 
mathematical principle must exclude anything which may have been 
given beforehand; it cannot have anything in front of it.75 Taking 
mathematics as his model, Descartes thus sought a proposition which 
refers only to itself, excluding all possible traces of prior experience. 
This absolute proposition turned out to be the proposition in general, as 
such, the pure positing of a thinking which asserts.76 Just as the perfectly 
general proposition posits only itself, so thinking in general, construed 
as absolutely mathematical, takes note only of what it already has. What 
Descartes discovered, argues Heidegger, is that pure thinking of this 
kind is always an ‘I think,’ ego cogito. Wherever pure thinking posits 
only itself, it must encounter the ego, the ‘I.’ Thus, in Heidegger’s words, 
Descartes concludes that ‘[i]n “I posit” the “I” as the positer is co- and 
72  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, pp. 125–26 [92].
73  Descartes (1969a), Principles of Philosophy, p. 241 (Principle LIV).
74  Descartes (1969a), Principles of Philosophy, p. 239–40 (Principle LI).
75  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 104.
76  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 104.
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pre-posited as that which is already present, as what is. The being of 
what is determined out of the “I am” as the certainty of the positing.’77 
The subject of the most fundamental proposition — the ‘I’ of the ‘I 
think’ — thus becomes the absolute substance which must ‘stand under’ 
everything else. With Descartes, argues Heidegger, the individual ‘I’ 
becomes the foundational subject, ‘that with regard to which all the 
remaining things first determine themselves as such.’78 These things, 
which stand in relation to and are determined by the individual subject, 
become ‘objects.’ Through Descartes’s intervention, the grammatical and 
logical distinction between subject and object thus becomes interpreted 
as a metaphysical distinction between mind and body. This is, argues 
Heidegger, a radical change in the way thinking, and subjectivity more 
generally, is understood to relate to things. The whatness of things now 
becomes illuminated on the basis of a mathematical impulse towards 
absolute first principles, which have themselves been grounded in the 
thinking subject construed as the foundational and individual ‘I.’
With Descartes, the ‘I’ principle thus becomes the fundamental 
axiom of all knowledge.79 Although he adopted without criticism 
Aristotle’s focus on the proposition, as well as his account of the thing 
as a property-bearing substance, Descartes displaced the organising 
principle in the proposition from the ‘is’ to the subject position. The 
ontological guideline distinguishing and combining the categories in 
general thus gets buried in the ultimate category of substance, where 
it no longer presents itself for investigation. Hence, with Descartes, the 
conditions determining the substantiality of substance, the thingness 
of the thing, get concealed behind a dogmatic appeal to the ultimacy 
of substance. As the absolute ground of all enquiry, the ‘I’ resists any 
further explication. It becomes self-grounding. However, Heidegger 
argues that the ‘I’ principle, while fundamental, is not the only 
fundamental axiom of knowledge which emerges from Descartes’s 
intervention. Indeed, because every propositional assertion necessarily 
implicates the ‘I’ principle, such assertions must always posit only 
what lies in the ‘I’ as the original subject. Hence, what is posited in 
77  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 104.
78  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 105.
79  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 107.
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the predicate must not speak against the subject. From this, Heidegger 
concludes that every proposition co-posits, along with the ‘I’ principle, 
an equally fundamental principle of non-contradiction.80 The idea is 
that the content of the ‘I’ as the foundational subject must be perfectly 
consistent with itself. As a consequence, reason in Descartes becomes 
formulated in terms of purity. The ‘I think’ provides the basis for 
reason, and non-contradiction ensures the purity, in the sense of logical 
consistency, of that reason. The fundamental mathematical axioms of 
the ‘I’ principle and the principle of non-contradiction thus combine to 
determine thinking as pure reason. This, in turn, provides the standard 
governing all determinations of the thingness of things: ‘The question 
about the thing is now anchored in pure reason, i.e., in the mathematical 
unfolding of its principles.’81 The Cartesian notion of ‘pure reason’ thus 
traces its roots back to Aristotle’s narrow construal of logos in terms of the 
proposition. However, the purity in the notion results more immediately 
from Descartes’s appropriation of mathematical techniques in order to 
establish the indubitable certainty of knowledge.
Descartes conceptualised thinking by analogy to mathematical 
practice, so as to then initiate a radically new formulation of the thingness, 
or whatness, of the thing as determined by the ‘I’ principle and the 
principle of non-contradiction. This move exemplifies what Heidegger 
identifies as the twofold foundation of modern science, namely, the 
experience of working with the things, and the generalisation on 
the basis of those experiences of an all-encompassing metaphysical 
projection of the thingness of things. Heidegger’s historical attention 
weighs more on the second aspect, but he does briefly consider ways 
in which Descartes’ philosophical initiatives related to the scientific 
work of his period. These considerations touch on the work of Galileo 
and Newton, as well as on the nature of the early-modern experiment, 
and they will be discussed further in Chapter Six. For present purposes, 
the next step in Heidegger’s history focusses on Kant’s response to 
Descartes’s introduction of pure reason as the basis for thinking and 
knowledge.
80  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 107.
81  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 108.
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6. Heidegger’s Phenomenological  
History of Logic: Kant
In the evolving historical dialectic between thinking and things, 
Descartes represents for Heidegger a key moment in the early-
modern determination of the whatness of the thing on the basis of a 
mathematically construed, pure reason. The next stage in Heidegger’s 
history, then, comes with Immanuel Kant’s critique of pure reason. The 
counter-concept arising from this critique is Kant’s notion of the thing-
in-itself, to which we gave detailed attention in Chapter Three. As we 
saw there, Kant conceived of the thing-in-itself as a property-bearing 
substance. This marks a strong continuity between Descartes and Kant, 
despite the latter’s criticism of the former. Indeed, Heidegger argues 
that, on the basis of this shared commitment to substance ontology, 
Kant likewise reproduced the Cartesian position that thinking is an 
attribute of substance.82 According to Heidegger, then, Kant’s critique 
of pure reason, while departing from Descartes in important ways, 
nevertheless left unquestioned Aristotle’s original introduction of the 
proposition as a model by which to formalise accounts of thinking 
and things, an introduction from out of which the ontological concept 
of substance first grew. Furthermore, Heidegger alleges that Kant 
uncritically adopted from Descartes a concept of the ‘I’ as an isolated, 
individual subject.83 Although he submitted the ‘thinking’ of the ‘I think’ 
to ontological critique, he left the ontology of the ‘I’ largely unexamined. 
The point where Kant radically departed from Descartes was with his 
move to submit the ‘I’ to phenomenological investigation. He begins 
to unpack the phenomenal content of the ‘I think,’ of the reasoning or 
judging individual, in a way which Descartes did not. The consequences 
of this move were, in Heidegger’s view, of far-reaching philosophical 
importance.
Recall that, according to Heidegger, one crucial influence in the 
transformation of the notions of thing and thinking from the ancient 
to the early-modern period was the rise of Christianity. In particular, 
productive subjectivity was reconceptualised as the creation of things 
82  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, pp. 366 [318–19].
83  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, pp. 367 [320].
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from out of nothing rather than from out of pre-existing material. This 
shift is powerfully represented in Descartes’s philosophy. Heidegger 
argues that, as a result, a distinctly hierarchical order was introduced 
into the way things are conceived.84 Among all that is, the highest and 
most real is the creative source of everything else. This is God, the 
uncreated creator, the ens increatum. Every other being is created, an 
ens creatum. Among created beings, the individual human being is 
most distinctive because its eternal salvation is in question. This is 
Descartes’s res cogitans. What remains of created beings constitutes the 
world, Descartes’s res extensa. The hierarchical ordering, in descending 
order of reality and perfection, is thus God, human beings, and world.
It is important to recognise what Heidegger is not arguing. He is not 
arguing that Cartesian philosophy is simply a transposition of Christian 
doctrine into a philosophical idiom. Indeed, Heidegger emphasises that 
the relation of early-modern philosophy to Church dogma can be ‘very 
loose, even broken.’85 His point is, rather, that the profound intellectual 
transformations of the early-modern period, to which Descartes made 
a key contribution, took place within a cultural context deeply suffused 
with orthodox Christian belief. We should thus not find it surprising that 
Descartes’s philosophical views were consequentially influenced by the 
specificities of the social and material environment in which he worked. 
The underlying assumption of Heidegger’s analysis is that philosophers 
are not individual and autonomous agents, whose singular ideas spring 
free from the social and historical soil in which they germinated but 
from which they no longer need to draw nourishment. This assumption 
is strongly at odds with the Cartesian view, and one may view its 
persuasiveness as bound together, in part, with the subsequent decline 
in influence of Christian notions of personal salvation on the intellectual 
milieu in which philosophers necessarily articulate and seek credibility 
for their work.
As we have seen, Heidegger argues that Descartes’s position was 
influenced not just by Christianity, but also by the growing importance 
of mathematics in his period. On the one hand, the predominance of the 
Christian doctrine of personal salvation helps to explain why Descartes 
relocated the guiding principle, which unifies things and thinking, 
84  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 109.
85  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 109.
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from the ‘is’ of the proposition to the ‘I,’ the foundational subject, of the 
proposition. On the other hand, the growing authority of mathematical 
techniques helps to explain why Descartes then formulated the epistemic 
security of the ‘I’ by analogy to the axiomatic certainty of mathematics. 
The doctrine of salvation suggests that the individual, by overcoming 
the burden of sin, may slip free from the finitude and impurity of mortal 
existence and find eternal existence in God. Axiomatic knowledge, 
by comparison, provides the individual with a means by which to 
overcome the threat of error and falsehood, and hence to achieve an 
absolute certainty uncorrupted by the contingent constraints of finite 
physical existence. The pure reason of the res cogitans, the ‘soul’ or 
‘mind,’ provided Descartes with an ultimate ground for knowledge, 
a ground which could be internally validated, independently of the 
worldly, and thus imperfect, influence of the res extensa, the ‘external 
world.’ The ‘I’ principle places the ground of reason in the individual 
thinking substance. The principle of non-contradiction ensures the 
internal purity of that individual substance.
On Heidegger’s reading, Kant’s critique of pure reason questions 
the alleged internal purity of the individual knower by challenging the 
idea that an individual can know anything at all in isolation from the 
‘external world.’ Implicit in this challenge is a rejection of the idea that 
an individual may escape the finite constraints of physical existence and 
secure knowledge of a potentially infinite scope. In Chapter Three, we 
reviewed Kant’s notion of finitude, and the doctrine of humility which 
it grounds. We can now see how finitude and humility arose for Kant 
in his response to the problem introduced by Descartes’s location of the 
conditions determining the thingness of things in the pure reason of 
the thinking ‘I.’ By placing the ‘I think’ at the foundation of knowledge, 
Descartes gives urgency to the question ‘What am I?’ or, more generally, 
‘What is the human being?’ The ‘I’ is not just one domain among others, 
but precisely that domain to which knowledge of all other domains 
must be traced back.86 The question ‘What is the thing?’ thus leads back 
inevitably to the question ‘What is the human being?’ Because Kant 
accepts Descartes’s account of the human being as a thinking substance, 
the question about the human being becomes for him a question 
86  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 110.
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about thinking. According to Heidegger, Kant’s primary question is 
thus the question of what an individual human being must be like in 
order to think. Descartes had already provided one clue: namely, that 
the individual, as a thinking substance, is bound by the law of non-
contradiction. According to Heidegger, Kant picks up on this clue and 
develops it into an investigation of what the ‘I’ must be like in order to 
be bound by laws. In other words, Kant’s critique of pure reason seeks 
after the conditions of possibility for law- or rule-governed thinking 
as such. Heidegger calls the articulation of these conditions ‘a basic 
problem for logic.’87 The search for a solution to this problem is a search 
for a ‘philosophical logic, or better, the metaphysical foundations of logic.’88
On Heidegger’s reading, then, Kant’s enquiry into the law-
governedness of thinking was a metaphysical enquiry into the ontological 
conditions which make scientific knowledge as such possible. He claims 
that this enquiry is prior to, and more fundamental than, the investigations 
typical of psychology, anthropology, ethics, or sociology.89 Whereas 
these latter domains of enquiry, in Heidegger’s view, take for granted 
the specific projection of the thingness of things which determines their 
particular subject matter, a more general ontological enquiry must address 
the conditions which make such determinations possible. Furthermore, 
Heidegger argues that ‘[o]nly as phenomenology is ontology possible.’90 
Hence, an enquiry into the existential conditions determining the 
possibility of logic is, for Heidegger, a phenomenological enquiry into 
the foundations of science. For him, logic is a particular kind of science, 
the ‘science of the rules of thought.’91 Accordingly, he argues that one 
signal achievement of Kant’s critique of pure reason was to open up the 
‘thinking’ of Descartes’s ‘I think’ to phenomenological investigation. In 
particular, Heidegger reads Kant as exploring the ontological basis for 
a subject’s ability to follow the laws structuring scientific thinking, chief 
among them being the law of non-contradiction. With this move, the law 
of non-contradiction, which had been treated by Descartes as the highest 
principle of all knowledge, is ‘removed from its position of dominance.’92 
87  Heidegger (1984a), Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 20.
88  Heidegger (1984a), Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 21.
89  Heidegger (1984a), Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 17.
90  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 60 [35].
91  Heidegger (1984a), Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 104.
92  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 184–85.
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What now dominates are those objective features of subjectivity which 
allow the ‘I’ to submit itself to the rules governing thinking.
By opening thinking up to phenomenological investigation, Kant 
reopens a question that was explicitly addressed by Plato and Aristotle 
but then closed off by Descartes: namely, the question of logos as that 
which functions to meaningfully combine concepts. As we saw earlier, 
Plato locates this phenomenon in the idea of the good, conceptualised 
by analogy to the demiurge, the producer pure and simple. Aristotle, 
in contrast, conceptualised it by analogy to the ‘is’ of the proposition, 
thereby characterising it not as a thing but rather as that according to 
which things are combined. Descartes, by relocating the phenomenon 
of ontological combination from the ‘is’ to the subject of the proposition, 
then came to treat it as a thing the nature of which resists further 
analysis. Kant, by investigating this phenomenon as an active, non-
thinglike feature of the subjectivity of the thinking subject, began to 
shed phenomenological light on what Descartes had formerly cloaked 
in darkness.
According to Heidegger, Kant located the phenomenon of ontological 
combination in the individual subject’s power of imagination 
[Einbildungskraft].93 For Kant, imagination is a ‘faculty of forming.’94 
This harkens back to Plato’s conceptualisation of the relation between 
things and thinking by analogy to production. Just as a craftsperson, 
or demiurge, forms disparate materials into a complete and unified 
whole, so too does the imagination of the subject form the jumble of 
brute sensation into an ordered and intelligible experience. Imagination 
thus makes intelligible experience possible. In the Critique of Pure Reason, 
Kant argued that ‘[t]he conditions of the possibility of experience in 
general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of 
experience.’95 Heidegger argues that this passage reflects a ‘fundamental 
posture’ in human history, one which it is impossible for us to avoid.96 
Both an intelligible experience and the things which meaningfully 
present themselves in that experience — that is, both thinking and the 
93  Martin Heidegger (1997 [1929]), Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 5th edn, 
enlarged, trans. by Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), p. 90.
94  Heidegger (1997), Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 91.
95  Immanuel Kant (1998), Critique of Pure Reason, ed. and trans. by Paul Guyer and 
Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 283 (line A158/B197).
96  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 183.
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things thought — are dependent on the faculty of imagination. We saw 
in Chapter Three that, for Kant, an intelligible experience involves the 
structured unity of two distinct faculties: spontaneity and receptivity, or 
what we have also discussed as constructivity and affectivity. According 
to Heidegger, Kant’s notion of imagination describes the common root 
from out of which the distinct stems of spontaneity and receptivity both 
grow.97 The power of imagination is, he writes, the ‘original unity’ of 
the two.98 Chapter Three focussed on receptivity, especially as it relates 
to the issues of human finitude and epistemic humility. In this chapter, 
our concern lies more with the constructive faculty which lends order 
and intelligibility to experience, thereby allowing us to make sense of 
the things around us.
Kant described the constructive aspect of imagination in terms of 
a ‘faculty of rules.’99 Furthermore, he argued that rules, insofar as they 
are objective, may also be called ‘laws.’100 The power of imagination, 
then, and especially its constructive aspect, provides the conditions of 
possibility for following, among the other fundamental rules of logic, the 
law of non-contradiction. Logic thus finds its phenomenological, which 
is to say its ontological, origins in the imagination of the individual 
subject. However, Heidegger emphasises that, for Kant, the subjectivity 
of the individual subject is not constitutive of the law. Rather, the law 
is that towards which the subject directs herself, and it is through such 
directedness that the individual first realises the possibilities for action 
97  Heidegger (1997), Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 97.
98  Heidegger (1997), Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 107. This reading of Kant 
has been strongly criticised. Michael Friedman, for example, argues that Heidegger, 
in this passage, is ‘turning Kant’s original problematic entirely on its head’ (Michael 
Friedman (2000), A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger (Chicago: 
Open Court), p. 61). In his preface to the second edition, Heidegger notes that 
‘[r]eaders have taken constant offense at the violence of my interpretations’ 
(Heidegger (1997), Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. xx). On the other hand, the 
book’s translator, Richard Taft, comments that ‘[o]ver the years, Kant and the Problem 
of Metaphysics has emerged as the cornerstone of an important and original (if 
controversial) direction in Kant interpretation that continues to assert an influence 
today’ (in Heidegger (1997), Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. xii). Whatever 
the case, I am here less concerned with the ‘accuracy’ of Heidegger’s interpretation 
of Kant, than with the role played by that interpretation in the development of 
Heidegger’s own account of logic.
99  Kant (1998), Critique of Pure Reason, p. 242 (line A126); cf. Heidegger (1997), Kant and 
the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 105.
100  Kant (1998), Critique of Pure Reason, p. 242 (line A126).
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open to her as a unique person.101 Strictly speaking, then, the law is not 
a purely spontaneous construction of the individual subject. But neither, 
strictly speaking, is it purely an object of the sensibility, or receptivity, 
of the individual. The law, writes Heidegger, is nothing empirical.102 It 
is not a thing awaiting discovery in the world. It is, rather, a structure 
found in reason. In this sense, then, the individual subject discovers the 
law within herself as something she is ultimately free to either follow 
or disregard, but which she nevertheless encounters as an obligation. 
Heidegger thus interprets Kant as arguing that reason is a ‘receptive 
spontaneity’ wherein the rules governing it are not freely constructed 
by the individual subject but rather encountered by her as the necessary 
constraints making reason, as such, possible. To accept these constraints, 
then, means to submit oneself to a ‘self-given necessity.’103 Heidegger 
writes that, for Kant, in submitting to the law, ‘I submit to myself.’104 
We thus experience the rules of reason as self-validating. We come to 
recognise them through the obligation we feel towards them, and we 
likewise experience them as the source of that obligation. According to 
Heidegger, it is because the subject’s relation to rules is marked by both 
constructivity and receptivity that Kant located rules in the power of 
imagination, a power which provides a common root for both.
It is a matter of logical necessity that a thing cannot be, for example, 
both a bird and not a bird. If S is P, then S cannot at the same time 
be not-P. This would be a logical impossibility, a contradiction. If we 
want to reason logically, then we must follow the principle, or law, of 
non-contradiction. This law sits at the foundation of logic. It puts an 
a priori constraint on thinking as Aristotle construed it on the model 
of the proposition. The necessity of the law is thus conjoined with the 
necessity of thinking in strictly propositional terms. We are obliged to 
follow the law of non-contradiction only so long as we also feel obliged 
to express ourselves in a logically sound manner. A poet, for example, 
may describe a thing in a way which is ambiguous between its being 
and not being a bird. Poetic thinking need not be logical thinking. We 
are thus free to ignore the law of non-contradiction to the extent that we 
101  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, pp. 135, 138; Heidegger (1997), 
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 111.
102  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 135.
103  Heidegger (1997), Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 109.
104  Heidegger (1997), Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 111.
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feel free to think in ways not determined by the logic of the proposition. 
Logical rules may compel us to think in certain strictly determined 
ways, but the compulsion itself is not a determination. We may, after all, 
choose to act otherwise, whatever the cost may be.
Heidegger draws this insight from Kant’s discussion of the role of rules 
in theoretical reasoning, finding there the idea that ‘[f]reedom already 
lies in the essence of pure understanding, i.e., of pure theoretical reason, 
insofar as this means placing oneself under a self-given necessity.’105 
Furthermore, because freedom is a question of action, theoretical reason 
is importantly tied to practical reason. Hence, Kant writes in the Critique 
of Pure Reason: ‘Everything is practical that is possible through freedom.’106 
Heidegger thus reads Kant as undertaking to explain theory in terms of 
action by giving priority to practical over theoretical reason. In his view, 
however, this undertaking remained ambiguous, as Kant presupposed 
an either/or of receptivity and spontaneity, of passivity and activity, 
thus failing in the end to fully realise the task of tracing both back to 
a common source in the power of imagination.107 Heidegger writes that 
Kant, in unveiling the receptive spontaneity of our relation to rules, ‘saw 
the unknown,’ and ‘had to shrink back.’108 Kant’s retreat is evinced in his 
shift of focus between the A and B editions of the Critique of Pure Reason. 
In the first edition, rule-governed thinking springs from the unified and 
irreducible receptive spontaneity of the imagination. In the second edition, 
Kant moved away from this unified stance, and instead assimilated rule-
governedness, and imagination in general, to pure spontaneity.109 With 
this, Kant backed away from his original insight that logic stems from 
the synthetic unity of our non-empirical constructive power, on the one 
hand, and our existence as finite creatures necessarily affected by things 
and persons, on the other. Heidegger argues that, subsequent to Kant’s 
important insight in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, ‘pure 
reason as reason drew him increasingly under its spell’: ‘Kant awoke to 
the problem of now searching for finitude precisely in the pure, rational 
105  Heidegger (1997), Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 109.
106  Kant (1998), Critique of Pure Reason, 674 (A800/B828); cf. Heidegger (1997), Kant and 
the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 109.
107  Heidegger (1984a), Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 184.
108  Heidegger (1997), Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 118.
109  Heidegger (1997), Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 114.
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creature itself, and not first in the fact that it is determined through 
“sensibility.”’110
Kant thus managed to momentarily lift the ontological principle 
unifying things and thinking from out of the substance-subject where 
Descartes had buried it. In doing so, he exposed the phenomenological 
character of this unifying source as the receptive spontaneity of 
imagination, but he then allowed this insight to collapse back into the 
Cartesian subject. Consequently, imagination, as the ground for logical 
reason, gets reentrenched as the purified property of an individual and 
autonomous thinking substance. This means that the world towards 
which thinking, as pure reason, directs itself is likewise conceptualised 
in terms of pure substance, as an independent property-bearing object 
standing opposite a thinking subject. Sceptical doubts about the 
existence of a world construed in this way, which we considered in 
Chapter One, then emerge to make no end of philosophical mischief.
Thus, although Kant failed to grasp the implications of his insight 
into the phenomenology of rule-following, he broke new ground 
and provided the hints on which Heidegger was then able to build. 
Heidegger located one important such hint in Kant’s remarks on the 
phenomenology of ‘respect’ [Achtung].111 Kant approached respect 
as the ‘feeling of my existence’ or as a ‘moral feeling’ which one 
experiences in response to the laws governing moral action.112 In my 
own terms, respect is an instance of the affectivity of the subject, and 
thus has an elementally emotional structure. Through this existential 
feeling of respect for the law one comes not only to recognise the law 
as law, one also comes to understand oneself as a person who can be 
guided by such laws. To be guided by a law or rule is to be affected by 
it. Guidability thus entails affectivity. The feeling that one’s existence 
is rule-governed is thus a sign of one’s finitude. I do not freely create 
the conditions governing my judgements or actions. On the contrary, 
110  Heidegger (1997), Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 118. In a lecture one year 
later, Heidegger would add that ‘Kant himself, as the second edition of the Critique 
of Pure Reason reveals, helped to prepare the turn away from an uncomprehending 
finitude toward a comforting infinitude’ (Martin Heidegger (1995a [1983]), The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. by William 
McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), pp. 208–09).
111  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 133.
112  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 133.
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in judging or acting I am constantly affected by existential pressures 
which are not solely of my own autonomous creation. On Heidegger’s 
reading, Kant argues that the law offers one a resource by which to repel 
those impulses or inclinations which threaten to disrupt moral action. 
Hence, the law may play a negative role, for example, by disabling 
the immediate sensible feelings of pleasure or pain which threaten to 
interfere with sound judgement. However, Heidegger points out that, 
for Kant, the disabling force exercised by the law against immediate, 
sensible feelings is itself also a feeling, an emotion. Indeed, he identifies 
this view, which he also ascribes to Spinoza, with the claim that ‘an 
emotion can be overcome only by an emotion.’113 In phenomenological 
terms, the repulsion of sensible feelings in the pursuit of rule-governed, 
or principled, action is itself motivated by a feeling. For Kant, this 
feeling is one of respect for the law, and it differs from sensible feelings 
like pleasure and pain in that it has an intellectual rather than somatic 
ground. Heidegger interprets Kant as arguing that respect for the law 
is produced by reason alone, that we possess it independently of, and 
prior to, sensible experience: ‘Reason, as free, gives this law to itself.’114 
Furthermore, Heidegger emphasises Kant’s claim that respect for the 
law, as a non-empirical feeling, is not directed towards things but rather 
towards persons. He quotes Kant’s statement in the Critique of Practical 
Reason that ‘[r]espect always goes to persons alone, never to things.’115 
113  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 134. Cf. Heidegger’s 
statement in Being and Time: ‘when we master a mood, we do so by way of a 
counter-mood; we are never free of moods’ (Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 
175 [136]). Note, too, this statement by scientist-philosopher Ludwik Fleck, written 
in the early 1930s: ‘The concept of absolutely emotionless thinking is meaningless. 
There is no emotionless state as such nor pure rationality as such. […] There is 
only agreement or difference between feelings, and the uniform agreement in 
the emotions of society is, in its context, called freedom from emotions’ (Ludwik 
Fleck (1979), Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, trans. by Fred Bradley 
and Thaddeus J. Trenn, ed. by Thaddeus J. Trenn and Robert K. Merton (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press), p. 49). Note, furthermore, this more recent statement 
from feminist epistemologist Alison Jagger: ‘emotional attitudes are involved on 
a deep level […] in the intersubjectively verified and so supposedly dispassionate 
observations of science’ (Alison M. Jagger (1989), ‘Love and Knowledge: Emotion in 
Feminist Epistemology,’ in Women, Knowledge, and Reality: Explorations in Feminist 
Epistemology, ed. by Ann Garry & Marilyn Pearsall (Boston: Unwin Hyman), pp. 
129–55 (p. 138)).
114  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 135.
115  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 135.
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Heidegger paraphrases this statement as: ‘Respect as respect for the law 
relates also, in its specific revelation, to the person.’116 More specifically, 
he interprets Kant as arguing that the person to whom respect for the 
law relates is ‘myself.’ Respect for the law is, on this reading, a ‘self-
subjection’: ‘In subjecting myself to the law, I subject myself to myself 
as pure reason.’117
There is, however, an interpretive anomaly here. Kant writes that 
respect for the law is a feeling directed toward persons. Heidegger 
paraphrases this as the claim that respect for the law is a feeling 
directed toward the person, namely, oneself. Where Kant used the plural, 
Heidegger transposes the singular. On the basis of this misinterpretation, 
Heidegger then accuses Kant of failing to overcome Descartes’s burial 
of the rules binding things and thinking in the individual ‘I.’ Yet, 
immediately following the passage Heidegger cites from the Critique 
of Practical Reason, Kant writes that the example of a virtuous person 
‘holds a law before me,’ that this person ‘provides me with a standard.’118 
On Kant’s account, it is towards another person, a virtuous person, that 
respect is felt. The behaviour of that person, in exemplifying the law, 
commands my respect for the law. Respect for the law is thus really 
respect for a person whose actions are seen to exemplify the law. Put 
in a nutshell, there is a distinctly intersubjective element in Kant’s 
phenomenological account of respect. Only by considering the way 
in which we are affected by the behaviour of others can we begin to 
understand the compulsive respect for the rules which motivate and 
guide our own behaviour.
A more felicitous reading of Kant’s critique of Descartes’s pure reason 
should thus attribute to him two important insights. First, as Heidegger 
observes, Kant opened up the Cartesian ‘I’ to phenomenological enquiry, 
revealing the receptivity at the core of thinking. For Kant, this receptivity 
was especially manifest in a feeling of respect towards rules or the law. 
Second, Kant furthermore challenged the autonomy of the Cartesian ‘I’ 
by recognising that respect for the law is constituted by respect towards 
116  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 135.
117  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 135.
118  Immanuel Kant (1956), Critique of Practical Reason, trans. by Lewis White Beck (New 
York: Macmillan), pp. 79–80.
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other persons. Heidegger obscures this second insight by interpreting 
Kant’s respect for persons as a respect for oneself, thereby foisting 
onto Kant a Cartesian construal of the ‘I’ as an isolated, self-referring 
individual. On this basis, Heidegger then argues that the ‘I’ should not 
be understood in terms of isolation, but rather in terms of community, 
or being-with-others, a point which will be considered in more detail 
later in this chapter. In making this argument, however, Heidegger is 
developing a point already present, if only in germinal form, in Kant’s 
own account. Where Heidegger more clearly departs from Kant is in 
his rejection of the substance ontology which the latter took over from 
Descartes. Whereas Kant conceived of the ‘I’ as a substance, or thing, 
Heidegger describes it in terms of existence. For Heidegger, thinking is 
not the attribute of a substance-subject, but rather of a form of existence, 
an intentional act which is necessarily directed towards things and other 
persons, and which can therefore never be understood independently 
of those things and other persons.
This brings us to the end of Heidegger’s history of the thematisation 
of thinking and its formalisation as logic. To recap, Plato and Aristotle 
had conceived of intentionality as the unifying principle which binds 
together things and thinking. For Plato it was the mythical demiurge, 
while for Aristotle it was the ‘is’ of the logos, construed narrowly as 
the proposition. Descartes shifted attention from the ‘is’ to the subject 
position of the proposition, thereby closing intentionality up in the pure 
reason of an isolated ‘I’ and thus supressing the essential link between 
thinking and things. Kant opened the ‘I’ back up, arguing that the rules 
which govern thinking entail the receptivity of the thinking ‘I’ towards 
other persons. Heidegger, for his part, builds on Kant’s insights. As 
we saw in Chapter Three, he more fully opens up the affectivity of the 
‘I’ to include things as well as persons. Later in this chapter, we will 
see how Heidegger also elaborated on the affective receptivity of the 
individual ‘I’ towards other persons through the methods of existential 
phenomenology. We will also consider some of the limitations of that 
method and examine the ways in which SSK can help to overcome 
them. In particular, SSK can help lead Heidegger towards a more fully 
developed account of the social foundations of logic. For the time being, 
let us directly address Heidegger’s phenomenological account of the 
existential foundations of logic.
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7. ‘The Argument Lives and Feeds on Something’
According to Heidegger, Kant’s critique of pure reason focussed on the 
question ‘What is the human being?’ and sought to answer this question 
by uncovering the conditions of possibility for rule-governed thinking 
as such. The articulation of these conditions is, for Heidegger, a basic 
problem for philosophical logic, a problem which can be solved only 
through metaphysical enquiry. As a metaphysical task, this enquiry 
refuses to take for granted the ancient Aristotelian projection of thinking 
as structured by the proposition. Heidegger thus understands logic as 
grounded in metaphysics, a position which puts him at odds with the 
prevailing view concerning the grounds of logic, a view he describes 
as self-evident, as ‘immediately intelligible on the level of common 
sense.’119
This prevailing, common-sense argument views logic as a ‘free-
floating’ and ‘ultimate’ form of thinking, one which holds primacy over 
all the sciences, broadly construed.120 By classifying metaphysics as a 
science, proponents of this argument claim that logic also holds primacy 
over metaphysics. All knowledge, including metaphysical knowledge, 
is necessarily grounded in logic. Metaphysical thinking presupposes 
logic, because without logic it could never be justified or carried 
out.121 Yet, Heidegger observes that, for the sake of consistency, this 
argument must also be applied to logic itself, as the science of thinking, 
thus yielding the discomforting conclusion that logic too presupposes 
logic.122 It thus becomes difficult to see how logic could be justified 
without falling into a vicious circle. Heidegger seeks to soften this circle 
with the counter-argument that logic is grounded in metaphysics, and 
that metaphysics holds primacy over logic. He thus attempts to turn the 
prevailing view that metaphysics presupposes logic on its head. Indeed, 
at one point he even makes the provocative suggestion that logic is 
only contingently related to philosophy: ‘Logic originated in the ambit 
of the administration of the Platonic-Aristotelian schools. Logic is an 
invention of schoolteachers, not of philosophers.’123
119  Heidegger (1984a), Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 103.
120  Heidegger (1984a), Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 103.
121  Heidegger (1984a), Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 104.
122  Heidegger (1984a), Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 104.
123  Heidegger (2000), Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 128.
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Heidegger’s response to the common-sense argument for the 
ultimacy of logic is a diagnostic one. Indeed, he cautions against attempts 
to directly attack the argument by means of a formal refutation.124 The 
problem with such attempts is that they implicitly presuppose that 
thinking is, at its base, necessarily governed by the formal rules of logic. 
Hence, in their very method, these attempts surrender to the prevailing 
account the very ground they had hoped to contest. Yet, although 
Heidegger refuses to cede this ground, he does accept as inevitable the 
circularity of any argument which seeks to probe the foundations of 
thinking as such.125 This inescapable circle is not, however, a formal circle, 
not a circle of logic, but a hermeneutic circle, a circle of interpretation. 
It is, moreover, an inherent feature of thinking. Heidegger argues that 
attempts to overcome the hermeneutic circle fail ‘from the ground up’ 
to grasp the way in which thinking actually works.126
Heidegger’s considerations are driven by the insight that all 
acts of thinking are acts of interpretation. This is just another way of 
recognising that thinking is necessarily constructive. To make sense of 
an experienced thing means to determine its whatness. An act of sense-
making is an interpretive act which implicates certain presuppositions 
about the thingness of the thing experienced. As we saw above, 
Heidegger describes the presuppositions guiding interpretation in terms 
of the metaphysical projection of the thingness of things. Metaphysics 
concerns the range of possibilities available for intelligibly determining 
the whatness of things experienced. Those possibilities may be viewed 
as the range of presuppositions on the basis of which one can make sense 
of one’s experience in the world. The hermeneutic circle springs from the 
fact that interpretation necessitates the prior existence of understanding. 
In order to achieve a determinate understanding of something through 
an act of interpretation, one must already possess some understanding 
relevant to that thing. For example, in order to achieve a determinate 
understanding of a word in a sentence, one must already possess 
some understanding of the overall meaning of the sentence. It thus 
appears that understanding presupposes understanding, that thinking 
presupposes thinking.
124  Heidegger (1984a), Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 106.
125  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 27 [7].
126  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, pp. 194 [153], 363 [315].
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If we then introduce into this circle the further claim that thinking 
is necessarily governed by formal logic, we end up with the assertion 
that logic presupposes logic, that logic grounds logic, which is just to 
say that logic needs only itself in order to be what it is. Here, then, we 
have the nub of the common-sense argument that logic is ‘free-floating’ 
and ‘ultimate.’ Logic is both the ground for all other forms of thinking, 
as well as the ground for itself. The primacy of logic is, in this way, self-
evident. Heidegger’s diagnostic response to this argument is to deny 
the claim that thinking is necessarily grounded in logic. This leaves in 
place the interpretive circle essential to thinking, but resists its further 
determination as a circle of logic. Indeed, Heidegger argues that the 
thinking presupposed in an act of interpretation ‘has nothing to do 
with laying down an axiom from which a sequence of propositions 
is deductively derived.’127 Thinking is not, at its base, structured by 
axioms, and thus interpretation cannot, at its base, be an act of inference 
from axioms, or first principles. Interpretation is not, in other words, 
inferential, but constructive or projective. Heidegger argues that when 
thinking turns to the interpretation of itself, when it thematises itself as 
an object of attention, it ‘put[s] itself into words for the very first time, 
so that it may decide of its own accord whether, as the thing which it is, 
it has that state of Being for which it has been disclosed in the projection 
with regard to its formal aspects.’128 What Heidegger is describing here 
is a process of self-interpretation by which thinking comes to exploit 
the possibility for articulating itself in formal or axiomatic terms, that 
is, in terms of logic. To treat thinking as fundamentally structured 
by axioms is to overlook this process of interpretation, and hence to 
confuse the end product of the interpretation — logic, as the science 
of thinking — for the thing being interpreted — thinking itself. In fact, 
according to Heidegger, logic is but one possible way in which thinking 
may come to understand itself. Only when the contingency of this 
particular self-articulation is acknowledged can thinking ‘decide of its 
own accord’ whether this articulation is an adequate representation of 
itself. Concealing this contingency, by erasing the interpretive processes 
which underlie it, risks forcing on thinking a representation of itself 
which it lacks the resources to question. Under such circumstances, it 
127  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 28 [8].
128  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 362 [315].
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becomes a matter of common sense to view thinking in terms of logic, 
and logic as something free-floating and ultimate.
Heidegger’s proposed diagnostic refutation to the common-sense 
argument for the ultimacy of logic is meant to demonstrate two points: 
first, why the argument is necessary under certain presuppositions; 
second, why the argument is at all possible.129 On the first point, we can 
now see that the argument becomes necessary once one presupposes both 
that thinking is necessarily grounded in fundamental axioms, as well as 
that the articulation of the formal propositional structure of thinking 
is not a constructive act of interpretation, but rather one of deductive 
derivation from those fundamental axioms. On the second point, the 
argument becomes possible only once these two presuppositions have 
been formally articulated and rendered credible. Heidegger’s history 
of the evolving relationship between things and thinking, recounted 
above, is meant to describe this process of articulation. It was Aristotle’s 
narrow interpretation of logos in terms of the proposition which founded 
logic as the formal study of propositionally structured speech acts. 
Descartes uncritically adopted this foundation, and was furthermore 
guided by mathematics, and perhaps also by the Christian doctrine 
of salvation, to shift the unifying locus of the proposition from the ‘is’ 
to the subject position, which, on the basis of the presumed axiomatic 
truth of the statement ‘I think,’ he narrowly construed in terms of the 
ego, the ‘I.’ This history is meant to suggest that the two presuppositions 
underpinning the common-sense argument did not, as it were, jump 
fully formed from the brow of Zeus, but instead emerged through a 
complex, protracted and controversy-laden historical process.
Heidegger claims that his diagnostic argument offers a ‘refutation’ 
of the common-sense argument, but this is not true.130 It is, after all, not 
impossible for the existence of a presupposition to be a matter of historical 
contingency while its justifiedness remains a matter of necessity. 
However, although Heidegger has not conclusively proven that the 
presuppositions of the common-sense argument are only contingently 
justified, he has, I think, succeeded in loosening up intuitions about 
their presumed necessity. In light of Heidegger’s historical analysis, 
concerns about the vicious circularity of the common-sense argument 
129  Heidegger (1984a), Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 106.
130  Heidegger (1984a), Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 106.
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are thus less likely to be assuaged by pointing to the conviction that 
the argument must, in any case, be accepted because there is no 
other alternative. Indeed, Heidegger’s analysis opens the field for a 
consideration of his own hermeneutic approach, which seeks to soften 
the circle by grounding logic in metaphysics. He writes that the common-
sense argument for the ultimacy of a free-floating logic ‘lives and feeds 
on something, something which the argument itself not only cannot 
produce but which it even believes it must deny.’131 This ‘something’ 
is, in his view, the existential foundation of logic, a foundation which 
he seeks to disclose through phenomenological analysis. The common-
sense argument cannot produce these extra-logical foundations 
because its mode of thinking is restricted to the domain of logic. And 
it furthermore denies the existence of such foundations because it 
contends that all other modes of thinking must ultimately reduce to 
logic. Heidegger’s existential-phenomenological account of thinking 
disputes this lattermost claim.
These considerations, focussing on logic as the science of thinking, 
find their place within Heidegger’s broader existential conception 
of science. This broader conception was given detailed attention in 
Chapter Two. Recall from there that Heidegger draws a distinction 
between logical and existential conceptions of science. The logical 
conception views science, in ideal terms, as a coherent body of true 
propositions, a conceptual scheme. It is important to emphasise, 
once again, that Heidegger does not reject the logical conception of 
science, but instead seeks to elucidate how it could have become at all 
possible, that is, to illuminate the grounds for its existence. He does 
this through a phenomenological enquiry into the existential conditions 
which enable the emergence of the propositional stance presupposed 
by the logical conception. Heidegger described this process in terms 
of a change-over from immersed involvement in a work-world, where 
things are taken up non-deliberatively as ready-to-hand, to a theoretical 
knowing which disengages from and objectifies things as present-at-
hand within-the-world, thus determining them as a subject matter for 
propositional knowledge claims. In this chapter, we have seen how the 
change-over in the way one understands the thingness of things also 
131  Heidegger (1984a), Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 106.
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profoundly relates to the way thinking itself is understood. As things 
come to be understood as property-bearing substances, or objects, 
thinking correspondingly comes to understand itself as a specific kind 
of object, one structured by propositions and formal rules. Logic, as the 
science of thinking, thus comes to understand itself logically, as being 
necessarily grounded in logic. In so doing, it loses sight of the historical 
change-over from which it emerged, thus closing itself off from an 
understanding of its own existential grounds. As a consequence, the 
science of thinking comes to misunderstand itself as a necessary and 
exclusive interpretation of thinking rather than as but one possible and 
contingent way in which thinking may be thematised.
Heidegger accepts Kant’s claim that thinking must be fundamentally 
understood in terms of a faculty of rules, arguing that rule-following is 
an inevitable part of the thinking process.132 On this basis, he defines 
logic, as the science of thinking, more narrowly as the ‘science of the rules 
of thought,’ and observes that one may follow rules without having a 
scientific understanding of them: ‘the inescapability of rule usage does 
not in itself immediately imply the inescapability of logic.’133 Heidegger 
thus draws a clear line between rules, on the one hand, and logic, on 
the other. The latter arises through the scientific study of the former, 
but a science is neither presupposed nor entailed by the existence of 
its object of study. Indeed, Heidegger argues that rules, in the act of 
thinking, ‘are not grasped as something at hand “in consciousness.”’134 
While one is immersed in the act of thinking, the rules guiding that 
act are understood unreflectively in their readiness-to-hand; they are 
not thematised as objects of deliberative attention. Because thinking, 
as rule-following, may proceed in the absence of logic, thinking does 
not necessarily presuppose logic. Thus the vicious circularity of the 
common-sense argument — that logic presupposes logic — is softened 
with the phenomenological argument that logic presupposes rules, 
but rules do not entail logic. It follows, therefore, that logic is not 
ultimate, and hence that metaphysics, as a form of thinking, need not 
presuppose logic. Indeed, Heidegger claims that his phenomenological 
investigation into the existential grounds of possibility for logic reveals 
132  Heidegger (1984a), Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 104.
133  Heidegger (1984a), Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 104.
134  Heidegger (1997), Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 108.
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the metaphysical foundations of logic. It is logic which depends on 
metaphysics, not the other way around.
The common-sense argument thus ‘lives and feeds’ on the prior 
existence of unthematised and inescapable rules for thinking. Attention 
to these unthematised rules, however, provides only a description 
of what thinking fundamentally is, but not an explanation of how it 
could at all be possible. Such rules, on their own, encompass neither 
the metaphysical foundations of logic, in particular, nor of thinking, in 
general. As we saw in the previous section, according to Heidegger, one 
of Kant’s principal achievements was that he pointed the way forward 
for such an explanation. Kant sought the conditions of possibility for 
thinking as such, consequentially locating them in the affectivity of 
the subject, that is, in the phenomenon of respect before the law. The 
phenomenology of respect is meant to explain the normative force 
attributable to the laws governing thinking. Let us now consider 
Heidegger’s attempts to build on Kant’s insight.
8. Time and Tradition at the  
Existential Root of Logic
Heidegger’s historical account of the relation between things and 
thinking began with his remarks on Plato’s mythical image of the 
demiurge. According to Heidegger, Plato’s demiurge represents the idea 
of the good, that is, the fundamental standard which guides thinking into 
proper contact with things. The good allows us to distinguish between 
the epistemically good and bad, between things which contribute to 
knowledge and those which do not. In this way, the good stands as 
the indispensable a priori element in thinking, one making scientific 
knowledge, as such, possible. The condition of possibility for scientific 
knowledge is thus the grasp of the a priori element which binds thinking 
together with things in the production of knowledge. On this basis, 
Heidegger declares Plato ‘the discoverer of the a priori.’135 However, 
as discussed earlier, he furthermore observes that Plato’s conception 
of the a priori, expressed with the image of the demiurge, possesses a 
‘mythical quality’ through which the philosophical significance of the 
135  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 326.
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a priori fails to properly present itself. Heidegger’s own account of the 
metaphysical foundations of logic may thus be viewed as an attempt to 
more fully articulate the philosophical significance of the a priori against 
the historical backdrop of its original presentation in the ancient myth 
of the cosmic demiurge.
As noted earlier, Plato expresses the normative contribution made 
by the good to acts of cognitive discernment by drawing an analogy 
with the light contributed by the sun to acts of visual discernment. 
Only in the light of day can we reliably distinguish the real from mere 
shadows. Likewise, only in the ‘illumination’ of the good can we 
reliably distinguish epistemically valuable phenomena from irrelevant 
or deceptive ones. Successful acts of discrimination require the prior 
existence of illumination, whether of a sensory or intellectual kind: 
‘What sunlight is for sensuous vision the idea tou agathon, the idea of 
the good, is for scientific thinking, and in particular for philosophical 
knowledge.’136 In Plato’s work, then, the a priori was introduced as that 
which provides the illumination, or enlightenment, necessary for proper 
acts of epistemic discernment, and hence for knowledge in general. 
The productive acts of the demiurge are not random acts of creation, 
but display an order and coherence — an inherent and compelling 
intelligibility — a logos — which directly expresses the fundamental 
contours of the good. As logos, the mythical image of the demiurge 
points out, and so lets us see, the relations of significance, or meaning, 
which bring unity and purpose to acts of production. It manifests the 
highest guiding principle of such action. The demiurge thus stands for 
the a priori principle without which productive action, including the 
production of scientific knowledge, would not be possible.
When Aristotle replaced the demiurge with the proposition, he 
narrowed down and rendered more conceptually precise the content of 
this guiding principle, and hence initiated a historical process in which 
the a priori was progressively demythologised. According to Heidegger, 
this was the foundational moment of logic as the science of thinking. 
Later in his life, Heidegger would remark that science demythologises 
myth in much the same way one might drain a marshland, leaving only 
136  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 283.
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‘dry’ ground behind.137 In the earlier works from which the present 
discussion draws, however, Heidegger’s mood is less glum. The 
young(ish) Heidegger sees himself as carrying forward a torch which 
had passed through the hands of, among others, Aristotle, Descartes, 
and Kant, thus bringing the sharp light of scientific philosophy into 
ever remoter corners of Plato’s inexhaustibly polysemous image of the 
a priori as cosmic demiurge.
Heidegger’s intervention was enabled by Kant’s critique of 
Descartes’s doctrine of pure reason, including the a priori rules 
governing such reason. Kant sought to disclose the conditions making 
it possible for the subject to follow rules, locating those conditions in 
the spontaneous receptivity of the subject’s imagination. We saw earlier 
how Heidegger criticised Kant’s dependency on the Cartesian concept 
of the subject, arguing that the imagination is not the extant property 
of a thinking substance, but instead a basic structure of the subject 
construed as existence. In this section, we will focus on another aspect 
of Heidegger’s critique of Kant’s concept of imagination: the aspect of 
time. By attending to the temporality of the imagination, Heidegger 
sought to further explicate the normativity of rule-following as first 
broached by Kant in his phenomenology of respect.
According to Heidegger, Kant argued that the spontaneity (or 
constructivity) and receptivity (or affectivity) which are unified in 
thinking share a common root in the subject’s imagination. Heidegger 
takes this argument one step further, urging that this common root 
is itself rooted in the existential soil of ‘original time.’138 Original time 
makes imagination, and hence thinking, possible. It is the existential 
condition of possibility for imagination, conceived as the faculty of 
rules, and for thinking, conceived as rule-following. On Heidegger’s 
account, we are able to follow rules only because we exist in original 
time. Original time thus replaces Plato’s demiurge as the normative 
standard providing a necessary guide for thinking.
Heidegger’s conceptualisation of thinking in terms of temporality 
is a natural consequence of his move from treating science as a body 
of concepts and formalised rules to treating it as a form of existence. 
137  Martin Heidegger (1996 [1984]), Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister,’ trans. by William 
McNeill and Julia Davis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), p. 111.
138  Heidegger (1997), Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 137.
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Science is not a static framework, but a dynamic activity of thinking 
and doing, a way of productively comporting oneself towards nature. 
Once scientific thinking has been construed dynamically, as something 
characterised by motion or change, it is a small and natural step to view 
thinking as also involving a temporal aspect. Indeed, Heidegger points 
out that the a priori, by its very name, demonstrates the temporality of 
thinking. The a priori is what ‘comes before’ sensory experience in the 
thinking process. It helps us to bring coherence and meaning to that 
experience by allowing us to discriminate between information which 
is salient and information which is not salient to the task at hand. The 
temporality of scientific practice is evinced by the necessary relation 
between a priori rules and sensory information, both of which combine 
in the production of natural knowledge. Thinking thus presupposes 
time. Heidegger writes that ‘[t]ime is the way in which the mind lets 
itself be given anything at all.’139 His urge to understand the conditions of 
possibility for scientific thinking, as such, therefore pushes him towards 
a phenomenological investigation of the way time is experienced in the 
existential act of thinking. This is an experience of what Heidegger calls 
‘original time.’
Before turning to an explication of Heidegger’s concept of original 
time, it will be helpful to first examine the common understanding of 
time to which he contrasts it. According to Heidegger, this common 
understanding was expressed in the first instance by Aristotle in his 
remarks, first, that ‘time is not movement, but only movement in so far 
as it admits of enumeration,’ second, that ‘we discriminate […] more 
or less movement by time,’ and, third, that time is therefore ‘a kind 
of number’ or something ‘countable.’ Aristotle furthermore observed 
that time, insofar as it involves the ‘before and after,’ is measured in 
terms of the ‘now.’ Conceived of as motion enumerated in terms of the 
‘now,’ time thus comes to be understood as a ‘perpetual succession’ of 
nows.140 During a 1927 lecture, Heidegger demonstrated the plausibility 
of Aristotle’s definition by pulling his watch out of his vest pocket. ‘I 
139  Martin Heidegger (2010a [1976]), Logic: The Question of Truth, trans. by Thomas 
Sheehan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), p. 280.
140  Aristotle (1941c), Physica, trans. by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, in The Basic Works 
of Aristotle, ed. by Richard KcKeon (New York: Random House), pp. 213–394 (p. 291 
[lines 219a3–12]); cf. Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, pp. 238–39.
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take my watch out of my pocket and follow the change of place of the 
second hand, and I read off one, two, three, four seconds or minutes. 
This little rod, hurrying on, shows me the time, points to time for me, 
for which reason we call it a pointer, a hand. I read off time from the 
motion of the rod.’141 Yet, Heidegger also observes that this common 
understanding of time does not tell us what time is, but only how 
we may point to it, or read it off. Aristotle’s definition is, he says, an 
‘access definition’ or ‘access characterisation’; it tells us only how time 
may become accessible.142 Indeed, returning his watch into his pocket, 
Heidegger asks: ‘Where then is this time? Somewhere inside the works, 
perhaps, so that if I put the watch into my pocket again I have time in 
my vest pocket? Naturally not.’ He will raise the same puzzle again in a 
1935 lecture: ‘This clock is set according to the German Observatory in 
Hamburg. If we were to travel there and ask the people where they have 
the time, we would be just as wise as before our journey.’143 The use of 
a watch, clock, or observatory only provides us with a means by which 
to precisely measure time in terms of the now. An understanding of 
time as a perpetual succession of nows is already presupposed in these 
acts of measurement. Moreover, Aristotle defines the unit of measure 
by which time becomes accessible — the now — in terms of the ‘before 
and after.’ Responding to this, Heidegger observes that ‘the experience 
of the before and after intrinsically presupposes, in a certain way, the 
experience of time, the earlier and the later.’144 Hence, the common 
understanding of time presupposes time. Aristotle’s definition thus 
appears circular: ‘[t]ime is time.’145
This circularity is roughly homologous with the circularity of the 
argument addressed in the previous section, that logic presupposes 
logic. There we saw how Heidegger softened the circle by differentiating 
between logic, as the science of rules, and the rules themselves. A 
science of rules entails the prior existence of rules. A thematic, formal 
understanding of rules presupposes a non-thematic, existential 
understanding of rules. The difference is between rules present-at-hand, 
141  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 240.
142  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, pp. 256–57.
143  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 22.
144  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 247.
145  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 241.
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taken up as objects of study, and rules ready-to-hand, taken up 
as ‘equipment’ in the act of thinking. In similar fashion, Heidegger 
distinguishes the common time expressed in clock usage from the 
original time presupposed by such usage. Common time is original time 
thematised and rendered countable in terms of the now. The common 
understanding of time as a perpetual succession of nows thus ‘lives 
and feeds’ on a prior existential understanding of original time. Just as 
Aristotle narrowed thinking down to what can be explicitly expressed 
in the proposition, so too did he narrow time experience down to what 
can be explicitly expressed as part of a succession of countable nows.
These remarks on rules and time merge in the case of an a priori rule. 
In its very name, as what ‘comes before,’ an a priori rule would seem to 
possess an inherently temporal aspect. Yet, when the temporality of the 
a priori is understood in terms of common time, difficulties arise. Under 
this common understanding, we seem forced to posit the a priori as the 
first, or earliest, now in a perpetual succession of extant nows. But the 
a priori is not properly characterised by its being the first in a series of 
such events, but rather by its being the condition of possibility for such 
events. The a priori is not a countable now, but something which must 
come before all countable nows. Indeed, the extant events of common 
time presuppose the original temporality of the a priori. Hence, when 
time experience is narrowed down to what can only be expressed 
explicitly in terms of a succession of countable nows, the a priori must 
be viewed as somehow existing beyond this perpetual string of extant 
temporal moments. Seen from the perspective of common time, then, the 
a priori must exist beyond time — it must be timeless. Hence, Heidegger 
writes that, when orienting ourselves towards the common concept of 
time, it becomes ‘consistent to deny dogmatically that the a priori has 
anything to do with time.’146 Furthermore, seen from the perspective of 
common time, thinking, insofar as it is grounded in a priori rules, must 
itself also be viewed as a consequentially timeless phenomenon. On 
such an account, it also becomes consistent to dogmatically deny that 
thinking, at its innermost, rule-governed core, has anything to do with 
time. This would appear to give grounds for asserting that scientific 
146  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 325.
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thinking draws its ultimate justification from a realm of rules which 
somehow exists beyond time.
The momentum behind such dogmatism loses its strength, however, 
once one recognises a role for original time in addition to, and as distinct 
from, common time. This recognition comes with the awareness that, 
just as there is a non-thematic way of experiencing rules, so too is there 
a non-thematic way of experiencing time. Experienced non-thematically, 
a priori rules need not appear to be uprooted from the soil of time. We 
discover the original temporality of a priori rules in our use of them as 
‘equipment’ in the task of thinking, rather than in our thematisation, or 
foregrounding, of them as distinct and determinate objects of thinking.
Viewed phenomenologically, original time is experienced in the 
course of our immersed involvement in a work-world. As we saw in 
Chapter Two, a work-world is structured by the equipmental relations 
in which the significance, or meaning, of a particular task is manifest. 
When we are immersed in a task, our attention is focussed not on 
the equipment we are manipulating or otherwise using, but on the 
work towards which we employ the equipment. In the midst of our 
undisturbed immersion in an equipmental context, we understand the 
things we use as ready-to-hand rather than present-at-hand within-
the-world. Heidegger observes that ‘[a]t the basis of this undisturbed 
imperturbability of our commerce with things, there lies a peculiar 
temporality which makes it possible to take a handy equipmental 
contexture in such a way that we lose ourselves in it.’147 With this, he 
draws our attention to the familiar experience of losing track of time 
while being immersed in a task. His point is that time does not disappear 
when we lose track of it. Our actions do not, in other words, suddenly 
become timeless. Rather, time is still there in the way we experience 
our actions, but we do not experience it numerically as a countable 
succession of nows, or as any kind of present-at-hand thing which is 
‘passing by,’ but instead in a ‘peculiar’ way, as the temporality of what is 
ready-to-hand in our productive acts of thinking and doing. Heidegger 
thus argues that temporality is the ‘condition of the possibility of 
all understanding.’148 Hence, we do not experience original time as 
an aspect or feature of the equipment we use in the course of work. 
147  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 309.
148  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 274.
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Original time is, rather, that which makes our equipmental dealings, our 
basic understanding of things ready-to-hand, possible as a basic mode 
of existence. Heidegger characterises the way in which original time 
becomes intelligible to us in the course of such equipmental dealings 
in terms of two kinds of relation: the ‘in-order-to’ (Um-zu) and the ‘for-
the-sake-of-which’ (Worumwillen).149 Each relation picks out a central 
aspect of a ready-to-hand thing, for example, a pen. The ‘in-order-to’ 
of the pen is its purpose: the task of writing. Yet the pen is not the sole 
piece of equipment which contributes to this task. Heidegger writes that 
‘[e]quipment is in terms of [aus] its belonging to other equipment: ink-
stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, 
doors, rooms.’150 Before an individual piece of equipment can ‘show 
itself’ in this arrangement, ‘a totality of equipment has already been 
discovered.’151 The work-world in which the task of writing becomes 
practically intelligible is thus a relational manifold of ready-to-hand 
things the totality of which facilitates the task of writing. Heidegger 
argues that the ‘whatness’ of a ready-to-hand thing is constituted by 
the multiple relations in which the thing is able to show its use, its 
handiness. The whatness of a piece of equipment is constituted by its 
‘assignedness’ [Bewandtnis] within an overall equipmental context.152
The in-order-to relation, however, only describes the assignedness 
of equipment; it does not explain whence that assignedness comes. 
This is where the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ relation comes into play. 
Heidegger writes that ‘[o]nly so far as the for-the-sake-of a can-be 
is understood can something like an in-order-to (a relation of 
149  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 271.
150  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 97 [68].
151  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 98 [69].
152  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, pp. 292–93. In this context, I 
have chosen to translate Bewandtnis as ‘assignedness,’ in preference to Hofstadter’s 
translation, ‘functionality.’ ‘Assignedness’ better captures the connotation of 
‘directedness’ present in Bewandtnis, emphasised in Heidegger’s close comparison 
of Bewandtnis with Verweisen, ‘assignment’ or ‘reference’ (Martin Heidegger (1927), 
Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag), pp. 83–84; cf. Heidegger (1962a), 
Being and Time, p. 115 [84], where Bewandtnis is translated as ‘involvement’). 
‘Assignedness’ also blocks unhelpful connotations of functionalism, which may be 
suggested by Hofstadter’s choice. I further address this delicate translation issue 
in Chapter Five, where I introduce and defend a context-specific translation of 
Bewandtnis as ‘end-directedness.’
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assignedness) be unveiled.’153 The assignedness relation of the pen 
can show itself only if one has already understood the for-the-sake-
of-which relation which makes possible the practical intelligibility 
of the pen as equipment for writing. Only after one has understood 
this relation can one be in a position to ‘let’ the pen be used as a pen. 
Heidegger writes that ‘[l]etting-be-assigned [Bewendenlassen], as 
understanding of assignedness, is that projection which first of all 
gives to the Dasein the light in whose luminosity things of the nature 
of equipment are encountered.’154
Heidegger’s use of the metaphor of illumination in this passage 
was surely deliberate. The whatness, or what-being, of equipment is 
projected as an illumination in which things may be ‘seen’ in their 
assignedness. Seeing, in this context, does not mean observing, but 
using. For Heidegger, the using and manipulating of equipment ‘has 
its own kind of sight, by which our manipulation is guided.’155 He calls 
this sight ‘circumspection,’ and argues that circumspection ‘dwells’ 
in the multiple relations of an equipmental totality.156 Furthermore, 
Heidegger identifies the for-the-sake-of-which with the source of light 
which lets equipment be seen in its assignedness. He thus intended the 
for-the-sake-of-which to be a critical reinterpretation of Plato’s idea of 
the good, which Plato had introduced by drawing an analogy to the sun. 
Heidegger writes that ‘the idea tou agathon [i.e., the idea of the good] 
is the for-the-sake-of-which,’ and that ‘the for-the-sake-of-which excels 
the ideas, but, in excelling them, it determines and gives them the form 
of wholeness, koinonia, communality.’157 Like Plato’s idea of the good, 
Heidegger’s notion of the for-the-sake-of-which refers to a unifying 
principle, one which grants coherence to our experience by guiding 
us in discriminating cognitively valuable from irrelevant or deceptive 
phenomena. Just as the productive acts of Plato’s demiurge display an 
order and coherence — an inherent and compelling intelligibility — so 
too do constructive acts of thinking, guided by the for-the-sake-of-which, 
153  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 295; translation modified.
154  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 293; translation modified.
155  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 98 [69].
156  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, pp. 98 [69], 122 [88].
157  Heidegger (1984a), Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, pp. 184–85.
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express an order and coherence, whether of a practical or theoretical 
kind. Like Plato’s mythical image of the demiurge, the for-the-sake-
of-which stands for the a priori element binding together things and 
thinking in the production of knowledge.
Through this critical reinterpretation of the demiurge, Heidegger 
attempts to further spell out, in phenomenological terms, the 
philosophical significance of Plato’s mythical image. Unfortunately, he 
seems not to have got very far in realising this attempt, certainly not as 
far as he may have thought he had. Recall from earlier that Heidegger 
credits Kant with taking an important step forward on this path by 
locating the conditions of possibility for rule-following, as such, in the 
feeling of respect. We are able to follow rules because we are capable 
of being compelled by those rules, of being affected by them. In this 
way, the rules of thinking help us to make sense of our experience, 
including our experience of ourselves. According to Heidegger, Kant 
argued that respect is specifically a feeling of respect for oneself, that is, 
for the self as Cartesian ‘I.’ However, as we saw, Kant actually claimed 
that respect is a feeling felt towards another person, a virtuous person 
whose actions exemplify the law or rule in question. Heidegger’s own 
emphasis on the intersubjective nature of our faculty of rules is thus 
not an innovative step beyond Kant, but rather a further elaboration 
of Kant’s own original insight. On this account, then, the aprioricity of 
rules for thinking depends on the ontological priority of social relations 
over relations that ‘I’ have with myself. One can understand oneself as 
an ‘I,’ as an individual thinking substance, only because one is already 
immersed in interpersonal relations which enable one to thematise and 
articulate one’s subjectivity in this way. Heidegger writes that ‘Being 
with Others belongs to the Being of Dasein […] [A]s Being-with, Dasein 
“is” essentially for the sake of Others. This must be understood as an 
existential statement as to its essence.’158
The for-the-sake-of-which, as the a priori phenomenon binding 
together things and thinking in knowledge production, is thus a 
fundamentally social phenomenon. Its temporality is expressed non-
thematically as the original time we experience in the course of our 
158  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 160 [123].
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non-deliberative immersion in a work-world. This fundamental mode 
of existence is the a priori social and historical condition for any and 
all possible acts of knowing, both practical and theoretical. Heidegger 
holds that we experience these conditions as ‘tradition’ [Überlieferung]. 
Tradition, he writes, is the ‘innermost character of our historicity,’ 
and we come to know it as the manifest ‘lore’ [Kunde] of the historical 
world in which we find and understand ourselves.159 The lore in which 
tradition is manifest ‘carries and leads the historical being of the era’ 
in which we live.160 Thus, on Heidegger’s account, it is tradition which 
turns out to provide the a priori unifying phenomenon which bind 
together things and thinking, thus providing the basic conditions of 
possibility for the production of knowledge in its broadest possible 
sense. The soil in which Plato’s demiurge, Kant’s imagination, and 
Heidegger’s for-the-sake-of-which are finally rooted, that soil from 
which the existential rules governing thinking draw their sustenance, is 
the soil of tradition. Hence logic, through its reliance on existential rules, 
turns out to itself be ultimately grounded in tradition. According to 
Heidegger, then, tradition provides the existential foundation for logic. 
As a consequence, the origins and essence of scientific thinking must lie 
not in an abstract and timeless realm of a priori logical rules, but in the 
rich social and historical fabric of our shared and largely unthematised 
co-existence as finite human beings. ‘[O]ur spiritual history,’ writes 
Heidegger — using an adjective (geistig) which might just as well be 
translated as ‘intellectual’ or ‘mental’ — ‘is bound 2000 years back.’161
159  Heidegger (2009), Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, p. 98.
160  Heidegger (2009), Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, p. 78. For 
this reason, James McGuire and Barbara Tuchanska err in writing that ‘Heidegger 
does not squarely consider history as a succession of generations, a process within 
which the handing down and inheriting of cultural heritage from predecessors 
occurs’ (James E. McGuire and Barbara Tuchanska (2000), Science Unfettered: A 
Philosophical Study in Sociohistorical Ontology (Athens OH: Ohio University Press), p. 
74). ‘Handing down’ is just what Überlieferung means. They also fail to appreciate 
Heidegger’s claim that being-with-others is elemental for the subject: ‘If the 
only ontological ground for cognition lies in the existential structures of Dasein, 
cognition remains an individual activity’ (p. 80). Hence, they falsely conclude that, 
for Heidegger, ‘science is a way of being of Dasein, not of communities’ (p. 81), 
missing the fact that Heidegger’s subject is an essentially social entity, ‘essentially 
for the sake of Others.’
161  Heidegger (2009), Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, p. 7.
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Plato’s discovery of the a priori was a discovery of the way in which 
tradition guides and gives shape to thinking, hence making possible 
its intelligible combination with the things of experience. The a priori 
provides the light in which thinking lets things be experienced as 
what they are. It is, furthermore, the source of the semantic, syntactic, 
and practical rules which make language use possible as a form of 
intelligible behaviour.162 Or, to take a non-linguistic artefact, the a priori 
is the basis in tradition through which a pen may become what it is as 
an instrument for writing.
Having employed the methods of phenomenological history to trace 
the ontological origins of science back to tradition, Heidegger seems to 
have slowly lost any further interest in this project. Perhaps this reveals 
the limitations of his existential-phenomenological method, with its 
focus on an archaeological investigation into the subject’s interior layers 
of historically sedimented understanding. Such a method would seem 
not especially well-suited for a more detailed exploration of the social 
and historical dimensions of science conceived as tradition. Once he 
had excavated the scientific subject down to its existential base in the 
bedrock of tradition, Heidegger’s interests shifted increasingly towards 
those possibilities latent in the tradition but excluded by Aristotle’s 
narrowing of the logos down to what can only be expressed within the 
formal structure of the proposition. He thus turned his attention more 
and more to non-scientific modes of subjectivity. Rather than further 
attending to the language of science, as determined by the proposition, 
Heidegger would instead declare in 1934 that the ‘original language is 
the language of poetry.’163 Many of his subsequent reflections on science 
would focus more negatively on scientific thinking as a historically 
contingent constraint imposed on the original scope and power of 
poetry as an essential expression of human experience. Hence, for the 
remainder of this chapter, we will trade the methods of phenomenology 
for those of sociology in order to more fully elaborate some of the 
positive implications of Heidegger’s conclusion that logic is rooted in 
the social soil of tradition.
162  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 120 [87].
163  Heidegger (2009), Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, p. 141.
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9. From the Phenomenology of Thinking to the 
Sociology of Knowledge
In a 1928 lecture, Heidegger argued that a fundamental philosophical 
study of subjectivity ‘remains prior to every psychology, anthropology, 
and characterology, but also prior to all ethics and sociology.’164 He 
seems to have held that the human and social sciences would remain 
unclear or in error until the object of their study — human being, whether 
taken individually or collectively — had been properly clarified in its 
fundamental structure. This clarification was the task Heidegger took 
up in Being and Time, which had appeared in 1927. Indeed, not only was 
the bulk of that book concerned with a phenomenological description 
of human subjectivity, the fourth chapter specifically addressed ‘being-
with’ (Mitsein), that is, the essential relation between the subject’s 
being-in-the-world with its equally fundamental existential state of 
being-with-others.
Section 27 of that chapter focussed on the ‘they,’ which badly 
translates the German neologism das Man. The concept of the ‘they’ 
is meant to pick out the way in which one uncritically blends in 
with one’s fellows in the course of everyday life: ‘In utilizing public 
means of transport and in making use of information services such as 
the newspaper, every Other is like the next.’165 The point seems a bit 
overstated, but the idea is sound: those who live together in a common 
society are continuously, and often imperceptibly, pushed into the same 
settled and uniform patterns of behaviour. Furthermore, these social 
conditions directly affect, and thus serve to organise, our intellectual 
and emotional lives: ‘We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [man] 
take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see 
and judge; likewise we shrink back from the “great mass” as they shrink 
back; we find “shocking” what they find shocking.’166 Heidegger goes on 
to observe that a person, by critically reflecting on her embeddedness 
in the ‘they,’ may discover less everyday possibilities for thinking 
and acting in the world, possibilities which may then enable her to 
express her personhood in a more unique or individualised manner. 
164  Heidegger (1984a), Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 17.
165  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 164 [126].
166  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 164 [126–27].
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The distinguishing features of a unique individual are thus not to be 
taken as a sign of her separateness from the group, but of her success 
at exploiting the less well-trodden possibilities made available by her 
participation in a shared tradition. Heidegger’s discussion is sometimes 
read as suggesting that the achievement of such individuality is a rare 
feat, performed only by an elite few, but this is neither here nor there. 
The interesting theoretical observation is that individuality derives 
from sociality, that individualism is enabled and maintained by and in 
an irreducibly social existence.
In a 1947 essay, Heidegger reflected back on his earlier discussion of 
the ‘they’ (das Man), writing that ‘[w]hat has been said in Sein und Zeit 
[Being and Time], §§27 and 35, about the word “man” (the impersonal 
one) is not simply meant to furnish, in passing, a contribution to 
sociology [soll keineswegs nur einen beiläufigen Beitrag zur Soziologie 
liefern].’167 Section 35 is a narrower application of the argument from 
§27 to the specific case of everyday versus unconventional forms of 
speech, and need not delay us here. Heidegger’s 1947 comment affirms 
that §27 of Being and Time was meant to make a fundamental, rather 
than an incidental, contribution to sociology.168 There is thus no clear 
evidence that Heidegger harboured an animosity toward sociology. 
Indeed, in a 1934 lecture, when addressing the definition of das Volk, 
or ‘the people,’ he suggested that ‘[w]e could for this purpose follow 
a new science, sociology, that is, the doctrine of the forms of society 
and community.’169 He declines to go this route, however, alleging that 
sociology’s search for definitions presupposes that das Volk is a present-
at-hand thing, a substance with fixed and timeless properties, a thing 
without a history. In sum, Heidegger does not reject sociology, but 
167  Martin Heidegger (1962b [1949]), ‘Letter on Humanism,’ trans. by Edgar Lohner, 
in Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, vol. 3, ed. by William Barrett and Henry D. 
Aiken (New York: Random House), pp. 271–302 (p. 273); my brackets, taken from 
Martin Heidegger (1949), Über den Humanismus (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann), 
pp. 9–10.
168  This point gets somewhat lost in the more widely available translation, by Frank 
A. Capuzzi and J. Glenn Gray, of the 1947 passage: ‘What is said in Being and 
Time (1927), sections 27 and 35, about the “they” in no way means to furnish an 
incidental contribution to sociology’ (Martin Heidegger (1993b [1947]), ‘Letter 
on Humanism,’ trans. by Frank A. Capuzzi and J. Glenn Gray, in Basic Writings, 
revised and expanded edn, ed. by David Farrell Krell (New York: HarperCollins), 
pp. 217–65 (p. 221)).
169  Heidegger (2009), Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, p. 59.
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rather criticises it for allegedly failing to recognise that the existential 
conditions governing social relations, including the relations governing 
knowledge production, are historically contingent conditions, that is, 
conditions rooted in a tradition.
Heidegger thus meant for his existential phenomenology to, among 
other things, provide sociology with a more defensible account of the 
existential conditions of possibility governing its core subject matter. 
We will set aside the question of whether Heidegger’s criticism offers 
a fair portrayal of the sociology of his time. What seems clear, however, 
is that it does not find much traction against the more recent sociology 
of knowledge — SSK in particular — which recognises the historical 
and social contingency of the conditions determining its own scientific 
method. Here, then, Heidegger’s scientific philosophy does resonate 
with the more recent scientific sociology. Both methods regard science 
as a finite, social and historical practice, and both methods attempt to 
reflexively style themselves in accordance with this model of science. 
The underlying assumption in both cases is that science provides 
the most reliable and authoritative basis for knowledge. David Bloor 
has been especially clear on this point: ‘I am more than happy to see 
sociology resting on the same foundations and assumptions as other 
sciences. […] For that foundation is our culture. Science is our form of 
knowledge.’170 Furthermore, both Barry Barnes and Harry Collins have 
noted the important influence of phenomenological methods on the 
way sociology of knowledge has developed since Heidegger’s time.171 
There is, then, a methodological thread running consequentially from 
Heidegger’s phenomenology of thinking to the more recent sociology 
of knowledge.
As was mentioned at the end of the last section, Heidegger would 
eventually lose his enthusiasm for scientific philosophy, and begin 
following other fundamental threads in the tradition of thinking. 
Nevertheless, his phenomenological study of logic, construed as the 
science of thinking, constitutes his own reflexive attempt to lay hold 
170  Bloor (1991), Knowledge and Social Imagery, pp. 160–61.
171  Barry Barnes (1974), Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul), pp. vii, 43; Harry M. Collins (1992), Changing Order: Replication and 
Induction in Scientific Practice, with a new forward (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press), pp. 15, 25 n. 12.
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of the conditions of possibility governing his own particular form of 
scientific philosophy. This affords us a conceptual bridge over which 
to now cross from the phenomenology of logic to the sociology of logic.
10. The Social Foundations of Logic
The sociology of logic challenges the view that the basic principles 
of logical thinking are resistant to sociological explanation. The key 
assumption which must be cast into doubt is that such principles enjoy 
an absolute ground impervious to the vagaries of historical and social 
life. This chapter has attempted to reconstruct Heidegger’s account of 
how this assumption came into being, and how it has subsequently 
fallen into doubt.
In the first instance, Descartes applied a mathematical interpretation 
to the proposition, which may have been motivated in part by the 
Christian doctrine of salvation, in order to establish thinking on a 
pure and absolute ground. He furthermore argued that the pure and 
absolute core of thinking, the individual ‘I,’ must act in accordance with 
an unrestricted law of non-contradiction. In the second instance, Kant 
addressed the question of what the ‘I’ must be like in order to be bound 
by rules like the law of non-contradiction. This question, observed 
Heidegger, is the basic problem of logic. By asking it, Kant effectively 
removed the law of non-contradiction from its position of dominance, 
instead explaining laws in terms of the faculty of imagination. Heidegger 
subsequently rooted the imagination in the soil of tradition, which is 
manifest, and hence made available for deliberate transmission, as an 
accumulated body of lore. It is through our participation in a historical 
tradition that the world becomes intelligible for us, and tradition does 
this by enabling us to properly follow the rules which give structure 
to thinking. Tradition allows us to make sense of things, to let things 
be what they are, by supplying us with the informal existential 
rules we need to bring our thinking into proper contact with things. 
These existential rules are historically manifest as lore, and may be 
subsequently formalised as logic.
There are striking similarities between Heidegger’s account of 
logic and the one afforded by SSK practitioners. Indeed, Barnes and 
Bloor have characterised logic as a ‘body of conventions and esoteric 
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traditions,’ as well as a ‘learned body of scholarly lore.’172 Barnes has 
also written, more generally, that the teacher of science is concerned 
primarily with ‘transmitting lore.’173 Furthermore, like Heidegger, Barnes 
and Bloor distinguish between the ‘varied systems of logic as they are 
developed by logicians,’ on the one hand, and the ‘informal intuitions 
upon which they all depend for their operation,’ on the other.174 Bloor 
has elaborated an account of this distinction as one holding between 
formal and informal kinds of knowledge, and emphasised ‘the priority 
of the informal over the formal.’175 This appears similar to Heidegger’s 
distinction between thematised and unthematised forms of thinking, as 
well the existential priority he gives to the latter over the former.
Bloor’s central claims are that the formal rules of reasoning are 
always the instruments of informal reasoning, and hence that any 
particular application of a formal rule is always a potential subject for 
informal social negotiation.176 In some cases, the application of a formal 
rule is not actually subject to negotiation because it is embedded in a 
highly standardised but informal context of shared practice. As Barnes 
and Bloor observe, in such cases everyone, or nearly everyone, just 
accepts the application of the rule without question. The application 
appears self-evidently appropriate, and thus requires no reasoned 
justification.177 As one example of a rule which enjoys this kind of status, 
Bloor identifies the law of non-contradiction.
Bloor begins his discussion of the law of non-contradiction by 
turning to Edward Evan Evans-Pritchard’s classic study of witchcraft 
among the Azande of Central Africa. According to Evans-Pritchard, 
the Azande treat witchcraft as an inherited physical trait, passed on 
from fathers to sons or from mothers to daughters.178 He comments 
172  Barry Barnes and David Bloor (1982), ‘Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology 
of Knowledge,’ in Rationality and Relativism, ed. by Martin Hollis and Steve Lukes 
(Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 21–47 (p. 45).
173  Barnes (1974), Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory, p. 64.
174  Barnes and Bloor (1982), ‘Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge,’ 
p. 44.
175  Bloor (1991), Knowledge and Social Imagery, p. 133.
176  Bloor (1991), Knowledge and Social Imagery, p. 133.
177  Barnes and Bloor (1982), ‘Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge,’ 
p. 46.
178  Edward E. Evans-Pritchard (1937), Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande 
(Oxford: Clarendon), p. 23.
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that ‘[t]o our minds it appears evident that if a man is proven a witch 
the whole of his clan are ipso facto witches, since the Zande clan is a 
group of persons related biologically to one another through the male 
line.’179 Yet, the Azande do not see things this way. They recognised 
the theoretical sense of Evans-Pritchard’s argument, but in practice 
they only consider the close paternal kinsmen of a known witch to be 
witches. Their practice would thus seem to contradict the theoretical 
implications of their beliefs about the inter-generational transmission of 
witchcraft substance. Evans-Pritchard concludes from this that practical 
negotiations of belief ‘free Azande from having to admit what appear 
to us to be the logical consequences of belief in biological transmission 
of witchcraft.’180 For example, the Azande reason that even if a man is 
the son of a witch, and so has inherited witch-substance, that substance 
may remain ‘cool’ throughout his life. If his witchcraft is never activated, 
then he can hardly be considered a witch.181 Hence, Evans-Pritchard 
observes that ‘Azande do not perceive the contradiction as we perceive 
it because they have no theoretical interest in the subject, and those 
situations in which they express their beliefs in witchcraft do not force 
the problem on them.’182
Bloor’s response to this has a positive and a negative side. On the 
negative side, he argues that Evans-Pritchard’s analysis involves two 
central ideas: first, that there really is a contradiction in Zande views 
whether the Azande see it or not; and second, that if the Azande were 
to recognise the contradiction, one of their major social institutions 
would be untenable. The first idea has to do with the uniqueness of 
logic, and the second with the authority of logic.183 Bloor rejects both 
ideas. In the first instance, he argues that there is no contradiction in 
Zande beliefs about witchcraft because the Azande may be seen to use 
a different logic. Hence, Evans-Pritchard’s premise of uniqueness must 
be rejected.184 There is a standard Zande logic and a standard Western 
logic. In the second instance, Bloor argues that both logics exercise little 
179  Evans-Pritchard (1937), Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic, p. 24.
180  Evans-Pritchard (1937), Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic, p. 24.
181  Evans-Pritchard (1937), Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic, p. 25.
182  Evans-Pritchard (1937), Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic, p. 25.
183  Bloor (1991), Knowledge and Social Imagery, p. 139.
184  Bloor (1991), Knowledge and Social Imagery, p. 139.
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authority over the practical negotiations of those who invoke them.185 
With the Azande, logic does not threaten their institution of witchcraft 
because one piece of logic can always be used against another, and even 
this is only necessary when logic is used by someone to pose a threat. 
But then it is the person, not the logic, who threatens.186 In such cases, 
informal reasoning, or practical negotiation, takes priority over formal 
reasoning. Hence, Bloor alleges that Evans-Pritchard was also wrong 
to think that logical contradictions, where they exist, must necessarily 
threaten social stability if they are allowed explicit articulation.
As observations about the nature of logic and its relationship to 
informal reasoning, both of these points seem convincing. However, 
they do not work as a negative assessment of Evans-Pritchard’s own 
views. As can be seen from the passages just quoted, Evans-Pritchard 
emphasised that the Zande doctrine of witchcraft contains ‘what 
appears to us’ to be a logical contradiction; he writes that ‘to our minds’ 
there is a contradiction in Zande beliefs. Elsewhere, he has argued 
that ‘[w]hat appear to be hopeless contradictions when translated into 
English may not appear so in the native language.’187 Furthermore, in 
an appreciation of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Evans-Pritchard writes that 
‘primitive mystical thought is organized into a coherent system with 
a logic of its own.’188 This is no assertion of uniqueness. As Mary 
Douglas has observed, Evans-Pritchard in fact strongly opposed the 
idea that those peoples who fail to employ standard Western logic 
are ‘illogical,’ or ‘non-logical,’ or ‘pre-logical.’189 Furthermore, Douglas 
argues that Evans-Pritchard also rejected the idea that formal logic 
should be granted authority over informal practical negotiation. She 
writes that ‘[w]ell before phenomenology’s claim that sociological 
understanding must start from the negotiating activities of conscious, 
intelligent agents, Evans-Pritchard had seized the problem, developed 
a method and shown what progress can be made.’190 Thus there is, in 
185  Bloor (1991), Knowledge and Social Imagery, p. 140.
186  Bloor (1991), Knowledge and Social Imagery, p. 141.
187  Edward E. Evans-Pritchard (1965), Theories of Primitive Religion (Oxford: Clarendon), 
p. 89.
188  Edward E. Evans-Pritchard (1970), ‘Lévy-Bruhl’s Theory of Primitive Mentality,’ 
Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford 1(2), 39–60 (p. 57).
189  Mary Douglas (1980), Evans-Pritchard (Sussex: Harvester Press), p. 34.
190  Douglas (1980), Evans-Pritchard, p. 86.
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fact, a strong doctrinal continuity between Bloor and Evans-Pritchard. 
They are friends, not foes.191 It must be noted, however, that Douglas’s 
attempt to grant Evans-Pritchard precedence over phenomenology fails 
to acknowledge that Heidegger’s argument in Being and Time for the 
existential priority of practice over theory, as well his description of the 
‘they’ as the existential condition of possibility for social negotiation as 
such, pre-date Evans-Pritchard’s earliest publications by several years. 
But there is no evidence that Evans-Pritchard had read Heidegger, nor 
is there any attempt in Being and Time to elaborate a sociological notion 
of negotiation. It would be better here to speak of synchronicity, rather 
than of priority.
Let us move on, then, to the positive side of Bloor’s analysis. Like 
Evans-Pritchard, Bloor blocks the parochial and paternalistic charge 
that the Azande are guilty of ignoring a contradiction in their reasoning. 
The problem arises because we are insensitive to the specific existential 
conditions which give shape to Zande social life: ‘The fact that we 
can imagine extending the witchcraft accusation to the whole of the 
clan is simply because we do not really feel the pressure against this 
conclusion.’192 Furthermore, if we did feel the absurdity of the conclusion, 
we could easily give reasons to reject it, if this were deemed necessary. 
The Azande, for example, drew from their well-established notion of 
‘cool’ witches in response to Evans-Pritchard’s theoretical queries. And, 
Bloor argues, we make precisely the same kinds of moves in our own 
Western scientific culture: ‘the Azande think very much as we do.’193
Bloor argues that the process of intellectual elaboration, where 
reasons are introduced to deflect unwanted conclusions, is a pervasive 
feature of our science. He gives two historical examples.194 The first 
191  In fact, both also share a legacy stretching back to the experimental psychologist 
Frederick Bartlett. On the one hand, Bloor recognises Bartlett as ‘a prototype 
sociologist of scientific knowledge’ (David Bloor (2000), ‘Whatever Happened 
to “Social Constructiveness”?,’ in Bartlett, Culture & Cognition, ed. by Akiko Saito 
(London: Psychology Press), pp. 194–215 (p. 196); see also David Bloor (1997a), 
‘Remember the Strong Program?,’ Science, Technology, & Human Values 22(3), 373–85). 
On the other hand, as Douglas observes, Evans-Pritchard adopted heavily from 
Bartlett, his own work thus displaying a ‘continuous relationship’ with Bartlett’s 
earlier studies of conventionalisation in perception (Douglas (1980), Evans-Pritchard, 
p. 26).
192  Bloor (1991), Knowledge and Social Imagery, p. 142.
193  Bloor (1991), Knowledge and Social Imagery, p. 145.
194  Bloor (1991), Knowledge and Social Imagery, pp. 143–45.
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concerns the phlogiston theory of combustion, a chemical theory which 
dominated in the eighteenth century and which has since been rejected. 
Proponents of this theory held that a metal is comprised of phlogiston 
and calx, or what we now call oxide. It was thought that when a metal 
is burned, the phlogiston is removed from it, leaving only calx behind. 
It was, however, discovered that the calx was heavier than the original 
metal, which raised the question of how the weight of a substance could 
be increased by taking something away from it. Some historians have 
argued that these circumstances logically imply that phlogiston must 
have a negative weight, an absurd conclusion which therefore doomed 
the theory. Yet, Bloor writes, most of those who adhered to phlogiston 
theory did not draw this conclusion. They instead reasoned that when 
phlogiston leaves the metal another, heavier, substance must take its 
place. The best candidate for this replacement was thought to be water. 
Hence, the conclusion that phlogiston must have a negative weight 
was deflected. It now only became necessary to hold that phlogiston 
was much lighter than water. The logic of subtraction — the removal 
of phlogiston from the metal through combustion — was thus traded 
for a logic of replacement — water substitutes for phlogiston during 
the combustion of the metal. Advocates of phlogiston theory were not 
contradicting a tacitly held logic of subtraction; they were using another 
sort of logic altogether.
The second of Bloor’s examples comes from the atomic theory of 
chemistry. At the turn of the nineteenth century, Joseph Louis Gay-
Lussac discovered a regularity in the way gases combine. One volume 
of gas always combines with some small whole number of volumes 
of another gas, where volume measurements are controlled for 
temperature and pressure. Thus, two volumes of hydrogen combine 
with one volume of oxygen to produce one volume of gaseous water. 
Because John Dalton’s atomic theory explained chemical combinations 
by the direct combination of atoms, Gay-Lussac’s results suggested that 
two hydrogen atoms must combine with one atom of oxygen to produce 
one compound atom of water. Each volume of gas therefore contains the 
same number of atoms. The trouble with this hypothesis, however, was 
that one volume of nitrogen could combine with one volume of oxygen 
to produce two volumes of nitric oxide. This suggested that one volume 
of nitric oxide contained only half the number of atoms of the original 
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volumes of nitrogen and oxygen. The idea that volumes contained the 
same number of atoms could now only be maintained if one assumed 
that atoms could be split in half. But Dalton resisted this conclusion, as 
he was not prepared to give up the doctrine of the indivisibility of the 
atom. There was a contradiction between this doctrine and the alleged 
regularity discovered by Gay-Lussac. Perhaps Gay-Lussac was wrong?
As Bloor observes, the conclusion that atoms are divisible is easily 
avoided without rejecting Gay-Lussac’s results. One need only assume 
that each atom of gas is really a particle composed of two atoms. When 
nitrogen and oxygen combine, they swap atoms. The combination is 
not the result of addition, as when hydrogen and oxygen combine to 
form water, but rather of substitution. We now know this solution as 
Avagadro’s hypothesis. This was a simple elaboration which supplanted 
the earlier logic of addition with a logic of substitution, thus allowing 
for a negotiation around a potential contradiction without giving up 
either Gay-Lussac’s useful empirical results or the doctrine of atomic 
indivisibility.
Bloor argues that this negotiation is of a piece with both eighteenth-
century negotiations around alleged contradictions in phlogiston theory 
and twentieth-century negotiations around alleged contradictions in 
Zande beliefs about witchcraft. He emphasises that the Azande and 
Western scientists think in the same general way, writing that ‘they 
have the same psychology […] but radically different institutions.’195 An 
institution is, on Bloor’s definition, ‘a collective pattern of self-referring 
activity.’196 A rule, or a group of rules, a logic, is an institution in this 
sense. To say that a logic is self-referring is to recognise that its validity is 
internal to the collective patterns of activity in which the logic becomes 
manifest. So, when we accuse the Azande of contradiction, our statement 
in fact refers, not to Zande logic, but to our own. We treat the Azande 
as if they were a part of our own community. Because the accusation 
carries force only within our own community, it is not surprising that 
it left the Azande unmoved. By the same token, the accusation that 
Gay-Lussac’s discovery contradicts the doctrine of atomic indivisibility 
presupposes a kind of chemical thinking in which gas particles are 
composed of only one atom. But this way of thinking was renegotiated 
195  Bloor (1991), Knowledge and Social Imagery, p. 145.
196 Bloor (1997b), Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions (London: Routledge), p. 33.
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with the introduction of Avagadro’s hypothesis. Hence the accusation 
carries force only in reference to a kind of chemical thinking which, 
through a process of negotiation, has now become obsolete.
The circular validity of self-referring logical domains is captured 
in Heidegger’s observation that logic, when treated as the ultimate 
ground for all thinking, must also ground itself. As discussed earlier, 
Heidegger characterised this as the argument that logic is ‘free-floating’ 
and ‘ultimate,’ that it grounds all other forms of thinking without 
requiring a further ground of its own. Heidegger challenged this 
argument by differentiating logic, as a system of formal rules, from 
informal, existential rules. The former is grounded in the latter. He 
furthermore conceptualises existential rules in terms of original time, 
which is manifest in two types of relation: in-order-to relations and for-
the-sake-of-which relations. This distinction between relations plays 
a role similar to the distinction Bloor makes between a self-referring 
practice and what ‘primes’ that practice. It is, he writes, a characteristic 
of self-referring practices that a separate account must be given of their 
origin, of how they get going, and this account must be presented in 
terms lying outside the domain of the practice itself.197 In other words, 
the priming element must exist prior to the practice; it is the a priori 
element which makes the practice possible.
Bloor’s self-referring practices, his institutions, recall Heidegger’s 
description of the multiple relations of the in-order-to. The assignedness 
of a work-world is manifest in the in-order-to relations making up that 
world. These relations represent the significance, or meaning, of a work-
world. The for-the-sake-of-which relation, on the other hand, provides 
the origins of that assignedness. In-order-to relations thus depend for 
their own existence on the prior existence of the for-the-sake-of-which. 
The latter provides the conditions of possibility for being assigned, 
for significance, as such. This looks a lot like Bloor’s priming element, 
which works to get the self-referring practice going. As discussed earlier, 
Heidegger’s notion of the for-the-sake-of-which is a phenomenological 
reinterpretation of Plato’s idea of the good. It serves as the fundamental 
feature of thinking enabling us to discriminate between epistemically 
197  Bloor (1997b), Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions, p. 32. Bloor adopts this notion of 
priming from Barry Barnes (1983), ‘Social Life as Bootstrapped Induction,’ Sociology 
17(4), 524–45 (p. 529).
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relevant and irrelevant phenomena, and hence to connect thinking with 
things in a coherent and meaningful way. The for-the-sake-of-which 
serves, in other words, as the normative principle guiding thinking.
Bloor writes that ‘the mystery of logical compulsion is […] the 
mystery of normativity.’198 Normativity emerges as individuals fall into 
regularised patterns of self-referential activity. Only as participants 
embedded in such patterns of regularised activity will individuals feel 
compelled to follow those patterns. The Azande interviewed by Evans-
Pritchard in the 1930s, for example, were not embedded in the patterned 
activities constitutive of Western logic, and so they did not feel the force 
of the contradiction alleged by Evans-Pritchard to exist within their 
doctrine of witchcraft. They could see the sense of it, but it did not move 
them, did not affect them. Normativity thus provides a necessary basis 
for logic as an institution, but the specific norms governing a particular 
logic will carry force only within the finite bounds of the specific 
social and historical setting in which that logic is sustained as a form 
of thinking. According to Heidegger, Kant cracked open the problem 
of normativity by asking what the human being must be like in order 
to be compelled by a rule. He suggested that human beings must be 
such that they are affected by the law, that they feel respect before the 
law as it is manifest in the actions of others. This claim resonates with 
Bloor’s own statement that ‘[w]e are compelled by rules in so far as 
we, collectively, compel one another.’199 Bloor furthermore specifies that 
‘the compelling character of rules resides merely in the habit or tradition 
that some models be used rather than others.’200 This invites comparison 
with Heidegger’s claim that the for-the-sake-of-which, as the normative 
element in thinking, is itself rooted in the soil of tradition. Both Bloor 
and Heidegger seek to dispel the mystery of normativity by tracing 
its origin back to tradition. For both, what primes an informal domain 
of logic, what compels its users into regularised patterns of common 
activity, is the tradition into which those users have been socialised.
As mentioned earlier, Heidegger’s analysis of logic comes to an end 
at this point. He identified the source of normativity in logic, but did 
not ply deeper into its structure. Bloor has, on the other hand, done 
198  Bloor (1997b), Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions, p. 2.
199  Bloor (1997b), Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions, p. 22.
200  Bloor (1991), Knowledge and Social Imagery, p. 138.
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just that. He emphasises that the socialisation process, because it is the 
source of normativity, cannot itself be described in normative terms.201 
The logic student is not guided by her own dispositions when learning 
to draw the correct inference, she is guided by her teacher. Indeed, only 
through such training does the student acquire the specific dispositions 
necessary for carrying on alone in proper logical fashion. By becoming 
habituated to a particular tradition of thinking, the student learns to act 
instinctively in response to certain kinds of stimuli. She will feel repelled 
by actions violating the rules to which she has become habituated, 
and attracted by actions which accord with them. She will feel herself 
compelled to act in accordance with those rules, and will have thus now 
also acquired the competence to socialise others into her tradition by 
transmitting to them the practical and theoretical lore she has made her 
own.202
So much agrees with, and also serves to extend, Heidegger’s account. 
However, Bloor’s sociological explanation of logical compulsion 
also includes a move which appears to conflict with Heidegger’s 
account. Bloor argues that we need to explain how ‘non-intentional, 
non-normative responses’ can give rise to the regularised pattern of 
an informal self-referring practice.203 The conflict arises because, for 
Heidegger, there can be no non-intentional responses. At the root of 
the conflict lie differing conceptions of intentionality. Bloor seems to 
understand intentionality as being inextricably tied up with semantic 
content. Hence, because ‘we always encounter the dependence of 
semantic content on a more basic, non-semantic level,’ Bloor concludes 
that the more basic non-semantic level must be free from ‘intentional 
elements.’204 We must, he cautions, resist the temptation to assume that 
our automatic responses are already endowed with ‘propositional and 
logical content.’205 Bloor thus seems to view intentionality as propositional 
content belonging to a substance-subject. To be sure, Bloor has noted 
that groups, rather than individuals, may be the bearers of intentions. 
201  David Bloor (2004b), ‘Institutions and Rule-Scepticism: A Reply to Martin Kusch,’ 
Social Studies of Science 34(4), 593–601 (p. 595).
202  The emotional dynamics which help keep epistemic groups together will receive 
slightly more systematic attention in Chapter Seven.
203  Bloor (1997b), Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions, p. 135.
204 Bloor (2004b), ‘Institutions and Rule-Scepticism,’ p. 597.
205  Bloor (2004b), ‘Institutions and Rule-Scepticism,’ p. 598.
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He has written that ‘[o]n the institutional theory intentionality, plural 
and singular, is not in the head.’206 Combined with the conviction that 
intentions must include propositional content, this would seem to push 
Bloor into viewing the group likewise as a substance-subject bearing 
propositional content, content which is not ‘in the head’ but, strange as 
it may seem, somewhere else. All the difficulties faced at the individual 
level thus threaten to reappear at the group level. Bloor is, of course, not 
insensitive to these difficulties, and thus he attempts to resolve them by 
furthermore arguing that intentions must be explained reductively in 
non-intentional terms.
Heidegger, in contrast, viewed intentionality in terms of our 
existential relation to things and persons in the world. Because one basis 
of human existence is being-in-the-world, we necessarily find ourselves 
always already among the other entities also inhabiting the world. As 
noted earlier, Heidegger viewed intentionality as the ‘directedness’ of 
our relation to these other entities. It is thus not a propositional content 
belonging to a substance-subject, whether individual or group, but a 
directional relation belonging to our existence as being-in-the-world. 
On this view, a basic feature of our existence is that ‘there is always an 
entity and an interconnection with an entity already somehow unveiled, 
without its being expressly made into an object.’207 The key points here 
are that, for Heidegger, our being in the world entails intentionality, and 
intentionality need not have an object. This departs from more standard 
theories of intentionality, but we have already discussed the conceptual 
background which drives this move. In Heidegger’s view, perceiving a 
thing as an object is a derivative, theoretical way of understanding the 
whatness of that thing. A more fundamental mode of understanding 
is one in which the thing is encountered non-thematically as a piece 
of equipment taken up in the course of a practical task performed in a 
work-world. In this latter case, we are directed towards the equipment, 
because we use it, but the intentionality of the relation includes no 
propositional content. Only when the intentional relation also takes on 
the character of a thematising do we then come to perceive that thing as 
an object, that is, as a property-bearing substance. This is not a transition 
206  David Bloor (1996), ‘Idealism and the Sociology of Knowledge,’ Social Studies of 
Science 26(4), 839–56 (p. 850).
207  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 157; translation modified.
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from a non-intentional to an intentional state, but from one mode of 
intentionality to another.
It is difficult to see that Bloor would lose anything crucial by adopting 
Heidegger’s account of intentionality.208 On the other hand, the benefits 
are clear. Bloor writes: ‘I certainly want to see the links between the 
intentional level and its non-intentional basis made stronger.’209 An 
explanation of this link may be strengthened in two ways. First, Bloor 
could shift his definition of intentionality in the way just mentioned. 
Second, he could adopt Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of the 
change-over in the way we experience and understand things. This is a 
change-over in intentionality. Recall that the transformation is from the 
way things are practically experienced during immersed involvement in 
a work-world to the way things are theoretically experienced as objects, 
and as the subject matter for propositional statements. A detailed 
account of the change-over was given in Chapter Two. As a rough recap, 
Heidegger analyses the change-over in terms of four stages. First, after 
an interruption in our immersed involvement with things, we step back 
and just look at them. This pure looking then becomes a thematising 
in which things now become experienced as the distinct objects of a 
disengaged form of perception. Third, we then begin to deliberate over 
these distinct objects so as to determine their properties. Finally, these 
determinate objects then become the subject matter for propositional 
assertions, that is, for the statements of theory and logic.
This stepwise description provides a more nuanced analytical tool 
than does Bloor’s bipartite distinction between informal and formal 
knowledge. It thus allows us to better understand how non-deliberative, 
non-propositional thinking shifts into deliberative, propositionally 
structured thinking. This shift can take place quickly and on an individual 
level, as was discussed in Chapter Two. However, as the present chapter 
has argued, a shift on the individual level is itself enabled by a collective 
history of the way the relation between things and thinking has come 
208  Bloor might worry that Heidegger’s account of intentionality threatens his own 
commitment to causal explanation. But Barnes has nicely demonstrated how the 
sociologist can incorporate intentional phenomena into a counterfactual account 
of causation (Barnes (1974), Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory, pp. 71–78). 
Of course, such accounts are far from uncontroversial, but I make no claim that the 
proposed negotiation will be easy to achieve in pragmatic terms.
209  Bloor (2004b), ‘Institutions and Rule-Scepticism,’ p. 600.
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to be thematised, and so theoretically understood, over the course of 
centuries. The way an individual makes sense of her relation to things 
can be explained by reference to the tradition which structures the way 
she thinks about those things, and, more concretely, to the processes by 
which she becomes socialised into that tradition. The explanation thus 
has both historical and social components.
Bloor argues that explaining the links between intentional 
phenomena and their non-intentional base is a difficult and complex 
task, and he compares it with attempts to explain the links between the 
phenomenal qualities of water and their molecular base in hydrogen 
and oxygen.210 His point is that chemists are not normally criticised 
for attempting such an explanation. He thus suggests that sociologists, 
in turn, ‘may reasonably ask that what is granted to the chemists be 
granted to them as well.’211
Maintaining the analogy to chemistry, it will be useful to compare 
Bloor’s hypothesis to the hypothesis of Gay-Lussac, discussed earlier 
in this section. On the basis of experimental findings, Gay-Lussac 
proposed that every fixed volume of gas included the same number of 
atoms. As we saw, this hypothesis directly contradicted the established 
doctrine of the indivisibility of the atom. Was Gay-Lussac’s hypothesis 
thus rejected in order to protect this doctrine? No. As Bloor argued, a 
negotiation occurred which swapped a logic of addition for a logic of 
substitution.
Move now to Bloor’s hypothesis that intentional phenomena 
may be explained in terms of non-intentional phenomena, the latter 
of which may also include ‘ordinary human interactions.’212 This 
hypothesis directly contradicts, and so threatens, the doctrine that 
human action must include an irreducibly intentional element. Should 
this doctrine be rejected in order to preserve Bloor’s hypothesis? Bloor 
evidently thinks so. But Heidegger’s account of intentionality allows 
for a simple negotiation which would preserve both this doctrine and 
Bloor’s hypothesis. Consider that Bloor’s hypothesis employs a logic of 
addition. Non-intentional phenomena combine to produce intentional 
phenomena much as hydrogen and oxygen combine to produce water. 
210  Bloor (2004b), ‘Institutions and Rule-Scepticism,’ p. 600.
211  Bloor (2004b), ‘Institutions and Rule-Scepticism,’ p. 600 n. 3.
212  Bloor (1997b), Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions, p. 133.
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One assumption of this logic is the identification of intentionality with 
propositional content. As just argued, we can replace this assumption 
with Heidegger’s claim that intentionality may either include or not 
include propositional content. By doing so, we trade Bloor’s logic of 
addition for a logic of substitution — whereby one mode of intentionality 
is substituted for another — thus preserving both his hypothesis as well 
as the doctrine that human actions are irreducibly intentional.213 The key 
move in this negotiation is the redefinition of intentionality from being 
a property of a mental substance to its being a structure of existence. 
Seen against the backdrop of the history sketched out in this chapter, 
this frees the concept of intentionality from the glass-bulb model of 
an internally organised mental substance, where it had been shielded 
from philosophical scrutiny by Descartes in the seventeenth century. 
Intentional acts are not necessarily mental acts, sealed up in a purified 
propositional space, and trying desperately to somehow break out and 
connect with the elusive things of an external world. They are existential 
acts which necessarily take place in a world shared with other persons 
and populated by all manner of things ceaselessly stimulating us into 
ever recurrent and reconfigurable patterns of thought.
11. Conclusion
The cumulative effect of this and the preceding chapters should have 
been to convince readers of the benefits of comparing and combining 
the tools and insights of SSK with those of Heidegger’s existential 
phenomenology. As we have seen, there are many striking similarities 
between Heidegger’s earlier concerns and the more recent concerns 
of SSK practitioners, as well as many ways in which their respective 
methods may be fruitfully combined. We have now explored a few of 
these. Absent from our considerations thus far, however, has been an 
explicit focus on issues relevant to the history of the natural sciences. 
213  The proposed negotiation is consistent with Martin Kusch’s observation that ‘Bloor 
only succeeds in reducing one intentional phenomenon to another’ (Martin Kusch 
(2004a), ‘Reply to My Critics,’ Social Studies of Science 34(4), 615–20 (p. 618)). However, 
Kusch appears to also identify intentionality exclusively with propositional content: 
‘an intentional fact involves concepts like beliefs and desire’ (Martin Kusch (2004b), 
‘Rule-Scepticism and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge: The Bloor-Lynch 
Debate Revisited,’ Social Studies of Science 34(4), 571–91 (pp. 579–80)).
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This wrinkle will be smoothed out in Chapters Five and Six. As will have 
already become clear in the present chapter, Heidegger was himself 
deeply engaged in historical research. The phenomenological history 
of logical thinking presented in this chapter represents just one thread 
running through the tapestry of Heidegger’s life-long engagement with 
the history of philosophy. Furthermore, as is evident from the preceding 
discussion, this engagement was no mere antiquarian interest in the 
past, but was instead driven by Heidegger’s desire to resolve perceived 
confusions in the present by excavating and developing the unrealised 
possibilities of the past. His longing after a new method by which to 
build a more stable foundation for the sciences, bounded as it was by 
a commitment to the irremediable finitude of human being, pushed 
Heidegger into ever deeper historical reflection. For him, the reservoir 
from which to draw insight lay not in a timeless and immaterial realm 
of distinct ideas or formalised propositional structures, but rather in the 
untapped possibilities latent in his own rich and variegated historical 
tradition.214
A key moment in Heidegger’s phenomenological history of logic 
was the early-modern mathematical interpretation of Aristotle’s 
construal of thinking in terms of the proposition. Heidegger broadly 
located this moment in the early seventeenth century, taking Descartes 
as his exemplar. In his view, the mathematicisation of the science of 
thinking, that is, of logic, coincided with the emergence of modern 
natural science. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, Heidegger discussed 
Descartes’s innovations together with the equally decisive work of 
Galileo and Newton. Heidegger’s remarks about Galileo and Newton 
will be considered in Chapter Six. In that chapter, as well as the one 
immediately ahead of us, we will pick up the second part of Heidegger’s 
two-part description of the existential foundations of modern science, 
a part left largely unaddressed in this chapter. Recall that Heidegger 
distinguished modern science from its predecessors by pointing to 
what ‘rules and determines’ the basic activities of the former in contrast 
to the latter. The first part of this determination was the distinctive 
214  As Reinhard May has demonstrated, Heidegger’s European tradition also included 
a long-standing, transcultural engagement with East Asian thought (Reinhard 
May (1996), Heidegger’s Hidden Sources: East Asian Influence on His Work, trans. by 
Graham Parkes (London: Routledge)).
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way in which early-modern scientists came to experience their work 
with things. The second part was what Heidegger described as early-
modern scientists’ metaphysical projection of the thingness of things. 
This description concerned the ways in which scientists’ productive 
comportment towards things served to determine, a priori, the whatness 
of those things. As we will see, these two parts feed into one another: the 
way a scientist experiences her work with things is shaped by her a priori 
projection of the thingness of those things, and her a priori projection of 
the thingness of things is likewise influenced by her past experience of 
working with those things. This interplay is possible because, as was 
argued in this chapter, the a priori does not derive its authority from a 
rarefied realm lying outside the everyday work-world, but is instead 
firmly rooted in the tradition which both enables and is sustained by 
that work-world.
In this chapter, the focus has been on the second part of Heidegger’s 
two-part description of the foundations of modern science. Indeed, this 
is where Heidegger placed almost all of his own attention. He thus 
never managed to give a full account of the interplay which he himself 
had identified and placed at the centre of his phenomenological account 
of science. Missing in Heidegger’s work is a more thoroughgoing 
exploration of the way in which the everyday work-world becomes 
thoroughly implicated in the metaphysical deliberations of scientists. 
This is another place where the empirical work definitive of SSK can 
help to fill out and strengthen Heidegger’s abstract reflections with 
detailed historical studies of concrete scientific work. We will see, in 
turn, that attention to Heidegger’s broader theoretical reflections can 
help protect historians of science from the methodologically induced 
parochialism which may threaten any specialised intellectual practice 
occupying itself so much with the trees that it comes to neglect certain 
important features of the forest.
Chapter Five  
 
Mathēsis and the Emergence  
of Early-Modern Science
1. Introduction
Place a grain of wheat on the ground in front of you. Does this amount 
to a heap of grain? No, of course not. So, add a second grain. Is it a heap 
now? No. A third grain? No. A fourth grain? No. A fifth grain? No. And 
so it goes also after a sixth grain, a seventh grain, an eight grain, and a 
ninth grain. When a tenth grain is added, we still do not have a heap.
But we do have a pattern. The pattern is this: if some grains do not 
make a heap, then adding one more grain will not turn them into a heap. 
On the basis of this pattern, we can now make more specific predictions. 
We can predict that adding an eleventh grain will not make a heap, nor 
will adding a twelfth grain, a thirteenth grain, or a fourteenth grain. The 
pattern, then, has the character of a general prediction: when you add 
one grain to a non-heap, the result will be a non-heap. A single grain 
cannot determine the difference between a non-heap and a heap.
The second-century Greek physician, Galen of Pergamon, exploited 
the predictive power of this pattern when he wrote:
I know of nothing worse and more absurd than that the being and not-
being of a heap is determined by a grain of corn. And to prevent this 
absurdity from adhering to you, you will not cease from denying, and 
© Jeff Kochan, CC BY 4.0   http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0129.05
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will never admit at any time that the sum of this is a heap, even if the 
number of grains of wheat reaches infinity by the constant and gradual 
addition of more. And by reason of this denial the heap is proved to be 
non-existent, because of this pretty sophism. And so it follows from this 
sophism that the mountain also does not exist.1
The ‘you’ to whom Galen addressed his comment was the ‘dogmatic’ 
physician. Galen argues that the dogmatist cannot reject the implication 
of the pattern without appearing silly. However, the dogmatist will 
then be forced to reject the existence of heaps, which is also silly. The 
dogmatist is thus faced with a paradox for which no solution is obvious.
This is a case of turnabout being fair play, because the dogmatist had 
already laid out the same kind of argument against Galen and other 
empirical physicians. In the above passage, Galen is demonstrating 
that the paradox cuts both ways, causing potential problems for the 
dogmatist as well.
Galen tells us that the dogmatist has challenged the empiricist 
physician’s claim that a belief will be credible if it is supported by 
evidence which has been seen ‘very many times.’ To this, the dogmatist 
asks: How many times? Ten? The empiricist says no, ten times is not 
enough. The dogmatist then asks: Eleven times? No, says the empiricist, 
eleven times is also not enough. The pattern has now appeared, and the 
dogmatist leads the empiricist into the paradox. If the empiricist insists 
on the method of ‘seeing very many times,’ she will be forced to admit 
the impossibility of empirical knowledge.
For if something that was seen forty-nine times and yet in all these times 
was not accepted nor considered to be true, now by the addition of this 
one single time comes to be considered acceptable and true, it is obvious 
that only by being seen a single time has it become acceptable and true. 
The inevitable conclusion is that seeing a thing once — although at the 
outset this was not accepted and considered true — has on this occasion 
such force that when added to something which was not acceptable and 
not considered true as to make it acceptable, and vice versa.2
The dogmatist argues that one observation is enough to produce 
knowledge. The ‘force’ of this single observation derives from the 
1  Galen of Pergamon (1944), On Medical Experience, 1st edn of the Arabic version, with 
English trans. by Richard Walzer (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 116.
2  Galen (1944), On Medical Experience, p. 97.
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physician’s ‘know[ing] from the very beginning what things have to 
be eliminated and disregarded as being superfluous and unnecessary, 
and what things have to be examined and to be judged carefully as 
to their usefulness and their necessity.’3 What the dogmatic physician 
is insisting on here is the need for an a priori standard by which 
to differentiate between epistemically desirable and epistemically 
undesirable phenomena. Moreover, the force of this standard in 
use will be immediate, manifesting itself on the basis of a single act 
of observation. At best, the empiricist’s little-by-little method fails to 
reflect the immediacy and constructivity of reason. Today, this kind of 
dogmatism is more commonly called ‘rationalism.’
The paradoxes generated by this pattern of argument pose a threat 
to empiricists and rationalists alike. More generally, they threaten 
confidence in both inductive and deductive forms of inferential 
reasoning. Scepticism about induction is well known, and has often been 
discussed in terms of the underdetermination of theory by data, a topic 
which we earlier addressed in Chapter Three. No matter how many 
times the empiricist observes the phenomena, no knowledge will arise 
without the mediation of some additional, unobserved element. For the 
rationalist, this additional element is the a priori. For the sociologist of 
knowledge, it is grounded in social convention. As we saw in Chapter 
Four, Heidegger grounds the a priori in a historical tradition, a stance 
which is compatible with that of SSK. By posing the socio-historical 
contingency of the a priori, the latter two positions reject the absolutism 
of the rationalist. For them, scientific knowledge is objective, but not 
absolutely so.4
3  Galen (1944), On Medical Experience, p. 93.
4  David Bloor uses the paradox of the heap to challenge a rationalistic belief in 
the absolute (i.e., exceptionless) validity of deduction (David Bloor (1991 [1976]), 
Knowledge and Social Imagery, 2nd edn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 
182–83). The paradox seems to offer an exception, because the repeated application 
of deduction to apparently true premises (‘adding one grain to a non-heap results 
in a non-heap’ and ‘one grain is added to this non-heap’) seems to result in a false 
conclusion (‘this is a non-heap’). Defensive reactions to the paradox can make 
explicit the social labour required to maintain belief in the absolute validity of 
deduction. An example can be found in a paper by Colin Howson, wherein he 
seeks to suppress the paradox as I present it in my own work (Colin Howson (2009), 
‘Sorites Is No Threat to Modus Ponens: A Reply to Kochan,’ International Studies in 
the Philosophy of Science 23(2), 209–12; Jeff Kochan (2008), ‘Realism, Reliabilism, and 
the “Strong Programme” in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge,’ International 
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Galen’s second-century response to the dogmatic physician is similar 
to these responses. He rebuffs the dogmatist’s charge that the empiricist 
cannot produce ‘technical’ — that is, objective — knowledge: ‘you 
would be acting both unjustly and wrongly in pestering us to specify, 
of a thing which when seen once only is not “technical” according to 
your argument, how many times it must be seen in order to become 
“technical.”’5 The injustice lies in ridiculing the empiricist ‘because we 
cannot state with exactitude the precise number […], but are only able 
to give a general notion.’6 Based on this argument, the dogmatist will 
insist that a definition of ‘heap,’ in order to be objective, must be precise 
rather than general; it must exactly specify how many grains make a 
heap. Yet, as Galen has already shown, the dogmatist cannot do this 
without appearing silly. Indeed, by specifying the precise number of 
grains with which a non-heap becomes a heap, the dogmatist reveals 
his purportedly ‘technical’ knowledge of heaps is, in fact, lamentably 
subjective.
Galen then expands this critique to encompass the dogmatist’s 
medical knowledge in general. He points out that the dogmatist’s a priori 
standard ‘is not uniform, universal, comprising all of you, because you 
have different views and each one of you holds an opinion completely 
contradictory to the opinion of the others.’7 The implication is that 
objective knowledge is marked, to some substantial degree, by social 
agreement. The paradox of the heap relies on this idea, since, because 
most people agree that heaps exist, the dogmatist will appear silly if he 
claims that they do not.
If you wish, speak, it will not cause me to be angry with you; if, however, 
you should say of something which people continually see under the 
same conditions throughout their lives, that it is non-existent, it will not 
help you at all. […] I for my part adhere to and follow that which is 
known to men, and accept what is obvious without inquiring into the 
cause of each individual thing. Therefore I say of what has been seen 
Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22(1), 21–38). I respond to Howson in Jeff Kochan 
(2009a), ‘The Exception Makes the Rule: Reply to Howson,’ International Studies in 
the Philosophy of Science 23(2), 213–16.
5  Galen (1944), On Medical Experience, p. 118.
6  Galen (1944), On Medical Experience, p. 119.
7  Galen (1944), On Medical Experience, p. 104.
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but once, that it is not ‘technical,’ just as a single grain of wheat is not a 
perfect heap; if, however, it is a thing that is seen many times in the same 
way, then I call it ‘technical.’8
For Galen, objective knowledge has a social aspect — it is ‘that which 
is known to men’ — and a historical aspect — it is based on that which 
is ‘seen many times in the same way.’ However, he also notes that 
such knowledge is ‘obvious without inquiring into the cause of each 
individual thing.’ When it comes to heaps, this may be true. But what 
about disease? At least in the case of unfamiliar diseases, it would seem 
that close attention to causes may help in the development of an effective 
treatment. This was a point made by Galen’s dogmatic opponent.
But just because the number of concomitants of diseases is so great and 
there is such variety in what causes evacuation and what is vomited up 
and what is introduced into the organism, while those things that affect 
it from the outside are still more numerous, the Empiricist is still less 
able to judge which of them are beneficial and which harmful.9
Here the dogmatist reinforces the claim that the physician requires a 
standard by which to reliably distinguish between causes which are, 
and those which are not, necessary for the understanding and effective 
treatment of disease. Galen accepts the need for such a standard, but 
dismisses the idea that it be subjected to systematic enquiry.
[I]t has been found that what has been seen many times becomes 
‘technical.’ With regard to the cause, however, which makes it completely 
‘technical’ and when it begins to be completely ‘technical,’ I am of opinion 
that it is idle to demand this. For I find that not a particle of harm befalls 
arts and men in their modes of life and activities for being ignorant of 
such things.10
Objective medical knowledge is produced through serial, disciplined 
observation, but the question of what norms guide those observations is 
of little interest to Galen. For him, it is enough to know those norms in 
a vague and general way, much as we do the norms used to distinguish 
8  Galen (1944), On Medical Experience, p. 119.
9  Galen (1944), On Medical Experience, p. 93.
10  Galen (1944), On Medical Experience, p. 121.
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between a heap and a non-heap. There is, he thinks, no great need 
to specify them in a systematic or precise way. In Heidegger’s term, 
Galen has no interest in thematising the norms which guide successful 
medical thinking. In SSK’s terms, he is happy to rely on those norms 
as a resource, but resists turning them into a topic. Galen’s attitude 
may thus strike one as distinctly unscientific. Moreover, it seems to be 
an attitude hostile to epistemology, in general, and, insofar as Galen 
attributes a social aspect to medical knowledge, to SSK, in particular.
In fact, as we will see in this chapter, later physicians became 
increasingly interested in understanding the methods by which reliable 
medical knowledge is produced. More than a millennium after Galen, 
Renaissance empirical physicians began to topicalise and systematically 
investigate the informal logic which they thought must underpin their 
techniques of medical discovery. As historians have long recognised, 
these physicians were innovators in the rationalisation of scientific 
method, and hence key contributors to the rise of early-modern 
empirical science.
The Renaissance empiricists examined in this chapter accepted the 
dogmatist’s view that physicians must know something in advance, 
from the very beginning, in order to successfully diagnose and treat 
disease. Moreover, they agreed with the dogmatists that this a priori 
knowledge was a knowledge of causes. However, they resisted the 
dogmatist’s claim that, on the basis of this knowledge, only one 
observation is needed to properly diagnose a disease. Indeed, the 
empiricists continued to defend their doctrine of serial observation, of 
medical knowledge gained little by little through a practice of ‘seeing 
many times in the same way.’
The epistemology of these empirical physicians thus appears to have 
been circular: they claimed both that they already possessed knowledge 
of health and disease at the very beginning of their enquiry, and that 
their knowledge of health and disease was the consequence of their 
method of serial observation. They argued, however, that this epistemic 
circle was not a vicious one. Like Galen over one thousand years earlier, 
these Renaissance physicians argued that their a priori knowledge was 
of only a general, imprecise sort. Their empirical method, then, was 
meant to transform this general and imprecise knowledge into specific 
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and precise knowledge. Hence, their account of knowledge was not 
viciously circular, because it involved two different sorts of knowledge, 
one linked to the other by an empirical method of investigation.
As already noted, this method of investigation bears striking 
similarities to what Heidegger called a thematising articulation, a 
topic to which we gave detailed attention in Chapter Four. One key 
aspect of this process of articulation is the transformation of informal, 
often tacitly held knowledge into explicit, formalised knowledge. 
The efforts of Renaissance physicians to understand this process, as 
a central feature of their own medical practice, provides further 
historical support for Heidegger’s existential conception of science. 
Moreover, this historical case also allows us to more fully explore one 
particular facet of Heidegger’s existential conception, namely, the 
mathematicisation of natural knowledge. With this, we expand on a 
topic first addressed in Chapter Two under the label of ‘the mathematical 
projection of nature.’ The role of mathematics in the emergence of early-
modern science has been a key point of debate among contemporary 
historians of science, a debate which, in many ways, reiterates the 
long-standing feud between empiricists and rationalists alluded to 
above. Heidegger’s concept of mathēsis, or ‘the mathematical,’ as 
well as its relation to what is commonly referred to as the ‘Scientific 
Revolution,’ adds a further perspective to this debate, one which seeks 
to combine the best insights from both camps. In addition, as we will 
see near the end of this chapter, Heidegger’s account of modern science 
as mathēsis also challenges the historiographic commonplace that the 
Scientific Revolution coincided with the expungement of Aristotelian 
‘final causes’ from scientific practice in the seventeenth century. On 
Heidegger’s account, final causes were not abandoned, but instead 
radically transformed — to wit, mathematicised. This claim will lay the 
ground for a more detailed discussion in Chapter Six about the rise of 
seventeenth-century experimental philosophy. For now, let us start 
with a review of Heidegger’s account of mathēsis, and then move on to 
consider the deliberations of empirically minded physicians during the 
three centuries prior to the emergence of early-modern science. These 
topics will lead us into the heart of key historiographic debates over the 
existence and nature of the Scientific Revolution.
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2. Modern Science as Mathēsis
As discussed in previous chapters, the thing has been typically defined 
as a property-bearing substance. Heidegger writes that this definition 
seems ‘natural,’ in the sense of ‘what is understood without further ado 
and is “self-evident” in the realm of everyday understanding.’11 Yet he 
challenges this construal of the ‘natural’ as being self-evident, and thus 
not amenable to further analysis, arguing instead that ‘[t]he “natural” is 
always historical.’12 The prevailing definition of the thing did not ‘just 
fall absolutely from heaven, but would have itself been based on very 
definite presuppositions.’13 Indeed, as was argued in Chapter Four, one 
key presupposition determining the prevailing definition of the thing 
was the Aristotelian claim that the structure of the thing may be usefully 
modelled on the structure of the proposition. According to Heidegger, 
this proposition-based account of the thing has played a central role in 
the development of the modern scientific understanding of the thing as 
an object of investigation.
One consequence of this definition is the treatment of a thing in 
abstraction from its concrete circumstances and other unique features. 
A definition of the thingness, or whatness, of the thing, as such, is a 
generalised definition which deliberately overlooks all the peculiarities 
distinctive of any one particular thing. Thus Heidegger writes:
[A] botanist, when he examines the labiate flower, will never be concerned 
about the single flower as a single one: it always remains an exemplar 
only. That is also true of the animals, for example, the countless frogs 
and salamanders which are killed in a laboratory. The ‘this one’ (je dieses) 
which distinguishes every thing, will be skipped over [übersprungen] 
by science.14
In this section, we will consider in detail Heidegger’s account of modern 
science as a form of understanding which ‘skips over’ the individual 
specificities of the things it investigates. Heidegger elaborates this 
account by characterising modern science in terms of the ancient 
11  Martin Heidegger (1967 [1962]), What Is a Thing?, trans. by William B. Barton, Jr., 
and Vera Deutsch (Chicago: Henry Regnery), p. 39.
12  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 39.
13  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 40.
14  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 15; translation modified.
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Greek concept of mathēsis, or what he also calls ‘the mathematical’ 
(das Mathematische). These considerations, arising out of a 1935–1936 
lecture course, present a further development of his earlier account of 
the mathematical projection of nature. What he had earlier treated as a 
central element of science, in general, now becomes a defining feature 
of modern science, in particular.
For Heidegger, mathēsis refers to that fundamental characteristic of 
modern science which distinguishes it from both ancient and medieval 
science. He addresses, and rejects in turn, attempts to distinguish 
modern science on the grounds that it begins with facts about things 
rather than with speculative propositions and concepts, that it uses 
experiments to get information about the behaviour of things, and that 
it relies on calculation and measurement in its investigations of things. 
On all three counts, Heidegger argues, there is no substantive difference 
between ancient and medieval science, on the one hand, and modern 
science, on the other. First, ancient and medieval science also observed 
the facts, and modern scientists also rely on speculative propositions 
and concepts. Second, the use of experiments, in the broad sense of 
controlled tests to gain information about things, was already familiar 
in the ancient and medieval periods. Heidegger comments that ‘[t]his 
kind of experience lies at the basis of all technological contact with 
things in the crafts and the use of tools.’15 Third, ancient science also 
made use of measurement and number.
Heidegger argues that it is not reliance on facts, as such, which 
is decisive for modern science, but ‘the way the facts are conceived.’ 
Likewise, it is not the experiment, as such, that matters, but ‘the manner 
of setting up the test and the intent with which it is undertaken and in 
which it is grounded.’ And so too with calculation and measurement: 
‘it is a question of how and in what sense calculating and measuring 
were applied and carried out, and what importance they have for the 
determination of the objects themselves.’16 Hence, it is not that facts, 
experiments, calculation and measurement are deployed, but how and 
to what end they are deployed, which distinguishes modern science. 
This points us towards the historically specific existential conditions of 
possibility governing what ‘essentially and decisively rules the basic 
15  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 67.
16  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, pp. 66–68.
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movement’ of modern science.17 It points us, in other words, towards the 
phenomenon of mathēsis. Heidegger suggests that mathēsis is something 
which governs modern science at a basic level. It thus includes a strongly 
normative component.
Heidegger defines mathēsis as ‘the teaching’ (die Lehre), in the sense of 
‘the doctrine’ or ‘the apprenticeship,’ which in turn has a double sense: 
‘teaching’ as entering into an apprenticeship (in die Lehre gehen) and then 
learning or studying; and ‘teaching’ as what is taught. Heidegger means 
here teaching and learning ‘in a broad and at the same time essential 
sense, not in the more recent, narrow, hackneyed sense of “schools” 
and “scholars.”’18 He furthermore distinguishes two fundamental 
features of modern science as mathēsis: (1) ‘work experiences,’ or ‘the 
direction and way of controlling and using [or manipulating] what is’; 
and (2) ‘metaphysics,’ or ‘the projection of the fundamental knowledge 
of being, upon which what is establishes itself as knowable.’19 These 
two fundamental features are ‘reciprocally related,’ and always occur 
together in the activities of scientifically engaged human beings.20
We have already encountered this twofold structure in Chapter Four, 
where our attention was primarily on the metaphysical projection of 
the thingness of things, as a constructive aspect of thinking, rather than 
on scientists’ work experiences in respect of those things. Nevertheless, 
already there we encountered the historical interplay between things, 
experienced as property-bearing substances, and thinking, construed 
as propositionally structured rule-following. In this chapter, and in 
Chapter Six, we will treat the experience of things more directly as 
work experience, that is, as experiences which arise from the direct 
engagement with and manipulation of material things. Our focus in 
17  ‘[…] was die Grundbewegung der Wissenschaft […] gleichursprünglich maßgebend 
durchherrscht’ (Martin Heidegger (1984b [1962]), Die Frage nach dem Ding: zu Kants 
Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen (Gesamtausgabe, vol. 41) (Frankfurt: 
Vittorio Klostermann), p. 68). Cf. Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 68.
18  Heidegger (1984b [1962]), Die Frage nach dem Ding, pp. 69–70. Cf. Heidegger (1967), 
What Is a Thing?, p. 69.
19  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 66; translation modified, my brackets. Cf. 
Heidegger (1984b), Die Frage nach dem Ding, p. 66.
20  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 66. Cf. Heidegger (1984b), Die Frage nach dem 
Ding, p. 66. Thus, Heidegger’s usage of mathēsis differs from that of Michel Foucault, 
who defines it as ‘the science of calculable order’ (Michel Foucault (1970), The Order 
of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Pantheon Books), p. 73).
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this chapter and the next will, in other words, be directed more towards 
the existential conditions enabling physical experimentation in modern 
science. As we will see, the experimental manipulation of things 
is, indeed, reciprocally related to the metaphysical projection of the 
thingness of things. The experimental set-up is a material instantiation 
of, as well as the material basis for, the metaphysical projection. Hence, 
Heidegger’s account of modern science in term of mathēsis recognises a 
central place for the material practices of experimental science without 
rejecting a role for metaphysics. His account can thus be assimilated to 
neither of the conventional empiricist and rationalist interpretations of 
the Scientific Revolution. It must be immediately emphasised, however, 
that Heidegger did not develop this strand of his existential conception 
of science in any great detail. Additional material from the history 
of science will allow us to develop and refine Heidegger’s account 
of modern science in a way which he did not, and which is, I think, 
consistent with his intentions.
According to Heidegger, the word mathēsis stems from the Greek 
word mathēmata, the name for a specific kind of thing. These are things 
insofar as they are learnable, or amenable to study.21 However, as he 
also points out, we do not, strictly speaking, learn a thing. We learn 
instead how to relate to a thing, for example, how to observe it, how to 
use it, or how to produce it. Hence, when we learn a thing, we are really 
learning something about our relation to it. Heidegger illustrates this 
point with the example of a rifle. We do not learn a rifle, he writes, but 
its usage. The acquisition of the usage happens through the usage itself, 
that is, through ‘exercise’ or ‘practice’ (Übung).22 In our practice with 
the rifle, we learn to load it, to control its trigger, and to aim it.
However, Heidegger argues that ‘practising’ (Üben) is only one kind 
of learning. There is another, more fundamental, kind of learning which 
actually makes it possible for us to learn through practice. This more 
basic learning allows us to perceive what a weapon is, what a use-item 
is, and, most generally, what a thing is. Heidegger argues that we do 
not learn the ‘what’ of a weapon only once we have learned the ‘how’ 
21  Heidegger (1984b), Die Frage nach dem Ding, p. 71; cf. Heidegger (1967), What Is a 
Thing?, p. 71.
22  Heidegger (1984b), Die Frage nach dem Ding, p. 71; cf. Heidegger (1967), What Is a 
Thing?, p. 71.
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of its usage. On the contrary, ‘[w]e already know [what a weapon is] 
beforehand, and must know it; otherwise we could not even recognise 
the rifle as such,’ we could not, that is, tell the difference between a rifle 
and a non-rifle.23
Yet, although we must first know what a rifle is if we want to learn 
its usage, this prior knowledge is something we need only have in a 
‘general’ and ‘indefinite’ way. In other words, when it comes to learning 
the usage of a thing, prior knowledge of the whatness of the thing is 
certainly necessary, but we need only possess it in a tacit way, as a kind 
of general and indeterminate background knowledge. When, in contrast, 
it comes to learning in the sense of mathēsis, we must deliberately ‘take 
note’ of (zur Kenntnis nehmen) what the thing is, doing so ‘specifically 
and in a determinate way.’ Such deliberate ‘taking note’ is the very 
ground of learning as mathēsis.24 This is a kind of learning in which — by 
taking note of what we already know — we begin to transform our 
pre-existing knowledge of what a thing is from a general and indefinite 
state into a specific and determinate state. Such is the case, Heidegger 
claims, when a specific rifle model is brought into existence: ‘[w]hen it 
becomes essential, in a general sense, to make available a thing like the 
one whose usage we are practising, that is, when it becomes necessary 
to produce it.’ This requires ‘a becoming-acquainted [Kennenlernen] 
with what fundamentally belongs to a firearm and with what a weapon 
is.’ Compared to the knowledge gained of a rifle’s usage, this is ‘a more 
basic acquaintance, one which must be learned beforehand, so that such 
a rifle type and its corresponding tokens may come to exist at all.’25
So what is it about the rifle which both the sharpshooter and the 
gunsmith must know in advance, but of which only the gunsmith need 
take note in order to fulfill her task? More generally, of what does one 
need to take note in order to learn in the sense of mathēsis? The answer, 
Heidegger tells us, is that ‘the producer must know beforehand what 
23  Heidegger (1984b), Die Frage nach dem Ding, p. 73; cf. Heidegger (1967), What Is a 
Thing?, p. 72.
24  Heidegger (1984b), Die Frage nach dem Ding, p. 73; cf. Heidegger (1967), What Is a 
Thing?, pp. 72–73.
25  Heidegger (1984b), Die Frage nach dem Ding, p. 72; cf. Heidegger (1967), What Is a 
Thing?, p. 72.
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Bewandtnis fundamentally accompanies the thing.’26 The German word 
Bewandtnis is a tricky one to translate. In this passage, Heidegger uses 
it without pausing to explain its meaning. However, if we turn to an 
earlier discussion, in §18 of Being and Time, we can get a better sense of 
what the term means in the context of Heidegger’s existential account of 
science. Crucially, Heidegger treats the noun Bewandtnis together with 
the closely related verb bewenden. Below is my translation of the key 
passage in Being and Time in which the term Bewandtnis first appears.27 
As will be immediately evident, Heidegger is introducing the term in 
the context of his discussion of readiness-to-hand, a concept we have 
already encountered numerous times in previous chapters.
That the being of the ready-to-hand has the structure of a reference 
or assignment [Verweisung] — means: it has in itself the character of 
directedness [Verwiesenheit]. What-is is thereby discovered as that which 
is directed towards something. With what-is, at this something, there 
is an end [es hat… sein Bewenden]. The being-character of the ready-to-
hand is end-directedness [Bewandtnis]. In end-directedness, there is a 
letting-be [bewenden lassen] with and at something. The relation of ‘with… 
at…’ [»mit… bei…«] will be denoted by the term ‘assignment.’28
In respect of Heidegger’s phenomenological account of scientific practice, 
the meaning of Bewandtnis is best understood as ‘end-directedness.’ I 
do not recommend this translation for general application throughout 
Heidegger’s work, but only as the best translation when it comes to 
his reflections on science as mathēsis. This is a philosophical translation 
with a particular, narrow aim.29
26  ‘[…] welche Bewandtnis es überhaupt mit dem Ding hat’ (Heidegger (1984b), Die 
Frage nach dem Ding, p. 72); cf. Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 72.
27  Ernst Tugendhat comments that there is probably no word in any other language 
which includes the same constellation of meanings as Bewandtnis. Thus, he 
concludes, Heidegger’s argument in §18 of Being and Time must resist intelligible 
translation (Ernst Tugendhat (1967), Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger 
(Berlin: de Gruyter), p. 290 n. 6). Caveat emptor!
28  Martin Heidegger (1927), Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag), pp. 83–84; 
cf. Martin Heidegger (1962a [1927]), Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and 
Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell), p. 115 [83–84].
29  Other philosophical translations for Bewandtnis, as used by Heidegger, include: 
‘involvement’ by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (in Heidegger (1962a), 
Being and Time), and by Hubert Dreyfus (in Hubert L. Dreyfus (1991b), Being-in-
the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I (Cambridge, 
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Being and Time provides the following concrete example for what 
Heidegger means by end-directedness, as well as the ‘with… at…’ 
relation of assignment: ‘with the ready-to-hand thing we call “hammer,” 
there is the end-directedness of being at work, hammering; with 
hammering, the end-directedness of being at fortifying; with fortifying, 
the end-directedness of being at sheltering against bad weather.’30 
Transposed to our example of the rifle, we can say that with the rifle 
there is the end-directedness of being at work, shooting; with shooting, 
the end-directedness of being at impacting at a distance; and with 
impacting at a distance, the end-directedness of being at subjugating 
others. Put otherwise, the task at which the sharpshooter works with the 
rifle is shooting. With the rifle, at this task, there is an end: proximally, 
impacting at a distance; more distally, subjugating others. The being of 
the rifle, its readiness-to-hand, is a directedness towards this end, it is 
that towards which the rifle is, essentially, directed. Heidegger writes that 
the ‘at-which’ [Wobei] of an end-directedness is also a ‘towards-which’ 
[Wozu], and that with this towards-which there can be yet another 
end-directedness.31 Hence, shooting is the end towards which the rifle 
is directed. With the towards-which of the rifle, proximally directed 
towards shooting, there is a further, more distal, end: impacting at a 
distance. The end-directedness of the rifle points towards shooting, and 
shooting, in turn, points towards impacting at a distance, and impacting 
at a distance points towards subjugating others.
However, this iteration of assignment finally comes to an end 
in a ‘primary’ towards-which. Heidegger writes that the ‘primary 
MA: The MIT Press)); ‘relevance’ by Joan Stambaugh (in Martin Heidegger (2010b), 
Being and Time, trans. by Joan Stambaugh, revised edn (Albany: SUNY Press)); 
‘relevance/involvement’ by Daniel Dahlstrom (in Daniel O. Dahlstrom (2013), The 
Heidegger Dictionary (London: Bloomsbury 2013)); ‘how it works’ by William Barton 
and Vera Deutsch (in Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?); ‘functionality’ by Alfred 
Hofstadter (in Martin Heidegger (1982a [1975]), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 
trans. by Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press)); and ‘role’ 
by John Haugeland (in John Haugland (2013), Dasein Disclosed: John Haugeland’s 
Heidegger, ed. by Joseph Rouse (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press)). At 
the time of writing, the poplar on-line LEO German-English dictionary translated 
Bewandtnis as ‘matter’ or ‘reason’ (dict.leo.org). The 2001 print edition of the well-
respected PONS English-German dictionary offers ‘reason’ and ‘explanation.’
30  Heidegger (1927), Sein und Zeit, p. 84; my emphases. Cf. Heidegger (1962a), Being 
and Time, p. 116 [84].
31  Heidegger (1927), Sein und Zeit, p. 84. Cf. Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 116 
[84].
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“towards-which” is a “for-the-sake-of-which” [Worum-willen].’32 For 
example, in the case of the hammer, the iteration bottoms out in 
‘protection.’ The hammer points towards hammering, which points 
towards fortifying, which points towards sheltering, which points, 
finally, towards protection. That for the sake of which one hammers, 
fortifies, shelters, is the subject’s protection, which Heidegger describes 
as a ‘possibility’ of the subject’s existence.33 Returning, once more, to 
our rifle example, we may take the primary towards-which of the 
rifle — that for the sake of which the rifle, ultimately, exists — to be 
sovereignty. With the rifle, one shoots, impacts, subjugates, for the sake 
of the subject’s sovereignty, an ontological possibility of its existence. 
Ultimately, at work, with the rifle, there is a directedness towards 
sovereignty as end. According to Heidegger, in order to work with 
the rifle in a way which lets it be what it is, one must already have a 
knowledge of its end-directedness, and, hence, the final end towards 
which it points. This is an antecedent knowledge which the sharpshooter 
and the gunsmith both possess in a general and indefinite way, and of 
which only the latter need deliberately take note, developing it, through 
mathēsis, into a more specific and determinate knowledge.
Now consider the example of a plant collector. A plant collector 
is more like a sharpshooter. In order to pick a plant and put it in her 
collection, she must already know what a plant is. If she did not know 
this, then she would not even be able to identify a plant, to tell the 
difference, for example, between a plant and a platypus. But this prior 
knowledge need only be of a general and indeterminate sort. On its 
basis, the plant collector can take a particular plant for her collection, 
without deliberately taking note of that plant’s general plantness, or 
whatness. In contrast, the botanist will deliberately take note of the 
general plantness of the plant. In the course of her work, she ‘skips over’ 
the individual specimens, taking them only as tokens of a general type. 
Nevertheless, it is with these individual specimens, by being concretely 
at work with them, that the botanist learns — develops a specific and 
determinate knowledge of — the type. This learning is mathēsis, and, 
according to Heidegger, it marks the difference between ancient and 
medieval science, on the one hand, and modern science, on the other.
32  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 116 [84].
33  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 116 [84].
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It should be emphasised that, in the examples of both the plant 
collector and the botanist, the particular, concrete plant is being treated 
as something ready-to-hand in a work-world. In other words, we are 
considering it as it is experienced by the one who is at work with it. 
From this perspective, then, there is no basic ontological difference 
between the plant and the rifle. Both are things ready-to-hand within a 
work-world. On Heidegger’s account, then, in being at work with either 
the particular plant or the particular rifle, there is an end-directedness. 
Furthermore, in both cases this end-directedness ultimately bottoms 
out in that for the sake of which the ready-to-hand thing is what it is. 
This for-the-sake-of-which is an existential possibility of the subject.
In the case of the hammer, this existential possibility is the subject’s 
protection. In the case of the rifle, it is the subject’s sovereignty. What 
about the plant? Here the answer is less obvious. On first blush, there 
does not seem to be anything for the sake of which the plant is what it is. 
This doubt is tied to our intuition that the plant is, in the first instance, 
not something ready-to-hand, but something present-at-hand. Yet 
this intuition was challenged in Chapters One and Two. According to 
Heidegger, a thing within the world is experienced, most immediately, 
as ready-to-hand. Only on this basis can it be subsequently experienced 
as present-at-hand within in the world. Hence, the what-being of a 
scientific thing should be understood fundamentally in terms of its 
readiness-to-hand, which is to say, in terms of its end-directedness. 
From this it follows that the scientific thing — that which in scientific 
work is let be what it is — is for the sake of an existential possibility 
of the subject. Heidegger argues that we already know this possibility, 
and must know it, when we intelligibly experience the scientific thing, 
as such, not to say when we start working with it. This possibility is 
the ultimate end towards which the what-it-is of the scientific thing 
is directed. The hammerness of the hammer points, finally, towards 
protection, and the rifleness of the rifle, finally, towards sovereignty. To 
what, then, does the plantness of the plant, finally, point?
Heidegger does not answer this question. Instead, he concentrates on 
the more general question of to what existential possibility the thingness 
of the scientific thing itself finally points. We will consider the specific 
content of Heidegger’s answer to this question in Chapter Six. In the 
meantime, in order to properly appreciate the grounds for that answer, 
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we must first gain a firmer grip on the more formal characteristics of 
Heidegger’s answer: namely, that the scientific thing — as something 
with which scientists are at work — possesses an end-directedness 
pointing towards a final end. We must know this end-directedness 
beforehand if we are to successfully identify and work with the thing. In 
scientific work, we deliberately take note of this end-directedness, bring 
it into the foreground, and thereby seek to articulate our prior general 
and indeterminate knowledge of it into a more specific and determinate 
knowledge. This is how we study mathēmata, things insofar as they can 
be learned. This is a process of mathēsis, whereby we learn what we 
already know.
Formally, then, Heidegger views the scientific thing in terms of its 
end-directedness, a feature which we deliberatively experience only 
insofar as we relate to the thing through mathēsis, that is, only insofar 
as we study or learn it. A further formal feature of the scientific thing is, 
therefore, epistemic circularity: we can only know it because we already 
know it. This may raise the worry that Heidegger’s account of mathēsis 
attributes to science a fallacious form of reasoning. On this account, 
so the worry goes, the conclusion of a scientific inference is already 
among its initial premises; hence, science gives us no reason to accept 
its conclusions as valid.
But we are already familiar, from Chapter Four, with Heidegger’s 
response to this worry in respect of logic, construed as the science of 
the rules of reason. The worry there was that, since science is grounded 
in rules of reasoning, and since logic is identical with those rules, then 
logic grounds logic.
In response, Heidegger rejected the premise which equates logic 
and rules. Logic may presuppose rules, but rules do not entail logic. 
Indeed, only when the rules of reason have been rendered in a specific 
and determinate way do they count as rules of logic. The job of logic, as 
the science of thinking, is to deliberatively take note of the general and 
indeterminate rules which implicitly govern informal reasoning, and 
then to study them in a way which specifies and determines them, in 
other words, clearly explicates them in a formal system. Hence, it is not 
the case that the conclusions of the science of logic are already among 
its premises, because the relation between premises and conclusion is 
interpretative rather than inferential. The science of logic is a practice 
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in which informal thinking becomes formalised, in which general and 
indeterminate rules of reason are rendered specific and determinate. If 
there is a circularity here, then it is not vicious.
We can now see that logic is a particular case of the more general 
scientific practice of mathēsis. Our past discussion of this case, in turn, 
shows why we need not worry about the circularity of mathēsis: this 
circularity is interpretative rather than inferential, hermeneutical rather 
than logical, and so virtuous rather than vicious. It is a fundamental 
feature of science conceptualised as an ultimately informal existential 
practice, rather than as a logically determinate system of precisely 
defined concepts. Furthermore, science, as a form of reasoning, is 
guided by rules. Logic may seek to thematise and define those rules, 
but the natural sciences will be less concerned with explicating and 
determining the dynamics of their own thinking, and more interested 
in reliably explicating and determining the whatness of the material 
things they take to be the object of that thinking. According to Heidegger, 
these sciences ultimately attend to the end-directedness of natural 
things. The rules of reason governing this attention help scientists to 
reliably distinguish relevant from irrelevant phenomena vis-à-vis their 
understanding of what the thing is. In other words, these rules play a 
normative role in scientific research.
As a scientific practice, then, mathēsis is ruled by norms. As we also 
saw in Chapter Four, Heidegger traces philosophical descriptions 
of the norm governing the relationship between thinking and things 
back to Plato’s mythic and polysemous image of the cosmic demiurge. 
According to Heidegger, this image — as well as its cognates, the sun 
and the idea of the good — mark Plato’s discovery of the a priori element 
in our understanding of things. The image of the demiurge, in particular, 
reflects the impulse of some early Greek thinkers to construe thinking 
and things in terms of craft production. As Heidegger observes in 
this context, ‘[a]ll forming of shaped products is effected by using an 
image, in the sense of a model, as guide and standard.’34 Hence, the 
normative aspect of mathēsis, as a productive practice, stands as an a 
priori image in the experience of working with things, as a projective 
image guiding the pursuit of a specific and determinate knowledge of 
those things. Heidegger describes this image as a Grundriss, a ‘ground 
34  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 106.
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rendering’ or ‘basic blueprint.’ For present purposes, we should note 
the dual nature of the blueprint representing the normative element 
in scientific practice. On the one hand, a blueprint helps guide the act 
of production. On the other hand, it represents, schematically, the end 
result of production. A blueprint is thus both a set of directions, and 
an image of that towards which those directions point. As a model of 
scientific practice, it captures, consequentially, both the how and the 
what of that practice. To experience the scientific thing in terms of its 
end-directedness thus means to experience it in light of an image of 
both its direction and its end. This image enables, is the condition of 
possibility for, that experience.
That mathēsis is guided by a basic blueprint lies at the core of 
Heidegger’s account of modern science. Heidegger views this blueprint 
in terms of a ‘measure.’ He writes that ‘[t]his basic plan (Grundriss) […] 
provides the measure [Maßstab] for laying out of the realm, which, in 
the future, will encompass all things of that sort.’35 Hence, the ground 
plan regulates scientific practice by imposing a general measure, a 
measure meant to apply to all things falling within the plan. Note that, 
although Heidegger introduces the concept of ‘measure’ in the context 
of his discussion of the mathematical, we are not meant to view this 
measure in quantitative terms. One can, for example, take the measure 
of a thing without judging it according to some quantitative unit. For 
example, the common phrase ‘taking the measure of a man’ need not 
imply quantification. On the other hand, one cannot judge a thing 
quantitatively without also taking its measure. In Heidegger’s account, 
the mathematical and the quantitative are connected, but the former 
is a broader category than the latter: ‘[i]n no way […] is the essence of 
the mathematical defined by numberness.’36 Hence, while the practice 
35  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 92.
36  Martin Heidegger (1977a [1952]), ‘The Age of the World Picture,’ in The Question 
Concerning Technology, by Martin Heidegger, trans. by William Lovitt (New York: 
Harper & Row), pp. 115–54 (p. 119); cf. Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 70. Cf. 
also: ‘When we hear of measure, we immediately think of number and imagine the 
two, measure and number, as quantitative. But the nature of measure is no more a 
quantum than is the nature of number’ (Martin Heidegger (1971a), ‘“… Poetically 
Man Dwells…,”’ in Poetry, Language, Thought, by Martin Heidegger, trans. by Albert 
Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row), pp. 213–29 (p. 225)). The OED defines 
‘measure,’ in one substantive sense, as a ‘standard or rule of judgement; a criterion, 
test; also, a standard by which something is determined or regulated.’
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of mathēsis may include numerical calculation, it cannot be reduced to 
such calculation. To render a general and indeterminate knowledge 
more specific and determinate does not necessarily mean to render it 
more numerically precise.
In addition to circularity and normativity, there is a third parallel 
between the present discussion and our earlier discussion of Heidegger’s 
phenomenological history of logical practice. This has to do with the 
source of normativity, of the measure regulating modern scientific 
practice. Recall from Chapter Four that Heidegger describes the 
temporal aspect of scientific work experience in terms of ‘original time,’ 
that is, time as experienced in the course of our immersion in a work-
world. Original time becomes intelligible to us in terms of two types of 
relation: in-order-to relations; and for-the-sake-of-which relations. The 
manifold of in-order-to relations is an existential space within which a 
particular piece of equipment is let be what it is in its readiness-to-hand. 
This manifold, in turn, is revealed only in light of the for-the-sake-of-
which relation. Only on the basis of the for-the-sake-of-which do we 
experience the intelligibility of things within a work-world. As we saw 
in Chapter Four, Heidegger also viewed the for-the-sake-of-which as a 
social phenomenon, rooted in, and continually nourished by, tradition. 
Hence, according to him, the source of normativity, of the measure 
regulating scientific practice, is tradition.
The multiplicity of in-order-to relations serves the same role as 
the iteration of assignment, or what Heidegger also calls the ‘totality 
of end-directness’ (Bewandtnisganzheit), in which a particular thing is 
let be what it is in its end-directedness.37 And just as the multiplicity 
is revealed only in light of the for-the-sake-of-which, so too does this 
totality of end-directedness bottom out in the for-the-sake-of-which. In 
being at work with the thing in a way which lets it be what it is, we must 
already possess an at least general and indefinite knowledge of the 
thing’s final end. Heidegger describes this ultimate end as an existential 
possibility of the subject. We may now more decisively identify it as a 
possibility afforded by the historical tradition in which the subject finds 
itself. According to Heidegger, the final end of modern scientific practice, 
that towards which it is ultimately directed, is rooted in an existential 
37  Heidegger (1927), Sein und Zeit, p. 84; cf. Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 116 
[84].
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possibility of the subject’s own socio-cultural history. Furthermore, this 
end has the formal structure of a ground plan, a basic blueprint laying 
out the measure against which all things falling within its domain — all 
potentially scientific things — will be judged.
In one last link to the discussion in Chapter Four, the socio-historical 
provenance of the ground plan of modern scientific practice suggests 
a solution to the sociological problem of ‘priming.’ Recall Bloor’s 
distinction between a self-referring practice, in which things acquire 
their meaning, and the priming element which gets that practice 
going. I argued that the for-the-sake-of-which, as the a priori element 
which grounds the multiplicity of in-order-to relations, serves as such 
a priming element. It is just a small step to now apply that argument 
to Heidegger’s description of the for-the-sake-of-which as an a priori 
ground plan which both directs, and serves as the final end for, the 
modern scientific practice of mathēsis.
As we will see in what follows, this move has consequential 
implications for the historiography of early-modern science. Specifically, 
it offers an at least partial answer to the question of how the Scientific 
Revolution got going. Here, the Scientific Revolution is understood as 
the emergence of a new cognitive and material domain in which to make 
sense of the things of nature. On Heidegger’s account of mathēsis, this 
new domain traces its origin back to a socio-historically conditioned 
possibility within the everyday work-world of early-modern subjectivity. 
Furthermore, because Heidegger argues that this socially contingent 
possibility is manifest in experience, whether informally or formally, as 
an image — a ground rendering or basic blueprint — we may treat it 
as a social image. As we will see later in Chapter Six, this allows us to 
connect Heidegger’s existential conception of science in yet another way 
to SSK, specifically, to David Bloor’s linkage between knowledge and 
social imagery.
Let us now return to Heidegger’s argument that the decisive 
difference between ancient and medieval science, on the one hand, 
and modern science, on the other, cannot be explained by the claim 
that modern science uniquely emphasises facts, measurement, and 
experiment as the grounds for natural knowledge. For Heidegger, it is 
rather the difference in the way the facts are conceived, the way the 
measurement or experiment is done, which is decisive. The question is 
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not whether facts, measurement, and experiment are employed — they 
are employed in all three periods — but to what end they are employed. 
According to Heidegger, it is the kind of end-directedness possessed by 
modern scientific things which distinguishes them from their ancient 
and medieval predecessors, namely, their directedness towards a basic 
blueprint, a single regulative ground plan, in respect of which they are 
let be what they are. In establishing facts about things, in measuring 
and experimenting on those things, mathēsis skips over their token 
specificities, instead taking note of the regulative ground plan according 
to which the scientific thing, in general, becomes intelligible as what it is.
The similarities and differences between ancient science, at least 
as exemplified in the earlier example of Galen, and mathēsis seem 
straightforward enough. Despite their specific disagreements, Galen’s 
empiricist and rationalist physicians agree, in general, that medical 
knowledge should be ‘technical’ or objective, that is, grounded in fact. 
They also agree on the necessity of an a priori standard according to 
which physicians take the measure of, and are thus able to discriminate 
between, epistemically relevant and irrelevant phenomena. In a broad 
sense, then, ancient science is concerned with both facts and measures. 
However, Galen’s empiricist and rationalist appear to disagree on the 
need for experiment. Recall the rationalist physician’s argument that 
reliable judgements can be made on the basis of a single observation, 
thereby dismissing the necessity of working with things over time. For 
the empiricist, in contrast, one must proceed ‘little by little,’ slowly 
acquiring knowledge over time through a method of disciplined serial 
observation of the things.
This disagreement between the ancient rationalist and empiricist 
over the need for a method of enquiry seems conjoined with their 
further disagreement over the necessary degree of determinateness of 
the physician’s a priori knowledge of the measure of medical knowledge. 
The rationalist requires such knowledge to be fully determinate, a 
condition which then enables immediate judgement on the basis of 
one observation. Galen’s empiricist, on the other hand, is content to 
leave such knowledge indeterminate, or obscure, arguing that ‘not a 
particle of harm befalls arts and men […] for being ignorant of such 
things.’ In contrast to mathēsis, then, Galen’s empirical method does not 
seek to turn a general and indeterminate knowledge of the thingness 
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of things into a particular and determinate knowledge. To his credit, 
Galen may thus avoid charges of circularity. However, as already 
mentioned, it is hard to see the scientific merit of his position. Indeed, 
how should reliable discrimination be achieved in the absence of an 
increasingly determinate knowledge of the standard which guides such 
discrimination?
As we will see in the next section, this question also troubled 
Renaissance physicians. They answered with the argument that a 
determinate knowledge of the norms guiding their medical practice was 
both necessary and to be gained little by little through an incremental 
method for working with the things. As a consequence, these 
Renaissance physicians faced the same worry about circularity which 
arises in Heidegger’s account of modern scientific practice as mathēsis. 
And their practical response to this worry turns out to have been not so 
very different from Heidegger’s own. This suggests that the decisive 
difference between mathēsis and medieval scientific practice was, 
perhaps, not quite so straightforward as Heidegger had imagined. Yet, 
without this difference, mathēsis can no longer provide an explanation 
for the rise of a definitively modern science, in short, for the Scientific 
Revolution. So, let us now consider this Renaissance method in some 
detail, before then comparing it with Heidegger’s account of early-
modern mathēsis.
3. Renaissance Regressus and the  
Logic of Discovery
According to John Randall, Renaissance scholars at the University of 
Padua, in Northern Italy, developed an account of scientific enquiry 
which they described as a ‘double process.’38 According to this account, 
a proper scientific method will begin with some observed effect, seek 
the cause of that effect, and then use that cause to explain the effect. 
This amounts to a recommendation that the effect be explained in 
terms of a cause which can itself be known only through that effect. 
The explanation of the effect thus seems to presuppose knowledge of 
38  John Herman Randall, Jr (1940), ‘The Development of the Scientific Method in the 
School of Padua,’ Journal of the History of Ideas 1(2), 177–206 (p. 190).
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that very same effect. Hence, scientists appear to explain only what they 
already know. As a consequence, there would seem to be no need for 
a method by which scientists acquire knowledge because they already 
possess the knowledge in question.
According to Randall, this double process had already been described 
in 1334 by Urban the Averroist.39 A more concretely developed account 
can be found later in the writings of Jacopo da Forlì (ca. 1364–1413/14), 
who taught medicine and natural philosophy at Padua. Forlì wrote:
[I]f when you have a fever you first grasp the concept of fever, you 
understand the fever in general and confusedly. You then resolve the 
fever into its causes, since any fever comes either from the heating of the 
humor or of the spirits or of the members; and again the heating of the 
humor is either of the blood or of the phlegm, etc.; until you arrive at the 
specific and distinct cause and knowledge of that fever.40
From this description, it is clear that Forlì did not consider the 
circularity of the espoused method to be irremediably vicious. Indeed, 
as he describes, the knowledge of the effect — the fever — undergoes 
a transformation in the course of the method. It is not, strictly speaking, 
the same knowledge in the end that it was at the beginning. Forlì 
emphasised the need for a procedure by which a general and confused 
knowledge of the effect is ‘resolved’ into a specific and distinct 
knowledge of that same effect. Randall describes this as ‘a clear case of 
the method of medical diagnosis.’41
39  Randall (1940), ‘The Development of the Scientific Method,’ p. 190. Alistair Crombie 
suggests that the Paduan ‘double process’ was imported from Oxford around 
1400 (Alistair C. Crombie (1962), Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental 
Science (1100–1700) (Oxford: Clarendon Press), p. 297). However, Randall’s dating 
indicates that its earliest known appearance in Padua was prior to 1400.
40  Cited in Randall (1940), ‘The Development of the Scientific Method,’ p. 189; 
originally from Jacobi de Forlivio super Tegni Galeni, Padua, 1475, comm. Text I.
41  Randall (1940), ‘The Development of the Scientific Method,’ p. 189. As I have 
shown elsewhere, something like the Paduan double procedure — and, indeed, 
Heideggerian mathēsis — can also been found in Ludwik Fleck’s historical account 
of the medical diagnosis of syphilis (Jeff Kochan (2015c), ‘Circles of Scientific 
Practice: Regressus, Mathēsis, Denkstil,’ in Critical Science Studies after Ludwik Fleck, 
ed. by Dimitri Ginev (Sophia: St. Kliment Ohridski University Press), pp. 83–99; 
reprinted as Jeff Kochan (2016), ‘Circles of Scientific Practice: Regressus, Mathēsis, 
Denkstil,’ in Fleck and the Hermeneutics of Science (Collegium Helveticum Heft 14), ed. 
by Erich Otto Graf, Martin Schmid and Johannes Fehr (Zürich, 2016), pp. 85–93). 
See Ludwik Fleck (1979 [1935]), Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, trans. 
by Fred Bradley and Thaddeus J. Trenn, ed. by Thaddeus J. Trenn and Robert K. 
Merton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
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During the fifteenth century, there was an increasing focus on this 
double process, which came to be called regressus in order to emphasise 
its exclusion from the charge of being a circulus vitiosus, a vicious circle. 
Paul of Venice (ca. 1369–1429) launched an early defence of the regressus 
against this charge, arguing that:
Scientific knowledge of the cause depends on a knowledge of the effect, 
just as scientific knowledge of the effect depends on a knowledge 
of the cause, since we know the cause through the effect before we 
know the effect through the cause. This is the principal rule in all 
investigation, that a scientific knowledge of natural effects demands a 
prior knowledge of their causes and principles. — This is not a circle, 
however. […] [T]he knowledge of why (propter quid) the effect is, is not 
the knowledge that (quia) it is an effect. Therefore the knowledge of the 
effect does not depend on itself, but upon something else.42
This ‘something else,’ which distinguishes the regressus from a vicious 
circle, was addressed by Agostino Nifo (ca. 1473–1538/45), a student 
and later a teacher of medicine and philosophy at Padua. He called it 
negotiatio, and included it as the third of the four kinds of knowledge 
which comprise the scientific method:
The first kind is of the effect through the senses, or observation; the second 
is the discovery (inventio) of the cause through the effect […]; the third is 
knowledge of the same cause through an examination (negotiatio) by the 
intellect, from which there first comes such an increased knowledge of 
the cause […]; the fourth is a knowledge of the same effect propter quid, 
through that cause known so certainly […].”43
Nifo further specified negotiatio as an intellectual act of ‘composition 
and division’: ‘negotiatio is directed toward the cause as a […] definition. 
But since a definition is discovered only through composition and 
division, it is through them that the cause is discovered in the form 
[…] from which we can then proceed to the effect.’ What Forlì earlier 
identified as the process by which a general and confused knowledge of 
a thing is ‘resolved’ into a specific and distinct knowledge of that same 
42  Cited in Randal (1940), ‘The Development of the Scientific Method,’ p. 191; 
originally from Summa philosophiae naturalis magistri Pauli Venti, Venice, 1503, I, cap. 
ix.
43  Cited in Randall (1940), ‘The Development of the Scientific Method,’ p. 192; 
originally from Augustino Niphi philosophi suessani exposition… de Physico auditu, 
Venice, 1552, I, com. Text 4.
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thing is now identified by Nifo as an intellectual process of negotiatio, 
or definition. Through negotiatio, an originally confused and general 
knowledge of a cause is rendered more definite.
Nifo’s concept of negotiatio was further developed by Jacopo Zabarella 
(1533–1589), who also taught philosophy at Padua, but, unlike those of 
his predecessors mentioned above, did not have a degree in medicine.44 
About the role of negotiatio in the regressus, Zabarella wrote:
When the first stage of the procedure has been completed, which is 
from effect to cause, before we return from the latter to the effect, there 
must intervene a third intermediate process (labor) by which we may be 
led to a distinct knowledge of that cause which so far has been known 
only confusedly. Some men knowing this to be necessary have called 
it a negotiatio of the intellect. We can call it a ‘mental examination.’ […] 
[S]till they have not shown how it leads us to a distinct knowledge of 
the cause, and what is the precise force of this negotiatio…. There are, I 
judge, two things that help us to know the cause distinctly. One is the 
knowledge that it is, which prepares us to discover what it is. […] The 
other help, without which this first would not suffice, is the comparison 
of the cause discovered with the effect through which it was discovered, 
not indeed with the full knowledge that this is the cause and that the 
effect, but just comparing this with that. Thus it comes about that we are 
led gradually to the knowledge of the conditions of that thing; and when 
one of the conditions has been discovered we are helped to the discovery 
of another, until we finally know this to be the cause of that effect.45
According to Zabarella, in order to gain knowledge of what a cause is, 
we must first know that it is. This knowledge-that enables a knowledge-
what of the cause, a knowledge which is not immediately grasped, but 
which only becomes clear and distinct through a fragile method of 
mental comparison. By this method, we are ‘led’ to a distinct knowledge 
of the ‘conditions’ of the thing under investigation. For Zabarella, these 
conditions can also be understood as the ‘principles’ from which the 
relation between cause and effect may be securely determined. As our 
knowledge of these conditions or principles improves, we acquire an 
44  Eckhard Kessler (1988), ‘The Intellective Soul,’ in The Cambridge History of 
Renaissance Philosophy, ed. by Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler 
and Jill Kraye (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 485–534 (p. 836).
45  Cited in Randall (1940), ‘The Development of the Scientific Method,’ p. 200–01; 
originally from Jacopo Zabarella, De Regressu, chpt. 5.
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increasingly determinate knowledge of the whatness of the cause, and 
hence also of its necessary relation to the effect.
Randall suggests that Zabarella represents the climax of a long 
historical development in which scientific knowledge was increasingly 
recognised to rely on a form of experience which distinctly differs from 
‘ordinary observation,’ in the sense of the ‘accidental or planless collection 
of particular cases.’46 Scientific experience is disciplined by method. 
Forlì called this method ‘resolution.’ Nifo called it negotiatio. Zabarella 
called it ‘mental examination.’ The necessity of this method undermines 
the claim that reasoning from effect to cause and then from cause back 
to effect must be viciously circular. Indeed, the method appears to be 
necessary just because the circle is not vicious. The knowledge of the 
cause at the beginning is not identical with the knowledge of the cause 
at the conclusion. The required method mediates between these two 
distinct ways of knowing the cause, joining them in a manner which 
then also transforms our original knowledge of the effect.
This method, then, is a method of discovery. Randall argues that the 
Paduan philosophers worked out ‘a logic of investigation and inquiry’ 
to accompany the existing Aristotelian theory of proof.47 Zabarella, in 
particular, paid an ‘ever closer attention to the way of discovery, to 
the careful and painstaking analysis of experience, to the method of 
resolution.’48 Strikingly, Zabarella justified the need for a method of 
discovery by pointing to the finitude of human cognitive abilities:
Since because of the weakness of our mind and powers the principles 
from which demonstration [i.e., proof] is to be made are unknown to 
us, and since we cannot set out from the unknown, we are of necessity 
forced to resort to a kind of secondary procedure, which is the resolutive 
method that leads to the discovery of principles, so that once they are 
found we can demonstrate the natural effects from them. […] It is certain 
that if in coming to any science we were already in possession of a 
knowledge of all its principles, resolution would there be superfluous.49
46  Randall (1940), ‘The Development of the Scientific Method,’ p. 199.
47  Randall (1940), ‘The Development of the Scientific Method,’ p. 201.
48  Randall (1940), ‘The Development of the Scientific Method,’ p. 204.
49  Cited in Randall (1940), ‘The Development of the Scientific Method,’ p. 197–98; 
originally from Jacopo Zabarella, De Methodis, III, xviii.
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This may be read as a critical response to Galen’s dogmatic physician, 
whom we met at the start of this chapter. Zabarella argues that because we 
lack the innate ability to immediately grasp, with clarity and confidence, 
the principles governing natural phenomena, we must rely on a method 
which enables us to articulate those principles on the basis of our finite 
sensory experience. Furthermore, Randall attributes to Zabarella the 
additional claim that, because this method serves to discipline and 
direct our experience of phenomena, it must be distinguished from the 
comparatively free and unstructured sensory experience indicative of 
more familiar, everyday modes of perception.
Yet, Randall seems to have been too optimistic in his assertion 
that Zabarella successfully worked out a logic or method of scientific 
discovery, as opposed to having just demonstrated the need for such a 
method. Indeed, when Zabarella turns to a discussion of different modes 
of discovery, his account is remarkably thin on detail. As we saw above, 
after first characterising ‘mental examination’ as the method by which 
a confused and indeterminate knowledge of the cause gets transformed 
into a clear and determinate knowledge, Zabarella then describes this 
transformation in terms of ‘just comparing’ the cause with the effect 
such that ‘it comes about’ that we are ‘led gradually’ to the conditions 
of the cause. But what rules structure this comparing, and so guide 
us to the correct causal conditions? Zabarella does not say. However, 
it appears that, if he had entertained the existence of such rules, then 
he would likely have considered them to be rules of reason. Consider 
his discussion of induction as a method of discovery. In his view, a 
universal stands to a particular as cause stands to effect. The relevant 
notion of cause is, in this context, an Aristotelian notion of formal cause. 
Furthermore, knowledge of the universal is gained inductively through 
experience of the relevant particulars. In other words, the formal cause 
is known through its effects. Thus, Zabarella writes: ‘One says that 
“human” is something truly sensible, not because the senses recognise 
humans as something universal, but because particular individual 
humans are sensible.’50 Zabarella’s thus roots knowledge of universals 
in sensory experience:
50  Jacobi Zabarella (1985), De Methodis; De Regressus, ed. by Cesare Vasoli (Bologna: 
Cooperativa Libraria Universitaria Editrice), p. 99. Original text: ‘hominem enim rem 
sensilem effe dicimus, non quòd hominé universalem sensus cognoscat, sed qiua singuli 
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[A]ll our knowledge takes its origin from sense, nor can we know 
anything with our minds unless we have known it first by sense. 
Hence all principles of this kind are made known to us by induction 
[…]. [I]nduction does not prove a thing through something else; in a 
certain sense it reveals that thing through itself. For the universal is not 
distinguished from the particular in the thing itself, but only by reason 
[ratio].51
It turns out, then, that a crucial ingredient in the regressus, which serves 
to enable scientific knowledge, is our capacity for reason. But what 
role does reason play in transforming a confused knowledge that the 
cause is into a determinate knowledge of what it is? Zabarella writes 
that induction ‘does not take all the particulars into account, since after 
certain of them have been examined our mind straightaway notices the 
essential connection, and then disregarding the remaining particulars 
proceeds at once to bring together the universal.’52 Reason thus allows 
us to apply a measure of salience to the data of our sense experience, 
to distinguish epistemically relevant particulars from epistemically 
irrelevant ones. It equips us with a standard by which to discriminate 
the essential from the accidental, the good data from the bad data, in 
our search for the clear and determinate cause or causes of a particular 
sensible effect. Reason, in other words, provides the norms enabling 
proper scientific judgement. A successful method is one which, among 
other things, embodies these rational norms. Zabarella seems to have 
never addressed the discriminative power of reason explicitly in such 
terms. He did not, in other words, thematise this intellectual power 
in such formal terms as ‘measure,’ ‘rule,’ or ‘norm.’ Nevertheless, his 
inquiry does explicitly uncover a normative element in thinking which, 
as we saw in Chapter Four, will later be formally articulated by Kant as 
a ‘faculty of rules.’
The question now arises of where Zabarella thought this 
discriminative power, these rational norms, to come from. It appears 
individui homines sensiles sunt’ (Zabarella, De Methodis, bk. 4, chpt. 19). I have closely 
followed Rudolf Schicker’s German translation (see Jacopo Zabarella (1995), Über 
die Methoden (De Methodis); Über den Rückgang (De Regressu), trans. by Rudolf 
Schicker (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag), p. 243).
51  Cited in Randall (1940), ‘The Development of the Scientific Method,’ pp. 198-99; 
originally from Zabarella, De Methodis, III, xix.
52  Cited in Randall (1940), ‘The Development of the Scientific Method,’ p. 200; 
originally from Zabarella, De Regressu, chpt. 4.
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that he took them to be, not innate and self-evident structures in reason, 
but the endowment of an external and mysterious intelligence. As 
Harold Skulsky has argued, ‘[t]he inductive process to which a writer 
like Zabarella pays tribute […] depends ultimately, not on reason, but 
on the generosity, or more properly the grace, of an alien will.’53 Eckhard 
Kessler similarly observes that, for Zabarella, because our irremediably 
finite epistemic power is capable of ‘containing the universal structure 
only in a confused and unintelligible way, it had to be illuminated by the 
agent intellect [intellectus agens], so that the universal in the individual 
was rendered distinct and intelligible.’ Zabarella furthermore held 
that the intellectus agens could be identified ‘with God himself as the 
principle of intelligibility.’54 Nicholas Jardine views this as evidence for 
the reliance of Zabarella’s scientific method on ‘divine revelation,’ and 
he equates Zabarella’s notion of intellectus agens with the Holy Spirit.55 
However, Jardine appears to carry this argument too far, concluding 
also that Zabarella took clear and determinate knowledge of the cause 
to be ‘formed in the imagination through a merely passive observation 
of the world.’56 It would seem that the point is, instead, that finite 
human beings may well actively observe natural phenomena, but, in 
the absence of normative guidelines for structuring that observation, 
they will not achieve proper scientific knowledge of those phenomena.57 
This has been argued by Charles Schmitt, who provides evidence that 
‘Zabarella did take it upon himself to go out and look at nature; and, what 
is more important, he observed carefully what he saw and applied it to 
the crucial philosophical questions in which he was interested.’58 What 
53  Harold Skulsky (1968), ‘Paduan Epistemology and the Doctrine of the One Mind,’ 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 6(4), 341–61 (p. 341).
54  Eckhard Kessler (1988), ‘The Intellective Soul,’ in The Cambridge History of 
Renaissance Philosophy, ed. by Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler 
and Jill Kraye (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 485–534 (p. 531).
55  Nicholas Jardine (1976), ‘Galileo’s Road to Truth and the Demonstrative Regress,’ 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 7(4), 277–318 (p. 301).
56  Jardine (1976), ‘Galileo’s Road to Truth,’ p. 301
57  Jardine’s mistaken assumption that, for Zabarella, no effort is required to 
move from confused to distinct knowledge of the cause, seems to underpin his 
questionable conclusion that the regressus, in general, is ‘blatantly circular’ (Jardine 
(1976), ‘Galileo’s Road to Truth,’ p. 308). As argued above, such effort is called for 
just because the regressus is not viciously circular.
58  Charles B. Schmitt (1969), ‘Experience and Experiment: A Comparison of Zabarella’s 
View with Galileo’s in De Motu,’ Studies in the Renaissance 16, 80–138 (p. 99).
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Zabarella does not do, however, ‘is consciously, and with forethought, 
attempt to test a particular theory or hypothesis by devising a specific 
experiment or observational situation by which to resolve the question.’59 
Schmitt thus concludes that ‘Zabarella can be called an empiricist with 
some justification, but he is clearly not an experimentalist,’ at least not 
in the early-modern sense of that term.60
We saw earlier that Randall believed Zabarella to have drawn a clear 
distinction between scientific experience, on the one hand, and ordinary 
observation, in the sense of ‘accidental or planless collection of particular 
cases,’ on the other. On this basis, Randall attempts to turn Zabarella 
into a proto-experimentalist, thereby establishing a clear continuity 
between the method of regressus and the Galilean experimental 
method which would emerge in the years shortly afterwards. We 
may now conclude that the distinction was more subtle than that, too 
subtle, in fact, to justify naming Zabarella a precursor to the Galilean 
experimental method. While his approach to observation was careful 
and goal-oriented rather than accidental and planless, he did not seek 
to discipline or control, much less to create, the act of observation in the 
manner distinctive of subsequent early-modern experimentalists. There 
was something missing in Zabarella’s conception of scientific method, 
something which prevented him from making the final step towards a 
modern scientific way of working with and thinking about nature. In 
fact, Randall recognised that absence, but he apparently minimises its 
significance:
There was but one element lacking in Zabarella’s formulation of method: 
he did not insist that the principles of natural science be mathematical. 
[…] With this mathematical emphasis added to the logical methodology 
of Zabarella, there stands completed the ‘new method’ for which men 
had been so eagerly seeking.61
From the perspective of Heidegger’s existential conception of 
science, this missing mathematical element appears to be the key 
feature separating Renaissance regressus from early-modern mathēsis. 
Furthermore, Heidegger argued that the emergence of early-modern 
59  Schmitt (1969), ‘Experience and Experiment,’ p. 105.
60  Schmitt (1969), ‘Experience and Experiment,’ p. 106.
61  Randall (1940), ‘The Development of the Scientific Method,’ pp. 204–05.
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experimental science was possible only because natural science had 
itself become mathematical, in the sense of adopting mathēsis as its core 
method of discovery. On this account, it seems to follow that Zabarella 
could not be a precursor to early-modern experimentalism because he 
did not experience the things of nature mathematically, as mathēmata. 
But before we can properly delineate the dependency of early-modern 
experimental science on the mathematical projection of nature, we must 
first more carefully consider the similarities and differences between 
Renaissance regressus and early-modern mathēsis.
4. From Renaissance Regressus  
to Early-Modern Mathēsis
There are three broad features in respect of which regressus and 
mathēsis may be usefully compared. These are: circularity, finitude, 
and method. Not only do these features figure prominently in both 
regressus and mathēsis, the relation of each to the others is also similar 
in both cases. To begin with, regressus and mathēsis are both manifestly 
circular accounts of scientific reasoning. In both cases, too, the account 
can be defended against charges of vicious circularity. As we saw in 
the previous section, Zabarella argued that the ‘weakness of our mind 
and powers’ renders us incapable of immediately possessing, with 
clarity and confidence, the scientific principles determining the causes 
of observed natural phenomena. Indeed, according to Zabarella, if 
we falsely believe ourselves capable of spontaneously grasping such 
principles, then we might claim to possess scientific knowledge of 
a phenomenon simply because we have observed it. Reasoning in a 
tight circle, we would be attempting to justify our knowledge of the 
phenomenon by citing our knowledge of it. This circle of reasoning is 
vicious. Zabarella argues that we cannot justify such claims to clear 
and immediate scientific knowledge, because our cognitive powers are 
weak rather than powerful, because they are finite rather than infinite. 
His argument that the circle of scientific reasoning is virtuous rather 
than vicious depends on his acknowledgement that our cognitive 
powers are ineluctably finite in scope.
Although cognitive finitude is, as we saw in Chapter Three, a central 
element in Heidegger’s existential conception of science, he did not 
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explicitly draw a connection between this and his account of modern 
science as mathēsis. The necessary connection between regressus and 
finitude made by Zabarella may now help us to explicate a similar 
connection between mathēsis and finitude in the case of Heidegger.
The circularity of mathēsis lies in its being a kind of learning, or 
discovering, in which we learn or discover something which we already 
know. We do not get this knowledge out of the things themselves, by 
simply observing or otherwise dealing with them, but, as Heidegger 
writes, ‘in a certain sense’ we bring it already with us. When we deal 
with a thing, we bring with us a ‘fore-conception’ of the thingness of the 
thing.62 More specifically, in dealing with a plant, we bring with us prior 
knowledge of the plant-like of the plant. In other words, the whatness of 
a thing is not something we get out of the things themselves, but is instead 
a projection which enables us to make sense of those things in terms of 
what they are. Heidegger argued that this projection, or fore-conception 
in our understanding, plays a central role in all acts of understanding. 
He thus defines understanding as an act of interpretation which 
depends on a perhaps only vaguely specified fore-conception, or prior 
understanding, of its subject matter. Understanding is thus a circular 
phenomenon: ‘Any interpretation which is to contribute understanding, 
must already have understood what is to be interpreted.’63 Because 
this circle in understanding is ineliminably present in all cognitive acts, 
in general, it must also be ineliminably present in all acts of scientific 
cognition, in particular. Heidegger recognised that this renders scientific 
demonstration circular, but rather than viewing this as a catastrophe, he 
took it to be an inevitable aspect of finite human existence. This circle 
of understanding, he writes, ‘is the expression of the existential fore-
structure of Dasein itself.’64 It is, in other words, a basic structural feature 
of the subject’s projective understanding. This existential structure is 
expressed in modern scientific cognition, in mathēsis, as a metaphysical 
projection of the thingness of things in terms of a basic ground plan or 
blueprint. As we saw in Chapter Three, Heidegger radically reinterprets 
the meaning of metaphysics, arguing that the basis for metaphysical 
62  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 191 [150].
63  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 194 [152].
64  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 195 [153].
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knowledge, as such, is ‘the humanness of reason, i.e., its finitude.’65 The 
hierarchy of explanation in Heidegger’s account of modern science 
thus breaks down like this: the circularity of scientific practice is to be 
explained in terms of the ineliminably projective element in mathēsis; 
and this ineliminably projective element is to be explained in terms 
of human finitude. In a nutshell, scientific demonstration is circular 
because scientific cognition is finite.
This is not precisely the same as the connection made by Zabarella 
between circularity and finitude. For him, finitude explains why the 
circle is virtuous rather than vicious. For Heidegger, it explains why 
there is any circle at all. The reason for this difference can be uncovered 
by addressing the third broad feature shared by both regressus and 
mathēsis: method. For both Zabarella and Heidegger, because we cannot 
immediately grasp, with clarity, the principles governing observed 
natural phenomena, we need to find a method which will help us to 
get clear on those principles. Method is thus meant, by both, to steer 
us towards scientific knowledge in spite of our cognitive finitude. But 
how it does this differs profoundly between the two. For Zabarella, 
method is meant to overcome the limitations of finitude. He seems to 
have believed that, through careful, goal-oriented acts of observation, 
we can prepare our minds to receive epistemic inspiration from God, 
the intellectus agens. Thus human cognitive finitude must, on Zabarella’s 
account, be understood in contradistinction to the infinite cognitive 
power of God, for whom the issue of circularity never arises because 
omniscience makes inferential or interpretative reasoning unnecessary.
As we saw in Chapter Three, Heidegger had a profoundly different 
account of finitude, an account he developed specifically in contrast 
to the one proffered by Kant. Both Heidegger and Kant viewed 
cognitive experience as being comprised of two distinct faculties: the 
first, receptivity; the second, constructivity (or projectivity). However, 
whereas Kant took finitude to be a constraint on receptivity, Heidegger 
took it to be a constraint on projectivity. For Kant, as Heidegger reads 
him, finitude is a state of deprivation which prevents us from gaining 
cognitive access to the intrinsic, independently existing properties — the 
essence, or whatness — of a thing. For Heidegger, on the other hand, 
65  Martin Heidegger (1997 [1929]), Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 5th edn, 
enlarged, trans. by Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), p. 15.
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finitude is more directly connected to projectivity. The essence of a 
thing is not something we receive from it, but something it possesses 
as a result of the socio-historically conditioned metaphysical projection 
within which it is let be what it is. On Heidegger’s account, not even 
an infinitely powerful intellect could grasp the intrinsic, independently 
existing essence of a thing, because no such essence exists. Hence, the 
finitude of our receptivity is not the issue; the issue is, instead, the 
finitude of our projectivity. The range of possible conceptualisations of a 
thing is conditioned by the historical tradition of the subject attempting 
to make sense of that thing. Only within the finite scope of possibilities 
enabled by the subject’s tradition can it experience a thing as intelligible, 
not to mention develop a clearly defined understanding of what it is.
This process of articulation is advanced, for both Heidegger and 
Zabarella, by method. Both view method as a means of sharpening up 
the intelligibility of observed phenomena by clearly defining the causal 
conditions of those phenomena. Indeed, both even understand this 
process against the background of the distinction, addressed in Chapter 
Two, between that-being and what-being, between knowing of a thing 
that it is and knowing of it what it is. Recall Zabarella’s argument that 
knowledge that a cause is enables us to discover what it is. This discovery 
process involves a comparison of cause and effect, through which 
we are gradually led to scientific knowledge of the causal principles 
underlying the observed effect. The method of regressus, by which our 
understanding of the observed phenomenon is rendered increasingly 
determinate, thus presupposes a distinction between the that-being and 
the what-being of the phenomenon. It presupposes, in other words, a 
version of the minimal realist doctrine introduced in Chapter Two.
To conclude this section, it remains only to emphasise that Zabarella’s 
reflections on method seem to have been motivated by an account of 
finitude similar to the one which Heidegger attributed to Kant, namely, 
one developed in contrast to the notion of an infinitely powerful 
intellectus agens. For Zabarella, method helps us to painstakingly 
transcend our finite human condition and achieve scientific knowledge 
through communion with a divine intelligence. For Heidegger, method 
helps us, not to transcend the finitude of our existence, but to articulate 
the historically engendered epistemic possibilities within that existence. 
In this case, the self-evidence of ordinary understanding is transcended 
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in pursuit of a more robust, conceptually clear, and critically well-
grounded knowledge of nature. Hence, for both Zabarella and 
Heidegger, method is tied to the metaphysics of transcendence. But, 
unlike Zabarella, Heidegger does not treat transcendence as a solution 
to finitude, construed as a problem for knowledge. He views it instead 
as the critical exploration of the finite range of the sometimes only 
vaguely understood epistemic possibilities which a scientist inherits 
through her participation in a shared historical tradition. It was for this 
reason that Heidegger reinterpreted metaphysics as being grounded in 
finitude, rather than as being, as Zabarella ostensibly thought, a means 
by which to overcome such finitude.
These respective conceptions of method, including the relation 
between method and finitude, imply dramatically different accounts 
of the norms which govern that method. In the case of Zabarella, 
because method transcends finitude, the norms which govern it must 
be similarly transcendent. In the case of Heidegger, because method 
discloses the latent possibilities within a historical tradition, the norms 
governing it must be embedded within that tradition. This points to 
two different understandings of the source of the a priori norms which 
govern scientific practice. In one case, the ultimate source of normativity 
is timeless. In the other case, it is historical.66 As we will see in the next 
section, these two perspectives motivate two different historiographic 
strategies for explaining the transition from late Renaissance to early-
modern science. Insofar as that transition is construed as a process 
of mathematicisation, these two strategies also enroll divergent 
conceptions of the mathematical impulse giving rise to early-modern 
science. In the first case, the mathematicisation of science is an act which 
allows practitioners to slip free from the historical constraints of their 
epistemic tradition. In the other case, it is an act of critical interpretation, 
in which practitioners discover and exploit a possibility latent in their 
historical tradition, employing it as a new measure in the production of 
reliable natural knowledge.67
66  Recall from Chapter Four, that these two different construals of the a priori are not 
incommensurable. Indeed, Heidegger argues that the timeless construal rests on an 
experience of time in terms of a present-at-hand succession of ‘nows.’ This he then 
explains in terms of a more basic experience of ‘original time,’ which is enabled and 
sustained by a historical tradition.
67  These contrasting accounts of how the basic measure was set for modern science 
bring to mind contrasting accounts of poetic creation. On the one hand, poetry is 
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5. Mathematics and Metaphysics at the Cusp of 
the Early-Modern Period
Randall’s argument for a strong continuity between the Renaissance 
method of regressus and the method distinctive of early-modern natural 
philosophy was quickly and influentially challenged by the historian of 
science Alexandre Koyré. As we have seen, Randall argued that ‘[t]here 
was but one element lacking in Zabarella’s formulation of method: he 
did not insist that the principles of natural science be mathematical.’68 
Koyré seizes on this statement, insisting that the missing mathematical 
element was not as trivial as Randall implies, but instead ‘forms […] 
the content of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century.’69 For 
Koyré, the mathematicisation of regressus marks a radical historical 
discontinuity in knowledge-making practices, and, more specifically, 
a sudden and profound usurpation of Aristotelian natural philosophy 
by a resurgent Platonism. This was, in Koyré’s view, the usurpation of 
empirical experience by rational theory: ‘Experience is useless because 
before any experience we are already in possession of the knowledge 
we are seeking for.’70 Koyré thus demonstrates his allegiance to a 
Platonic doctrine of innate ideas, that is, ideas which we somehow 
possess independently of, and prior to, empirical experience. He also 
demonstrates his allegiance to the same doctrine as Galen’s rationalist 
critic of empiricism. This move has its merits if one believes that the 
circularity of the Paduan method is vicious, and that it must be broken 
divine inspiration; on the other, it is an evocation of possibilities latent in natural 
language. The idea of poetry as existential measure-setting became crucial for 
Heidegger in the 1950s. According to Charles Bambach, for the later Heidegger, 
‘[p]oetry measures the limits of what is appropriate for human beings, shaping the 
contours of our mortal fate’ (Charles Bambach (2013), Thinking the Poetic Measure of 
Justice: Hölderlin-Heidegger-Celan (Albany: SUNY Press), p. 174). Indeed, Heidegger 
would write that poetry sets ‘[a] strange measure for […] scientific ideas.’ In so 
doing, poetry ‘speaks in “images” [Bildern]’ (Heidegger (1971a), ‘“… Poetically 
Man Dwells…,”’ pp. 223, 226). This recalls, from Chapter Four, Heidegger’s rooting 
of the origins of logic— the science of thinking — in Plato’s mythic image of the 
cosmic demiurge. In Chapter Six, I argue that Heidegger placed the origins of the 
early-modern experiment in a cognate image of the scientific thing.
68  Randall (1940), ‘The Development of the Scientific Method,’ p. 204.
69  Alexandre Koyré (1943a), ‘Galileo and Plato,’ Journal of the History of Ideas 4(4), 
400–28 (p. 406 n. 17).
70  Alexandre Koyré (1943b), ‘Galileo and the Scientific Revolution of the Seventeenth 
Century,’ Philosophical Review 52(4), 333–48 (p. 347).
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through escape into a non-experiential realm of pure thought, an 
orthodoxly understood metaphysical realm lying beyond the worldly 
realm of physical sensation.
There is some modest reason to think that Koyré’s interpretation 
of the history of science may have been influenced by his reading of 
Heidegger, that his emphasis on the mathematicisation of method 
tracked Heidegger’s own description of the historical shift to mathēsis. 
Indeed, a 1931 French translation of Heidegger’s 1929 inaugural 
lecture ‘What is Metaphysics?’ included an introduction by Koyré, 
in which he describes Heidegger as ‘one of those great metaphysical 
geniuses whose influence marks an entire period.’71 The period in 
question was, of course, Koyré’s own. Yet, it seems that Koyré failed 
to properly understand both Heidegger’s stance towards metaphysics, 
and, more specifically, towards Platonism, as well as his view of the 
role played by mathematics in early-modern natural philosophy. With 
respect to Heidegger’s stance towards Platonism, recall that Heidegger 
reinterprets Plato’s fundamental and unifying idea of the good in terms 
of what Heidegger dubbed the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ (Worumwillen). 
The for-the-sake-of-which lends a compelling intelligibility and 
coherence to experience by guiding us in our discrimination between 
cognitively valuable and cognitively irrelevant or deceptive phenomena. 
Like Plato’s idea of the good, captured also in the mythical image of the 
cosmic demiurge, the for-the-sake-of-which denotes the a priori rules 
of reason which bring together things and thinking in the production 
of natural knowledge. The phenomenological importance of Plato’s 
theory of ideas, then, lies in the emphasis it puts on our compulsive 
feeling — our affectivity— towards the basic rules of reasoning, rules 
which help us to distinguish between epistemically good and bad 
phenomena. However, whereas Plato sought to explain this feeling of 
compulsion in terms of receptivity towards a supernatural realm of 
ideas, Heidegger attempted to instead explain it in naturalistic terms, as 
receptivity towards the manifold intersubjective history of a prevailing 
cultural tradition. In both cases, the phenomenology of this feeling of 
compulsion — this experience of objective necessity — is recognised 
71  ‘[…] un de ces grands génies métaphysiques qui marquent de leur influence une 
période tout entière’ (Alexandre Koyré (1931), ‘L’introduction du “Qu’est-ce que la 
métaphysique?”’ Bifur 8, 5–8 (p. 5)).
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and described, but the respective causal explanations given for that 
experience are dramatically different. In the first case, the cause is 
supernatural; in the second case, it is natural. Indeed, for Heidegger, 
our affective experience of the a priori signals our deep epistemic 
dependency on a shared historical tradition, rather than our ability to 
transcend tradition in an act of pure reason. This manifold tradition 
provides the range of possibilities available to us for making sense of 
nature, for rendering it intelligible, and metaphysics, on Heidegger’s 
account, is a study of the conditions of historical possibility generated 
by and sustained within this tradition.
Despite his enthusiasm for Heidegger’s alleged metaphysical 
‘genius,’ Koyré seems to have missed the fact that Heidegger’s ambition 
was to deconstruct, rather than to champion, Platonic rationalism. For 
Koyré, the early-modern mathematisation of natural philosophy was 
initiated by ‘some of the greatest geniuses of mankind, a Galileo, a 
Descartes.’72 He argues that it was an act of ‘pure unadulterated thought, 
and not experience or sense-perception […] that gives the basis for the 
“new science” of Galileo.’73 Koyré thus identifies mathematics with 
metaphysics, construed as Platonism, and hence describes Galileo 
unequivocally as a Platonist.74
During the late Renaissance and early-modern periods, however, 
there also existed a distinctly Aristotelian culture of mathematics. 
Indeed, when Randall writes that mathematics was the missing element 
in Zabarella’s method, he had Aristotelian mathematics in mind.
[W]ith rare exceptions the Italian mathematicians down through 
Galileo, when they possessed a philosophical interest at all, were not 
Platonists but Aristotelians in their view of mathematics, of its relations 
to physics, and of the proper method of natural knowledge. […] What 
they constructed as ‘new sciences’ it remained for Descartes to interpret 
in the light of the tradition of Augustinian Platonism.75
72  Koyré (1943a), ‘Galileo and Plato,’ p. 405.
73  Koyré (1943b), ‘Galileo and the Scientific Revolution,’ p. 346.
74  Koyré (1943a), ‘Galileo and Plato,’ p. 425. In a comparison of Heidegger and Ernst 
Cassirer, Michael Friedman notes that Cassirer influenced Koyré’s Platonic account 
of the Scientific Revolution (Michael Friedman (2000), A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, 
Cassirer, and Heidegger (Chicago: Open Court), p. 88).
75  Randall (1940), ‘The Development of the Scientific Method,’ p. 205.
264 Science as Social Existence
In Chapter Four, I recounted Heidegger’s interpretation of Descartes 
as first modelling his conception of the subject on Aristotle’s narrow 
construal of logos as proposition, but then decisively mathematicising that 
construal in order to establish the indubitable certainty of pure reason. 
We may now more precisely specify Descartes’s mathematicisation 
of the rules of reason as having been predominantly Platonist in its 
motivation. By understanding those rules as being valid independently 
of experience, Descartes hoped to secure them as the absolute basis 
for incontrovertible, universal knowledge. A Platonic interpretation 
of mathematical experience thus underwrote Descartes’s rationalistic 
claim to epistemic absolutism.
That Galileo was, in fact, more motivated by an Aristotelian 
interpretation of mathematical experience is a point which has 
been recently pressed by Peter Dear: ‘Galileo aimed at developing 
scientific knowledge […] according to the Aristotelian (Archimedean) 
deductive formal structure of the mixed mathematical sciences.’76 These 
mathematical sciences were ‘mixed,’ rather than ‘pure,’ because they 
were principally concerned with questions about the physical world 
rather than with abstract mathematical objects. The chief sixteenth-
century examples of mixed mathematical science were astronomy and 
optics, the former calculating the positions and movements of celestial 
objects and the later studying the behaviour of light rays construed in 
geometrical terms. As Dear notes, sixteenth-century astronomical and 
optical practice also differed from the pure mathematical sciences of 
geometry and arithmetic in that they made wide use of specialised 
instruments, such as quadrants and astrolabes, in order to produce 
precise empirical observations.77 Thus, according to Dear, they represent 
the emergence of ‘something resembling “experimental science.”’78
Mixed mathematics was, furthermore, different from natural 
philosophy in that the former sought to determine the quantitative 
properties of things through acts of uniform measurement, while the 
latter sought to determine what kinds of things they were, and hence 
76  Peter Dear (1995), Discipline & Experience: The Mathematical Way in the Scientific 
Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 125–26.
77  Peter Dear (2006a), ‘The Meanings of Experience,’ in The Cambridge History of Science, 
vol. 3: Early Modern Science, ed. by Katharine Park and Lorraine Daston (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), pp. 106–31 (p. 119).
78  Dear (2006a), ‘The Meanings of Experience,’ p. 119.
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what their natural place was in a hierarchically ordered cosmos. To 
determine the natural kind of a thing is to determine the universal form 
which it instantiates. In Aristotelian terms, a thing’s natural kind is thus 
also its ‘formal cause,’ its ‘what-it-is.’ So, for example, the formal cause 
of a particular oak tree is the universal oak tree, what an oak tree is 
by nature, and by definition. Moreover, by subsisting in its nature, by 
being what it is, or the kind of thing it is, an oak tree assumes its proper 
place within the cosmos. There is, then, a tight association between 
the formal cause of a thing, on the one hand, and its natural place in a 
heterogeneous and hierarchically ordered cosmos, on the other. Natural 
philosophers, by attending to formal causes, viewed themselves as the 
rightful surveyors of natural phenomena within this qualitatively and 
hence differentially ordered cosmos.
Dear observes that the main charge laid by Aristotelian natural 
philosophers against mathematicians was that the latter did not provide 
causal explanations of natural phenomena.79 Indeed, he describes 
the explanations of mixed mathematicians as ‘operational,’ and he 
contrasts these with the explanations proffered by Aristotelian natural 
philosophers.80 Yet, as we can know see, this contrast should be more 
strictly specified as one between operational explanations, on the one 
hand, and explanations in terms of formal causes, on the other. Indeed 
operational explanations are also, in a broad sense, causal explanations, 
and hence they were neither unknown nor unappreciated by 
Aristotelian natural philosophers. Recall, for example, the fourteenth-
century Paduan natural philosopher and physician Jacopo da Forlì’s 
description of regressus in terms of the resolution of a general and 
confused knowledge of fever into a specific and distinct knowledge 
of its causes, which will in turn lead back to a specific and distinct 
knowledge of the fever itself. Forlì’s goal was to explain fever as being 
caused by such physical operations as the heating of the humor, spirits, 
or members of the patient’s body. The type of cause at play here is not 
a formal cause but rather what Aristotle called an efficient cause, which 
79  Dear (2006a), ‘The Meanings of Experience,’ p. 120; Peter Dear (1995), Discipline & 
Experience: The Mathematical Way in the Scientific Revolution (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press), p. 36.
80  Peter Dear (2006b), The Intelligibility of Nature: How Science Makes Sense of the World 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press), p. 2.
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is ‘the primary source of change or rest.’81 Because Aristotle viewed 
change as movement, the efficient cause is also sometimes called the 
‘moving cause.’ Resolving the fever into its precise causes involved 
discriminating between probable and improbable efficient causes, for 
example, between the heating of the spirits and the heating of the 
humors as the most likely reason for the fever. As we saw, Agostino 
Nifo later more precisely articulated Forlì’s concept of resolution in his 
concept of negotiatio, which Zabarella then called mental examination. 
The regressus could thus involve negotiatio in the empirical determination 
of the efficient causes which produce change in natural bodies.
Dear seems to overlook this when he describes negotiatio as a 
‘mysterious process,’ a ‘form of contemplation’ which presumes ‘the 
mind’s innate ability to grasp universals.’82 These universals were 
apparently the essences, or formal causes, of the phenomena under 
study. According to Dear, regressus was a ‘logical technique […] 
designed to generate true scientific knowledge, which for an Aristotelian 
had to be certain knowledge.’83 The Paduan regressus theorists allegedly 
believed that negotiatio was a strictly logical practice which allowed the 
contemplative mind to ‘intuitively’ grasp, as necessary, abstract and 
universal things, formal causes, which in turn were meant to correspond 
to something ‘metaphysically real.’84 In short, according to Dear, the 
Paduan theorists were committed to a form of rationalism.
Although this description may stick, in some degree, to Zabarella (who 
was not a physician), it seems mistaken as a general characterisation of 
the Paduan physicians. For them, regressus involved an empirical search 
for the physical causes of illness. The heating of the humors of the body 
was not understood to be an abstract, metaphysical phenomenon: it 
was understood to be a physical operation which could be studied and, 
hopefully, physically manipulated so as to restore the patient to health. 
In fact, the study of the efficient causes of disease appears to have been 
81  Aristotle (1941c), Physica, trans. by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, in The Basic Works 
of Aristotle, ed. by Richard KcKeon (New York: Random House), pp. 213–394 (p. 241 
[line 194b29]).
82  Dear (1995), Discipline & Experience, p. 28.
83  Dear (1995), Discipline & Experience, p. 27.
84  Peter Dear (1998), ‘Method and the Study of Nature,’ in The Cambridge Companion 
of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, vol. 1, ed. by Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 147–77 (p. 152).
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a common endeavour in late Renaissance medical practice. At the very 
least, it managed to cross north over the Alps. Indeed, as Dear himself 
notes, an operational emphasis on efficient causes also characterised the 
work of the sixteenth-century Swiss physician Paracelsus and his many 
followers.85
Moreover, as Randall makes clear, the Paduan method was not 
generally meant to produce rational certainty, least of all through 
acts of pure intellectual contemplation: ‘at no time do the Paduan 
medical Aristotelians attribute any such perceptive power to intellect.’86 
Zabarella was not a medical Aristotelian, and so his case may have been 
different. But consider Nifo’s identification of regressus with ‘physical 
demonstrations,’ and his claim that the empirical ‘science of nature is 
not a science simpliciter, like [pure] mathematics. Yet it is a science propter 
quid [i.e., demonstrative].’87 Nifo furthermore notes that Aristotle, in the 
Meteors, ‘grants that he is not setting forth the true causes of natural 
effects, but only in so far as was possible for him, and in conjectural or 
hypothetical fashion.’88 Since even Aristotle himself admitted that the 
empirical study of nature may not yield certain knowledge, it is not 
surprising that the medical Aristotelians of Padua demanded no more 
of their own method.
Dear seems to have exaggerated the epistemic difference between 
Paduan medical Aristotelians, on the one hand, and sixteenth-century 
Aristotelian mixed mathematicians, on the other. In fact, both groups 
appear to have been involved in empirical studies of natural phenomena, 
and neither side made strong claims to the sort of epistemic certainty 
typically attributed to the rationalistic demonstrations of logicians 
and pure mathematicians. Koyré, in turn, appears to have more 
clearly recognised the empirical and conjectural nature of the Paduan 
regressus method, but he viewed this as an ailment in need of remedy 
through the metaphysical salve of Platonism. Hence, where Dear 
85  Peter Dear (2001), Revolutionizing the Sciences: European Knowledge and Its Ambitions, 
1500–1700 (Basingstoke: Palgrave), p. 51.
86  Randall (1940), ‘The Development of the Scientific Method,’ p. 194.
87  Cited in Randall (1940), ‘The Development of the Scientific Method,’ p. 194; 
originally from Augustino Niphi philosophi suessani exposition…de Physico auditu, 
Venice, 1552, I, comm. Text 4, Recognitio.
88  Cited in Randall (1940), ‘The Development of the Scientific Method,’ p. 194; 
originally from Augustino Niphi philosophi suessani exposition…de Physico auditu, 
Venice, 1552, I, comm. Text 4, Recognitio.
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sees too much orthodox metaphysics in the Paduan method, Koyré 
sees too little. Their interpretations thus move in opposite directions: 
Koyré’s away from empirical experience and deeper into metaphysics; 
Dear’s away from metaphysics and deeper into empirical experience. 
In contrast to both of these interpretations, I want to suggest that the 
movement in question was never a movement to or from experience. 
The key point of contention here is the definition of metaphysics. Both 
Koyré and Dear understand metaphysics in the orthodox sense, as 
being opposed to empirical experience. On a Heideggerian reading, 
in contrast, metaphysics is bound together in a reciprocal relationship 
with experience. The mathematical projection of nature — within which 
things are experienced in terms of a single, basic measure — operates in 
continuous concert with the particular, concrete ways in which scientists 
work with — and, above all, seek to take the measure of — those things.
The greater the number of natural phenomena which have been 
successfully drawn into the realm of intelligibility circumscribed by 
this basic measure, the more compelling the mathematical projection 
becomes as the existential basis for knowing nature. In this way, 
by expanding the effective reach of a particular way of working 
with nature, scientists progressively entrench in social practice the 
metaphysical measure which guides and gives meaning to that work. 
Through this work, the projected measure increasingly becomes that for 
the sake of which scientific work is done. In other words, through this 
process, the things with which one works are progressively experienced 
in terms of their directedness towards this final measure. The things 
thus lend themselves more and more easily to an explanation in terms 
underpinned by that measure, the final end in light of which scientific 
practice lets things be what we already know them to be, if only in a 
general and indeterminate way.
This self-reinforcing reciprocal relation between metaphysical 
projection and work experience would seem to confound the more 
common historiographic claim that the emergence of early-modern 
science was the consequence of a historical swing either towards 
or away from either rationalism or empiricism. On a Heideggerian 
account, early-modern science received its impulse not from one or the 
other, but instead from a transformation in the existential relationship 
between metaphysics and experience, between abstract understanding 
and concrete action, between theory and experimental practice. As we 
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will see below, this transformation was, above all, a transformation 
in the role played by the notion of ‘final cause’ in the early-modern 
pursuit of natural knowledge. The remainder of this chapter will thus 
consider the relationship between the concrete practices characteristic 
of, but not limited to, the mixed mathematical arts, on the one hand, 
and the metaphysical notion of ‘final cause,’ on the other. A better 
understanding of this relationship will put solid ground under our feet 
when, in Chapter Six, we go on to develop a more detailed and concrete 
historical analysis of the transition from late Renaissance regressus to 
early-modern mathēsis.
6. Nature, Art, and Final Causes in  
Early-Modern Natural Philosophy
It has become a historiographic commonplace that the emergence of 
early-modern science was accompanied by the collapse of the so-called 
art-nature distinction. This distinction was allegedly a barrier to the free 
application of the experiment in the investigation of nature. According 
to this widely received view, the key pillar upholding the art-nature 
distinction was the Aristotelian concept of final cause. Hence, the 
breakdown of this distinction entailed a rejection of final causes.
In this section, I will challenge this historiographic commonplace. 
In doing so, I will begin to apply Heidegger’s notion of mathēsis more 
directly to contemporary debates in the history of early-modern science, 
an application which will extend into Chapter Six. My main claim here 
will be that no consequential breakdown in the art-nature distinction 
was necessary for the emergence of early-modern science, because the 
distinction, while important, was never as strict or inflexible as has 
often been suggested. As a consequence, there was no corresponding 
need to eliminate final causes from explanations of experimentally 
produced natural phenomena. Indeed, despite early-modern rhetoric 
to the contrary, the coherence and intelligibility of experimental 
manipulations of nature required that a central role be given to final 
causes. Without allowing room for final causes in explanations of the 
artful manipulation of nature, we will achieve an only partial, and 
perhaps not entirely coherent, understanding of early-modern scientific 
practice. As we will see, the claim that early-modern experimental 
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operations cannot be properly explained without reference to final 
causes is a specific example of Heidegger’s more general claim that 
early-modern mathēsis was a matter, not just of working with the 
things, but also of the metaphysical projection of the thingness of those 
things. According to Heidegger, the ultimate end towards which the 
end-directedness of scientific things points, their final end, is a basic 
blueprint. This blueprint is, in Aristotelian terms, the final cause of 
those things.
In the last section, I addressed Dear’s distinction between operational 
and causal explanations, arguing that operational explanations, by 
making reference to how things happen, appeal to efficient causes, and 
thus are also causal explanations. But they are not causal explanations 
of the type most valued by sixteenth-century Aristotelian natural 
philosophers: they are not explanations in terms of formal cause. These 
explanations address a thing in terms of what it is, rather than of how it 
happens. In other words, they explain it in terms of the kind of thing it 
is, in terms of the specific thingness manifested in the thing. For example, 
a sixteenth-century explanation of fever in terms of the heating of the 
humors specifies that the heating causes the fever, that this is how fever 
happens. Yet, notice that it also says something about what fever is: 
namely, that it is the kind of thing which occurs when the humors are 
heated. There is, then, an important connection between efficient and 
formal causes, because operational explanations in terms of the former 
implicate a role for the latter.
Once fever has been defined in terms of the processes by which it 
occurs, it becomes possible, at least in principle, to treat it by intervening 
in those processes. On the medieval definition, one could mitigate 
a fever by artificially cooling the patient’s humors: for example, by 
immersing her in a basin of cool water. Such an intervention may help 
to return the patient to a natural state of health. This is an important 
point. Recall that, for Aristotle, change is a kind of movement. Medical 
interventions, as the efficient causes of health, may also be called the 
moving causes of health, because to restore a patient’s health means to 
move her back into a natural state. Aristotle wrote that ‘the movement 
of each body to its own place is motion towards its form.’89 We saw in 
89  Aristotle (1941d), On the Heavens, trans. by J. L. Stocks, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, 
ed. by Richard KcKeon (New York: Random House), pp. 398–466 (p. 459 [lines 
310a34–35]).
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the last section that a thing, by being what it is, instantiates its form. In 
so doing, it takes its proper place in the cosmos. We can now add that a 
thing, by becoming what it is, moves towards its form, and, in so doing, 
also moves to its proper place — or what we may be more inclined to 
call its proper state — in the cosmos. The physician directly intervenes 
in the operations of the patient’s body — operates on her — in order 
to bring her back into proper form, good shape, a natural state of 
health. Health is thus that for the sake of which the physician performs 
the operations, and those operations are likewise performed in order to 
restore the patient’s health.
In their respective accounts of the Scientific Revolution, both Dear 
and SSK practitioner Steven Shapin observe that ‘that for-the-sake-of-
which’ an operation occurs was known to Aristotelians as the ‘final 
cause.’90 Dear furthermore recognises a distinction between the formal 
cause of a thing, the kind of thing it is, on the one hand, and its final 
cause, on the other. The motivation for this distinction, he writes, ‘was 
to understand in the most fundamental way what things were and why 
they behaved as they did.’91 Yet, while Aristotle did distinguish in this 
way between formal and final causes, he also argued that the two are 
often identical, and, furthermore, that they coincide with the efficient, 
or moving, cause: ‘the “what” and “that for the sake of which” are one, 
while the primary source of motion is the same in species as these.’92
For example, the process of growth initiated in an acorn can 
be explained only in light of the end, or final cause, of that process: 
namely, a mature oak tree. The final cause explains why an acorn grows 
into an oak tree rather than into an artichoke. Similarly, according to 
Aristotle, it explains why ‘the healable, when moved and changed qua 
healable, attains health and not whiteness.’93 A movement towards 
form has a directedness, a regularity, which distinguishes it from 
chance occurrence, and this regularity of movement is what a reference 
to final causes is meant to explain. Final causes explain why something 
becomes what it is: why an acorn becomes an oak tree. They thus serve 
90  Steven Shapin (1996), The Scientific Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press), p. 139; Dear (2001), Revolutionizing the Sciences, p. 13.
91  Dear (2001), Revolutionizing the Sciences, p. 14.
92  Aristotle (1941c), Physica, trans. by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, in The Basic Works 
of Aristotle, ed. by Richard KcKeon (New York: Random House), pp. 213–394 (p. 248 
[lines 198b26–27]).
93  Aristotle (1941d), On the Heavens, p. 459 (lines 310b17–18).
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to explain generative movement qua generative, that is, qua movement 
which we experience as organised and directed towards form. Formal 
causes, in contrast, explain what something is. Their focus is on being, 
rather than on becoming. What an oak tree is can be explained without 
reference to the generative movements which brought the oak tree into 
being. Final and formal causes can thus be viewed as different modes of 
explanation with respect to the same thing. This is a difference between 
a directed process and its natural outcome, between a thing’s regulated 
actualisation and its resultant actuality. In the case of the oak tree, the 
operation is internal: oak trees reproduce themselves through acorns. 
Here, the formal and final causes are similarly located in the oak tree. 
They are equally situated in the very thing about which they are meant 
to provide an explanation.
Accordingly, Andrea Falcon has argued that, for the Aristotelian 
student of nature, formal and final causes were often not distinguishable 
in practice.94 Indeed, Aristotle reiterates this point in On the Generation 
of Animals: ‘first, the final cause, that for the sake of which a thing exists; 
secondly, the formal cause, the definition of its essence (and these two 
we may regard pretty much as one and the same).’95 Aristotelian natural 
philosophers could thus be justified in speaking not of two distinct 
causes but of only one single ‘formal/final’ cause.
Crucially, the same cannot be said of Aristotelian students of art. For 
them, formal and final causes are separated because, in art, the source 
of movement lies outside the moving body, the emergent work of art. 
As Aristotle wrote: ‘[A]rt is a principle of movement in something other 
than the thing moved, nature is a principle in the thing itself.’96 Hence, 
when the physician immerses a feverish patient in a basin of cool water, 
the source of the movement meant to restore the patient to health lies, 
at least in significant part, outside the patient, in the physician, or, more 
accurately, in the medical art of the physician. Furthermore, as noted 
94  Andrea Falcon (2015), ‘Aristotle on Causality,’ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. Zalta (Spring 2015 Edition), §3.
95  Aristotle (1941e), On the Generation of Animals, trans. by Arthur Platt, in The Basic 
Works of Aristotle, ed. by Richard KcKeon (New York: Random House), pp. 665–80 
(p. 665 [lines 715a4–7]).
96  Aristotle (1941f), Metaphysics, trans. by W. D. Ross, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, 
ed. by Richard KcKeon (New York: Random House), pp. 689–926 (p. 874 [lines 
1070a7–10]).
 2735. Mathēsis and the Emergence of Early-Modern Science
above, medical art is not a random activity, but an activity directed 
toward a specific end, namely, health. The physician is the site of 
both the activity (efficient cause) and the principle (final cause) which 
organises and gives an overall meaning to that activity. The patient, on 
the other hand, is both the object of treatment (material cause) and the 
site of health (formal cause) to which the physician endeavours to return 
that body. In contrast to generation in nature, the formal cause — the 
‘what’ — and the final cause — ‘that for the sake of which’ — are not 
united in art, because they each exist in a different location. Yet, in 
the medical arts, there are exceptions to this general rule, and such 
cases serve to weaken the distinction between nature and art. Hence, 
Aristotle writes that ‘a doctor doctoring himself: nature is like that.’97 
Or, to take another example, one walks about ‘in order to be healthy.’98 
Just as with the oak tree, in this case the respective locations of the final 
and formal causes are now the same, and so the two causes become 
indistinguishable in practical terms. In addition, the efficient cause is 
now located, as with the oak tree, in the body being moved: the patient 
is also the agent, a self-mover.
One may object that, even when there is no necessary difference 
between nature and art with respect to location of causes, an important 
distinction may still be made by pointing to the deliberative character 
of artful movement in contrast to natural movement. According to this 
argument, the doctor deliberately sets out to doctor herself, while the 
oak tree reproduces itself automatically, that is, without deliberation. 
But Aristotle challenged this distinction as well. He observes that 
‘art does not deliberate.’ Hence, ‘[i]f the ship-building art were in the 
wood, it would produce the same results by nature.’99 Self-awareness 
thus seems to play no necessary role in Aristotle’s conception of art. For 
him, the regulative movements of art can be just as non-deliberative as 
those of nature. This recalls Heidegger’s own observations, discussed 
in Chapter Four, about the non-deliberative character of our actions 
when we are immersed in a work-world. The master fiddler does not 
97  Aristotle (1941c), Physica, p. 874 (line 199b30).
98  Aristotle, Physica, lines 194b34; trans. by R. Hope and cited in Bas C. van Fraassen 
(1980), ‘A Re-Examination of Aristotle’s Philosophy of Science,’ Dialogue 19(1), 
20–45 (p. 24).
99  Aristotle (1941c), Physica, p. 251 (lines 199b327–29).
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deliberate over the placement of her fingers while she is fiddling. She 
just fiddles. Hence, if the art of fiddling were instead located in the 
fiddle, the fiddle would play itself, in just the same way an oak tree 
reproduces itself through an acorn: namely, non-deliberatively, without 
self-awareness, but nevertheless with a directedness which serves to 
organise the corresponding operations. In fact, Heidegger recognises in 
Aristotle a distinction between the ‘end’ (telos) towards which a thing is 
directed, on the one hand, and the ‘goal’ or ‘purpose’ of that thing, on 
the other. On this basis, Heidegger concludes that for Aristotle: ‘telos is 
not “goal” or “purpose,” but “end.”’ One may attribute to a thing the 
cause of its own activity without also attributing to it self-awareness or 
consciousness.100 For both Heidegger and Aristotle, the end-directedness 
of both natural and artful movement may be explained without recourse 
to the intellectualist concepts of ‘goal’ and ‘purpose.’
In addition to their shared interest in non-deliberative practice, 
there is another important parallel between Heidegger’s work and 
Aristotelian natural philosophy. Readers will have already noticed 
that Heidegger, like Aristotle, uses a concept of the ‘for-the-sake-of-
which.’ Indeed, Aristotle’s observation that health is that for the sake of 
which one walks about, and that one walks about in order to maintain 
one’s health, recalls Heidegger’s own close association between the 
concepts ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ and ‘in-order-to.’ As we saw above, 
and more fully in Chapter Four, Heidegger links these two concepts 
in his discussion of equipment, or ready-to-hand things, that is, things 
as we experience them in use. We use a pen, for example, in order to 
make marks on a page, so as to communicate. The use of the pen is an 
in-order-to of graphic communication. Yet such communication is more 
than just mark-making. The marks on the page must be shaped and 
organised such that they convey a meaning. Only then will they count 
as communication. Graphic communication is thus that for the sake 
of which one uses the pen. Only once we have acquired the skills for 
100   Martin  Heidegger  (1976  [1967]),  ‘On  the  Being  and  Conception  of  φύσις  in 
Aristotle’s Physics B, 1,’ Man and World 9(3), 219–70 (pp. 231). See also: Martin 
Heidegger, Martin (1977b [1954]), ‘The Question Concerning Technology,’ in The 
Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, by Martin Heidegger, trans. by 
William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row), pp. 3–35 (p. 8); Martin Heidegger (2000 
[1953]), Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New 
Haven: Yale University Press), p. 63.
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such communication can we use the pen in order to convey a meaning. 
Hence, Heidegger writes that ‘[o]nly so far as the for-the-sake-of a 
can-be is understood can something like an in-order-to (a relation of 
assignedness) be unveiled.’101 This understanding of the for-the-sake-
of-which — of the final cause — allows for a ‘projection […] in whose 
luminosity things of the nature of equipment are encountered.’102 In 
partly more Aristotelian terms, an understanding of the final cause of a 
thing opens up (‘projects’) a space of intelligibility in which the formal 
cause, or whatness, of the thing may be realised through the efficient 
cause, or operations, by which that thing comes to be experienced as 
what it is. So, the understanding, or the art, of graphic communication 
informs one about what kinds of marks will contribute to meaning, 
and hence also about how the pen is to be used in order to produce 
those kinds of marks. As a consequence, an understanding of the final 
cause, whether deliberative or non-deliberative, marks the difference 
between random, meaningless behaviour and results, on the one 
hand, and organised, meaningful practices and products, on the other. 
Heidegger’s concept of understanding thus plays much the same role as 
Aristotle’s concept of art with respect to production: both are directed 
towards the for-the-sake-of-which, towards the final cause or end. 
Such understanding brings with it rules for regulating our behaviour 
in a sensible way, for successfully choosing between cognitively good 
and cognitively bad courses of action in order to produce meaningful 
results. It explains, for example, why a carpenter qua carpenter produces 
cabinets rather than crockery.
It is worth reiterating that the rules or instructions originating in the 
for-the-sake-of-which need not be articulated, much less formalised, in 
order to perform their regulative function: they can be non-deliberative, 
unreflective, or tacit. They do not entail the self-awareness of the 
moving, or efficient, cause. On this point, Aristotle and Heidegger agree, 
but Aristotle goes further by applying the idea, not just to art, but also 
to self-generation in nature. This returns us to the issue of intentionality 
and naturalised epistemology, addressed at the end of Chapter Four. 
We saw there that Bloor’s call for a naturalised account of scientific 
reasoning need not entail the naturalistic reduction of intentional states to 
101  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 295; translation modified.
102  Heidegger (1982a), Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 293.
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non-intentional states. For such a reduction presupposes that intentional 
states necessarily include propositional content. Yet Heidegger 
rejects this presupposition, arguing that intentional actions — actions 
exhibiting a directedness — can also be non-propositional in character. 
This underpins the present claim that intentional states may be non-
deliberative. Intentional acts are not necessarily conscious phenomena, 
and so intentional activity may be ascribed to something without 
supposing that thing to possess a consciousness. When Aristotle argues 
that nature displays intention through the directedness of its activities, 
but that it does not deliberate, he would appear to espouse an account 
of natural intention which does not presuppose a sentient nature. In 
Aristotle, natural things move themselves to their proper place in an 
ordered cosmos, but, like the master fiddler, they do not have to think 
about doing so — they just do it. Aristotle appears to have imagined 
nature as a master artist, unreflectively performing itself.
It is this ‘performance’ which Aristotelian natural philosophers 
took as their object of study. By cataloguing the final/formal causes 
which govern the self-movement of nature, they hoped to achieve 
a dense and precise understanding of the ordered cosmos. If each 
thing moves naturally to form, to its own proper place in the cosmos, 
then a catalogue of these various forms would also provide a kind 
of conceptual map of the heterogeneous and hierarchically ordered 
places which constitute the qualitatively complex structure of the 
world. In the most abstract of terms, this conceptual map was meant 
to articulate in clear and explicit terms the implicit role played by final 
causation in regulating natural operations in the world. It may thus be 
viewed as a kind of cosmic operations manual, with the proviso that 
the original operator, just like the master artist, has no need for such a 
manual. Indeed, the master artist is likely to find a manual purporting 
to explicate her practice as, at best, an over-simplification of what 
she actually does. On the other hand, she may also find it difficult 
to articulate, in clear and determinate propositional terms, what she 
finds evident in her art but lacking in the manual.
These considerations should now make us wary about the oft-
made claim that early-modern practitioners can be distinguished by 
their rejection of the Aristotelian distinction between art and nature. 
Historiographically, this distinction has often been viewed as an 
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obstacle to the rise of the mechanical philosophy on which the new 
experimental practice is thought to have been based. Shapin writes that 
‘the precondition for the intelligibility and the practical possibility of 
a mechanical philosophy of nature was setting aside that Aristotelian 
distinction.’103 Dear, who, as we have seen, emphasises the importance 
of mixed mathematics in the development of experimental practice, 
argues that ‘[t]he art-nature distinction impinged on the use of 
artificial contrivance in the making of natural knowledge — that is, it 
compromised the legitimacy of using in natural philosophy the sorts 
of procedures used by mathematicians.’104 Like Shapin, Dear suggests 
that ‘[t]he widespread adoption of various forms of “mechanical 
philosophy” went along with a drastic weakening of the art-nature 
distinction in philosophical thought,’ and he then adds that this 
‘provided ontological vindication of the primacy of the mathematical 
sciences.’105 It is a historiographic commonplace that early-modern 
experimental philosophy was enabled by the rising fortunes of the 
mechanical philosophy. However, Shapin and Dear also maintain that 
the Aristotelian distinction between art and nature was a central barrier 
to the rise of the new experimentalism. I think that we should not accept 
this claim. Let me explain my disagreement by addressing Dear’s more 
detailed argument.
On closer inspection, it appears that the true barrier to experimental 
practice was, according to Dear, Aristotelian final causes: ‘[t]o the extent 
that Aristotle’s natural philosophy sought the final causes of things, and 
thereby to determine their natures, experimental science was therefore 
disallowed.’106 At the root of the rejection of the art-nature distinction 
was, therefore, the rejection of final causes. This would seem to make 
sense since, as we have seen, Aristotle distinguished art and nature 
by the location of their respective final and efficient causes. For the 
things of nature, the principle of their movement is internal, while for 
the things of art, the principle of their movement is external. However, 
103  Shapin (1996), The Scientific Revolution, p. 31.
104  Dear (1995), Discipline & Experience, p. 153.
105  Dear (1995), Discipline & Experience, p. 151.
106  Dear (2006a), ‘The Meanings of Experience,’ in The Cambridge History of Science, vol. 
3: Early Modern Science, ed. by Katharine Park and Lorraine Daston (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), pp. 106–31 (p. 110).
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for Aristotle this distinction was not, as Dear suggests, an ‘absolute 
separation.’107 Indeed, recall Aristotle’s argument that nature is like 
a doctor doctoring herself. Hence, in some special cases, art moves 
its object internally, and these special cases provided Aristotle with 
an analogical model for his account of natural generation. There was, 
for him, no absolute distinction to be drawn between art and nature, 
because he understood natural processes, in general, by analogy to 
special cases of artistic process.
Yet, Dear argues that natural and artificial causes were considered 
distinct because the regularity of natural processes could be ‘subverted’ 
by artificial causes.108 For example, ‘[a]n aqueduct […] is not a natural 
watercourse; it reveals the intention of its human producer, which 
thwarts that of nature.’109 But this example can also speak for an affinity 
between art and nature. From an Aristotelian perspective, the natural 
tendency of liquid water is to move as close as possible to the centre of 
the earth. The aqueduct does not thwart or subvert this tendency, but 
is entirely dependent on it for the successful delivery of water. The 
final cause which gives sense to the operations of the aqueduct is thus 
compatible with the final cause which gives sense to the operations 
of the natural watercourse: both facilitate the movement of liquid 
water to its proper place in the cosmos. This is not to say that artifice 
cannot be used to subvert the natural tendencies of things, but only 
that this possibility does not warrant an absolute separation of art and 
nature. Indeed, Aristotle wrote that ‘if things made by nature were 
made also by art, they would come to be in the same way as by nature. 
[…] [G]enerally art partly completes what nature cannot bring to a 
finish, and partly imitates her.’110 In general, then, Aristotle viewed the 
respective operations of art and nature as complementary rather than 
as contradictory.
This point is emphasised in Dear’s description of the early-modern 
experiment as ‘mimetic, not semiotic.’111 The artifice of experiment 
107  Dear (1995), Discipline & Experience, p. 155.
108  Dear (1995), Discipline & Experience, p. 155.
109  Dear (1995), Discipline & Experience, p. 155. Elsewhere, Dear assimilates ‘contrived 
situations’ to ‘interference’ with natural processes in the natural philosophical 
context (Peter Dear (1990), ‘Miracles, Experiments, and the Ordinary Course of 
Nature,’ Isis 81(4), 663–83 (p. 681)).
110  Aristotle (1941c), Physica, p. 250 (lines 199a14–17).
111  Dear (1995), Discipline & Experience, p. 159.
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imitates nature, rather than signifying it. According to Dear, mimesis 
is a primary characteristic of experimental manipulation.112 The 
experimental philosopher reproduces, or mimics, natural processes 
using artificial means, with the goal of generating new knowledge of 
nature, ‘especially knowledge of an operational kind.’113 Historically, 
this move involved what Dear describes as ‘[a] subtle redefinition of 
natural knowledge — and thus of nature itself.’114 He refers to the 1647 
book, Discours du vuide, by the French physician and college teacher 
Pierre Guiffart, as evidence for this subtle redefinition. Dear cites 
Guiffart as stating:
There is a very notable difference between art and nature: art cannot 
produce anything without nature; it not only needs nature to furnish the 
material, but it also needs nature’s natural inclinations to go along with 
it, so that thereby it supplements nature’s rules and produces its own 
work.115
The subtle redefinition alleged to appear in this passage is that 
‘[k]nowledge of nature, rather than being about identifying purposes 
[i.e., final causes], is now, insensibly, becoming about characterising 
“rules” […] of nature.’116 On the basis of this perceived distinction 
between final causes, on the one hand, and rules, on the other, Dear 
draws a further distinction between the ‘teleological’ explanations of 
Aristotelian natural philosophers and the ‘operational’ explanations of 
mixed mathematicians and the experimental philosophers inspired by 
them.117
This recalls Dear’s distinction between the operational explanations 
of mixed mathematicians, on the one hand, and explanations based on 
formal causes, as proffered by Aristotelian natural philosophers, on the 
other. In response to this, I argued, first, that operational explanations 
are also causal explanations because they refer both to efficient causes 
and, at least tacitly, to final causes, and, second, that final causes and 
formal causes are, in the realm of Aristotelian natural philosophy, 
effectively identical. It follows from this that Dear’s distinction between 
112  Dear (1995), Discipline & Experience, p. 159.
113  Dear (1995), Discipline & Experience, p. 159.
114  Dear (1995), Discipline & Experience, p. 157.
115  Dear (1995), Discipline & Experience, p. 157.
116  Dear (1995), Discipline & Experience, p. 157.
117  Dear (1995), Discipline & Experience, p. 158.
280 Science as Social Existence
operational and teleological explanations should be regarded with 
some scepticism. As we have seen, explanations in terms of final causes 
can be viewed as explanations in terms of the rules which give meaning 
and direction to natural processes: they explain, for example, why an 
acorn grows into an oak tree rather than into an artichoke. The same 
point is implied in the passage from Guiffart. He argues that art relies 
on the support of natural inclinations so that it may act to supplement 
nature’s rule-governed activity. Yet natural inclinations seem just 
to be the natural tendencies definitive of final causes. Following 
its natural tendency, an acorn develops into an oak tree. Hence, as 
Guiffart suggests, because it relies on the natural tendencies of natural 
materials, art ends up supplementing, rather than violating, nature’s 
rules. Natural inclinations are here conceptualised as inclinations to 
follow the rules governing natural movement. The crucial point to 
be emphasised, then, is that a focus on the rules governing natural 
processes is simultaneously a focus not just on material causes, but also 
on final causes, and so it cannot be read as a rejection of the art-nature 
distinction. Hence Guiffart’s ability to faultlessly refer to nature’s rules 
while still asserting a notable difference between art and nature. For Dear, 
Guiffart’s affirmation of the art-nature distinction must be dismissed as 
‘lip service,’ because Dear has put himself in an interpretative position 
where rule-based operational explanations of nature are incompatible 
with the Aristotelian doctrine of final cause allegedly underpinning a 
distinction between artificial and natural processes.118
Dear emphasises ‘manipulation’ as a key element in his explanation 
for the transition from late Renaissance natural philosophy to early-
modern experimental philosophy, or what I have called the transition 
from regressus to mathēsis. The notion of artful manipulation was, he 
argues, a ‘Trojan horse’ by which the art-nature distinction could be 
circumvented, thereby allowing the applied techniques of mixed 
mathematicians to flood into early-modern natural philosophy.119 
In response to Dear’s hypothesis, I have sought, in this section, to 
demonstrate two things. First, I have argued that the claim that early-
modern experimental philosophy subverted the art-nature distinction 
should be treated with some scepticism. I have suggested that this 
118  Dear (1995), Discipline & Experience, p. 161.
119  Dear (1995), Discipline & Experience, p. 161.
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distinction was not, per se, an obstacle for experimental practice, because 
artful manipulation had always been viewed as potentially compatible 
with natural processes. Second, I have argued that manipulation alone 
does not sufficiently explain the early-modern mathematisation of 
natural knowledge. Indeed, attention to manipulation alone explains 
very little. One must also attend to the governing principles which lend 
order and meaning to those manipulations, which explain to what end 
those manipulations are directed and for what end they are performed. 
Put otherwise, efficient causes must be married to final causes if we are to 
shed adequate explanatory light on the rule-governed dynamics which 
we observe in the worlds of both nature and art. Coherent operational 
explanations presuppose that for the sake of which those operations 
occur, because, without this presupposition, those operations would 
not be intelligible as anything more than random activity.
7. Conclusion
Tongue planted firmly in cheek, Shapin begins his 1996 book, The 
Scientific Revolution, with the following declaration: ‘There was no such 
thing as the Scientific Revolution, and this is a book about it.’120 Indeed, 
although historians of science have, in recent years, become increasingly 
circumspect about the notion of a Scientific Revolution, few have been 
willing to abandon it entirely. In particular, the idea that early-modern 
science was inaugurated by a sudden, radical, and complete — in 
short, a revolutionary — epistemic break with the past has been largely 
abandoned by historians, with the historiographic emphasis shifting to 
more nuanced considerations of both the continuities and discontinuities 
which exist between early-modern science and its predecessors.
The Heideggerian account of the Scientific Revolution which I have 
begun to outline in this chapter shares this circumspective stance. 
Recall that my explication of Heidegger’s account of modern science 
as mathēsis began with Heidegger’s insistence that facts, measurement, 
and experiment, broadly construed, figure as continuous threads 
running from modern science all the way back through medieval 
to ancient science. Moreover, according to Heidegger, the Scientific 
Revolution was sparked not by the rejection of tradition, but instead by 
120  Shapin (1996), The Scientific Revolution, p. 1.
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the consolidation of an existential possibility which had, until that time, 
lain relatively dormant within that tradition. In this way, Heidegger’s 
use of the term ‘revolution’ [Umwälzung] harkens back to an older 
meaning of that term: not a sudden and radical break with the past, but 
instead a transformative, as opposed to an atavistic, return to it.
The extent to which Heidegger viewed the Scientific Revolution 
as powerfully tied to the past is clearly evinced by his claim that the 
Aristotelian concept of final cause was not, after all, abandoned by early-
modern scientific practitioners. In this, as we have seen, Heidegger 
argues for greater historical continuity than do both Dear and Shapin. 
Yet, this concept was retained only to then undergo transformation 
in a way which profoundly altered the extant practices of fact-stating, 
measuring, and experimenting. Heidegger identified this transformation 
with the mathematisation of scientific knowledge. At its root, this 
mathematisation had to do, not with numerical practice, but with the 
development of a uniform measure, a basic blueprint, circumscribing 
the thingness of scientific things. It was the mathematisation of final 
causes, rather than their rejection, which allowed physical apparatus 
to flood into the knowledge-making practices of early-modern natural 
philosophy. It was how these apparatuses were used, and the end to 
which they were put, which mark a decisive transformation in the 
meaning of those practices. Furthermore, it was the concentration of 
scientific experience under a uniform measure which allowed numerical 
practice to likewise flood into, and give new form to, the early-modern 
natural philosophical experience of nature. Hence, Heidegger’s account 
of science as mathēsis may be read as charting a neutral course between 
two competing historiographic schools, each of which favours an 
explanation of the Scientific Revolution in terms of either the rise of 
experimental or mathematico-numerical practice. His account is meant 
to illuminate the common soil in which these two aspects of modern 
science are rooted, and from which they both sprang. It thus allows us 
an opportunity to reconnect recent historical studies of early-modern 
experimental philosophy with the theory-oriented studies which have 
typically been the brief of historians more concerned with early-modern 
mathematical practice. Chapter Six will give concrete, micro-historical 
attention to the ways in which the mathematicisation of final causes 
transformed the fortunes of early-modern experimental practice.
Chapter Six  
 
Mathematics, Experiment, and the 
Ends of Scientific Practice
1. Introduction
In Chapter Five, we familiarised ourselves with Heidegger’s concept 
of mathēsis. This concept lies at the heart of his attempt to understand 
the emergence of early-modern science in terms of mathematisation. 
In particular, mathēsis — as a kind of learning or studying wherein we 
learn what we, in a general and indeterminate way, already know — is 
meant to capture the mathematisation of the pre-modern Aristotelian 
notion of final cause. As we saw, Heidegger grounds his analysis in 
our experience of the thing as ready-to-hand within a work-world, that 
is, as something with which we are at work. According to Heidegger, 
such a thing has an end-directedness. When we work with (rather than 
against) it, we let it be what it is in its directedness towards some end; 
we let it, so far as is possible, fulfill that end.
I suggested that this end is the final cause of the thing, that for the 
sake of which we let the thing, in the course of working with it, be what 
it is. Heidegger argues that, in the case of early-modern scientific work, 
the end of the thing is a ground plan, a basic blueprint. As the final 
cause of the thing, this basic blueprint provides the measure against 
which our work with the thing makes sense. It guides our judgement 
© Jeff Kochan, CC BY 4.0   http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0129.06
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about what is, and what is not, relevant as we work with the thing, and 
thus also our basic understanding of the thingness of the thing.
According to Heidegger, the measure given by the ground plan 
applies to the scientific thing as such. All potential scientific things will 
be circumscribed within the experiential realm laid out according to 
this measure. This circumscription forms the basis of mathematisation. 
The totality of end-directednesses within this realm — and thus also the 
ends of the corresponding scientific practices — becomes consolidated 
under one uniform measure — a single, final end. Hence, the scientific 
thing is what it is insofar as it conforms to this measure. This conformity 
is not, however, a strict determination. Recall that those things which the 
ground plan renders knowable are initially known in an only general 
and indeterminate way. Through mathēsis, this knowledge may then 
be developed into something more specific and determinate, and this 
determination may take a number of different shapes. All of these shapes 
will, however, still share the same general form. For example, individual 
plants and animals may refer to two different categories — the plant-
like and the animal-like — but those two categories, in turn, refer to a 
single, more general category — the thing-like. Similarly, we may refer 
to things either in quantitative or operational terms, but we must first be 
able to refer to them as things. Hence, even though all scientific things 
conform to the same general measure, they are nevertheless amenable 
to specification and determination in a variety of different ways.
As a consequence, mathēsis, as the mathematical projection of the 
thingness of things, as a basic projective structure in the subjectivity of the 
subject, served to facilitate the influx of both numerical and instrumental 
practices into early-modern natural philosophy. By allowing for the 
consolidation of all potentially scientific things under one general 
measure, mathēsis expanded the range of application for concrete 
mathematical techniques. If a thing could be drawn within the scope of 
scientific experience, then one could also quantify it. Mathēsis likewise 
enabled and expanded the range of application for concrete instrumental 
techniques. Hence, scientific things came to be increasingly viewed as 
a legitimate subject matter for artful manipulation. Quantification and 
manipulation are thus two different possibilities for specifying the 
uniform thingness of the scientific thing. Thus, as was claimed at the 
close of Chapter Five, Heidegger’s introduction of mathēsis, as a central 
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and collective existential impulse behind the rise of early-modern 
science, charts a middle course between the historiographic Scylla and 
Charybdis of mathematics and experiment.
This is not so much a rejection as it is a resolution of the historical 
difference between what Thomas Kuhn identified as mathematical 
and experimental traditions in the physical sciences.1 Each tradition 
represents a different way of specifying and determining the same 
general and indeterminate knowledge of things. Kuhn’s traditions may 
thus be better described as sub-traditions within a broader tradition in 
which scientific thinking is guided by a uniform measure against which 
scientific things are experienced as intelligible. The shared root of these 
two traditions in mathematical projection furthermore helps to explain 
why these two traditions could eventually come together, especially, as 
Kuhn observes, in the case of nineteenth-century physics.2 Like the hills 
on either side of a valley, a bridge can be built to join them. However, 
Heidegger’s account reminds us that, despite the distance between 
them, each hill nevertheless forms one side of the same valley.
Peter Dear also challenges Kuhn’s distinction between mathematical 
and experimental practices, arguing for an ‘intimate relationship’ 
between the two, manifested most spectacularly in the late-seventeenth-
century mathematico-experimental work of Isaac Newton.3 Yet, as we 
saw in Chapter Five, Dear locates the heart of experimental practice 
not, as Kuhn did, in the tradition represented by Robert Boyle’s mid-
seventeenth-century experimental philosophy and the Royal Society 
of London (of which Boyle and then Newton served as President), but 
instead in the physical apparatuses and artful manipulations of the 
Aristotelian tradition of mixed mathematics. Indeed, Dear argues that 
‘Boylean experimental philosophy was not the high road to modern 
experimentation; it was a detour.’4 Since Kuhn’s experimental tradition 
was precisely the Boylean one, it would seem that Dear has not really, 
1  Thomas Kuhn (1977), ‘Mathematical versus Experimental Traditions in the 
Development of Physical Science,’ in The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in 
Scientific Tradition and Change, by Thomas Kuhn (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press), pp. 31–65.
2  Kuhn (1977), ‘Mathematical versus Experimental Traditions,’ p. 63.
3  Peter Dear (1995), Discipline & Experience: The Mathematical Way in the Scientific 
Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), p. 246.
4  Dear (1995), Discipline & Experience, p. 2.
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after all, discovered an intimate relationship between the two sides of 
Kuhn’s distinction.
Steven Shapin, in contrast, preserves Kuhn’s distinction, and 
emphasises the importance of Boyle’s experimental philosophy 
as a forebear of the Newtonian programme.5 In fact, Shapin even 
strengthens Kuhn’s distinction by carefully outlining Boyle’s resolve in 
insulating experimental philosophy from techniques of mathematical 
demonstration. According to Shapin, Newton would later both adopt 
Boylean experimental practice and marry it to those same mathematical 
techniques.6 Yet, as we will see later in this chapter, although Boyle 
eschewed mathematical forms of persuasion, his experimental 
philosophy was not incompatible with mathēsis. Indeed, I will argue 
that Boylean experimental philosophy was, in the Heideggerian sense, 
strongly mathematical. Although Boyle rejected the concrete techniques 
of specification typical of mathematical practice, his understanding of 
the thingness of scientific things was nevertheless guided by a uniform 
measure. This uniform measure influenced, in turn, the way Boyle 
worked with, or manipulated, those things.
Shapin notes that Boyle’s suspicion of mathematics included the 
rejection of an ‘ontology’ contending that ‘physical qualities were 
uniform.’7 Instead, Boyle allowed that ‘substances like air and water 
varied in their physical properties from one locale to another and from 
one time to another.’8 In other words, Boyle rejected an ontology which 
insisted that the properties of token instances of the same type always be 
specified in the same way. But Boyle’s tolerance of context-dependency 
in the specification of physical properties is compatible with my claim 
that he was a mathematical philosopher in the Heideggerian sense. 
5  Steven Shapin (1988), ‘Robert Boyle and Mathematics: Reality, Representation, 
and Experimental Practice,’ Science in Context 2(1), 23–58; Steven Shapin (1994), A 
Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press), pp. 310–54.
6  Steven Shapin (1996), The Scientific Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 
p. 116. Note that, while Kuhn made the tentative psychologistic suggestion that the 
experimental/mathematical distinction may be ‘rooted in the nature of the human 
mind,’ Shapin’s account is more sociological, attributing to Boyle the conviction 
that ‘mathematical means of persuasion were embedded within an improper, 
even immoral, social order’ (Kuhn (1977), ‘Mathematical versus Experimental 
Traditions,’ p. 64; Shapin (1988), ‘Robert Boyle and Mathematics,’ p. 33).
7  Shapin (1988), ‘Robert Boyle and Mathematics,’ p. 47.
8  Shapin (1988), ‘Robert Boyle and Mathematics,’ p. 48.
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Boyle could have both understood the thingness of things according to 
a single uniform measure, and allowed that this thingness be specified 
and determined in different context-sensitive ways. What appears to 
have been important to him was the existence of a common ontological 
measure against which these localised differences could then be 
meaningfully judged.
In fact, Boyle’s belief that the ‘extension of experimental culture’ could 
be achieved through the imposition of ‘universal metrological standards’ 
may be viewed as a concrete manifestation of his tacit, or unconscious, 
commitment to a uniform metaphysical standard according to which 
experimental experience, in general, was to be organised.9 I use the term 
‘unconscious’ in acknowledgement of Kuhn’s observation that, because 
seventeenth-century experimental philosophers like Boyle typically 
decried metaphysics and celebrated experiment, the interaction which 
did occur between the two was ‘usually unconscious.’10 Consequently, 
as an explicit concept by which to make sense of Boyle’s experimental 
practice, mathēsis figures into the present account as an analyst’s 
category rather than an actor’s category.
My method is thus not historicist in the currently prevailing sense, 
defined by Shapin as a ‘practice devoted to interpreting historical action 
in historical actors’ terms.’11 Nor is it presentist, in the sense of using 
present-day terms to understand the past. Mathēsis is not an established 
present-day term. It is a term originating in ancient Greek discourse, as 
well as the etymological source of the present-day words ‘mathematical’ 
and ‘mathematics.’ Heidegger returns to the ancient term in order 
to re-introduce a meaning which no longer forms an explicit part of 
present-day usage. Indeed, this ancient meaning also appears not to 
have figured in Boyle’s use of the term ‘Mathematicks.’ According to 
Shapin, especially in the context of the experimental philosophy, Boyle 
understood mathematics largely as a set of techniques for producing 
9  Shapin (1988), ‘Robert Boyle and Mathematics,’ pp. 30, 29.
10  Kuhn (1977), ‘Mathematical versus Experimental Traditions,’ p. 44.
11  Shapin (1994), A Social History of Truth, p. xvi n. 1. Shapin offers no programmatic 
defence of historicism, adding: ‘nor do I believe that historicism is without its 
problems and proper limitation’ (Shapin (1994), A Social History of Truth, p. 328). 
See also Steven Shapin (1992), ‘Discipline and Bounding: The History and Sociology 
of Science as Seen through the Externalism-Internalism Debate,’ History of Science 
30(4), 333–69 (pp. 353–59).
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deductive certainty and numerical precision. By addressing the 
etymology of the word, Heidegger sought to recover a meaning which 
had become sedimented in subsequent culture, thus continuing to 
influence participants without figuring into their active vocabulary. 
Hence, mathēsis might be viewed as a tacit actor’s category, with its 
influence on Boylean experimental culture being inferred through its 
explicit effects on the linguistic and non-linguistic practices of that 
culture.
In what follows, I will argue that Boyle was, in the Heideggerian 
sense of mathēsis, a mathematical philosopher. My focus will be on 
Boyle’s dispute with the natural philosopher and mathematician Francis 
Line. A key point in this controversy was the legitimacy of Aristotelian 
final causes in experimental discourse. Boyle decried final causes as 
metaphysical, and condemned Line’s use of them. He commented, ‘I 
am not very forward to allow acting for ends to bodies inanimate, and 
consequently devoid of knowledge.’12 This implies an understanding 
of final causes which links them to sentience and knowledge. Yet, as 
we saw in Chapter Five, neither Aristotle’s nor Heidegger’s concept 
of final cause necessarily ascribes sentience or knowledge to the thing 
whose movements it was meant to help explain. Hence, I will argue, 
the term ‘final cause’ included a sedimented meaning, one which Boyle 
neglected in his dispute with Line. Furthermore, the dynamics of Boyle’s 
argument against Line reveal his own tacit, or unconscious, reliance on 
final causes in this sedimented and neglected sense.
This notion of final causes ties directly into mathēsis. Indeed, the 
final cause is the mathematical measure which allows us to make 
sense of the operations of both nature and art. Heidegger’s account of 
seventeenth-century science especially focuses on the mathematisation 
of Aristotelian final causes, that is, their consolidation under a single 
uniform measure. This account gives particular attention to the roles of 
Galileo and Newton. I will first review Heidegger’s brief discussion of 
these two figures, before teasing out the implications of his comments 
12  Robert Boyle (1662 [1966]), A Defence of the Doctrine Touching the Spring and Weight of 
the Air, Proposed by Mr. R. Boyle, in his New Physico-Mechanical Experiments; Against 
the Objections of Franciscus Linus. Wherewith the Objector’s Funicular Hypothesis is also 
Examined, in The Works of Robert Boyle, vol. 1, by Robert Boyle, ed. by Thomas Birch 
(Hildesheim: Georg Olms), pp. 118–85 (p. 143).
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for our understanding of the early-modern experiment. Then I will 
move on to Boyle’s dispute with Line, showing that the historical line 
Heidegger traces from Galileo to Newton runs directly through Boyle. 
In the penultimate section, I will bring Heidegger’s concept of the 
mathematical into dialogue with David Bloor’s concept of social imagery, 
and briefly explore some general implications of this combination for 
the historiographic method of the sociology of scientific knowledge 
(SSK).
Before we leap into the main current of the chapter, it bears 
emphasising that what follows is not an exercise in intellectual history. 
Recall, once more, that Heidegger defined mathēsis in terms of a twofold 
reciprocal relation between a mathematical projection of nature, on the 
one hand, and work experiences, on the other. Hence, in explicating and 
expanding on Heidegger’s argument, I will give significant attention to 
the materiality of early-modern scientific and technological experience, 
in general, and Boyle’s experimental manipulations of nature, in 
particular. My goal is to capture, if only roughly, the way in which 
material practice and metaphysical project came to mutually reinforce 
one another, each giving strength to the other, until a powerful new way 
of understanding and intervening in natural processes emerged, a novel 
intellectual and material culture, a new way of being in the world.
2. The Galilean First Thing  
and the Aims of Experiment
In her 2004 book, The Body of the Artisan: Art and Experience in the 
Scientific Revolution, Pamela Smith argues that ‘the methods, goals, 
and episteme of art’ are ‘central to an understanding of the Scientific 
Revolution.’13 In particular, she emphasises the crucial contribution of 
an ‘artisanal epistemology’ to the emergence of early-modern science. 
This epistemology was widely manifest in the artistic activity of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and it provides evidence for a 
‘form of cognition’ unique to the craft operations of the period.14 In step 
13  Pamela H. Smith (2004), The Body of the Artisan: Art and Experience in the Scientific 
Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), p. 19.
14  Smith (2004), The Body of the Artisan, p. 21.
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with Dear’s emphasis on the seventeenth-century preoccupation with 
operational explanations, discussed in Chapter Five, Smith argues that 
these artisans were more concerned with understanding the processes 
of nature than with creating representations of nature. To this end, they 
developed a deep and sophisticated expertise about the way matter 
behaves under a diverse range of conditions, with a particular interest 
in cases involving the generation and transformation of matter.15 This 
expert knowledge was not abstract and theoretical, but embodied 
and practical: ‘in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the pursuit 
of natural knowledge became active and began to involve the body; 
that is, one had to observe, record, and engage bodily with nature.’16 
Echoing the earlier ‘craftsman thesis’ of Edgar Zilsel, Smith argues 
that communication by these expert artisans with physicians, scholars, 
princes, and city governors created a social dynamic from which 
‘new attitudes toward nature and a new discourse about it emerged.’17 
Furthermore, like Zilsel, who claimed that these social developments 
provided only ‘necessary conditions,’ not sufficient conditions, for the 
rise of early-modern science, Smith also cautions that her account of 
artisanal practice offers an only ‘partial answer’ to the question of what 
brought about the Scientific Revolution.18 Although she places more 
stress on the contribution of artisans, Smith nevertheless emphasises 
that this period was marked by a ‘mutual influence’ between artisans 
and humanists, between practitioners and theorists, an influence which 
was ‘reciprocal and dialectical,’ an influence which ‘runs both ways.’19 
Her book, then, is not a reductionist account of science in terms of the 
skilled manipulation of matter by elite artisans, but instead a powerful 
reminder of the necessary and profound role played by those artisans in a 
larger social transformation. In so arguing, she reinforces a point against 
intellectualist accounts of the Scientific Revolution represented by, 
among others, Alexandre Koyré’s reductionist emphasis on theoretical 
imagination as both necessary and sufficient for the emergence of 
15  Smith (2004), The Body of the Artisan, pp. 7, 14.
16  Smith (2004), The Body of the Artisan, p. 18.
17  Edgar Zilsel (1942), ‘The Sociological Roots of Science,’ American Journal of Sociology 
47(4), 544–62; Smith (2004), The Body of the Artisan, p. 151.
18  Zilsel (1942), ‘The Sociological Roots of Science,’ p. 547; Smith (2004), The Body of the 
Artisan, p. 19.
19  Smith (2004), The Body of the Artisan, p. 22.
 2916. Mathematics, Experiment, and the Ends of Scientific Practice
early-modern science. Indeed, Koyré explicitly rejected Zilsel’s claim 
for an artisanal influence on Galileo’s work.20 John Randall was likewise 
dismissive of Zilsel’s craftsman thesis, which he viewed, incorrectly, as 
necessarily rooted in a Platonic metaphysics.21
It is important to recognise that Heidegger’s account of the Scientific 
Revolution in terms of mathēsis predates the mid-twentieth-century 
swing towards theory-dominant explanations of early-modern science. 
As noted in Chapter Two, Heidegger was a reductionist champion of 
neither theory nor practice, but was instead concerned with gaining a 
better understanding of the complex relationship between the two. Recall 
his exclamation that ‘it is by no means patent where the ontological 
boundary between “theoretical” and “non-theoretical” behaviour really 
runs!’22 However, when it comes to historical analysis, Heidegger, like 
Smith, puts his emphasis on one side of this dynamic: in his case, giving 
more attention to intellectual rather than to pragmatic factors. Yet, just 
as Smith urges us, despite the one-sidedness of her account, to keep the 
reciprocal nature of the dynamic in mind, so too should we approach 
Heidegger’s own historical comments in the same fashion. Heidegger 
gives scarcely any attention to the material practices of early-modern 
science, but his account does not preclude such attention. In fact, as we 
have already seen in the last chapter, he explicitly styles mathēsis as a 
reciprocal relation between ways of working with things, on the one hand, 
and the metaphysical projection of the thingness of things, on the other.
In this section, I will first gloss Heidegger’s brief historical comments 
on the emergence of early-modern science, and then suggest how these 
comments may relate to the more practice-based accounts proffered by 
historians like Smith. This will further strengthen the point, made in 
Chapter Five, that an analysis of manipulation alone cannot properly 
explain the profound historical changes we are hoping to understand. 
In order to make sense of early-modern accounts of nature, we must 
20  Alexandre Koyré (1943a), ‘Galileo and Plato,’ Journal of the History of Ideas 4(4), 
400–28 (p. 401 n. 6).
21  John Herman Randall, Jr (1961), The School of Padua and the Emergence of Modern 
Science (Padova: Editrice Antenore), p. 130.
22  Martin Heidegger (1962a [1927]), Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and 
Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell), p. 409 [358]. (Following scholarly convention, 
page numbers in square brackets refer to the original 1927 German edition of Being 
and Time.)
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give attention to both efficient and final causes, to both operations and 
ends. In order to understand what early-modern natural philosophers 
were up to, we should focus not just on the fact that they manipulated 
nature using experimental equipment, but also on the way they 
selectively ordered those manipulations with the intention of producing 
reliable natural knowledge. I have proposed that Heidegger’s account 
of the Scientific Revolution be interpreted as a story of change in the 
prevailing conception of final causation in respect of natural processes. 
I consider this interpretation compatible with Zilsel’s and Smith’s 
respective macro- and micro-historical attention to the transformation 
in relations between humanists and artisans, practitioners and theorists, 
during the same period. This is a proposed interpretation, rather than a 
straightforward gloss, of Heidegger’s account, because this is not how 
he explicitly described matters. I believe, however, that what follows is 
consistent with his overall approach in the 1920s and 1930s, though I 
will also note some consequential points of critical departure from a few 
of his more specific claims.
Recall from Chapter Five that, for the Aristotelian natural 
philosopher of the late Renaissance, the natural movement of a thing 
was understood as movement to proper place, or, to form. This natural 
movement was regulated by the thing’s final cause. From this it follows 
that a fundamental change in natural philosophical conceptions of 
motion should also involve a fundamental change in corresponding 
conceptions of final cause. As the understanding of natural motion 
fundamentally changes, so too does the understanding of the rules or 
guidelines which give order and meaning to that motion. Although 
Heidegger did not have much to say about changes in early-modern 
conceptions of final causation, he does give brief but crucial attention 
to the corresponding changes in early-modern conceptions of natural 
motion. A review of Heidegger’s observations on this point will help us 
to render more explicit the implied corresponding changes in prevailing 
conceptions of final causation during that same period.
Heidegger’s discussion focuses on Newton’s First Law of Motion, his 
principle of inertia, which reads: ‘Every body [corpus omne] continues in 
its state of rest, or uniform motion in a straight line, unless it is compelled 
to change that state by a force impressed upon it.’23 Heidegger points 
23  Martin Heidegger (1967 [1962]), What Is a Thing?, trans. by William B. Barton, Jr., 
and Vera Deutsch (Chicago: Henry Regnery), p. 78.
 2936. Mathematics, Experiment, and the Ends of Scientific Practice
out that the phrase corpus omne, or ‘every body,’ indicates Newton’s 
rejection of the fundamental Aristotelian distinction between terrestrial 
and celestial bodies.24 Indeed, under this law, the thingness of things 
is no longer subject to any kind of qualitative division: Newton’s First 
Law treats all things as being basically the same, as being circumscribed 
by the same basic blueprint. Furthermore, according to Heidegger, 
Newton’s law is a formal articulation of an understanding of thingness 
which had already been expressed in Galileo’s earlier account of free fall. 
For Heidegger, Galileo’s key innovation was to explain the difference 
in the time it takes for distinct bodies to fall to earth ‘not from the 
different inner natures of the bodies or from their own corresponding 
relation to their particular place,’ but from the external forces acting on 
them, for example, the resistance of the air.25 With this, Galileo rejects 
the Aristotelian attempt to contrastively explain a difference in natural 
motion between two bodies by reference to a difference in their inner 
orientations towards distinct places within a qualitatively differentiated 
cosmos. This latter kind of explanation is no longer valid because all 
things are now conceived of as belonging to qualitatively identical 
places in the cosmos. Heidegger writes that with Galileo the cosmos is 
now understood to be ‘the realm of the uniform space-time context of 
motion.’26 In qualitative terms, the heterogeneity of places within the 
cosmos has now become a homogeneity of positions within a uniform 
spatial realm.
There is a clear affinity between Heidegger’s account of Galilean 
motion and his earlier discussion of place in the context of the change-
over from practical immersion in a work-world to a theoretical 
understanding of things as objects. In Being and Time, Heidegger writes 
that:
In the ‘physical’ assertion ‘The hammer is heavy’ we overlook not only 
the tool-character of the entity we encounter, but also something that 
belongs to any ready-to-hand equipment: its place. Its place becomes a 
matter of indifference. This does not mean that what is present-at-hand 
loses its ‘location’ altogether. But its place becomes a spatio-temporal 
position, a ‘world-point,’ which is in no way distinguished from any 
other.27
24  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 86.
25  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 90.
26  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 92.
27  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 413 [361–62].
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Here, Heidegger is describing the nascent experience according to 
which early-modern mathematical physicists began to make sense 
of nature. In his later discussion of Galileo’s free-fall experiments, he 
emphasises the sharp contrast between this way of experiencing nature 
as intelligible and the way distinctive of orthodox Aristotelians of the 
same period.
Both Galileo and his opponents saw the same ‘fact.’ But they interpreted 
the same fact differently and made the same happening visible to 
themselves in different ways. […] Both thought something along with 
the same appearance but they thought something different, not only 
about the single case, but fundamentally, regarding the essence of a 
body and the nature of its motion.28
In contrast to his more orthodox contemporaries, Galileo’s work 
experiences were shaped by a projection of nature in which the 
qualitative differences between things, so central to the prevailing 
Aristotelian image of the cosmos, had now become a matter of 
indifference. He presupposed uniformity vis-à-vis the thingness 
of things. At a basic phenomenological level, he experienced all 
things as the same. Methodologically, by drawing attention to the 
phenomenology of this basic Galilean experience, Heidegger seeks to 
uncover the ontological core of Galilean natural philosophy. Indeed, as 
Heidegger argued, ‘[o]nly as phenomenology, is ontology possible.’29
For Heidegger, an ontological commitment to the qualitative 
uniformity of things is clearly evident in Galileo’s final book, the 1638 
Discourses and Mathematical Demonstrations Relating to Two New Sciences, 
from which he paraphrases Galileo as stating ‘Mobile mente concipio 
omni secluso impedimento’: ‘I think in my mind of something moveable 
that is left entirely to itself.’30 This generic moveable body will become 
the corpus omne of Newton’s First Law. Free from external influence, 
it exists in an autonomous state of uniform and perpetual motion (or 
rest). The social field of intelligibility in which the existence of such 
a thing can make sense is what Heidegger dubbed the mathematical 
projection of nature. He now identifies this shared projection with the 
28  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 90.
29  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 60 [35].
30  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 91.
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mente concipio of Galileo: ‘There is a prior grasping together in this mente 
concipere of what should be uniformly determinative of each body as 
such, i.e., for being bodily. All bodies are alike. No motion is special. 
Every place is like every other, each moment like any other.’31 This is, 
for Heidegger, the missing mathematical element which marks the 
emergence of early-modern science: ‘[t]he mathematical is the “mente 
concipere” of Galileo.’32 Thus the key feature of early-modern mathēsis, 
what crucially distinguishes it from Renaissance regressus, discussed in 
Chapter Five, is the uniformity or univocality in its projection of the 
thingness of the things. As Heidegger argues, ‘[a]ll determinations of 
bodies have one basic blueprint (Grundriss).’33 In other words, as we 
saw in Chapter Five, all bodies — and, more broadly, the thingness of 
all things — are experienced and understood according to one basic and 
uniform measure. Against this measure, ‘the structure of every thing 
and its relation to every other thing is sketched in advance.’34 Where the 
community of orthodox Aristotelian natural philosophers experienced 
a qualitatively differentiated, hierarchically ordered cosmos, Galilean 
philosophers now see a uniformly ordered world in which every place, 
and every thing, is qualitatively like every other.
On the basis of his conception of the mathematical projection in 
terms of a basic blueprint, Heidegger concludes that ‘[n]ow nature is no 
longer an inner capacity of a body, determining its form of motion and 
place.’35 He seems here to have in mind a definition of nature in terms 
of final cause, that is, in terms of a principle regulating a thing’s natural 
movement and place in the cosmos. If, as Heidegger argues, this final 
cause can no longer be viewed as something internal to the thing, then 
it must be viewed as external to that thing. However, this does not seem 
to be Heidegger’s conclusion. Instead, he argues that ‘[n]ature is now 
the realm of the uniform space-time context.’36 But this seems like a non 
sequitur. It is difficult to see how this space-time ‘realm’ is supposed to 
determine the form of motion and the place of a thing. It would seem, 
rather, to be the arena in which such a determination may occur. Hence, 
31  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 91.
32  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 116.
33  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 91.
34  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 92.
35  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 92.
36  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 92.
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a definition of nature in terms of this realm does not replace the inner 
capacity of a thing to move towards its proper place in the cosmos. 
Instead, one may say that the thing retains an inner capacity to follow 
specific rules of motion, rules which guide it to its natural place. But 
this place is not unique to the thing’s kind, or category; it is rather a 
generic place, qualitatively identical to every other place, in the uniform 
space-time realm. It would thus be more consistent with Heidegger’s 
overall account to describe the mathematical, not as replacing the inner 
capacities of things, but rather as rendering those capacities uniform in 
a way which mirrors the uniformity of the post-Aristotelian cosmos. In 
a uniform world, a differential, or pluralistic, account of final causes 
becomes unnecessary. Because this world admits of no differences, 
there is no need to reckon difference in the fundamental rules governing 
the natural movements of things. Indeed, now only one basic set of 
rules is needed in order to understand these movements at their most 
primitive level. In this way, the mathematical projection opens up an 
experiential space in which the concept of a universal physical law 
first becomes intelligible, and then realises its formal articulation in 
Newton’s First Law: every body continues in its state of rest, or uniform 
motion in a straight line, unless it is compelled to change that state by 
a force impressed upon it. In the Newtonian universe, it is an implicit 
assumption that every physical thing possesses a capacity to consistently 
follow this basic and universal law. This law now serves as the final 
cause of a thing’s most primitive form of motion: it is what regulates 
that motion; it is that for the sake of which the thing moves, elementally, 
through a uniform space-time realm.37 In achieving pure conformity to 
this universal law — and so escaping the contingent effects of external, 
localised causal forces — the thing assumes its proper place, or state, 
37  Trish Glazebrook calls this the early-modern ‘homogenization’ of natural place. She 
correctly observes that now ‘[n]o distinction is made between things on the basis 
of motion toward an end.’ However, from this she then incorrectly concludes that 
‘things are apprehended not in terms of [internal] essence or telos [i.e., end],’ ‘but on 
the basis of external force’ (Trish Glazebrook (2000b), ‘From φύσις to Nature, τέχνη 
to Technology: Heidegger on Aristotle, Galileo, and Newton,’ The Southern Journal of 
Philosophy 38, 95–118 (pp. 109, 110; my brackets); see also, Trish Glazebrook (2001b), 
‘The Role of the Beiträge in Heidegger’s Critique of Science,’ Philosophy Today 45(1): 
24–32 (p. 25)). But, if this were true, then the First Law would be unintelligible. 
Explanations in terms of external force entail a conception of internal essence, even 
when that essence is homogenous across entities.
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in the post-Aristotelian cosmos, that is, a place where it is left entirely 
to itself, to be at rest, or to move uniformly in a straight line, without 
interference from without.
Yet, Heidegger argues that Newton’s First Law ‘speaks of a thing 
that does not exist. It demands a fundamental representation of things 
which contradicts the ordinary.’38 The problem is that, although every 
thing may be capable of following this law, there is no basis in ordinary 
experience to accept this because we do not ordinarily encounter things 
as being unaffected by external forces. Put in Galileo’s terms, we do 
not ordinarily experience a thing ‘left entirely to itself.’ What is more, 
Heidegger argues that ‘[t]here is also no experiment which could ever 
bring such a body to direct perception.’39 Hence, the new mathematical 
projection of nature puts at its centre an elemental understanding of 
the thing which is closed off not just from ordinary experience, but 
from experimental experience as well. We can encounter it neither in 
ordinary life nor in the laboratory.
Heidegger argues that this mathematical understanding of the thing, 
which places it beyond the scope of experimental observation, also makes 
possible the experiment as ‘a necessary and prime component of [scientific] 
knowledge.’40 Because the mathematically projected thing is a necessary 
condition for the possibility of experimental knowledge, it cannot also 
be something discoverable by experimental means. Heidegger writes 
that ‘[i]t is precisely the projecting-open of nature in the mathematical 
sense that is the presupposition for the necessity and possibility of 
“experiment.”’41 The idea seems to be that the art of experiment, as a 
set of operations for investigating nature, is necessarily guided by 
a mathematical — more precisely, an axiomatic — understanding of 
things as primitively autonomous, as left purely to themselves in a 
qualitatively uniform world. One may picture the cosmic demiurge, 
forging the ‘First Thing’ into existence, and then sending it out, alone, 
into the empty expanse of space, where it sails unobstructed under the 
rule-governed constancy of its own internal inertia.
38  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 89.
39  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 89.
40  Martin Heidegger (1999 [1989]), Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), trans. 
by Pravis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), p. 113; 
my brackets.
41  Heidegger (1999 [1989]), Contributions to Philosophy, p. 113.
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But the experimental practitioner will never discover this First Thing, 
because she works in a world populated by an untold number of things, 
each impinging on the autonomy of the others. What the axiomatic 
image of the First Thing gives the experimentalist is an understanding of 
things which permits her to meaningfully distinguish their fundamental 
thingness, their whatness or essence, from the effects wrought on them 
by the external contingencies of their local environment. Hence, a 
thing falls to the earth, not because it is composed essentially of earth, 
but because the earth exerts an external influence on it, accelerating 
it downward. The earth thus interferes with the autonomy of the 
thing, accelerating it out of its indigenous state of uniform rectilinear 
motion (or rest). In doing so, it allows the thing to become an object 
of experimental observation. More specifically, the experimentalist can 
now empirically investigate the acceleration of the thing as caused by 
the earth. Furthermore, because the thing’s relationship to the earth is 
not unique, one can predict that the earth will affect other things in 
the same way. Hence, a heavier or lighter body should also accelerate 
towards the earth at the same rate: the effect should be universal, as 
determined by the mathematically projected basic blueprint of nature.
As Heidegger observes in respect of Galileo’s free-fall experiment, 
this prediction was not confirmed, because two simultaneously released 
bodies, of differential weight, hit the earth’s surface at different times. 
Yet Galileo was able to reason that this was not evidence of a difference 
in the respective relations of the two bodies to the earth, but rather of the 
differential effect of a further external influence, air resistance, on the 
bodies. Again, the axiomatic image of the First Thing allows this further 
effect to be explained away as irrelevant to the phenomenon under test. 
In a vacuum, or near vacuum, this effect should not be present, as was 
famously confirmed by David Scott when he let a hammer and a feather 
fall freely from an equal height during the 1971 Apollo 15 moonwalk. 
The point is that the thing, as mathematically projected, allows the 
experimentalist to identify certain causal influences as irrelevant to 
the effect under study, in the interests of isolating just those causes 
responsible for that effect. Because the project establishes the a priori 
uniformity of all bodies, including their uniform receptivity to fixed 
rules of motion, an observed difference in the behaviour of two bodies 
must indicate, not an essential difference in the bodies themselves, but 
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rather a difference in the external causal nexuses which act on those 
bodies. To artificially achieve the same observed effect in the behaviour 
of the two bodies is to have successfully eliminated the difference in 
their respective causal nexuses — as Scott dramatically demonstrated 
on the moon’s surface. In this way, the experimental practitioner isolates 
the cause of a particular behaviour, or effect, and then demonstrates the 
regularity of this causal relation.
This artificially facilitated isolation of causes, and the accompanying 
determination of the relevant causal relation, is a process of discrimination 
which presupposes a stable standard of judgement. According to 
Heidegger, this standard is provided by the mathematical projection 
of the thingness of things, which stipulates that no observable effect on 
the thing is essential to the nature of that thing, and so all such effects 
can, in principle, be eliminated without compromising the indigenous 
nature of the thing. The thingness of the thing is thus defined in terms of 
the purity of its conformity, in the absence of external influence, to what 
Newton formalised as the First Law of Motion. The experimentalist 
cannot empirically demonstrate the existence of this pure state, but she 
can employ it as a norm by which to justify the elimination of noise 
from an experimental system, that is, the externally generated effects 
interfering with the specific causal relations which the experiment is 
meant to isolate and test. In principle, all observable effects might be 
eliminated from an experimental system, thus leaving the thing entirely 
to itself, in a purified state of mathematically projected thingness. But 
this marks the limit of possibility for experimental practice, because 
it makes scientific knowledge of things impossible. In practice, the 
experimentalist is rather more concerned with isolating and stabilising 
specific causes, so as to reliably demonstrate, or explain, specific effects.
This artificially facilitated act is a demonstration of the kind which 
Paduan medical Aristotelians called propter quid, that is, a demonstration 
of why an effect is. Recall, from Chapter Five, Agostino Nifo’s four 
stages of scientific method. First, one observes an effect. Second, one 
discovers the cause of that effect. Third, one gains precise knowledge 
of the cause through negotiatio, or definition. Fourth, on the basis of 
this precise knowledge, one now knows the effect propter quid, that 
is, in a well-reasoned, or well-grounded, manner. Nifo argued that 
this well-grounded knowledge of an effect carries the certainty of 
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demonstrative knowledge, but only in an empirical, not a mathematical, 
sense. Negotiatio is not a purely rational, or intellectual, operation, but 
also includes a material element. The isolation and definition of a 
relevant cause requires the physical manipulation of the causal system 
under investigation. As argued in Chapter Five, these manipulations 
require a principle to guide them, to give them order and meaning, 
otherwise they would amount only to random behaviour. In the case 
of early-modern science, this principle was the missing mathematical 
element enabling the transition from medieval regressus to early-
modern mathēsis. In Aristotelian terms, this element supplies the final 
cause guiding experimental manipulations, the organising principle, or 
source of intelligibility, for the new experimental philosophy. Crucially, 
this element includes an a priori conception of the thingness of the thing, 
a conception which is not discovered inductively through observation 
of the thing under investigation — as Jacopo Zabarella had argued in 
the case of regressus — but which is instead already known before the 
investigation has even begun. It serves as a basic axiom upon which 
that investigation becomes possible. According to Heidegger, this is 
a uniform conception of the thing as law-abiding and autonomous, a 
thing which, when left to itself, conforms absolutely to an inherent and 
universal principle of inertia, a principle which would become formally 
articulated in Newton’s First Law. This uniform conception — the 
Galilean First Thing — provides a basic blueprint for the metaphysical 
projection of the thingness of things in general, a projection which 
Heidegger uses to explain the emergence of early-modern science.
More narrowly, this mathematical conception renders intelligible 
the technical stabilisation of the thing in an artificial set-up where 
most of the causal forces acting on it are systematically eliminated, or 
rendered irrelevant, in the interests of isolating specific, observable, 
and contingent causal effects, effects the artificially induced repetition 
of which evince a regularity in the thing’s relation to its artificially 
controlled environment. In this way, the art of experiment may be 
viewed, not as a violation of natural processes, but instead as an attempt 
to complement or complete them. Viewed from within the mathematical 
project, the new experimental philosophy does not seek to impose a final 
cause on the thing from without, so as to override its natural tendencies, 
but instead to organise and employ artificial operations in accordance 
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with an image of the thing as it is when left to its own indigenous, 
rule-governed nature.42 The aims of experimental practice are thus 
twofold. First, and more familiarly, the experiment aims to disclose 
specific regularities in an artificially controlled experimental system, a 
system comprised of two or more interacting things: for example, the 
uniform acceleration of a body vis-à-vis the earth. Second, and more 
provocatively, the experiment employs artificial means to move, or 
manipulate, the thing in a way which brings it closer to being what it 
is, to achieving its proper place in the uniform space-time realm as an 
internally disciplined and wholly autonomous thing. It seeks, in other 
words, to treat things in accordance with the one basic blueprint of the 
mathematical projection. The second aim provides the phenomenological 
background against which the first aim can be intelligibly pursued. The 
regularity of a relation between two things presupposes the constancy 
and rule-conformity of each thing on its own, and this presupposition is 
provided by the mathematical projection of the Galilean First Thing. As 
a consequence of this projection, the practitioner understands the goal 
of her artificial manipulations to be in conformity with nature’s own 
indigenous dispositions. Experimental art thus not only imitates nature, 
but also, to repeat a passage from Aristotle first cited in Chapter Five, 
‘art partly completes what nature cannot bring to a finish.’43 As we will 
see in the next section, within this mathematically structured experience, 
experimental manipulations acquire an aura of transparency, they are 
experienced as granting neutral access to an independently existing and 
stable natural order. They are experienced, in other words, as disclosing 
objective matters of natural fact.
42  On this point, my interpretation differs from that of Glazebrook, who has 
Heidegger arguing that ‘[t]he experiment […] is violent in that it sets beings up to 
behave in ways they would not when left to themselves’ (Trish Glazebrook (2000a), 
Heidegger’s Philosophy of Science (New York: Fordham University Press), p. 104; see 
also Trish Glazebrook (1998), ‘Heidegger on the Experiment,’ Philosophy Today 42(3), 
250–61). She supposes that, for Heidegger, the final end towards which a thing is 
naturally directed is necessarily violated by the modern experiment. This may have 
been the view of orthodox Aristotelian natural philosophers, but it was not, on my 
reading, Heidegger’s view.
43  Aristotle (1941c), Physica, trans. by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, in The Basic Works 
of Aristotle, ed. by Richard KcKeon (New York: Random House), pp. 213–394 (p. 250 
[lines 199a14–17]).
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3. Releasing Experimental Things
Historian of science Robert Kohler has argued that the scientific 
laboratory is governed by a ‘logic of placelessness’: ‘Laboratory workers 
eliminate the elements of place from their experiments.’44 This claim is 
stronger than Heidegger’s claim that the mathematical projection of 
nature ‘overlooks’ place, rendering it a matter of ‘indifference.’45 Yet 
the difference between elimination and indifference has been lost on 
some critics of Heidegger’s existential account of science. Karin Knorr-
Cetina, for example, writes that Heidegger’s account of science ‘is 
founded on nothing more than the decontextualization from which it 
was derived.’46 William Blattner likewise argues that, for Heidegger, 
natural science ‘releases’ things from situatedness, ‘decontextualizes 
them.’ Dimitri Ginev follows in step, presenting Heidegger as asserting 
the ‘disappearance of any situatedness (or place) in what becomes 
mathematically projected.’ However, although Heidegger does argue 
that the thing is ‘released’ in the mathematical projection, this means 
neither that it becomes decontextualised, nor that its place is eliminated. 
It means, instead, that the thing comes to be experienced differently. Its 
situatedness in an everyday environment becomes unimportant for the 
subject’s understanding of what it is. Its context has not been eliminated, 
but instead replaced by the artificially constructed and controlled 
environment of the laboratory. Laboratory practitioners still experience 
the thing as situated, but its situation has changed dramatically. The 
thing is now encountered in a different context, an artificial context 
designed to move the thing closer to its natural place, as determined by 
the mathematical projection, the place to which it is now understood to 
properly belong.47
44  Robert E. Kohler (2002), Landscapes and Labscapes: Exploring the Lab-Field Border in 
Biology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 9, 6.
45  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 413 [361].
46  Karin D. Knorr-Cetina (1981), The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the 
Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science (Oxford: Pergamon Press), p. 143; 
William Blattner (1995), ‘Decontextualization, Standardization, and Deweyan 
Science,’ Man and World 28, 321–39 (p. 321); Dimitri Ginev (2011), The Tenets of 
Cognitive Existentialism (Athens OH: Ohio University Press), p. 4.
47  The claim that Heidegger embraced a logic of placelessness in respect of scientific 
things is further challenged by his 1931 statement that an explanation of the 
whatness of things in terms of their ‘going towards their place […] until today 
is not in the least refuted, in fact not even grasped’ (Martin Heidegger (1995b 
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The claim that the experiment helps move the thing to its proper 
place in a mathematically projected world challenges the more common 
view that the experiment serves to control the thing. On the present 
account, the experiment does not control the thing, but rather the causal 
nexus in which the thing is situated, and it does this in the interest 
of letting the thing be what it is. This is the meaning of Heidegger’s 
statement that the thing is ‘released’ [entschränkt] by natural science 
from the confines of its everyday situation.48 In German, the noun 
Schrank can mean ‘bound,’ in the mathematical sense of the upper or 
lower bounds of a finite number set. But it also carries the more general 
meaning of a limit, fence, or barrier. Hence, the phrase etwas in Schranken 
halten means to restrain something, to hold it back, to rein it in. When a 
thing becomes entschränkt, it is ‘dis-bounded,’ released from the bounds, 
bonds, or barriers which had restrained it — it is set free. Recall, from 
the last section, the mythical image of the cosmic demiurge, forging the 
First Thing in her workshop, sending it off to sail, alone and unhindered, 
across the empty expanse of space, ruled only by the constancy of its 
own internal inertia. Now imagine that thing suddenly plunging into 
the blooming and buzzing causal nexus of the world as we ordinarily 
experience it. It is from this latter situation that the experimentalist 
seeks to release the thing, stripping away the causal interference which 
prevents it from being what it is, and thus turning it back towards the 
purity of its own mythical beginnings.49
[1985]). Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ 1–3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force, trans. 
Walter Brogan & Peter Warnek (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), p. 67). 
Indeed, Heidegger sought to understand the radical transformation of this kind of 
explanation in the early-modern period, rather than to affirm its rejection.
48  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 413 [362].
49  Heidegger’s account of the experiment appears to share some characteristics with 
Nancy Cartwright’s more recent account. She writes that the experiment provides 
‘the circumstances where the feature under study operates, as Galileo taught, 
without hindrance or impediment, so that its nature is revealed in its behaviour’ 
(Nancy Cartwright (1999), The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 84). Furthermore, she argues that we 
must already know, in some general sense, what this nature is in order to design 
an experiment which will successfully reveal it: ‘[w]ithout the concept of natures, 
or something very like it, we have no way of knowing what it is we are testing’ 
(p. 90). For Cartwright, these are ‘Aristotelian-style natures’ (p. 81). Hence, she 
concludes: ‘The empiricists of the scientific revolution wanted to oust Aristotle 
entirely from the new learning. I have argued that they did no such thing’ (p. 103). 
A detailed comparison of the respective accounts of Heidegger and Cartwright 
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The question now is: how did late Renaissance practitioners come 
to understand the thing in this way? What caused this profound shift 
in the phenomenology of their scientific experience of things? The 
short answer is: the emergence of the mathematical as an increasingly 
powerful influence on scientific cognition. Yet Heidegger argues that 
‘this mathematical must […] be grasped from causes that lie even 
deeper.’50 With this, he points us towards the conditions of possibility 
for the early-modern mathematical experience of things.
Heidegger’s own attempt to shed light on these conditions is not 
especially helpful, but he does hint at the direction in which a further 
explanation may be pursued. Sticking close to his own philosophical 
preferences, Heidegger looks for the ‘deep’ causes of the mathematical 
in the work of Descartes. In particular, he focuses on what was 
probably Descartes’s first philosophical work, Rules for the Direction 
of the Mind, an unfinished manuscript which he may have written in 
1628, and which was already mentioned in Chapter Four. In this work, 
declares Heidegger, ‘the modern concept of science is coined.’51 The 
Rules provide substantial evidence for the formal articulation of the 
mathematical, particularly in respect of its tendency to ‘explicate itself 
as the standard of all thought and to establish the rules which thereby 
arise.’52 Accordingly, as we saw in Chapter Four, Descartes develops a 
concept of thinking in terms of the res cogitans, the thinking thing, which 
he defined in the first-person singular. The thinking thing thus becomes 
an individual ‘I’; thinking is always an ‘I think.’ As a consequence, 
through Descartes’s efforts, the mathematical becomes grounded 
in the ‘I,’ which itself becomes the basis for all thought, all the rules 
which govern reason. Recall, furthermore, Descartes’s claim that all 
knowledge statements, in addition to positing the ‘I’ principle as their 
necessary ground, also always posit an equally fundamental principle 
of non-contradiction. This second principle secures the purity of the ‘I,’ 
and so also the purity of reason. The individual ‘I’ is the condition of 
might be worthwhile, but this is not the place for it. Suffice here only to note 
that, on Heidegger’s account, Cartwright’s natures will ultimately refer back to a 
possibility in the subject’s shared historical existence, and will thus be amenable to 
sociological investigation.
50  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 95.
51  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 101.
52  Heidegger (1967), What Is a Thing?, p. 100.
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possibility for thinking, as such, and the principle of non-contradiction 
is the condition of possibility for the purity of that thinking.
There is a striking similarity between this early-modern 
understanding of the thinking thing, on the one hand, and the early-
modern understanding of the physical thing, on the other. The res 
cogitans shares an important homology with the res extensa, the extended, 
or corporeal, thing. Just like the Galilean First Thing, introduced above, 
the Cartesian ‘I’ is individual and autonomous, governed only by the 
constancy, the purity, of its own inner principle. This similarity should 
not come as a surprise. As we saw in Chapter Four, Heidegger insisted 
on the unity of things and thinking. Because the concept of each is 
dialectically bound to the other, the historical development of one will 
reflect that of the other. According to Heidegger, this dialectical relation 
was located by Aristotle in the ‘is’ of the proposition, but subsequently 
obscured when Descartes buried it in the ‘I’ of the subject. Kant then 
re-discovered it in the individual subject’s feeling of ‘respect’ [Achtung] 
for the law, its phenomenological understanding of itself as a law-
abiding being, as a being capable of being affected by the law. Heidegger 
then construes Kant’s notion of respect as self-respect, and argues 
that, for Kant, the individual subject is bound by rules which it gives 
to itself. In opposition to this, Heidegger argues that rule-following is 
not individualistic, but presupposes one’s participation in a tradition, 
an awareness of one’s historical being-with-others. Recapping the 
argument of Chapter Four, the principle of unity which binds together 
things and thinking in the coherent production of scientific knowledge is, 
for Heidegger, rooted in tradition, a historical and social phenomenon, 
which has been subject to a string of philosophical articulations over 
the generations, tracing back through Descartes’s ‘I’ to Aristotle’s ‘is,’ 
and then to its beginnings in Plato’s mythical image of the demiurge. 
Heidegger identifies this principle of unity with the for-the-sake-of-
which, his version of the Aristotelian final cause. Hence, he outlines a 
philosophical history of the notion of final cause from Plato’s demiurge, 
through Aristotle, Descartes and Kant, to his own concept of the subject, 
Dasein. For Heidegger, ‘Dasein’s very Being [i]s the sole authentic “for-
the-sake-of-which.”’53 In other words, the source of the principles which 
53  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 116 [84].
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give order and meaning to our experience of things is our own social 
and historical existence.
This is a radical reinterpretation, but not a complete rejection, of the 
ancient Greek craft analogy. The mythical world of the demiurge is 
now reformulated as the social world. The art which unifies things and 
thinking, which organises and thus renders intelligible our experience 
of things, the art which helps things by letting them become what they 
are, is a finite and social human art. More specifically, the rules which 
guide that art are finite, social rules. Hence, Heidegger argues that the 
intelligibility of Newton’s First Law, as universally applicable to all 
corporeal things, is possible only on the basis of a particular historical 
projection, namely, a mathematical projection of the uniform thingness 
of things. This projection must, furthermore, be understood as a finite 
and historical feature of human social existence. Heidegger locates 
its distal cause in the ancient image of the cosmic demiurge, but his 
account of this mythical image in historical and social terms provides an 
opportunity to also locate its causes in more proximal socio-historical 
human actions, including the actions of the late Renaissance artisanal 
class.
The influence of this artisanal class on Galileo’s natural philosophy 
was a key feature of Zilsel’s craftsman thesis, which placed at its centre 
the macro-sociological transition from feudal to capitalist patterns 
of social organisation in that period. But more micro-sociological 
explanations are also possible. Smith, for example, points to recent 
research suggesting that late Renaissance craft methods were the result 
of a carefully thought-out technology, one which depended crucially 
on the maintenance of a strict consistency in the physical materials 
to which those methods were applied.54 Such practical concerns with 
uniformity in craftwork would seem to manifest themselves also in 
the experimental practitioners’ desire to maintain the stability and 
uniformity of experimental things in order to reliably reckon the 
regularities in their causal relations with one another. As argued above, 
this uniformity finds its ultimate expression in Galileo’s principle of 
inertia, where a thing left to itself is just like every other thing, moving 
or resting with a constancy determined by a single, universal rule. The 
54  Smith (2004), The Body of the Artisan, p. 7.
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differences between things are thus to be judged by differences in the 
external causes which play on them in their bumpy passage through the 
heavy traffic of the cosmos. Likewise, the differences between artisanal 
products, when each is wrought from the same uniform material, are 
to be judged by differences in the operations to which they have been 
subjected in the intensive manufactory of the terrestrial workshop.
Based on the present interpretation of Heidegger, I suggest that 
the proximal sensibility of the artisanal workshop may have provided 
early-modern experimental practitioners with a powerful analogy by 
which to conceptualise the thing in terms of material uniformity and 
reliable responsiveness to standardised methods of manipulation. The 
point is that artisans provided natural philosophers with more than just 
an example of embodied knowledge-making, that is, knowledge won 
through the manipulation of natural materials; they also demonstrated 
an attitude towards embodied knowledge-making which prized the 
uniformity of both methods and materials. They put much effort into 
developing a sophisticated material diagnostics according to which 
the response of a particular material to standardised techniques of 
manipulation and manufacture could be reliably predicted. For example, 
Smith notes Paracelsus’s sixteenth-century observation that ‘carpenters 
of his day knew how to choose, cut, and prepare wood panels, so that 
even after centuries very little warping and twisting takes place.’55 
Likewise, the use by Renaissance sculptors of ‘consistent alloys […] 
indicates that they knew their materials and went to some trouble to 
procure what they needed.’56 Late Renaissance artisans were thus 
compelled by principles of control and prediction in their work with 
materials. These materials were controlled for consistency, so that their 
behavioural responses to standardised forms of manipulation could be 
anticipated with confidence. Establishing the uniformity of material 
dispositions was thus a key value of artisanal practice.
Ursula Klein and Emma Spary argue that early-modern laboratories 
emerged as sites where this intense interest in the stabilised connection 
between manual techniques and material responsiveness flourished: 
‘[l]aboratories […] represented a strand of early-modern expertise 
developing around the manufacture of materials, as well as chemical 
55  Smith (2004), The Body of the Artisan, p. 86.
56  Smith (2004), The Body of the Artisan, p. 86.
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techniques such a distilling, smelting, or dissolving.’57 Indeed, the 
metallurgical practice of smelting is especially suggestive in this 
regard. As Christoph Bartels has argued, the ‘beginnings of both 
early-modern science and technology are closely linked to mining 
and metal production.’58 The efficient manufacture of base metals was 
both a physically and an intellectually demanding undertaking, one 
which required ‘hands-on knowledge and skill as well as text-based 
and mathematical knowledge.’59 Base metals like copper, mercury, tin, 
and lead do not ordinarily occur in their elemental forms, but must 
be extracted from natural ores through a complex process known as 
smelting. This process frees the base metal from the ore, using intense 
heat in a controlled environment to induce a chemical transformation in 
which unwanted substances are driven off in the form of gases and slag. 
It bears emphasising that the smelting process does not simply melt the 
base metals out of the ores in which they are present. Instead, smelting 
is a transformative process in which base metals are ‘released’ from 
the chemical bonds which bind them together with sulfur, oxygen, or 
silicon in their ordinarily occurring ore state. According to Bartels, the 
depletion of metal-rich ores in Europe’s leading mining districts in the 
second half of the sixteenth century, which increased the difficulty of 
metal production, led to a sudden rationalisation of smelting techniques, 
marked by innovations in ‘precision measurement, data collection, the 
use of mathematics, attempts at standardization, the writing of technical 
instructions, [and] the writing of technical books to be published.’60
There is thus a striking operational homology between smelting, on 
the one hand, and experimental practice as described by Heidegger, on 
the other. Just as Heidegger argued that the experimentalist seeks to 
release the thing from the ordinary causal constraints which prevent 
57  Ursula Klein and Emma C. Spary (2010), ‘Introduction: Why Materials?,’ in 
Materials and Expertise in Early Modern Europe: Between Market and Laboratory, ed. by 
Ursula Klein and Emma C. Spary (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 1–23 
(p. 6).
58  Christoph Bartels (2010), ‘The Production of Silver, Copper, and Lead in the Harz 
Mountains from Late Medieval Times to the Onset of Industrialization,’ in Materials 
and Expertise in Early Modern Europe: Between Market and Laboratory, ed. by Ursula 
Klein and Emma C. Spary (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 71–100 (p. 
100).
59  Bartels (2010), ‘The Production of Silver, Copper, and Lead,’ p. 97.
60  Bartels (2010), ‘The Production of Silver, Copper, and Lead,’ p. 97.
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it from being what it is, so too does the metallurgist seek to release the 
metal from the ordinary causal constraints which prevent it from being 
what it is. Moreover, there was a rapid increase in the rationalisation and 
publication of smelting techniques during the period just prior to the 
emergence of the modern experiment in the early seventeenth century. 
In the case of both smelting and experiment, the object of pursuit is a 
product of art, and, in both cases, the artful production of this object 
seeks to return it to its pure, indigenous state. In neither case, however, 
can one speak of an opposition between art and nature. Instead, the 
operational dynamic is one in which art comes to the aid of nature by 
progressively stripping away the external causal constraints which 
prevent the thing from being what it is, thereby allowing it to more 
fully realise its proper place in the cosmic order. Because these artful 
manipulations are experienced, within the mathematical projection, 
as facilitating natural processes, they carry with them an aura of 
transparency; they are understood to provide practitioners with neutral 
access to an independently existing natural order, that is, to objective 
matters of fact.
Heidegger’s account of the early-modern experiment thus lends 
conceptual support to recent historiographic attempts to explain the 
emergence of early-modern science, in part, by reference to the skilled 
artisanal manipulation of materials. In particular, Heidegger’s account 
throws light on that for the sake of which these manipulations were 
often performed: a cultural image of the First Thing. These historical 
studies, in turn, lend support to Heidegger’s philosophical account, 
most strikingly the studies of late Renaissance and early-modern 
metallurgy. If, as historians like Bartels, Klein, Smith, and Spary argue, 
the emergence of early-modern science was consequentially linked to 
mining and metal production, then it is possible that the mythical image 
of the First Thing found concrete, existential support in the artisanal 
experience of manufacturing pure metals. The pursuit of pure metals 
through increasingly sophisticated and rationalised metallurgical 
practices offers a powerful analogy for the natural philosophical 
pursuit of the Galilean First Thing through the practices of experiment. 
In this way, early-modern work experiences, on the one hand, and the 
mathematical projection of nature, on the other, may be viewed as 
reciprocally related, as serving to mutually reinforce one another.
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Heidegger writes that ‘[t]he more exactly the ground plan of nature 
is projected, the more exact becomes the possibility of experiment.’61 In 
other words, the more precise the projected ground plan becomes, the 
more legitimate and unequivocally compelling experiment becomes 
as a method by which to render nature intelligible. The mathematical 
projection is the condition of possibility for the experiment, and so the 
more secure it becomes, the more powerfully it comes to shape our 
experience of nature, the more apt we will be to regard the experiment 
as a preferred means of investigation. Yet, it is also the case that, the 
more effectively the experiment verifies a mathematical conception 
of nature, the more secure the mathematical projection becomes as 
the existential basis for that conception. An effective experiment not 
only verifies a theory, it also reinforces the authority of the projection 
in which both experiment and theory become possible as a means by 
which to make sense of nature. According to Heidegger, the modern 
physical experiment does this by producing an ever more exact 
account of the thing, through ever more precise acts of numerical 
measurement.62 These rigorous acts of measurement serve to increase 
the precision of our understanding, and hence to reduce vagueness, or 
equivocation, in our descriptions of nature. In rigorously disciplining 
things by experimental means, we facilitate increased rigour in our 
thinking and theories about those things. Numerical measurement 
thus offers an effective and efficient means by which to underwrite an 
unambiguous, determinate, and logically consistent account of natural 
order. Numerical measurement furthermore becomes compelling as an 
investigative technique to the extent that the thingness of things is itself 
projected as inherently unambiguous, as pure and naturally amenable 
to precise determination.
This emphasis on exactitude allows for a further specification of the 
argument, made in the previous section, that the aims of experimental 
practice are twofold. First, the experiment discloses specific regularities 
in the relation of one thing to another. For Heidegger, this disclosure, as 
we can now see, is one which tends towards precision in its specification 
61  Martin Heidegger (1977a [1952]), ‘The Age of the World Picture,’ in The Question 
Concerning Technology, by Martin Heidegger, trans. by William Lovitt (New York: 
Harper & Row), pp. 115–54 (p. 122).
62  Heidegger (1977a), ‘The Age of the World Picture,’ p. 122.
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of the thing’s behavioural regularities. Second, the experiment moves 
the thing closer to what it is, to being an internally disciplined and 
autonomous thing. This movement, as we can also now see, involves the 
material simplification and control of the thing’s causal environment, 
thus disambiguating the thing’s behavioural responses, allowing them 
to be unequivocally individualised, such that their regularities may 
then be exactly specified. As noted earlier, the second aim provides 
the phenomenological background against which the first aim may be 
intelligibly pursued. The material reduction of causal ambiguity in an 
experimental system allows the experimental practitioner to specify 
natural processes as precisely defined regularities, or even as exact 
laws. Heidegger argues that only through the specification of such 
regularities, ‘only within the purview of rule and law[, do] facts become 
clear as the facts that they are.’63 This is so because the physical matter 
to which a statement of natural fact refers has itself been isolated from 
the multifarious and competing causes of its ordinary environment, 
thereby allowing the regularities of its specific environmental relations 
to be clearly individuated and precisely measured. In the course of this 
process, the matter in question thus becomes a matter of fact, a discrete 
thing to which an unambiguous propositional statement of fact may then 
be applied. In the next section, we will apply Heidegger’s account of 
the early-modern experiment in a concrete, micro-historical case study 
of one dramatic dispute between two seventeenth-century natural 
philosophers: Robert Boyle and Francis Line.
4. Boyle versus Line: A Study  
in Experimental Fact-Making
In their 1985 book, Leviathan and the Air-Pump, a classic of the SSK 
literature, Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer argue that seventeenth-
century experimental practice depended crucially on the emergence of 
a clearly defined community of experimental philosophers. Admission 
into this community required one to accept the view that artificially 
produced matters of fact could provide a legitimate basis for reliable 
63  Heidegger (1977a), ‘The Age of the World Picture,’ p. 120.
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knowledge of nature.64 This social restriction helped to define the 
boundaries of the experimental community, determining those who 
were, and those who were not, to be counted among its members. 
According to Shapin and Schaffer, the establishment of the epistemic 
rule that reliable natural knowledge must rest on experimental 
matters of fact depended, in important part, on the prior definition 
of an experimental community through social rules of inclusion and 
exclusion. Hence, as they see it, the epistemic problem of how best to 
acquire knowledge of nature was contingent on the social problem of 
how best to define the community of natural philosophers: ‘the effective 
solution to the problem of knowledge was predicated on a solution to 
the problem of social order.’65
This insight from SSK can help us to expand on Heidegger’s claim, 
cited at the end of the last section, that scientific facts become clear as the 
facts they are only within the purview of rule and law, that is, only within 
a domain of practice in which causal regularities are disambiguated 
and thus more precisely specified. Shapin and Schaffer’s argument 
that solutions to problems of knowledge are based on solutions to 
problems of social order suggests that effective epistemic techniques 
for the causal disambiguation of matters of fact are (necessarily but 
not sufficiently) contingent on the deployment of effective social 
techniques for the specification of membership in the relevant epistemic 
community. By demanding commitment to the epistemic primacy of 
experimentally produced matters of fact, early-modern experimental 
philosophers effectively eliminated, as irrelevant, explanations based 
on causes which could not be experimentally produced. On first blush, 
this may suggest that only efficient, or operational causes, were meant 
to play a role in the new experimentalists’ explanations of natural 
phenomena. However, as we have already seen, explanations in terms 
of operational causes, if they are to explain causal regularities, must 
make at least tacit use of final causes. Hence, the social dynamics of 
exclusion which specified the early-modern experimental community 
could not have rejected final causes, as such, without threatening the 
intelligibility of the experimental enterprise. It should follow, then, 
64  Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer (1985), Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, 
and the Experimental Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press), p. 24.
65  Shapin and Schaffer (1985), Leviathan and the Air-Pump, p. 282.
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that these dynamics functioned instead to disambiguate between 
the legitimate and illegitimate uses of final causes in explanations of 
experimentally produced phenomena. The burden of this section will 
be to demonstrate that the social logic of early-modern experimental 
subjectivity served to disambiguate final causes by relying, if only 
tacitly, on the mythical image of the First Thing. This image functioned 
as the uniform measure by which to differentiate between proper 
and improper causal explanations of experimental phenomena. This 
differentiation was, at base, a social one: the image of the First Thing 
also enabled a discrimination between authentic and inauthentic 
members of the experimental community. In other words, it also guided 
judgements about the proper social organisation of seventeenth-century 
experimental philosophy.
I wish to support these claims by examining a case of controversy in 
seventeenth-century experimental philosophy over the correct causal 
explanation of the ‘Torricellian effect,’ named for mathematician and 
physicist Evangelista Torricelli, who first produced it in 1644. Shapin 
and Schaffer observe that, in the decade following its production, this 
experimental effect ‘was associated with […] questions of immense 
cosmological importance.’66 Given the diverse and dramatically 
contradictory causes which were proposed to explain the Torricellian 
effect, Shapin and Schaffer name it as ‘a key example of scandal in 
natural philosophy.’67
To perform a reasonable approximation of the Torricellian 
experiment, do the following. Take a thin glass tube, about one metre 
long, and hold it vertically with the lower opening of the tube blocked 
with one of your fingers. Then have the tube filled right to the top with 
mercury (wear gloves!), being careful to eliminate any air bubbles. Seal 
the upper opening of the tube with a finger of your other hand, making 
sure that there is no air trapped between your finger and the mercury. 
Now immerse the lower end of the tube into a beaker half-filled with 
mercury, and remove your finger from this lower opening while keeping 
the upper opening of the tube firmly covered. What happens? One 
might expect the mercury to drop out of the tube, pulled down by the 
earth’s gravity, since your finger is no longer holding it up by blocking 
66  Shapin and Schaffer (1985), Leviathan and the Air-Pump, p. 41.
67  Shapin and Schaffer (1985), Leviathan and the Air-Pump, p. 41.
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the bottom opening of the tube. In fact, the height of the mercury in the 
tube does drop as some of the mercury runs out of the tube and into 
the beaker. However, the mercury level in the tube does not drop all 
the way down to the level of mercury in the beaker. Indeed, most of the 
mercury remains in the tube, suspended at a height of about seventy-
five centimetres above the level of mercury in the beaker (assuming 
the experiment is being performed near sea level). Even in the absence 
of your finger sealing the bottom of the tube, something still seems to 
be holding the mercury up, thus interfering with the effects of gravity. 
This suspension of the column of mercury in the tube, significantly 
above the mercury level in the beaker below, is the main experimental 
effect produced in the Torricellian experiment. In what follows, I will 
refer to this suspended column of mercury as the ‘Torricellian effect.’ 
Seventeenth-century natural philosophers disputed with one another 
over the cause of the Torricellian effect, that is, over the legitimate 
answer to the question of what holds the column of mercury suspended 
at a height of about seventy-five centimetres.
There are two secondary features of the Torricellian experiment 
also worth noting. First, because the mercury level in the metre-long 
tube has dropped, a space of about twenty-five centimetres has now 
opened up in the upper portion of the tube, between the surface of the 
suspended column of mercury and the finger sealing the upper end of 
the tube. This space is known as the ‘Torricellian space.’ Second, the 
appearance of this space in the tube is accompanied by a feeling, in the 
flesh of the finger sealing the upper end of the tube, that it is now being 
forced down into the tube. This experience is a secondary effect of the 
Torricellian experiment, and this effect is normally called ‘suction.’ As 
we will see, however, the term ‘suction’ is problematic, as it presupposes 
that the flesh of the finger is being pulled rather than pushed into the 
tube. In other words, it presupposes that the relevant physical cause 
of this effect is located inside the tube rather than outside of it. In early-
modern debates over the meaning of the Torricellian experiment, much 
depended on the position one took in respect of this fine distinction.
I will focus on one specific seventeenth-century dispute over the 
natural philosophical meaning of the Torricellian experiment, one 
which occurred between Robert Boyle, on the one side, and Francis 
Line, who published under the Latin name Franciscus Linus, on the 
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other. This dispute was occasioned by the publication in 1660 of Boyle’s 
book New Experiments Physico-Mechanical, Touching on the Spring of the 
Air, and its Effects; Made, for the Most Part, in an New Pneumatical Engine. 
Two aspects of the title of Boyle’s book deserve emphasis. First, the title 
indicates that Boyle has undertaken an investigation of the cause of 
certain effects, the cause in question here stipulated as the ‘spring of the 
air.’ Second, this investigation was conducted, for the most part, using a 
new experimental instrument which Boyle called a ‘pneumatic engine,’ 
but which is usually referred to by historians of science, including 
Shapin and Schaffer, as an ‘air-pump.’ Stated simply, the air-pump 
was a sealed glass vessel from which air was evacuated by means of an 
attached pump.
Boyle performed several experiments within this glass vessel, 
investigating the results produced on an observed phenomenon when 
air was removed, consequentially if not entirely, from the causal 
nexus within which that phenomenon was embedded. For example, 
in Experiment Seventeen of his book, Boyle lowered the Torricellian 
experiment through an opening in the top of the glass vessel of his air-
pump, such that the open beaker of mercury was completely inside the 
vessel but the vertical Torricellian tube still protruded up through the 
vessel opening.68 (The tube used in this case had a closed upper end, so 
it was unnecessary to seal it with a finger.) Boyle then sealed the vessel 
opening though which the tube protruded, so as to render the vessel as 
air-tight as possible. With everything in place, he then used the pump to 
evacuate as much air as possible from the glass vessel.
By removing air from the space surrounding the lower portion of 
the Torricellian apparatus, particularly from around the open beaker of 
mercury, Boyle introduced dramatic changes to the Torricellian effect. 
Specifically, in the absence, or near absence, of air in the glass vessel, 
the suspended column of mercury in the tube dropped to almost the 
same height as the mercury in the beaker (which itself rose slightly). In 
other words, the Torricellian effect had been almost entirely eliminated. 
On the basis of this result, Boyle argued that it must have been the 
68  Robert Boyle (1660 [1966]), New Experiments Physico-Mechanical, Touching on the 
Spring of the Air, and its Effects; Made, for the Most Part, in an New Pneumatical Engine, 
in The Works of Robert Boyle, vol. 1, ed. by Thomas Birch (Hildesheim: Georg Olms), 
pp. 1–117 (pp. 33–39).
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presence of ambient air, pushing down on the surface of the mercury in 
the beaker, which counteracted the effects of gravity, thus causing the 
mercury in the tube to be suspended at a height of about seventy-five 
centimetres. Boyle’s experiment purportedly served to reduce ambiguity 
and increase rigour in the natural philosophical understanding of the 
Torricellian effect by more definitely specifying the cause of that effect, 
narrowing it down to the pressure of the ambient air on the surface of 
the mercury in the beaker.
However, Boyle was not content to simply argue that ambient air 
was the principal cause of the Torricellian effect. He also claimed to 
know what about the air produced this effect. He identified this ‘what’ 
as the ‘spring’ of the air. In Experiment One of New Experiments, Boyle 
wrote that he finds it ‘not superfluous nor unreasonable’ to ‘insinuate’ 
the air’s spring as a ‘likely’ cause for the experimental effects produced 
in the glass vessel of his air-pump.69 However, Boyle’s initial diffidence 
regarding the epistemic status of the air’s spring quickly disappeared. 
As Shapin and Schaffer observe, by the early 1660s, Boyle viewed 
the spring of the air as an established matter of fact rather than as a 
hypothesis. However, Boyle did not spell out the reasons for his 
growing confidence. As Shapin and Schaffer write, ‘[v]iewed naively, 
or as a stranger might view it, it is unclear why the spring of the air, 
as the professed cause of the observed results, should be treated as a 
matter of fact rather than as a speculative hypothesis.’70 In response to 
this puzzle, they make the sociological argument that ‘Boyle’s criteria 
and rules for making his preferred distinctions between matters of 
fact and [hypothetical] causes have the status of conventions.’71 These 
conventions, in turn, drew their legitimacy from the ‘total pattern of 
activities’ constitutive of the experimental culture which Boyle and his 
colleagues were struggling to establish.72 Shapin and Schaffer support 
their sociological explanation for Boyle’s discrimination between facts 
and speculative causes with a detailed examination of the way Boyle 
responded to his critics, including the Jesuit mathematician and natural 
philosopher Francis Line.
69  Boyle (1660), New Experiments Physico-Mechanical, p. 11.
70  Shapin and Schaffer (1985), Leviathan and the Air-Pump, p. 51.
71  Shapin and Schaffer (1985), Leviathan and the Air-Pump, p. 52.
72  Shapin and Schaffer (1985), Leviathan and the Air-Pump, p. 52.
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Before turning to Boyle’s dispute with Line, it will be useful to first 
briefly consider what Boyle meant when he attributed a spring to the air. 
At the most general level, Boyle had in mind a corpuscular conception 
of the air as being made up of individual microscopic particles. He 
thus understood the spring of the air as a disposition of individual air 
particles which was activated when those particles came into contact 
with one another, or with any other body. Hence, he writes that
our air either consists of, or at least abounds with, parts of such a nature, 
that in case they be bent or compressed by the weight of the incumbent 
part of the atmosphere, or by any other body, they do endeavour, as 
much as in them lieth, to free themselves from that pressure, by bearing 
against the contiguous bodies that keep them bent; and, as soon as 
those bodies are removed, or reduced to give them way, by presently 
unbending and stretching out themselves.73
Put briefly, air particles endeavour to free themselves when placed 
under pressure by an adjacent particle. Each particle possesses a ‘power 
or principle of self-dilation,’ which becomes actualised as an ‘endeavour 
outward’ when the particle is under compression.74 Boyle conceived of 
the earth’s atmosphere as composed of innumerable particles heaped 
up on top of one another, such that air particles near the earth’s surface 
where maximally compressed under the great weight of the atmosphere 
above them. In respect of the Torricellian experiment, Boyle argued 
that the pressure of the atmospheric air on the surface of the mercury 
in the beaker was the sole cause of the Torricellian effect. By placing 
the Torricellian apparatus in the glass vessel of his air-pump, and then 
exhausting most of the air from the vessel, Boyle removed the cause of 
this effect. As air particles were removed from the vessel, the remaining 
particles were able to progressively exercise their power of self-dilation, 
unbending themselves until they exerted scarcely any more pressure 
on the mercury in the beaker. In other words, Boyle used his air-pump 
to ‘release’ the air corpuscles remaining within its chamber from the 
external influence of neighbouring corpuscles. This, in turn, released 
the surface of mercury in the beaker from the weight of the atmosphere. 
As a consequence, the column of mercury in the tube descended under 
73  Boyle (1660), New Experiments Physico-Mechanical, p. 11.
74  Boyle (1660), New Experiments Physico-Mechanical, p. 11.
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the force of gravity, draining out into the beaker. A key consequence of 
Boyle’s explanation is that it rendered the Torricellian space, between 
the suspended column of mercury and the top of the tube, causally inert. 
In Boyle’s view, the Torricellian effect could be sufficiently explained by 
reference to the removal of air pressure from the surface of the mercury 
in the beaker.
Boyle was careful to distinguish this particular explanation of the 
air’s spring from the general fact that the air has a spring. He emphasised 
this distinction by noting the contrasting explanation of René Descartes, 
who conceived of the air particles as lifted by heat and the ‘restless 
agitation of that celestial matter’ surrounding the earth to the point 
where they begin to whirl about, ‘each corpuscle endeavour[ing] to 
beat off all the others from coming within the little sphere requisite to 
its motion about its own centre.’75 Yet, despite the differences between 
these two explanations, they both assume that the air is composed of 
particles possessing an ‘endeavour outward,’ a disposition to push 
away neighbouring bodies in order to achieve for themselves a state 
free from external causal interference. Boyle’s and Descartes’s divergent 
explanations for the air’s spring thus stand as different specifications, 
or articulations, of the same general idea. Put in Aristotelian terms, 
this disposition plays the role of efficient cause in the movements or 
operations of these particles. Moreover, as Boyle’s own words suggest, 
the meaning of the particles’ outward movement, that for the sake of 
which they so move, appears to be a state of freedom from external 
influence, in other words, a state of autonomy. This autonomy may 
be understood as the final cause of the particles’ outward movement, 
as the principle according to which one is able to make sense of those 
minute mechanical operations, to experience them as intelligible.
Let us now turn to the explanation Francis Line gave for the 
Torricellian effect. Line presented his arguments in a 1661 book titled 
Tractatus de Corporum Inseparabilitate, or ‘A Treatise on the Inseparable 
Nature of Bodies.’76 Unlike Boyle, Line did not treat the Torricellian space 
75  Boyle (1660), New Experiments Physico-Mechanical, p. 12.
76  Linus, Franciscus (1661), Tractatus de Corporum Inseparabilitate in quo Experimenta 
de Vacuo, tam Torriculliana, quam Magdeburgica, et Boyliana examinantur, veraque 
eorum causa detecta, ostenditur, vacuum naturaliter dari non posse: unde et Aristotelica 
de Rarefactione sententia tam contra Assertores Vacuitatum, quam Corpusculorum 
demonstratur (London).
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as irrelevant for a causal explanation of the Torricellian effect. Indeed, 
he suggested that this space contains a fine thread of matter — like 
Boyle’s springs, too fine to be seen by the eye — which connects the 
upper surface of the suspended column of mercury to the flesh of the 
finger sealing the top end of the tube. This thread, or funiculus in Latin, 
helped to prevent the mercury column from falling below seventy-five 
centimetres, and thus contributed causally to the Torricellian effect. 
Hence, unlike Boyle’s corpuscular springs, which possess a power of 
self-dilation, Line’s thread possesses a power of self-contraction. This 
was manifest as an endeavour inward, in contrast to the endeavour 
outward of Boyle’s springs; where Boyle’s springs push things away, 
Line’s thread pulls them together. Line argued, in particular, that it 
pulls the mercury and the finger, at either end of the Torricellian space, 
towards one another. I will refer to this as Line’s ‘thread hypothesis.’ 
Like Boyle’s spring hypothesis, the thread hypothesis sought to explain 
the Torricellian effect in efficient, or operational, causal terms.77
Furthermore, Line’s thread hypothesis also sought to explain a 
secondary feature of the Torricellian experiment, namely, the experience 
of the flesh of one’s finger being forced down into the Torricellian 
space. He argued that the thread attached to the finger’s flesh, by its 
power of self-contraction, was what pulled the flesh into the tube. This 
explanation was also meant to explain why one’s finger was not only 
forced into the tube, but also why it stuck to the tube end. Indeed, much 
as effort is required to pull one’s palm from the hose end of an operating 
vacuum cleaner, so too is effort required to pull one’s finger from the 
top end of the Torricellian tube, that is, in Line’s terminology, to break 
the thread attaching one’s finger to the top of the mercury column. Line 
argued that Boyle’s spring hypothesis failed to sufficiently explain this 
secondary effect of the Torricellian apparatus.
Line also thought that his thread hypothesis had another advantage 
over Boyle’s spring hypothesis. As a Jesuit scholar, he was obligated to 
uphold the Scholastic doctrine that nature abhors a vacuum. Line thus 
also argued that the thread forms in the Torricellian space in order to 
77  Conor Reilly notes that Line’s thread hypothesis was not original: ‘[s]uch a concept 
had already been suggested under a number of different forms, by several scholars’ 
(Conor Reilly (1969), Francis Line S. J.: An Exiled English Scientist 1595–1675 (Rome: 
Institutum Historicum), p. 65).
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fill the void left by the falling mercury, thereby preventing a vacuum. 
Thus, in addition to explaining the adhesion of one’s finger to the 
tube, as well as contributing to an explanation of the Torricellian effect 
itself, Line argued that his thread hypothesis also confirmed a widely 
held belief about nature: ‘And hence is confirmed that common axiom 
used in the schools for so many ages past, that nature doth abhor a 
vacuum.’78 In Line’s view, then, the prevention of a vacuum — that is, 
the absolute separation of bodies — was that for the sake of which the 
thread forms in the tube and pulls inward. The prevention of a vacuum, 
of the separation of the constituents of matter, was the final cause, or 
reason, explaining why the thread is disposed to form and contract 
itself. In contrast to Line, Boyle declined to give an explanation for why 
his corpuscular springs are disposed to dilate themselves. Although 
he sought to explain the Torricellian effect in terms of an efficient, or 
operational cause — the spring’s endeavour outward — Boyle did not 
likewise offer an explanation in terms of a final cause, that is to say, he 
did not provide a reason for why the springs always move themselves 
outward as opposed to in some other direction.
In 1662, Boyle published a response to Line in which he used his 
earlier silence about final causation as a strength in promoting his spring 
hypothesis over Line’s alternative proposal. Furthermore, he exploited 
Line’s reference to final causation in order to attack the intelligibility of 
the latter’s proposed efficient cause, the thread hypothesis. Boyle writes:
It seems also very difficult to conceive, how this extenuated substance 
should acquire so strong a spring inward, as the examiner all along his 
books ascribes to it. Nor will it serve his turn to require of us in exchange 
an explication of the air’s spring outward, since he acknowledges, as 
well as we, that it has such a spring.79
Here, Boyle argues that, because Line has accepted the legitimacy of 
Boyle’s spring hypothesis, Boyle is under no obligation to provide a 
further explanation of spring in terms of final causation. This implies 
78  Cited in Boyle (1660), New Experiments Physico-Mechanical, p. 135.
79  Robert Boyle (1662 [1966]), A Defence of the Doctrine Touching the Spring and Weight of 
the Air, Proposed by Mr. R. Boyle, in his New Physico-Mechanical Experiments; Against 
the Objections of Franciscus Linus. Wherewith the Objector’s Funicular Hypothesis is also 
Examined, in The Works of Robert Boyle, vol. 1, ed. by Thomas Birch (Hildesheim: 
Georg Olms), pp. 118–85 (p. 143).
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the view that an explanation in terms of operational causes can be 
accepted as legitimate independently of considerations of final cause. 
Yet, although Boyle allows himself the benefit of this supposition, he is 
not willing to extend this same benefit to Line. He uses Line’s appeal to 
the horror vacui as a final cause to undermine the legitimacy of Line’s 
appeal to a self-contracting thread as an efficient cause. Yet, as his own 
work makes clear, there is no necessary connection between a particular 
efficient cause and a specific final cause. Hence, Boyle might have 
instead recognised the possible legitimacy of Line’s thread hypothesis 
in isolation from the horror vacui, and he might even have reinterpreted 
that hypothesis in a way more in step with his own principles.
In fact, this appears to have been Line’s strategy towards Boyle. 
As Boyle notes, Line claimed that ‘[i]t cannot be conceived [concipi 
non posse]’ on a corpuscular model how Boyle’s spring could take up 
more space when it dilates itself.80 Line seems to have had in mind 
the Aristotelian idea that ‘things can increase in size not only by the 
entrance of something but also by qualitative change; e.g. if water 
were to be transformed into air.’81 Hence, a sponge will increase in 
size by absorbing water, but a volume of water will increase in size 
by qualitatively changing from a liquid to a gas. In the second case, 
nothing has been added to the substance; instead the substance itself 
undergoes a change. On the corpuscular model, in contrast, there is no 
qualitative change in the basic material of water when it changes from 
a liquid into a gas. The corpuscles of water remain the same, but more 
space is opened between them. Likewise, there is no qualitative change 
to a corpuscular spring when it self-dilates. The more successfully it 
can beat back its neighbours, the more space it will take up, even as its 
physical size remains unchanged. It thus seems clear that Line and Boyle 
drew on radically different conceptions of matter in their respective 
interpretations of the phenomenon of spring. And both claimed to find 
the other’s conception unintelligible. Yet Line was willing to accept the 
air’s spring as a matter of fact so long as it was explained in accordance 
with his own non-corpuscular principles. In contrast, Boyle was 
reluctant to do the same for Line’s thread hypothesis. Indeed, he sought 
to reject that hypothesis by arguing, in part, that the principles Line 
80  Boyle (1662), A Defence of the Doctrine Touching the Spring and Weight of the Air, p. 126.
81  Aristotle (1941c), Physica, p. 282 (lines 214a36–214b2).
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used to explain it — above all, the horror vacui — were unintelligible. 
Given that Boyle was happy, in other contexts, to distinguish between 
operational hypotheses and their explanation, his attempt here to erase 
that distinction seems less than fully compelling.
In addition to unintelligibility, Boyle offered three other reasons 
to reject Line’s thread hypothesis: ‘this hypothesis of our author’s […] 
seems to be partly precarious, partly unintelligible, partly insufficient, 
and besides needless.’82 He immediately notes, however, that ‘it will 
not be so convenient’ to prove each of these claims in isolation from 
the others.83 Hence, for example, Boyle combines his argument from 
precariousness with charges of unintelligibility when he argues that 
Line’s thread hypothesis relies on a belief in the horror vacui, which has 
not been ‘cogently prove[d].’84 This lack of proof, concludes Boyle, ‘may 
help to shew his doctrine to be precarious.’85 But, if the merits of Line’s 
thread hypothesis can be judged independently of his belief in the horror 
vacui, then this argument from precariousness lacks adequate force.
Perhaps the most promising reason Boyle gave to reject Line’s thread 
hypothesis was that it is needless, or unnecessary. One of Line’s strongest 
empirical arguments for his thread hypothesis was that it explains both 
why one feels one’s finger being forced into the Torricellian tube, as 
well as why the end of the tube sticks to one’s finger. In addressing the 
former case, Boyle writes that
the finger that stops the tube being exposed on the upper parts and 
the sides to the external air, has the whole weight and pressure of the 
atmosphere upon it. […] [C]onsequently that part of the finger that is 
within the tube will have much less pressure against it from the dilated 
air without. By which means the pulp of the finger will be thrust in 
(which our author is pleased to call sucked in).86
In addressing the latter case, Boyle argues that the ‘pressure of the ambient 
air’ will ‘thrust in the pulp of the finger at the upper orifice of the tube, 
and make it stick closely enough to the lip of it.’87 Boyle immediately 
82  Boyle (1662), A Defence of the Doctrine Touching the Spring and Weight of the Air, p. 134.
83  Boyle (1662), A Defence of the Doctrine Touching the Spring and Weight of the Air, p. 134.
84  Boyle (1662), A Defence of the Doctrine Touching the Spring and Weight of the Air, p. 135.
85  Boyle (1662), A Defence of the Doctrine Touching the Spring and Weight of the Air, p. 137.
86  Boyle (1662), A Defence of the Doctrine Touching the Spring and Weight of the Air, p. 126.
87  Boyle (1662), A Defence of the Doctrine Touching the Spring and Weight of the Air, p. 129.
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recognised that Line would not be convinced by this latter explanation, 
writing that ‘I know the examiner affirms, that no thrusting or pressure 
from without can ever effect such an adhesion of the finger to the tube. 
But this should be as well proved as said.’88 Surely, however, the onus 
lay with Boyle to prove that his hypothesis sufficiently explains this 
adhesion, rather than with his critic to prove that it does not. In any case, 
Line was not alone in finding Boyle’s explanation unconvincing. The 
powerful Dutch natural philosopher, Christiaan Huygens, commented 
at the time that he could ‘not see that either Linus’ hypothesis or Mr. 
Boyle’s is satisfactory, that is, why the siphon sticks to the finger, so that 
one must use some little force to draw it off.’89 It seems clear that, at the 
time of the dispute, Boyle’s claim to have given a sufficient explanation 
of ‘suction’ was not uncontroversial. Hence, it could not have provided 
adequate grounds for arguing that Line’s thread hypothesis was not 
needed for an explanation of this phenomenon.
It should be emphasised that Line, in order to provide space for his 
own explanation of the Torricellian effect, did not need to likewise argue 
that Boyle’s explanation was unnecessary, but only that it was insufficient. 
This would have been enough for him to justify the introduction of his 
thread hypothesis as necessary, but not sufficient, for a comprehensive 
explanation of the effect. Line’s position was consistent with the view 
that both his thread hypothesis and Boyle’s spring hypothesis were 
necessary for an explanation of the Torricellian effect, but that neither 
was, on its own, sufficient for such an explanation. On this basis, Line 
could have agreed with Boyle’s claim that his thread hypothesis was 
‘partly insufficient’ without revising his original argument.90
It seems that Boyle did not fully understand Line’s position with 
respect to this point. Although he recognised in several passages 
that Line was criticising his spring hypothesis for being insufficient, 
in other passages he reacted as if Line were rejecting it as wholly 
unnecessary. In the first instance, Boyle’s observation that Line ‘denies 
it not, that the air has some weight and spring, but affirms, that it 
is very insufficient to perform such great matters’ was one which he 
88  Boyle (1662), A Defence of the Doctrine Touching the Spring and Weight of the Air, p. 129.
89  Cited in Reilly (1969), Francis Line S. J., p. 85.
90  Elizabeth Potter also makes this observation (Elizabeth Potter (2001), Gender and 
Boyle’s Law of Gases (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), pp. 36, 133).
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repeated several times throughout his response to Line.91 Yet he also 
described Line as arguing that ‘the things we ascribe to the weight and 
spring of the air are really performed by neither,’ and also of trying 
to ‘invalidate the hypothesis of weight and spring of the air.’92 In other 
words, despite explicitly recognising evidence to the contrary, Boyle 
ultimately treated Line as employing a zero-sum strategy, whereby 
only one of their respective hypotheses could be explanatorily 
relevant. However, it was, in fact, Boyle who employed this strategy, 
not Line. Boyle argued that his spring hypothesis provided not just a 
necessary, but also a sufficient, explanation for the Torricellian effect. 
Hence, he viewed Line’s proposed explanation as not only insufficient, 
but also unnecessary, or ‘needless.’ But this appears to misrepresent 
the dispute. Whereas Boyle treated the choice between the spring 
and thread hypotheses in exclusive either/or terms, Line seems to 
have taken a more inclusive approach in which both hypotheses 
could contribute to a comprehensive operational explanation of the 
Torricellian effect.
In sum, the four reasons Boyle gave for his rejection of Line’s thread 
hypothesis — that it is ‘partly precarious, partly unintelligible, partly 
insufficient, and besides needless’ — do not seem to adequately justify 
that rejection. Two further reasons may help us to more fully understand 
Boyle’s response to Line. The first reason has to do with Boyle’s desire 
to neutralise the explanatory significance of the Torricellian space. 
This space had been a flashpoint for metaphysical disputes over the 
existence of a vacuum. The Aristotelian doctrine of the horror vacui 
played a central role in this dispute. As Shapin and Schaffer show, Boyle 
was not trying to resolve this dispute, but instead to sideline it: ‘[w]hat 
he was endeavouring to create was a natural philosophical discourse in 
which such questions [about the existence of a “metaphysical” vacuum] 
were inadmissible.’93 By neutralising these disputes, Boyle and his 
colleagues hoped to provide a solution to the problem of social order 
made pressing by the intense civil conflict of their period. Their solution 
91  Boyle (1662), A Defence of the Doctrine Touching the Spring and Weight of the Air, p. 156; 
see also pp. 124, 162, 178.
92  Boyle (1662), A Defence of the Doctrine Touching the Spring and Weight of the Air, pp. 
134, 178.
93  Shapin and Schaffer (1985), Leviathan and the Air-Pump, p. 45.
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involved creating a new mode of discourse in which metaphysics 
was supposed to have no legitimate place. This discourse embraced 
the language of ‘experimental “physiology”’ in opposition to the 
language of ‘metaphysics.’ This distinction set up a powerful boundary 
within discourse about the natural world, and ‘[d]issension involving 
violations of this boundary […] was deemed fatal.’94 Boyle rejected 
Line’s thread hypothesis because it violated this boundary by invoking 
the metaphysical doctrine of the horror vacui, and thereby threatened 
the social order which Boyle and his colleagues were struggling to 
establish. According to Shapin and Schaffer, this boundary was a social 
convention rooted in collective efforts to reestablish social and political 
order. Hence, Boyle’s epistemological reasons for rejecting Line’s 
thread hypothesis cannot be neatly separated from considerations of 
the social context in which the debate took place. By invoking the horror 
vacui — the inseparability of matter — Line not only threated Boyle’s 
professed empiricism, but also the conception of social order he shared 
with other members of the emerging community of experimentalists.
Yet, as I argued above, once Line’s thread hypothesis is separated 
from his commitment to the doctrine of the horror vacui, this doctrine 
can no longer provide a compelling reason for rejecting the hypothesis. 
In this light, Line’s thread hypothesis seems no more metaphysical than 
Boyle’s spring hypothesis. Indeed, Boyle even interprets it as an inverse 
of his own hypothesis: whereas he posits a spring outward, Line posits a 
spring inward. It is the directionality of the two hypotheses which most 
clearly and consequentially distinguishes them. This brings us to the 
second of the two further reasons for Boyle’s rejection of Line’s thread 
hypothesis. As an efficient, or moving, cause, Line’s thread moves itself 
in the wrong direction. It acts to move things together, rather than to 
push them apart. I have argued, in general, that the directedness of an 
efficient cause, as that which regulates or guides a thing’s operations 
and thus gives them a clear and stable meaning, is what Aristotle had 
meant by the notion of final cause. In this sense, any interpretation of 
a thing which ascribes to it a regular pattern of behaviour will rely on 
this notion. Without it, the regularity of the thing’s operations would 
appear to be a coincidence, a matter of chance, rather than the result of a 
94  Shapin and Schaffer (1985), Leviathan and the Air-Pump, p. 80.
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power or principle belonging to that thing. Hence, when Boyle ascribed 
a power of self-dilation, an endeavour outward, to his corpuscular 
springs, he was implicitly recognising that a final cause regulates the 
operations of those corpuscles.95
Boyle’s tacit ascription of a final cause to the operations of his 
corpuscular springs was buried beneath his declaration that the spring 
of the air was a matter of fact. As observed above, Boyle insisted on 
a strict distinction between matters of fact, on the one hand, and 
speculative hypotheses, on the other. Indeed, first recognising the 
Torricellian effect to be a matter of fact, Boyle then speculated that 
its cause was the outward spring of the air. However, Boyle quickly 
dropped his speculative tone and declared this outward spring to also 
be a well-established matter of fact rather than a hypothesis. As Shapin 
and Schaffer note, Boyle did not explicate a reason for this change in his 
attitude, and they suggest that a sociological explanation can be given, 
one which makes sense of Boyle’s apparently arbitrary distinctions as 
having been guided by social conventions. On this basis, we can treat 
Boyle’s discrimination between metaphysical and empirical language 
as a social discrimination motivated by a specific conception of social 
order. This was a discrimination in which a power of outward spring 
could be accepted as an empirical matter of fact, while a power of inward 
spring was rejected as an unintelligible metaphysical hypothesis.
The credibility of Boyle’s claim to have eschewed metaphysics was 
contingent on his success in rendering invisible the interpretative space 
95  The outward endeavour of Boyle’s microscopically insensible corpuscles was 
metaphysical. However, he also studied sensible phenomena manifesting a similar 
power of motion. In a 1685 treatise, Boyle remarks on thick pieces of glass which, 
when cooled after removal from a furnace, burst apart, their pieces ‘fly[ing] to a not 
inconsiderable distance from one another’ (Robert Boyle (1685 [1966]), An Essay of 
the Great Effects of Even Languid and Unheeded Motion, in The Works of Robert Boyle, 
vol. 5, ed. by Thomas Birch (Hildesheim: Georg Olms), pp. 1–37 (p. 24)). Likewise, 
when a bow string is cut, ‘the bow will fly suddenly outwards, and the parts of the 
string will swiftly and violently shrink from one another’ (p. 26). And gemstones, 
when extracted from the hard cement of an aggregate rock, ‘quickly expanded 
themselves, as if it were by an internal and violently compressed spring, and would 
presently burst asunder’ (p. 27). From this, Boyle concludes that ‘bodies, which as 
to sense, are in a natural state of rest, may be in a violent one, as of tension, and may 
have […] a strong endeavour to fly off or recede from one another’ (p. 26). Boyle 
may have viewed these phenomena as empirical vindication for his metaphysical 
claim that corpuscular springs manifest an internal power of outward endeavour 
when released from compression.
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between the Torricellian effect and his causal explanation of that effect 
in terms of outward spring. Hence, the most pressing threat posed to 
Boyle by Line’s thread hypothesis was that it posited a power of inward 
spring which plausibly explained many of the same aspects of the 
Torricellian experiment. In this way, Line’s intervention threatened to 
re-expose the contingency of the interpretative space existing between 
the Torricellian effect and Boyle’s causal spring hypothesis, a space 
which Boyle had worked hard to render invisible. Building on Shapin 
and Schaffer’s analysis, one may conclude that Line’s thread hypothesis 
threatened the conception of social order which tacitly grounded 
Boyle’s explanation of the Torricellian effect. However, contrary to what 
Shapin and Schaffer argue, this threat cannot be explained in terms of 
Line’s appeal to metaphysics, in the form of final causes, because Boyle 
also shared this commitment to final causation. It would seem, instead, 
that Boyle viewed the threat more as directed at his particular, tacit 
conception of the final cause of an individual corpuscle’s movement: a 
state of autonomy, of freedom from the things which surround it. Yet, 
as we have seen, Line did not challenge Boyle’s conception of outward 
spring, as such. Line accepted the necessity of Boyle’s proposed cause, 
but challenged its sufficiency as an explanation of the Torricellian 
experiment. Hence, what was ultimately at stake for Boyle was not 
the validity of his spring hypothesis, but its exclusivity. Insofar as his 
hypothesis provided a solution to the problem of social order, Boyle 
meant for it to serve as an exclusive solution, one that was both necessary 
and sufficient.
These two features of Boyle’s explanation of the Torricellian 
effect — outward spring and exclusivity — can be fit together with two 
complementary features of Heidegger’s explanation of the emergence 
of early-modern science in terms of the mathematical. These latter two 
features are what I have called the First Thing, and what Heidegger 
called the basic blueprint. The mythical image of the First Thing helps 
to further explicate Boyle’s model of a spring-like corpuscle which 
endeavours to beat away all neighbouring bodies, thereby opening up 
around itself a free space in which it can realise its natural, autonomous 
state. This autonomous state is the final cause regulating the behaviour 
of Boyle’s corpuscular springs. It is that place towards which things, by 
exercising their power of outward spring, endeavour to move themselves. 
Boyle’s air-pump supported this endeavour, helping the corpuscles to 
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realise their natural state. This end state or place is represented by the 
First Thing. Moreover, this end state is the only one towards which 
things may be legitimately directed. In other words, Boyle’s corpuscular 
springs can be ultimately regulated by only one final cause. Hence, 
the image of the First Thing also functions as the one basic blueprint 
governing the indigenous operations of all air corpuscles. Just as Boyle’s 
inward spring was meant to play an exclusive role in his explanation 
of the Torricellian experiment, so too was the image of the First Thing 
meant to serve as the one basic blueprint governing explanations of 
material phenomena in the new Galilean universe. The Galilean First 
Thing was the basic blueprint guiding Boyle’s explanation of the spring 
of the air. It was the tacitly held mathematical image underpinning the 
social logic of inclusion and exclusion which enabled Boyle and his 
colleagues to discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate accounts 
of experimental phenomena, and hence also between authentic and 
inauthentic members of the emerging seventeenth-century community 
of experimental philosophers. The success of Boyle’s refutation of Line’s 
thread hypothesis was consequentially determined by this tacit image. 
In the next section, I will argue that this tacitly held, mathematical 
image of the First Thing was, at root, a social image.
5. Social Imagery and Early-Modern Science
The idea that knowledge is governed by an image — a social image — has 
had an important, if somewhat underdeveloped, place in SSK. Indeed, 
David Bloor considered it so central that he gave his influential 1976 
introduction to SSK the title Knowledge and Social Imagery. In this 
section, I will discuss the relationship between Heidegger’s mythical 
image of the Galilean First Thing and Bloor’s notion of social imagery. 
This discussion will allow us to further explore, on the one hand, the 
sociological aspects of Heidegger’s account of the emergence of early-
modern science, and, on the other hand, the theoretical insights which 
SSK may draw from that account.
Bloor argues that ‘we think about knowledge by manipulating images 
of society.’96 A clear distinction must be drawn here between an image 
96  David Bloor (1991 [1976]), Knowledge and Social Imagery, 2nd edn (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press), p. 52.
 3296. Mathematics, Experiment, and the Ends of Scientific Practice
of society and society itself. Bloor argues that society is too complex 
and overwhelming for us to understand it directly. As a consequence, 
we must rely on simplified social models: ‘Immersed as we are in 
society we cannot grasp it as a whole in our reflective consciousness 
except by using a simplified picture, an image, or what may be called 
an “ideology.”’97 This image subsequently guides the way we come to 
think about knowledge in general. Crucially, our manipulation of social 
images need not be a conscious act. In other words, the connection 
between a theory of knowledge and a social image will often be a tacit 
one. This means that social imagery will often serve as an analyst’s 
category without also being an actor’s category. According to Bloor, an 
analyst should not limit her explanations to the consciously deployed 
categories and concepts of those actors whose behaviour she is seeking 
to explain. She should also seek to uncover the social categories and 
concepts which structure an individual actor’s thoughts and actions 
at a tacit, or unconscious, level. One of the key targets of this method 
of excavation is the social imagery which may shape and guide actors’ 
thoughts and actions without their being aware of it.
The claim that social imagery guides actors’ practices suggests that 
it plays a role similar to that of Aristotelian final causes. In other words, 
Bloor’s concept of social imagery appears to include a teleological 
element. This introduces a potential tension into the comparison 
between Bloor’s social imagery and the Heideggerian notion of the 
Galilean First Thing. Bloor strongly repudiates teleological forms of 
explanation as being inimical to SSK: ‘There is no doubt that if the 
teleological model is true then the strong programme is false.’98 Yet, this 
apparent tension may be resolved once we recognise that the offending 
aspects of what Bloor calls the ‘teleological model’ are absent from the 
notion of the First Thing. These aspects are, first, that the teleological 
model entails the existence of ‘purposive’ behaviour, and, second, that 
this behaviour is ‘naturally oriented towards truth.’99 The worry, in 
the first case, is that science is being treated as a process of ‘mind or 
“consciousness,”’ rather than as a configuration of socially sustained 
97  Bloor (1991), Knowledge and Social Imagery, p. 53.
98  Bloor (1991), Knowledge and Social Imagery, p. 12.
99  David Bloor (1973), ‘Wittgenstein and Mannheim on the Sociology of Mathematics,’ 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 4(2), 173–91 (pp. 178, 185).
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material practices.100 In the second case, the worry is that this allegedly 
mental process is directed towards a non-contingent (i.e., asocial and 
ahistorical), or absolute, truth. As we have seen, SSK entails neither of 
these claims. As we have also seen, the image of the First Thing likewise 
entails neither of these claims. As the basic blueprint of early-modern 
scientific practice, the First Thing can guide behaviour at a wholly tacit 
and non-deliberative level. Furthermore, the grounds for the First Thing 
are not absolute or necessary, but ultimately bottom out in the subject’s 
shared, historically contingent tradition. Hence, Bloor’s reservations 
with respect to teleology do not apply in the case of the Galilean First 
Thing.101
Having resolved this initial worry about a potential conflict between 
Bloor’s social imagery and the Heideggerian image of the First Thing, 
let us now turn to the example Bloor offers to illustrate his explanatory 
100  Bloor (1973), ‘Wittgenstein and Mannheim,’ p. 174 n. 4; citing Popper.
101  In respect of the second point, note that Bloor has more recently reiterated 
his identification of ‘telos’ with a non-contingent ‘inner necessity’ guiding 
scientific practice (David Bloor (2011), The Enigma of the Aerofoil: Rival Theories 
in Aerodynamics, 1909–1930 (Chicago: Chicago University Press), p. 436). As for 
the first point, the issue is similar to the one addressed in Chapter Four, where 
I argued that Bloor’s identification of intentionality with mental content does 
not touch a Heideggerian account of intentionality, which construes this in non-
mental terms. That Heidegger did not espouse a teleological model, in Bloor’s 
sense, is further attested in Michael Friedman’s observation that ‘[Ernst] Cassirer’s 
philosophy of symbolic forms […] diverges from Heidegger’s existential analytic of 
Dasein precisely in emphasizing a teleological development toward the genuinely 
“objective” and “universally valid” realm of scientific truth’ (Michael Friedman 
(2000), A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger (Chicago: Open Court), 
p. 138). Friedman also notes the influence of Cassirer’s anti-naturalistic teleological 
historiography on such historians of science as Edwin Arthur Burtt, Eduard Jan 
Dijksterhuis, and Alexandre Koyré (Friedman (2000), A Parting of the Ways, p. 88; 
see Edwin Arthur Burtt (1925), The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical 
Science: A Historical and Critical Essay (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & 
Co.); Eduard Jan Dijksterhuis (1961 [1950]), The Mechanization of the World Picture, 
trans. by C. Dikshoorn (London: Oxford University Press); Koyré (1943a), ‘Galileo 
and Plato’; and Alexandre Koyré (1943b), ‘Galileo and the Scientific Revolution of 
the Seventeenth Century,’ Philosophical Review 52(4), 333–48). This historiographic 
tradition appears to be a central object of Bloor’s criticism. Barry Barnes criticises 
a similar teleological method in György Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness 
(Barry Barnes (1977), Interests and the Growth of Knowledge (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul), p. 48; see György Lukács (1971 [1923]), History and Class Consciousness: 
Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. by Rodney Livingstone (London: Merlin Press)). 
For a more recent comparison of Heidegger and Cassirer, see Peter E. Gordon (2010), 
Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press).
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method. Drawing from Karl Mannheim’s 1925 essay, ‘Conservative 
Thought,’ Bloor attempts to uncover the social imagery influencing 
the works of philosopher of science Karl Popper and historian and 
philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn.102 In a nutshell, Bloor argues that 
Popper’s account of scientific knowledge reflects an Enlightenment 
ideology, while Kuhn’s account of scientific knowledge reflects a 
Romantic ideology. These two ideologies represent two different images 
according to which Popper and Kuhn organised, and thus made sense of, 
the empirical data regarding modern scientific knowledge production. 
As Bloor puts it, in the case of each thinker, ‘the same facts are fitted 
together to form a different picture.’103 In thinking about scientific 
knowledge, in developing an epistemology of scientific practice, Popper 
and Kuhn each manipulated a distinct image of society, and that social 
image powerfully influenced the different ways in which they each 
came to perceive the structure and dynamics of scientific knowledge.
Bloor gives considerable attention to the differences between 
Popper’s and Kuhn’s epistemologies, mapping them respectively onto 
the more general cultural categories of Enlightenment and Romanticism. 
Here, however, I want to focus on one strong similarity between these 
two otherwise divergent accounts of scientific knowledge, as well as 
a difference which then appears within this common perspective. 
According to Bloor, Popper and Kuhn shared a perception of science 
as the work of ‘collectivities’ or ‘social wholes.’104 In other words, both 
thinkers tended to view scientific practice in terms of bounded and 
coherent spheres of social activity. However, each then goes on to 
analyse social wholes in dramatically different ways. As Bloor writes, 
Popper treated social wholes as ‘unproblematically equivalent to sets 
of individual units.’105 Kuhn, in contrast, rejected such individualism. 
In his work, ‘[s]ocial wholes are not treated as mere collections of 
individuals but are seen as having properties of a special kind, e.g. 
certain spirits, traditions, styles and national characteristics.’106 Hence, 
102  Karl Mannheim (1953 [1925]), ‘Conservative Thought,’ in Essays on Sociology and 
Social Psychology, by Karl Mannheim, ed. by Paul Kecskemeti (London: Routledge), 
pp. 74–164.
103  Bloor (1991), Knowledge and Social Imagery, p. 60.
104  Bloor (1991), Knowledge and Social Imagery, pp. 62, 63.
105  Bloor (1991), Knowledge and Social Imagery, p. 62.
106  Bloor (1991), Knowledge and Social Imagery, p. 63.
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while for Popper ‘individuality is not bound up in society,’ for Kuhn 
‘[i]ndividuals can only be understood in context.’107 At root, this is a 
disagreement over how to specify the subjectivity of the subject, over 
what it is to be a human being.
Popper and Kuhn each approached scientific knowledge in terms 
of social wholes, but Popper treated those wholes as reducible to their 
individual components, while Kuhn treated them as irreducible to those 
individual components. At stake in this difference is the location of the 
principle or principles according to which a social whole is organised, 
according to which it is viewed as a structured unit rather than an 
unruly shambles. For Popper, organising principles are uniformly 
located in the individual parts making up the whole.108 For Kuhn, they 
cannot be located in the individual parts but must instead be a property 
of the whole itself. According to Bloor, these divergent ontologies guide 
the respective epistemologies of their authors, with Popper favouring a 
view of scientific knowledge as the property of individuals and Kuhn 
a view of scientific knowledge as the property of groups. For present 
purposes, however, what is more important than this purported 
disagreement is the shared belief of these two thinkers in the existence 
of identifiable and coherent social wholes. In this sense, when Popper 
and Kuhn thought about scientific knowledge, their thoughts were 
being guided by the same kind of social image, an image of the social 
group as an organised whole. As a consequence, they both also tended 
to view scientific knowledge in terms of organised wholes, whether of 
concepts, practices, or a combination of both.
The implication of this is that the Enlightenment and Romantic 
ideologies which Bloor used to develop his comparative study are, at 
least in one important sense, not so different from one another. Indeed, 
they appear to share a common root in an image of the social group 
as an organised and bounded whole. This conclusion is supported by 
Mannheim’s argument in the essay mentioned above, the essay on 
which Bloor modelled much of his discussion.
107  Bloor (1991), Knowledge and Social Imagery, pp. 62, 63.
108  I have elsewhere questioned Bloor’s reading of Popper, arguing that Popper is 
much closer to being a communitarian epistemologist than is allowed for by Bloor 
(Jeff Kochan (2009b), ‘Popper’s Communitarianism,’ in Rethinking Popper, ed. by 
Zuzana Parusniková and Robert S. Cohen (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 
272) (Berlin: Springer), pp. 287–303).
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Mannheim addresses the same macro-sociological phenomenon as 
did Zilsel — the historical transition from feudalism to capitalism — but 
he picks it up at a later stage. Whereas Zilsel focussed on social changes 
during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which he argues led to 
the Scientific Revolution in the early seventeenth century, Mannheim 
focusses instead on the emergence of conservative thought in the 
nineteenth century, presenting it as a response to the growing cultural 
hegemony of Enlightenment rationalism from the late eighteenth 
century onward. Like Zilsel, Mannheim analyses the usurpation of 
feudalism by capitalism as a process of rationalisation.109 The process 
was ‘revolutionary and radical just because it want[ed] to rationalize the 
whole social order right from the beginning in a systematic manner.’110 
Nineteenth-century conservative thought grew out of a widespread 
and deliberate resistance to this process. In the face of rationalisation, 
conservative thinkers made a deliberate effort to maintain and develop 
the remnants of a pre-capitalist experience which had once been taken 
for granted but was now threatened with extinction.111 This effort led to 
the rise of the counter-revolutionary movement of Romanticism, which 
‘seized on the submerged ways of life and thought, snatched them from 
oblivion, consciously worked them out and developed them further, 
and finally set them up against the rationalist way of thought.’112 Thus, 
what Mannheim dubs ‘romantic conservatism’ included two steps. 
First, it sought to rescue and revitalise the remnants of a disappearing 
pre-capitalist way of life. Second, it sought to actively articulate those 
remnants and develop them into an explicit and comprehensive project 
of intellectual resistance to Enlightenment rationalism. This second 
step was above all motivated by a rejection of the perceived rigidity 
and linearity of Enlightenment thinking, which Romantic thinkers 
endeavoured to replace with a more dynamic and dialectical form of 
thought.113 Crucially, Mannheim argues that this second move reiterated, 
rather than abandoned, the faith of Enlightenment rationalism in 
the power of reason to understand the world: ‘romantic thought 
109  Mannheim (1953), ‘Conservative Thought,’ p. 85.
110  Mannheim (1953), ‘Conservative Thought,’ p. 149.
111  Mannheim (1953), ‘Conservative Thought,’ p. 115.
112  Mannheim (1953), ‘Conservative Thought,’ p. 89.
113  Mannheim (1953), ‘Conservative Thought,’ pp. 150–51.
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(unintentionally perhaps) merely continues, though more radically, 
and with new methods, the same process which the Enlightenment 
had already hoped to complete — the thorough rationalization of 
the world.’114 Mannheim uses the following analogy to illustrate the 
fundamental similarity, as well as the subsequent differences, between 
Enlightenment and Romantic thought:
The conservative picture of things as a whole is like the inclusive sort of 
picture of a house which one might get by looking at it from all possible 
sides, a concrete picture of the house in all its detail from every angle. 
But the progressive is not interested in all this detail; he makes straight 
for the ground plan [Grundriss] of the house and his picture is suitable 
for rational analysis rather than for intuitive representation.115
The fundamental similarity between the two positions is their shared 
view that the world in its entirety can be captured in a ‘picture of things 
as a whole,’ a comprehensive image of everything that is. On the basis 
of this shared view, each position then employs a different method to 
rigorously work out the content of this world picture. The Enlightenment 
rationalist uses abstraction and systematisation to uncover the fixed 
‘ground plan’ of the world. The Romantic thinker emphasises concrete 
description and the dynamic balance of competing forces in order to 
disclose the organic unity of the world. By each pursuing a distinct 
ideal of intellectual rigour, an ideal determined by standards internal 
to their own methods and experience, both rationalistic progressives 
and romantic conservatives aim to identify and define a comprehensive 
picture of the world construed as a whole.
Yet not every kind of conservativism depends on a conception of the 
world as a whole. In addition to Romantic conservativism, Mannheim 
identifies another form of nineteenth-century conservativism, which he 
dubs ‘feudalistic conservatism.’ This form followed only the first of the 
two steps characterising Romantic conservativism: that is, it consciously 
sought only to preserve and explicate elements of a pre-capitalist 
114  Mannheim (1953), ‘Conservative Thought,’ p. 153.
115  Mannheim (1953), ‘Conservative Thought,’ p. 111. The bracketed text has been 
inserted from the German original (Karl Mannheim (1984 [1925]), Konservatismus. 
Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie des Wissens, ed. by David Kettler, Volker Meja and Nico 
Stehr (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp), p. 121). Note that Grundriss is the original term for 
both Mannheim’s concept of ‘ground plan’ and Heidegger’s concept of ‘one basic 
blueprint,’ under which, I have argued, the First Thing may be placed.
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tradition which, by that time, existed only on the periphery of society.116 
Feudalistic conservativism focusses its attention on the specific details 
of concrete practice, making little effort to integrate those details into an 
overall, coherent picture of the world. It resists the ‘subsumption of the 
individual and particular under one general principle’ and so ‘does not 
really trouble itself with the structure of the world in which it lives.’117 
Unlike Romanticism, feudal conservativism did not identify itself as a 
counter-revolutionary response to Enlightenment rationalism. Hence, 
feudalistic conservatives felt little compulsion to adopt, so as to then 
renegotiate, the Enlightenment conception of the world as an object 
which could be accessed, as a whole, through the power of reason. In 
addition, their suspicion of theoretical abstraction, and their attention to 
concrete practice, were ‘exceedingly sober.’118 They displayed no traces 
of the romantic tendency to conceptualise the world as a dynamic unity 
of competing, often non-rationalisable, life forces.
One upshot of Mannheim’s argument is that, in addition to the 
Enlightenment and Romantic imagery Bloor discusses in his comparison 
of Popper and Kuhn, one can also add feudalistic conservativism. Unlike 
the former two positions, feudalistic conservativism was not motivated 
by a need to identify and elaborate a picture of the world as a whole. 
In this, it proves closer to a pre-Enlightenment intellectual tradition, 
one which concerned itself with the description and explanation of the 
concrete details of experience without attempting to integrate those 
details into one comprehensive and consistent whole. Hence, although 
Mannheim was mainly concerned with the nineteenth century, when 
Enlightenment rationalism had become well-developed and culturally 
dominant, his comments on feudalistic conservativism point to an 
earlier period, in the seventeenth century, when proto-Enlightenment 
rationalism posed a still relatively weak threat to the dominant 
feudalistic tradition.
These insights may now be applied to the dispute between Boyle 
and Line in the early 1660s. I want to suggest that this dispute can be 
understood as a conflict between an ascendant rationalism and a still-
dominant feudalistic traditionalism. More to the point, I am suggesting 
116  Mannheim (1953), ‘Conservative Thought,’ p. 88.
117  Mannheim (1953), ‘Conservative Thought,’ pp. 155, 103.
118  Mannheim (1953), ‘Conservative Thought,’ p. 159.
336 Science as Social Existence
that Boyle represents the early impulses of a rationalism which pursued 
a systematic model of the world as a whole, while Line represents the 
late tendencies of a tradition which was intensely engaged with concrete 
detail but had little interest in systematic analyses of a universalising 
scope. I want to make two arguments: first, that Bloor’s concept of social 
imagery may be applied, in an illuminating but imperfect way, to this 
episode in the history of science; and second, that Heidegger’s account 
of modern science explains why the application of Bloor’s concept must 
be imperfect.
The application of the concept of social imagery to the dispute 
between Boyle and Line is imperfect because it is not symmetrical. If, 
as Bloor argues, a social image functions as a simplified model of the 
world construed as whole, and if Line was a traditionalist who had no 
use for such a model, then the concept of a social image will not be 
useful in examining his case. In contrast, if Boyle represents, at least 
in this instance, an emerging culture of rationalism, then the concept 
should apply in his case. Indeed, this asymmetry picks out one of the 
key issues at stake in the dispute. This was the issue of what role a 
simplified picture of things as a whole should play in the production of 
reliable experimental knowledge. Since, as Bloor argues, social imagery 
often guides an actor’s thinking at a tacit level, the question of whether 
the world can be systematically treated as whole need not have been 
something Boyle and Line deliberately addressed in their dispute. 
The point is rather that we, as analysts instead of actors, may usefully 
illuminate the dispute in terms of this question.
In fact, the relevant analysis was already done in the last section. 
What I wish to pick out here with Bloor’s concept of social imagery 
was there picked out with Heidegger’s concept of the one basic 
blueprint. In short, Heidegger’s basic blueprint is an instance of Bloor’s 
social imagery. Both concepts are meant to highlight the exclusivity 
of a style of thinking, the fact that the image or blueprint serves as a 
comprehensive picture of things as a whole. I argued in the last section 
that Boyle’s thinking was guided by such an image, an a priori image in 
which the thingness of the thing was specified beforehand according to 
the Galilean First Thing. If this image was furthermore a social image, 
in Bloor’s sense, then it should follow that Boyle, when thinking about 
knowledge, was manipulating images of society. Indeed, this was one of 
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the main points of Shapin and Schaffer’s study. They argued that Boyle’s 
epistemological concerns were, at root, concerns about social order, 
especially, the problem of disorder caused by political controversy. To 
this, I added the suggestion that the image of the First Thing served 
Boyle as a model by which to construct a clearly defined community of 
experimental philosophers — a social whole — in which the dangers of 
controversy could be effectively managed.
As we have seen, Boyle, in his dispute with Line, defended the 
sufficiency of his own spring hypothesis against the challenge posed by 
Line’s thread hypothesis. This defence appears to have been motivated by 
Boyle’s assumption that the phenomena of the Torricellian experiment 
could be subsumed under one general explanatory hypothesis. This 
epistemological assumption reflected Boyle’s commitment to a 
simplified model of society in which members took for granted a 
consistent base of clearly defined principles and matters of fact. Line, in 
contrast, appears to have taken a more eclectic view, allowing instead 
that both his and Boyle’s hypotheses were necessary for an explanation 
of the Torricellian phenomena. Underpinning Line’s assumption was, it 
appears, not a commitment to a competing model of the social whole, 
but rather a complacent disregard for the necessity of any such model. 
It seems plausible that Line’s epistemology, such as it was, reflected the 
prevailing feudal tradition — with its indifference towards simplified 
models of society — which was only just then beginning to face the 
challenge of an ascendant, rationalistic conception of the world. Hence, 
the dispute was not a conflict between two competing images of the 
social whole, but between Boyle’s perceived need for such an image, 
on the one hand, and Line’s apparent indifference to that need, on the 
other.
However, it was not the case that every follower of the feudal tradition 
was indifferent to the threat posed by the new rationalism. In fact, at 
stake in this period were conceptions not just of society and nature, but 
also of religion. This should not be surprising, as it is a commonplace 
among contemporary historians of science that conceptions of society, 
nature, and religion were, in Boyle’s period, not easily separated. As 
the historian Quentin Skinner has observed, Boyle insisted that his 
experimental activity supported his religious faith because it provided 
evidence for the ‘design’ of the world. By demonstrating that nature 
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as a whole was created on the basis of a rational plan, Boyle hoped to 
provide empirical grounds for the existence of a divine creator. ‘L’horloge, 
donc l’horloger,’ notes Skinner, and then immediately adds: ‘During the 
seventeenth century, however, this familiar trope of the Enlightenment 
was still widely believed to carry alarming religious consequences.’119
One such expression of alarm came from the Anglican cleric and 
humanist Méric Casaubon. In a letter ‘Concerning Natural experimental 
Philosophie, and some books lately about it,’ published in 1669, Casaubon 
criticised members of the Royal Society for claiming that religious 
controversies could be settled on the basis of ‘plain reason.’120 The nub 
of this worry was Casaubon’s resistance to the idea that God’s creation 
could be understood in accordance with a basic blueprint, accessible to 
anyone possessing natural reason. As Michael Spiller remarks, Casaubon 
viewed this ambition as deluded and dangerous, because ‘reality is too 
vastly complex, and human beings too corrupt, irremediably frustrated 
by recurring and permanent vices and frailties.’121 Any attempt to know 
the world as a whole was bound to fail, as nature outstrips finite human 
understanding, making controversy inevitable.
In this dispute over the nature of knowledge, the conflict was not 
about what picture of the world to adopt, as it would be in the later feud 
between Enlightenment rationalists and Romantics, but instead about 
whether or not a world picture should be adopted at all as an instrument 
in the acquisition of knowledge. As Spiller notes, Boyle was, at best, an 
uneasy accomplice in the development of early-modern rationalism.122 
Yet, in his dispute with Line, Boyle appears to have been strongly 
motivated by a simple and consistent conception of nature structured in 
terms of the Galilean First Thing. Line, for his part, appears to have been 
119  Quentin Skinner (2002), ‘Hobbes and the Politics of the Early Royal Society,’ in 
Visions of Politics, vol. 3: Hobbes and Civil Science, by Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), pp. 324–45 (p. 336).
120  Reprinted in Michael R. G. Spiller (1980), ‘Concerning Natural Experimental 
Philosophie’: Meric Casaubon and the Royal Society (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff), 
pp. 149–189. According to Richard Serjeantson, Casaubon ‘had a strong fascination 
with the natural world: as a young man he attempted some of the experiments in 
Francis Bacon’s Sylva sylvarum’ (Richard W. Serjeantson (2004), ‘Casaubon, Méric,’ 
in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, vol. 10, ed. by H. C. G. Matthews and 
Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 464–66 (p. 466)).
121  Spiller (1980), ‘Concerning Natural Experimental Philosophie,’ p. 130.
122  Spiller (1980), ‘Concerning Natural Experimental Philosophie,’ p. 136.
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guided by no one picture at all, but instead by an eclectic willingness 
to blend together a variety of doctrines. Put in Heidegger’s terms, only 
Boyle comported himself in a mathematical manner. In his dispute 
with Line, Boyle’s thinking and conduct exemplified the emerging 
mathematical projection which marked the historical and existential 
transition from a medieval to an early-modern understanding of nature.
Heidegger argues that ‘[t]he world picture does not change from 
an earlier medieval one into a modern one, but rather the fact that the 
world becomes picture at all is what distinguishes the essence of the 
modern age.’123 For Heidegger, the modern age, the age of modern 
science, is, at base, the age of the world picture. He thus presents a 
theory of scientific knowledge which applies only to the modern age. 
According to this theory, modern science is possible only on the basis of 
a projected picture of the world as a whole. This projection is the a priori 
condition of possibility for such knowledge. The subsequent pursuit of 
modern scientific knowledge is conceived as the filling out, the rigorous 
articulation and refinement, of a picture of the world which has already 
been projected, albeit only generally and confusedly, in advance.124
Heidegger’s argument that thinking in terms of a world picture 
is a specifically modern development provides an opportunity to 
refine Bloor’s sociological claim that we think about knowledge by 
manipulating images of society. Bloor writes that this is ‘a theory about 
how people think. The hypotheses are not alleged to be necessary 
truths. […] Furthermore the range of application of the picture here 
presented has yet to be determined.’125 On the basis of Heidegger’s 
discussion of the world picture, as well as the above analysis of the 
dispute between Boyle and Line, we may now tentatively limit the 
123  Heidegger (1977a), ‘The Age of the World Picture,’ p. 130.
124  Hans-Jörg Rheinberger suggests that Heidegger’s term Weltbild (‘world picture’) 
‘might be more appropriately translated as “[…] Planetary Configuration”’ (Hans-
Jörg Rheinberger (1997), Towards a History of Epistemic Things: Synthesizing Proteins 
in the Test Tube (Stanford: University of Stanford Press), p. 25 n. 6). This has the 
benefit of emphasising the material aspect of the phenomenon, but it also seems 
to deflect attention from the projective role played by the subject in creating 
that phenomenon, not to mention the intersubjective (social) labour required to 
materially extend it to, and sustain it on, a planetary scale. See also Hans-Jörg 
Rheinberger (2010a), An Epistemology of the Concrete: Twentieth-Century Histories of 
Life (Durham: Duke University Press), p. 234.
125  Bloor (1991), Knowledge and Social Imagery, p. 154.
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range of application of Bloor’s theory to the modern era. SSK’s method 
of analysing scientific controversies in terms of conflicting, often tacitly 
held, pictures of society seems most applicable to modern controversies. 
These conflicting pictures are images of society construed as a whole, 
images which, in turn, motivate conceptions of knowledge construed 
as a whole. As human relations come, in the modern era, to be viewed 
in terms of social wholes, human knowing likewise comes to be 
viewed in terms of epistemic wholes. Hence, the modern problem of 
organising knowledge into a structured whole can be understood as 
the modern problem of organising society into a structured whole. 
Whether actors view knowledge as a system of concepts — organised 
around basic principles of logic and definition — or as a system of 
practices — organised around basic principles of prediction and control, 
or credibility and power — in both cases, the SSK practitioner will seek 
to uncover the underlying social image held by the actors, along with 
the basic principles around which that image is organised. However, 
in cases where groups of actors genuinely treat knowledge in a non-
systematic and eclectic way, the implication of Heidegger’s argument is 
that there will be no underlying image of a social whole which the SSK 
practitioner may uncover and then use to explain the actors’ epistemic 
activities. The sociologist may, in these latter cases, discover shared 
social interests, and use these to explain behaviour, but, if Heidegger’s 
argument is correct, these interests will not be the components of a single, 
integrated social image, a shared ideology or blueprint determined by a 
single coherent set of basic principles.
6. Conclusion
Some readers may feel that there is an elephant in the room which I have 
ignored throughout this chapter. This alleged elephant is the mechanical 
philosophy of the early-modern period. However, while far from being 
irrelevant, the mechanical philosophy is, in fact, largely peripheral to 
the main concerns of this chapter. There is, then, no elephant in the 
room. So why not talk about it?
Mechanism is usually contrasted with organicism, with the attendant 
account of the Scientific Revolution then emphasising a transition in 
the prevailing image of the world from an organic to a mechanical one. 
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What should be immediately clear, however, is that this difference 
in philosophical orientation — organistic versus mechanistic — is 
underpinned by a shared impulse to grasp the world as a single, 
structured whole. It is this shared impulse, rather than the difference 
between these two philosophies, which has been a central concern 
of this chapter. On this basis, we may reasonably doubt, for example, 
Carolyn Merchant’s claim that ‘[t]he rejection and removal of organic 
and animistic features and the substitution of mechanically describable 
components would become the most significant and far-reaching 
effect of the Scientific Revolution.’126 On the contrary, according to the 
argument presented here, the most far-reaching and significant effect of 
the Scientific Revolution was the institutionalisation of a concept of the 
world as a thing which is ordered — organised — according to a uniform 
measure, a basic blueprint. Both models of the world as a machine and as 
an organism reflect this institutionalisation, because both machines and 
organisms are, so we tend to think, discrete organised units, structured 
individuals or wholes.127
Merchant describes the Scientific Revolution as ‘the transition from 
the organism to the machine as the dominant metaphor binding together 
the cosmos, society, and the self into a single cultural reality — a world 
view.’128 She furthermore argues that the ancient notion of ‘[t]he female 
earth was central to the organic cosmology that was undermined by the 
Scientific Revolution.’129 This may give the impression that the organic 
cosmology was itself an ancient institution, supplanted by a mechanistic 
cosmology in the early-modern period. However, Merchant also argues 
that the doctrine of the world’s ‘organic unity’ emerged in the late 
Renaissance, citing as evidence works published only in the second 
half of the sixteenth century, or later.130 Hence, it would appear that an 
126  Carolyn Merchant (1980), The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific 
Revolution (San Francisco: Harper & Row), p. 125.
127  In 1940, Heidegger claimed that ‘the idea of “organism” and of the “organic” is 
a purely modern, mechanistic-technological concept’ (Martin Heidegger (1976 
[1967]), ‘On the Being and Conception of φύσις in Aristotle’s Physics B, 1,’ Man and 
World 9(3), 219–70 (p. 234)). This claim is stronger, and more contentious, than is 
required for the present argument.
128  Merchant (1980), The Death of Nature, p. xxii.
129  Merchant (1980), The Death of Nature, p. xx.
130  Merchant (1980), The Death of Nature, pp. 103–126. Works cited include: Giovanni 
Battista della Porta’s Magiae naturalis (published 1558); Bernardino Telesio’s De 
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organic world picture may not have been a pre-revolutionary institution 
after all, but rather a revolutionary challenger subsequently replaced 
by its equally revolutionary rival, the mechanical world picture. The 
ancient notion of a female earth may well have been replaced along with 
its cosmological counterpart, but it does not follow from this that this 
ancient notion represents a cosmology, an image of the world conceived 
as a whole.
On these admittedly fragile grounds, I tentatively suggest that the 
conflict between organic and mechanical philosophies was not a cause, 
but rather a consequence, of the rise of early-modern science. This was 
a struggle between two emergent conceptions of the world as a whole. 
It thus presupposed that the world can be so conceived, that is, as a 
whole. The institutionalisation of this presupposition was, I suggest, 
one of the most significant and far-reaching effects of early-modern 
scientific culture. It entailed not just that things be conceived in terms 
of a uniform measure, but that the world itself also be so conceived, 
as a thing disciplined by a single measure, a uniform image, a basic 
blueprint.
We may thus question Elizabeth Potter’s attempt to assimilate the 
dispute between Boyle and Line to the broader ideological dispute 
between mechanical and organic cosmologies. Potter attempts to slot 
Line’s thread hypothesis into an organic philosophy, calling it a ‘non-
mechanistic assumption’ which presupposes the idea of ‘[a] World 
Spirit or Nature having consciousness and feelings.’131 The implication 
is that Line conceived of the world as possessing consciousness and 
feeling, that is, as being a living, sentient organism.
Potter’s argument follows Boyle’s own by forcing a necessary 
connection between Line’s thread hypothesis and his affirmation of 
the metaphysical doctrine of horror vacui. Yet, as I have argued, this 
connection may also be viewed as contingent. Indeed, Boyle insisted on 
the contingency of the relation between his own spring hypothesis and 
any further metaphysical doctrine. So why deny the same treatment to 
rerum natura iuxta propia principia (published 1565); Giordano Bruno’s Spaccio de la 
bestia trionfante (published 1584); Tommaso Campanella’s De sensu rerum et magia 
(published 1620). Note that all of these works appeared after Nicolaus Copernicus’s 
De revolutionibus orbium coelestium (published 1543), with which the beginning of 
the Scientific Revolution is often credited.
131  Potter (2001), Gender and Boyle’s Law of Gases, p. 160.
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Line? Furthermore, it is worth repeating that Line was obliged, as a Jesuit, 
to affirm the horror vacui. What is more, one may doubt whether this 
doctrine, when affirmed by a Jesuit, was meant to slot into an organic 
cosmology which construed the world as a living, conscious being. This 
construal is much stronger than the more modest claim that nature acts 
to prevent a vacuum. In order to attribute this act to nature, one need not 
ascribe to it consciousness and feeling. Like human activity, the activity 
of nature may be non-deliberative — as when an acorn grows into an 
oak tree. When Boyle attributed an outward endeavour to corpuscles of 
air, he presumably had this non-deliberative notion of activity in mind. 
Line’s thread hypothesis need not be treated any differently.
It is worth noting that Line was a skilled mechanician, with ‘a 
reputation for ingenuity in the construction of timepieces,’ especially 
sundials.132 Indeed, in his Brief Lives, compiled in the late seventeenth 
century, John Aubrey described Line as having constructed ‘the 
finest Dialls in the World,’ and also as possessing ‘great skill in the 
Optiques.’133 On the basis of this reputation, Line was invited by Charles 
II to design and build a sophisticated sundial, ultimately comprised 
of 250 individual units, which was installed at Whitehall in 1669.134 
Hence, although Line was evidently no mechanical philosopher, he 
was certainly not unfamiliar with mechanical ways of thinking and 
working. Moreover, Line’s thread hypothesis might even be viewed in 
mechanical terms, since strings, lines, and threads seem, on a basic level, 
no less mechanical than springs. For example, Walter Charleton, elected 
to the Royal Society in 1663, gave substantial attention to threads in 
his mechanical studies of attraction and adhesion. With attraction, he 
asked: ‘Why therefore should we not conceive, that in every Curious 
and Insensible Attraction of one bodie to another, Nature makes use of 
132  Peter Davidson (2009), ‘Francis Line S. J., Explicatio horologii (1673),’ in Jesuit Books in 
the Low Countries (1540–1773): A Selection from the Maurits Sabbe Library, ed. by Paul 
Begheyn, SJ., Bernard Deprez, Rob Faesen, SJ, and Leo Kenis (Leuven: Uitgeverij 
Peeters), pp. 187–90 (p. 187).
133  John Aubrey (2014), Brief Lives, with an Apparatus for the Lives of Our English 
Mathematical Writers, vol. 1, ed. by Kate Bennett (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 
p. 151.
134  Davidson (2009), ‘Francis Line S. J., Explicatio horologii (1673),’ p. 189. Line published 
a detailed description, with illustrations, of the Whitehall sundial in 1673, in both 
Latin and English. Davidson’s entry includes reproductions of the Latin title page 
and one of Line’s illustrations.
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certain slender Hooks, Lines, Chains, or the like intercedent Instruments, 
continued from the Attrahent to the Attracted […]?’ With adhesion, he 
observed that when amber ‘is no sooner Warmed by rubbing, but there 
rise out of it certain small Lines or Threads, which adhere to a mans 
finger that toucheth it, and such as may, by gentle abduction of the 
finger, be prolonged to considerable distance.’135 It is not surprising, 
then, that Boyle sometimes treated Line’s thread hypothesis as being 
inadequately mechanical rather than as not being mechanical at all. 
For example, he argued that Line had not adequately explained how 
his thread attaches itself to the surfaces inside the Torricellian space: 
‘For I farther demand, how the Funiculus [i.e. thread] comes by such 
hooks or grapple-irons, or parts of the like shape, to take fast hold of 
all contiguous bodies, and even the smoothest, such as glass, and the 
calm surface of quicksilver.’136 Hence, Boyle does not appear to have 
judged Line’s thread hypothesis as necessarily non-mechanical. In fact, 
there is compelling reason to think that Line was quite comfortable with 
mechanical ways of thinking, and very little reason to think that he was 
committed to an organic cosmology.
More generally, I have argued that the central dispute between Boyle 
and Line cannot be reduced to a contest between distinct world pictures 
or ideologies. Instead, this dispute focussed on two different ways of 
conceptualising the directedness of natural processes, particularly in 
the context of the Torricellian experiment: either inward or outward. 
However, even this difference was not at the core of the dispute. At 
its centre, the dispute had instead to do with exclusivity versus 
inclusivity vis-à-vis the question of directedness. Boyle favoured an 
exclusive explanatory role for his spring hypothesis. Line, in contrast, 
sought only to win a legitimate place for his hypothesis alongside 
Boyle’s own. He appears to have followed a piecemeal and pluralistic 
approach, incompatible with exclusivity, whereas Boyle was guided by 
an exclusive conception, a basic blueprint and uniform measure, of the 
thingness of things — what I have called the Galilean First Thing. As a 
135  Walter Charleton (1654 [1966]), Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charltoniana: Or 
a Fabrick of Science Natural, Upon the Hypothesis of Atoms (New York: Johnson 
Reproductions), pp. 344, 345.
136  Boyle (1662), A Defence of the Doctrine Touching the Spring and Weight of the Air, p. 142.
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consequence, Boyle was, on my argument, a mathematical philosopher, 
while Line (a professor of mathematics in Liège) was not.
This argument entails a significant modification, but not a 
rejection, of Kuhn’s distinction between early-modern mathematical 
and experimental traditions. While still describing distinct arenas 
of epistemic practice, these traditions should be viewed as the sub-
traditions of an emerging, broader early-modern tradition wherein 
things came increasingly to be experienced according to a single, 
uniform measure. This homogenisation of thing-experience was 
marked by a consolidation of the final causes of things under this one 
basic measure. As a consequence, the proper place of the scientific 
thing — the end towards which it naturally moves in becoming what 
it is — was rendered qualitatively uniform. Early-modern experimental 
philosophers did not, in practice, reject final causes in their attempts 
to understand the things of nature. Instead, what made their manner 
of working new was its dependency on a basic blueprint, a uniform 
projection of the thingness of things. According to Heidegger, the 
existential growth of this dependency was a defining feature of the 
mathematisation of early-modern science. This was a process whereby 
experimental apparatus could now be reliably used to release the 
scientific thing from the external constraints which prevented it from 
realising its own indigenous end. In other words, the experiment was 
designed to let the thing be what it is. Experimental art supported and 
supplemented nature by helping the thing approach its proper place 
within a mathematically projected cosmos.

Chapter Seven  
 
Conclusion: Subjects, Systems, and 
Other Unfinished Business
Heidegger delivered his lectures on Galileo, Newton, and mathēsis 
during the winter semester of 1935–1936. In the autumn of 1935, just 
before, or just as, this lecture course was getting started, Heidegger 
also hosted, over the course of several days, a discussion by two 
distinguished German scientists: the physiologist and physician Viktor 
von Weizsäcker, and the physicist Werner Heisenberg. The discussion 
took place in Heidegger’s small cabin, perched on the slope of a 
meadow above the Black Forest village of Todtnauberg. Also present, 
among others, was Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, a nephew of the 
older von Weizsäcker and a student of both Heisenberg and Niels 
Bohr. The younger von Weizsäcker would later become a distinguished 
nuclear physicist in his own right. The meeting in Todtnauberg marked 
the beginning of the younger von Weizsäcker’s long friendship with 
Heidegger, one which lasted until Heidegger’s death in 1976.
According to von Weizsäcker’s later recollection, the participants of 
the meeting crowded around the narrow table in Heidegger’s tiny living 
room, with Heidegger seated at the table head, Viktor von Weizsäcker 
and Heisenberg on either side of him, and Carl von Weizsäcker at 
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the foot, facing Heidegger.1 The two scientists spoke at length with 
one another, ‘each interested in the other, but, in fact, separated by a 
chasm.’ Heisenberg was deeply preoccupied with the ‘abyss opened 
by the unsought after discovery of the inseparability of subject and 
object in quantum theory,’ but he felt one could not live in this abyss. 
He insisted on ‘a precise explanation of the role of the subject as 
observer, as experimenter.’ Viktor von Weizsäcker, in contrast, wanted 
just as badly to see the subject as a ‘living object’: ‘He did not view the 
objective observer of quantum theory as a subject at all.’ When the two 
scientists had anchored themselves deep in mutual misunderstanding, 
Heidegger intervened.
‘You, Mr. von Weizsäcker, seem to mean the following.’ Three crystal 
clear sentences. ‘Yes, that’s exactly what I wanted to say.’ ‘And you, Mr. 
Heisenberg, probably mean this.’ Three sentences of the same kind, and 
the answer: ‘Yes, that’s how I picture it.’ ‘Then the relation could be the 
following’: Four or five short sentences. Both agreed: ‘It could be like 
that.’ The dialogue continued until Heidegger had to help them out of 
the next impasse.
A year earlier, in 1934, when the young von Weizsäcker was working 
with Bohr in Copenhagen, he bought a copy of Being and Time and 
read it alongside Kant’s work. Although he had trouble understanding 
the writings of both, he felt Heidegger came closer than any other 
philosopher to the ‘unsolved problems’ he faced in his own work.2 Later, 
in a 1949 essay on the ‘Relations of Theoretical Physics to Heidegger’s 
Thinking,’ von Weizsäcker observed that ‘the substantive separation of 
the res cogitans and res extensa is the methodological presupposition of 
the classical natural sciences in their entirety.’ The methodological purity 
of these classical sciences forbids the mixing of the two. Furthermore, 
the ideal of classical physics had been to speak only of one of the two 
Cartesian substances: ‘It should speak of the object as if there were no 
subject whose object it is or can be.’ With the new physics, in contrast, 
a physicist who asks what the atom is ‘has every reason not to repeat 
Descartes’s error’ by determining this ‘is’ in terms of the properties of 
1  Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker (1977a), ‘Begegnungen in vier Jahrzehnten,’ in 
Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger, ed. by Günther Neske (Pfullingen: Verlag Neske), 
pp. 239–47 (pp. 239–40); my translations.
2  von Weizsäcker (1977a), ‘Begegnungen in vier Jahrzehnten,’ pp. 240–41.
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a discrete substance, but instead ‘to follow Heidegger in questioning 
what “being” itself means.’3
Despite Heidegger’s impartial adjudication of the debate between 
the older von Weizsäcker and Heisenberg, it is clear that the younger 
von Weizsäcker viewed Heidegger’s philosophy as directly (though not 
entirely) supportive of the new physics, and as directly critical of the 
classical understanding exemplified by his uncle Viktor. Indeed, as we 
saw in Chapter One, Heidegger traced the original impulse of modern 
treatments of the subject as a ‘living object’ not just back to Descartes, but 
still further back to Aristotle’s definition of the human being as zōon logon 
echon, later interpreted to mean ‘animal rationale,’ a living thing capable 
of reason. In Chapter Four, we then saw how, according to Heidegger, 
this ancient view was transformed (among other things, Christianised) 
within the framework of Descartes’s substance ontology. The living 
thing becomes a discrete substance, an object with the properties of life 
and reason. By insisting that the subject be understood reductively as a 
living object, Viktor von Weizsäcker appears to have been reproducing 
the modern entanglement of Cartesian ontology and the methods of 
classical science. The Cartesian subject continues to circulate beneath 
the elder von Weizsäcker’s commitment to an object ontology, asserting 
its presence through those deliberate methodological acts which, 
paradoxically, seek to erase it from the realm of legitimate scientific 
discourse. At least, this is how I imagine it would have looked from 
the perspectives of Heidegger, Heisenberg, and Carl von Weizsäcker. 
On the other hand, Heisenberg’s insistence on the need for a precise 
explanation of the scientific subject would have presumably looked to 
the older von Weizsäcker like a regressive move threatening the basic 
methodological presuppositions of established scientific method, and 
hence the prevailing norms of objective knowledge production.4
3  Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker (1990 [1949]), ‘Beziehungen der theoretischen 
Physik zum Denken Heideggers,’ in Zum Weltbild der Physik, 13th edn, by Carl 
Friedrich von Weizsäcker (Stuttgart: S. Hirzel Verlag), pp. 243–45 (pp. 244–45); my 
translations.
4  On the relationship between Heidegger and Heisenberg, see: Cathryn Carson 
(2010), ‘Science as Instrumental Reason: Heidegger, Habermas, Heisenberg,’ 
Continental Philosophy Review 42(4), 483–509; Bernard Freydberg (2002), ‘What 
Becomes of Science in “The Future of Phenomenology”?,’ Research in Phenomenology 
32(1), 219–29; Trish Glazebrook (2000a), Heidegger’s Philosophy of Science (New York: 
Fordham University Press), pp. 247–51; Werner Heisenberg (1959), ‘Grundlegende 
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One central goal of this book has been to provide a more precise 
account of the subjectivity of the scientific subject — in a nutshell, to 
elaborate an account of science as social existence. This has involved the 
combination of SSK with Heidegger’s existential conception of science. 
This combination is based, among other things, on the phenomenological 
deconstruction of the Cartesian subject-object distinction in its entirety, 
rather than on the reductive collapse of the subject-side of the distinction 
into its object-side.
Yet, from a certain perspective, this method may appear lamentably 
misguided, as it insists on a necessary role for the subject. The first three 
chapters of this book considered a number of criticisms which appear 
to have been motivated by this perspective. Looking back, I would 
like to suggest (not without mischief) that these criticisms may be 
labelled as either conservative or liberal. Chapter One briefly addressed 
the conservative criticism, and Chapters Two and Three addressed 
variations of the liberal criticism. On my reading, the conservative feels 
threatened by the thematisation of the subject because she believes 
that the prevailing methods of science prohibit a place for subjects. 
Instead, she emphasises the strictly object-based nature of knowledge: 
the subject must be suppressed in order to conserve the propriety of 
established scientific norms. The liberal, in turn, feels threatened by 
attention to the subject because she views this as a sly attempt to reassert 
the authority of the subject-object distinction, and thus to re-impose 
an unwelcome and atavistic constraint on the recently won autonomy 
of the post-Cartesian scientific imagination. Despite their differences, 
both criticisms mistakenly believe that a methodological orientation 
to the subject must be underpinned by an essentialist commitment to 
Cartesian substance ontology.
The conservative critics mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 
One accuse SSK practitioners of handling their alleged Cartesian 
Voraussetzungen in der Physik der Elementarteilchen,’ in Martin Heidegger zum 
Siebzigsten Geburtstag. Festschrift, ed. by Günther Neske (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther 
Neske), pp. 291–97; Werner Heisenberg (1977), ‘Brief an Martin Heidegger zum 
80. Geburtstag,’ in Dem Andenken Martin Heideggers. Zum 26. Mai 1976 (Frankfurt: 
Vittorio Klostermann), pp. 44–45; Hans-Peter Hempel (1990), Natur und Geschichte. 
Der Jahrhundertdialog zwischen Heidegger und Heisenberg (Frankfurt: Hain); and Hans 
Seigfried (1990), ‘Autonomy and Quantum Physics: Nietzsche, Heidegger, and 
Heisenberg,’ Philosophy of Science 57(4), 619–30.
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commitment with incompetence. For these critics, the object-based 
method is meant to capture the independently existing object without 
interference from the subject. SSK practitioners argue that this is not 
possible, because knowledge of the object necessarily implicates the 
knowing subject. The critics interpret this as scepticism about the 
existence of an independent object of knowledge, or, put otherwise, 
scepticism about the fundamental separability of object from subject. 
This is more generally framed as scepticism about the existence of the 
external world. This scepticism, so the critics say, results from SSK’s 
incompetent failure to protect the object-side from corruption by the 
subject-side of the Cartesian ontological schema. In other words, it 
results from an incompetent failure to follow the established methods 
of classical science.
I have argued that this criticism misjudges SSK in both motive 
and method. SSK practitioners deliberately seek to follow the 
methodological conventions of science by affirming the existence of 
an external world. At the same time, however, they wish to radically 
reform the theory of knowledge arising from the Cartesian schema. 
This attempted reform, I have suggested, has not been radical enough, 
and this has led to significant tensions in SSK’s attitude towards 
external-world scepticism, tensions which have been effectively 
exploited by critics, conservative and liberal alike. I argued that SSK 
can resolve these tensions by adopting Heidegger’s phenomenological 
deconstruction of the Cartesian schema, a move which explains the 
subject-object distinction in terms of a more basic subject-world relation. 
Now the subject is no longer seen as a social substance gaining access 
to an external world, but as an entity whose basic modes of existence 
include being-in-the-world and being-with-others. With this move, an 
affirmation of the existence of an external world becomes meaningless, 
because the subject is not something to which a world can be external. 
This move may be viewed as a preliminary answer to Heisenberg’s call 
for a more precise explanation of the scientific subject, the experimenter, 
following the collapse of the orthodox subject-object distinction in the 
early twentieth century.
The liberal critic of Chapter Two was Joseph Rouse, who accuses 
both Heidegger and SSK practitioners of espousing a theory-dominant 
account of science. I challenged this criticism in both cases, while 
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acknowledging that, in the case of SSK, Rouse makes some good 
points. Indeed, he exploits the tensions just mentioned in order to 
charge SSK with a ‘vestigial commitment to epistemology.’ By this he 
means a commitment to the Cartesian schema. According to Rouse, 
SSK practitioners seek to separate social and natural phenomena into 
autonomous domains, and they must then face the sceptical problem 
of how the constructive social domain achieves access to the natural 
domain in the production of knowledge. Rouse reads this as an atavistic 
recapitulation of the subject-object distinction, where the subject is a 
relatively rigid social substance and nature the discrete object of its 
epistemic attentions. Yet, without claiming that SSK practitioners have 
slipped entirely free from this schema, I argued that Rouse dramatically 
suppresses the not inconsiderable ways in which they have recognised 
the instability and dynamism of the social realm.
Rouse’s argument that Heidegger, too, espouses a theory-dominant 
account of science is based on his claim that Heidegger’s mathematical 
projection of nature is a theoretical phenomenon. In particular, 
Heidegger’s emphasis on this allegedly theoretical projection 
purportedly leads him to dismiss experimental practice as merely 
incidental to scientific activity. In response, I have argued, over several 
chapters, that Heidegger’s mathematical projection is the existential 
condition which makes modern scientific activity — both theoretical 
and experimental — possible. In his alternative proposal, Rouse turns 
this explanatory model on its head, arguing instead that meaning-
constitutive scientific practices are, in fact, the condition of possibility 
for existence. The existence of subjects and objects is to be explained 
by practices, and not the other way around. Hence, the explanatory 
role of Heidegger’s mathematical projection — as a historical mode of 
scientific subjectivity — is neutralised. In his proposed alternative to 
SSK, Rouse likewise seeks to dissolve the distinction between social 
subject and natural object in an ever-circulating field of heterogeneous 
scientific practices. Here, too, the explanatory role of the social subject 
has been neutralised.
In my view, such attempts to erase — rather than to deconstruct 
and transform — the traditional distinctions of subject and object, 
society and nature, mind and body, and theory and practice serve a 
particular conception of freedom, one which regards such distinctions 
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as placing an unnecessary and unwelcome constraint on the free play 
of intellectual analysis. Underpinning this conception is a particular 
idea of the human being. This is an idea which credits the human being 
with an intrinsic ability to throw off the cognitive constraints of its social 
and historical circumstances, so as to achieve autonomy. It is, in other 
words, an idea which directly challenges the finitude of human reason 
and imagination.
This brings us to the liberal critic of Chapter Three, Bruno Latour. 
My analysis focussed narrowly on Latour’s debate, in the 1990s, with 
David Bloor. In inviting his readers to take ‘one more turn after the 
social turn,’ Latour argued that the symmetry principle, a central tenet of 
SSK, uncritically reproduces the subject-object schema as formulated by 
Immanuel Kant. According to Latour, SSK is grounded in a distinction 
between a ‘subject pole’ and an ‘object pole,’ with all of SSK’s explanatory 
resources being gathered around the subject pole, and none at all being 
drawn to the object pole. He declares this asymmetrical, and proposes 
that all explanatory resources should be removed from the subject 
pole as well, leaving both the subject and the object equally useless 
in explanations of scientific knowledge production. Under this new, 
and allegedly more thoroughgoing, symmetry, the subject and object, 
society and nature, themselves become topics requiring explanation. As 
with Rouse, they are to be explained in terms of fields of circulating 
scientific practice. Thus the explanatory significance of the social subject 
has once again been neutralised.
I argued that Latour, like Rouse, exploits genuine tensions in the 
SSK literature, but likewise exaggerates their significance, consequently 
suppressing the extent to which SSK practitioners have sought to 
radically reformulate the orthodox subject-object distinction. In my view, 
to acknowledge such efforts would have compromised Latour’s main 
goal: to promote an unrestrained constructivity, stripped of its social 
and historical constraints, as the fundamental explanatory resource for 
studies of science.
I suggested that we can better understand what is at stake in the 
debate between Bloor and Latour by considering Heidegger’s own 
analysis of the Kantian version of the subject-object distinction. Kant 
construes the object as a thing-in-itself. On Heidegger’s reading, the 
thing-in-itself marks the extreme limit of human understanding. It is that 
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aspect of nature which continually outstrips our correspondingly finite 
ability to make sense of it, to draw it into the snare of our constructive 
power. The thing-in-itself thus represents independently existing 
nature, and so figures as a basic presupposition in the position I have 
called ‘minimal realism.’ Accordingly, I argued that Latour’s attack on 
the thing-in-itself amounts to a rejection of both minimal realism and 
the finitude of human understanding. As a consequence, Latour may be 
viewed as embracing a concept of unrestrained constructivity, as well as 
a position which I have dubbed ‘pragmatic idealism.’
My main goal in these concluding reflections is not to relaunch my 
earlier critique of the positive doctrines of these liberal critics, but instead 
to reemphasise the inadequacy of their alleged refutations of SSK and 
Heidegger’s existential conception of science. They have not succeeded 
in refuting these positions because they have not properly understood 
them. I will, nevertheless, offer the opinion that these critics have also 
failed in their positive attempt to radically liberate themselves from 
the subject-object distinction. Rather than superseding the informal, 
existential root of this distinction (that is, our feeling of directedness 
towards independently existing things), they have instead succeeded 
only in suppressing it as a topic of analysis, and hence as a potential 
basis for understanding science. As a result, these critics seem to grant 
free licence to the subject’s activities while simultaneously withholding 
the conceptual tools by which to properly analyse and explain those 
activities. This unfortunate circumstance may be viewed as a form 
of — perhaps unwitting — intellectual dissimulation: the concealment 
of a concept which, in fact, plays a central role in the position being 
promoted. This concealed concept is, of course, the concept of the 
subject.
In contrast to this, Chapters Four, Five, and Six investigated the 
scientific subject as one side of a phenomenologically grounded 
distinction between thinking and things. One central consequence of 
this investigation has been to improve our understanding of the concept 
of scientific practice. The liberal dissimulation sinks the subject beneath 
the surface of a smoothly functioning system of practices, thereby 
masking the subject’s crucial role in the constitution of those practices. 
The reintroduction of the subject allows us to topicalise practices in a 
way discouraged by those who, paradoxically, promote practice as one 
of their primary explanatory resources. By topicalising practices, we can 
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develop a better understanding of what practices are, and this, in turn, 
will enable us to better control and apply the concept of practice as a 
central explanatory resource.
These considerations now allow us to segue back to Carl von 
Weizsäcker’s reflections on Heidegger and post-classical physics. Von 
Weizsäcker felt that Heidegger’s ruminations on the question of being 
could guide him in his attempt to overcome the classical Cartesian image 
of the atom as a property-bearing substance. Heisenberg, in kind, was 
searching for a new post-Cartesian understanding of the experimenter-
subject’s role vis-à-vis the atom and other experimentally detectable 
objects. As we have seen, Heidegger’s question of being may be treated 
as a question about the meaning of the word ‘being.’ He argues that 
‘being’ is a polysemous word, with connotations of both existence and 
essence, that-being and what-being. Hence, to ask about the being of the 
atom is to ask both whether it is and what it is.
I have argued that to assert the independent existence of a thing 
to which an experimental term refers is to be a minimal realist about 
that thing; it is to assert that the thing is, that it exists. This assertion 
formally articulates, in propositional terms, our experience of that 
thing’s independent existence, an experience grounded in our 
receptivity towards, our ability to be affected by, that thing. On the 
basis of this experience, we know that the thing is, but not what it is; 
we can state whether it is, but not what it is. In contrast, being able 
to say what the thing is depends on our being able to experience it in 
its whatness as well as its thatness. This experience is grounded in our 
projective understanding of the thing, our ability to make sense of it, 
to construct it as meaningful. This experience, too, may be formally 
articulated in propositional statements about what the thing is, about its 
essence. Such acts of articulation may, however, also be non-linguistic, 
as, for example, in the case of a laboratory set-up, constructed to let 
the thing be what it is for the disciplined experience of an attentive 
observer. That the experimenter’s experience is disciplined points to 
the sociological — in addition to the psychological, biological, and 
technological — conditions which give shape to that experience. For 
this reason, topicalising the scientific subject invites the application of 
psychological, biological, technological, and sociological explanatory 
resources.
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We can now see how von Weizsäcker’s question about the being of 
the atom and Heisenberg’s question about the role of the experimenting 
subject come together. The that-being and what-being of the atom 
correlate, respectively, to the receptivity and constructivity of the 
scientific subject. Hence, in order to understand the being of the atom, 
we must also investigate the structure of scientific experience. This is 
why Heidegger argued that the question of being points necessarily 
towards the existential structure of the subject (Dasein), towards a 
phenomenological analysis of the subjectivity of the subject. As we 
have seen, Heidegger’s analysis picks out at least four basic, interrelated 
characteristics of that subjectivity: (1) being-in-the-world; (2) being-
with-others; (3) understanding; and (4) affectivity.
In Chapter One, the first characteristic was used to help SSK 
practitioners in their realist response to the external-world sceptic. 
According to Heidegger, being-in-the-world is a basic state of subjectivity 
when experienced in more immediate non-Cartesian and non-Kantian 
terms. But it is not the only basic state. The second characteristic — being-
with-others — is an equally basic aspect of subjectivity. Indeed, 
Heidegger writes that ‘[t]he world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]. 
Being-in is Being-with Others.’5 However, Heidegger did not develop 
this second characteristic of subjectivity as thoroughly as he did the first 
characteristic. I have used the insights and empirical studies of SSK to 
help mitigate this deficiency in Heidegger’s work, first with respect to 
the social foundations of logic, in Chapter Four, and then with respect 
to the emergence of early-modern experimental practice, in Chapter Six. 
Certainly a good deal more work could still be done in this area.
The third basic characteristic of subjectivity — understanding — has 
received ample attention throughout the preceding chapters. This 
characteristic picks out the fundamentally cognitive aspect of subjectivity, 
an aspect underpinning and enabling all knowledge, whether it be tacit 
or explicit, non-propositional or propositional, practical or theoretical. 
Much attention has also been given to the changes-over from tacit to 
5  Martin Heidegger (1962a [1927]), Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and 
Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell), p. 155 [118]. (Following scholarly convention, 
page numbers in square brackets refer to the original 1927 German edition of Being 
and Time.) Cf. Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 163 [125]: ‘So far as Dasein is, it 
has Being-with-one-another as its kind of Being.’
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explicit, non-propositional to propositional, and practical to theoretical 
forms of cognition. For Heidegger, all of these changes-over occur 
against the continuous backdrop of the subject’s elemental state of 
understandingly being in the world with others. As we have seen, a key 
structure of this understanding is projection. Accordingly, Heidegger 
viewed the emergence of early-modern scientific practice and theory 
against the existential backdrop of a mathematical projection of the 
thingness of things. Understanding may thus be viewed in terms of the 
projective constructivity of the subject.
The fourth basic characteristic of the subjectivity of the 
subject — affectivity — has received comparatively little attention in this 
book. Indeed, I directly addressed it only in Chapter Three, and again, 
more briefly, in Chapter Four, as part of a discussion of the receptivity 
of the subject. The argument in Chapter Three was that Heidegger’s 
construal of receptivity as affectivity grounds his reinterpretation (not 
rejection) of the Kantian thing-in-itself. Affectivity is thus a core concept 
of minimal realism. Things affect us, therefore they exist. I drew from 
clinical studies of anxiety to empirically support this claim.
In Chapter Four, we saw that Kant, in Heidegger’s reading, recognised 
the affective nature of receptivity in his phenomenology of respect for 
rules. The compulsive character of this respect provides an existential 
condition of possibility for thinking and doing, for understanding, 
as such. Our affectivity vis-à-vis rules for understanding helps to 
explain their normative power as guides for our thinking and doing. 
However, as we also saw, in Heidegger’s account it is not towards the 
rules themselves that our respect is directed, but towards the persons, 
the community, generating and sustaining those rules. On this basis, 
I developed the implications of Heidegger’s phenomenology of rule-
following by joining it with the more empirical work of SSK, summed 
up in Bloor’s observation that ‘[w]e are compelled by rules in so far as 
we, collectively, compel one another.’6
However, unlike in the case of being-with-others, SSK can offer few 
resources for developing Heidegger’s meagre account of the affective 
dimension of scientific subjectivity. Indeed, against the backdrop of 
Heidegger’s claim that ‘Dasein-with is already essentially manifest in a 
6  David Bloor (1997b), Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions (London: Routledge), p. 22.
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co-affectivity and a co-understanding,’ we may judge SSK to have been 
far more concerned with co-understanding than with co-affectivity.7 
This is a serious deficiency, one also reflected in the pages of this 
book. Despite the substantial attention which has already been given 
to changes-over in understanding, these changes-over will never be 
properly understood until comparable attention has been also given 
to the corresponding changes-over in affectivity. Although Heidegger 
argued that ‘[u]nderstanding always has its mood,’ and although he 
recognised ‘[t]he fact that moods can […] change over,’ he gave scarcely 
any attention to the affective structure of cognitive changes-over in 
understanding.8 For their part, SSK practitioners have likewise failed 
to produce studies systematically focussed on the affective aspect of 
scientific knowledge production.
I view this deficiency as ‘unfinished business,’ and thus as an 
invitation for future research. Accordingly, the remainder of this chapter 
will point forward, towards areas where valuable scholarly work might 
still be done. In moving forward, then, let us begin by first looking back, 
one last time, to Carl von Weizsäcker’s reflections on Heidegger and 
twentieth-century science. Despite his high regard for Heidegger, von 
Weizsäcker also points to deficiencies in Heidegger’s knowledge of the 
natural sciences. Von Weizsäcker’s criticism hinges on Heidegger’s later 
reflections, from the 1940s onward, on the relationship between modern 
physics and modern technology, and so carries us beyond the scope of 
Heidegger’s earlier work, which has been the main focus of this book. 
Let us review some of Heidegger’s later reflections before considering 
von Weizsäcker’s criticism.
In 1953, Heidegger presented a lecture, published in 1954 as ‘The 
Question Concerning Technology,’ in which he argued that ‘[t]he 
modern physical theory of nature prepares the way […] for the essence 
of technology,’ and that it does so because it ‘pursues and entraps 
[stellt] nature as a calculable coherence of forces.’9 The implication is 
7  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 205 [162]; translation modified.
8  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, pp. 182 [143], 173 [134].
9  Martin Heidegger (1977b [1954]), ‘The Question Concerning Technology,’ in The 
Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, by Martin Heidegger, trans. by 
William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row), pp. 3–35 (pp. 22, 21); my brackets. Cf. 
Martin Heidegger (1954a), ‘Die Frage nach der Technik,’ in Vorträge und Aufsätze, by 
Martin Heidegger (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske), pp. 9–40 (p. 25).
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that modern physics paves the way for modern technology, because 
it ‘entraps’ nature. However, ‘entraps’ is a misleading translation of 
stellen, which typically means ‘to place.’ Indeed, just a few lines earlier, 
Heidegger had made clear that stellen, in his specialised usage, reflects 
two different meanings: first, an ‘ordering which challenges forth’ (das 
herausfordernde Bestellen); second, a ‘producing which brings forth’ (das 
hervorbringende Her-stellen).10 He states that these two meanings are 
‘fundamentally different, and yet they remain related in their essence.’11 
The word ‘entraps’ emphasises the first meaning of stellen, and suppresses 
the second. To more succinctly express this first meaning, Heidegger 
proposes the word Ge-stell, typically translated, for this purpose, as 
‘enframing.’12 As the essence of modern technology, enframing places 
nature in a frame, just as ‘entrap’ means to place something in a trap. 
To more succinctly express the second, contrasting meaning of stellen, 
Heidegger uses the ancient Greek word poiēsis, which is meant to 
signify the kind of the non-modern technical production typical of art, 
poetry, and handicraft.13 Heidegger thus denotes the double meaning 
he ascribes to stellen by the concepts of enframing and poiēsis.
As just mentioned, Heidegger states that these two meanings 
are fundamentally different, but he also says that they are related 
‘in their essence.’ They are essentially related because ‘[b]oth are 
ways of revealing.’14 For Heidegger, revealing means ‘com[ing] into 
unconcealment.’15 This may be glossed as a thing’s being moved, 
metaphorically, from hiddenness or concealment, and placed in the 
light. Revealing thus means ‘illuminating,’ rendering a thing intelligible 
or understandable as what it is. According to Heidegger, enframing and 
poiēsis are two fundamentally different ways in which this is done, two 
fundamentally different ways in which a thing is ‘placed’ in the light of 
projective understanding.
10  Heidegger (1954a), ‘Die Frage nach der Technik,’ p. 24. Cf. Heidegger (1977b), ‘The 
Question Concerning Technology,’ p. 21.
11  Heidegger (1977b), ‘The Question Concerning Technology,’ p. 21.
12  Heidegger (1977b), ‘The Question Concerning Technology,’ p. 19. In ordinary usage, 
Gestell usually means ‘frame,’ ‘rack,’ or ‘shelf.’
13  Heidegger (1977b), ‘The Question Concerning Technology,’ p. 10.
14  Heidegger (1977b), ‘The Question Concerning Technology,’ p. 21.
15  Heidegger (1977b), ‘The Question Concerning Technology,’ p. 11.
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If placing a thing in the light of understanding means putting it in its 
proper place, the place where it may be encountered as what it is, then 
enframing and poiēsis each suggest fundamentally different conceptions 
of a thing’s proper place, and hence also of its whatness. While this is 
not how Heidegger explicitly described the difference, the grounds for 
such an interpretation have already been established in Chapters Five 
and Six, with the discussions of mathēsis and final causation. In Chapter 
Five, I argued that we need the concept of a final cause in order to make 
sense of the artful manipulation of things. The final cause explains the 
order and meaning of such manipulations, grounds their intelligibility, 
thereby distinguishing them from random, unstructured behaviour. It 
thus plays a necessary role in any comprehensive account of practice. It 
explains how a practice realises its completion in a finished thing, how 
the practice lets the thing become what it is. In Aristotelian terms, to 
let a thing become what it is means to guide it to its proper place in the 
cosmos. A practice may thus be viewed as an act of placing, regulated 
by a final cause. There will be as many final causes as there are proper 
places in the cosmos.
In Chapter Six, I laid out Heidegger’s account of the mathematisation 
of early-modern science in terms of mathēsis, a process whereby final 
causes become consolidated under a single, uniform measure. This 
uniform measure is the one final cause, the basic blueprint, regulating 
the early-modern experimental manipulation of nature. Under the 
guidance of this basic blueprint, the prevailing conception of the 
thingness, or whatness, of things is rendered uniform. As a consequence, 
the scientific thing now has only one proper place in the cosmos, and 
there is thus only one general way of properly ‘placing’ it in that cosmos, 
of letting it be what it is. Under these circumstances, the scientific thing 
is illuminated or revealed — experienced as intelligible — in the light of 
a single, homogenous understanding.
I want to now suggest that, as two different ways of placing things in 
the light of understanding, enframing and poiēsis are guided, respectively, 
by homogenous and heterogeneous pictures of place. Enframing is 
a homogenous revealing; poiēsis is a heterogeneous revealing. With 
enframing, then, the world is experienced in light of a single, uniform 
picture. With poiēsis, by contrast, the world is experienced in light of 
multiple diverse pictures.
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Heidegger calls enframing a ‘challenging revealing,’ as well as 
an ‘ordering revealing.’16 His idea seems to have been that enframing 
challenges or orders things — forcibly places, or frames, them — into a 
single, homogenous picture, in light of which we may then experience 
them as what they are. In this way, ‘[e]nframing […] blocks poiēsis,’ 
prevents us from encountering things in the heterogeneous light of 
multiply different pictures.17
On the face of it, this seems like not such a bad thing when it comes 
to scientific practice. For example, standardised terminologies and 
methods allow for effective cooperation between differently situated 
laboratories. In this sense, homogenous revealing may be viewed as 
a strength of modern science. Natural scientists are able to coordinate 
with one another, and to build on one another’s results, because they all 
inhabit, so to speak, the same general picture. Homogenous revealing 
allows for a productive co-understanding of nature among members of 
the scientific community. However, Heidegger also observes that this 
strength carries with it a danger, because the modern physical theory of 
nature ‘prepares the way’ for enframing: ‘Modern physics is the herald of 
Enframing.’18 His idea seems to have been that modern science proffers 
a standardised form of understanding which, when transported out of 
the realm of scientific practice, and into the broader realm of human 
society, poses a threat to the diverse range of understandings which 
are presumably integral to the well-being of that broader society. What 
stands as a strength in science proves to be a weakness in society in 
general. Modern machine technology provides the physical medium by 
which the homogenous revealing of modern science becomes suffused 
into society as a whole. However, as I suggested at the end of Chapter 
Six, the fact that machine technology should have provided this medium 
seems a matter of social and historical contingency. Whether one 
understands society in terms of a machine or in terms of an organism, 
one is, in both cases, conceptualising it as a whole, in light of a single, 
uniform picture. And it is this homogenisation of understanding which 
sits at the core of Heidegger’s worries about scientific and technological 
modernity.
16  Heidegger (1977b), ‘The Question Concerning Technology,’ pp. 16, 19.
17  Heidegger (1977b), ‘The Question Concerning Technology,’ p. 30.
18  Heidegger (1977b), ‘The Question Concerning Technology,’ p. 22.
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A significant question, which Heidegger leaves unanswered, is why 
this homogenisation should at all take place. Assuming Heidegger’s 
account is correct, then how should society in general have become, or 
now be under threat of becoming, wholly enframed by the homogenous 
revealing peculiar to the comparatively small community of modern 
scientists? This question is perhaps best left to historians and 
sociologists of science and technology. From the perspective presented 
here, however, their answers should give consequential attention 
to the role of subjectivity in the process. In this regard, Heidegger 
offers a phenomenological clue when he refers to the ‘irresistibility 
of ordering.’19 Because the co-understanding giving shape to modern 
science is irresistible, its application beyond the scientific realm will 
also be experienced, increasingly, as irresistible or compelling. Hence, 
alternative experiences of nature will be blocked, among them, and most 
importantly, the experience enabled by the heterogeneous revealing of 
poiēsis. In some highly speculative comments, Heidegger suggests that 
the irresistibility of enframing may somehow lead to its own dissolution, 
by bringing to light an ‘as yet unexperienced […] saving power.’20 This 
saving power will allow for a return to the heterogeneous revealing 
of poiēsis. Heidegger then wonders: ‘Could it be that the fine arts […] 
may expressly foster the growth of the saving power […]?’ This, then, 
is his highly tentative answer to the perceived threat of enframing. In 
concluding his speculations, Heidegger does not argue that, but instead 
wonders whether, the fine arts may furnish the necessary ‘restraint’ by 
which to counter the irresistibility of enframing. He thus leaves the 
question concerning technological enframing unresolved.21
19  Heidegger (1977b), ‘The Question Concerning Technology,’ p. 33.
20  Heidegger (1977b), ‘The Question Concerning Technology,’ p. 33.
21  Heidegger (1977b), ‘The Question Concerning Technology,’ pp. 35, 33. Andrew 
Feenberg has developed Heidegger’s suggestion that the fine arts may facilitate 
resistance to enframing (Andrew Feenberg (2005), Heidegger and Marcuse: The 
Catastrophe and Redemption of History (London: Routledge). I have critiqued 
Feenberg’s proposal from an SSK perspective (Jeff Kochan (2006), ‘Feenberg and 
STS: Counter-Reflections on Bridging the Gap,’ Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science 37(4): 702–20). Feenberg has responded to this criticism (Andrew Feenberg 
(2006), ‘Symmetry, Asymmetry, and the Real Possibility of Radical Change: A 
Reply to Kochan,’ Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 37(4), 721–27). 
Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch have thrown their hats into the debate as well 
(Harry M. Collins and Trevor Pinch (2007), ‘Who Is to Blame for the Challenger 
Explosion?,’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 38(1), 254–55). Wiebe Bijker 
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There is much to contend with here. For present purposes, however, 
let us limit ourselves to von Wiezsäcker’s response to Heidegger.22 Von 
Weizsäcker argues that Heidegger was right to identify enframing as 
‘the signature of our time.’ Nevertheless, Heidegger’s own reflections 
on enframing were handicapped, he writes, because ‘Heidegger was 
unable to think the natural sciences through to their base.’ In von 
Weizsäcker’s view, the reason that an alternative to enframing has 
not yet presented itself ‘lies in the fact that the path of science has 
not yet reached its end.’23 As a physicist, von Weizsäcker felt himself 
obliged to follow scientific understanding to its conclusion, and he 
expressed mild optimism that an alternative would be thus disclosed, 
while he remained sensitive to the risk and uncertainty of the venture: 
‘The saving power is already intangibly present here in the middle of 
the world of tangibility. The prospecting and trespass of paths in the 
danger is accessible through planning and is therefore an obligation.’24 
The ‘planning’ to which von Weizsäcker refers seems to deliberately 
depend on empirical-causal analysis guided by the homogenising 
revealing of enframing. He describes enframing as ‘the deconstruction 
of reality in conceptual acts of imagination, and the attempt to 
reconstruct the whole as the sum of interacting parts.’25 For him, the 
and Trevor Pinch cite this exchange as exemplifying debates over whether SSK (and 
its offshoot, the social construction of technological systems, or SCOTS) provide 
grounds for a political critique of science and technology (Wiebe E. Bijker and 
Trevor Pinch (2012), ‘Preface to the Anniversary Edition,’ in The Social Construction 
of Technological Systems: New Directions in Sociology and History of Technology (25th 
Anniversary Edition), ed. by Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes and Trevor Pinch 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), pp. xi–xxxiv (p. xxvii n. 3)).
22  For my part, I have responded to Latour’s Heideggeresque claim that modern 
science ‘transform[s] society into a vast laboratory’ by arguing that the field sciences 
offer an alternative model, one contrary to the epistemic imperialism implicit in 
Latour’s laboratory model (Bruno Latour (1983), ‘Give Me a Laboratory and I Will 
Raise the World,’ in Science Observed: Perspectives on the Social Study of Science, ed. by 
Karin D. Knorr-Cetina and Michael Mulkay (London: SAGE), pp. 141–70 (p. 166)). I 
gloss the subjectivity of this alternative in terms of ‘epistemic neighbourliness’ (Jeff 
Kochan (2015d), ‘Objective Styles in Northern Field Science,’ Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science 52, 1–12).
23  Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker (1977b), ‘Heidegger und die Naturwissenschaft,’ 
in Der Garten des Menschlichen: Beiträge zur geschichtlichen Anthropologie, by Carl 
Friedrich von Weizsäcker (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag), pp. 413–31 (pp. 431, 413–
14, 427); my translations.
24  von Weizsäcker (1977b), ‘Heidegger und die Naturwissenschaft,’ p. 431.
25  von Weizsäcker (1977b), ‘Heidegger und die Naturwissenschaft,’ p. 431.
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‘whole’ to be deconstructed and reconstructed includes the subject. 
He writes that ‘[t]he reflexive or phenomenological self-awareness 
of the subject can be supported or corrected by the causal insight of 
the natural sciences.’26 The idea seems to be that subjectivity should 
be drawn within the frame of a world picture, where it will then be 
analytically deconstructed and reconstructed in a process which will, 
so von Weizsäcker hopes, ultimately disclose a mode of understanding 
which enables ‘restraint’ in the face of the ‘irresistibility’ of enframing. 
Where Heidegger saw the path from enframing back to poiēsis as 
travelling through the fine arts, von Weizsäcker saw it as travelling 
more deeply into the natural sciences, or, more specifically, more 
deeply into the dynamics of enframing itself. Indeed, he even named 
the scientific field most likely to yield this result: ‘[t]his conceptual 
reconstruction of a whole is today called systems theory.’27 For him, an 
answer to the danger posed by modern technological thinking lies in 
the direction of systems theory, the scientific discipline of cybernetics.
Von Weizsäcker argues that in order to understand the conditions 
of possibility for modern science and technology, that is, in order to 
understand the origins of enframing, we must investigate ‘the basic 
condition of possibility for conceptual thinking as such.’28 In other words, 
the focus of his proposed system-theoretic investigation of enframing is 
squarely centred on an understanding of the subjectivity of the subject. 
The subject is to be viewed in cybernetic terms, as an entity existing 
within a self-regulating system. And this system, in turn, is to be viewed 
in ecological terms, as the physical surroundings in which conceptual 
thinking, as such, emerges, stabilises, and evolves. Von Weizsäcker’s 
hope was that cybernetics will discover the ‘fundamental laws 
formulat[ing] the way and manner by which a conceptual-empirical 
thinking of what is can be the case.’ More specifically, these laws will 
describe the logic of objective experience, that is, the rules governing 
‘the correctness of behaviour [a]s adaequatio ad rem, adaptation to the 
conditions of the ecological niche.’29 In a nutshell, then, von Weizsäcker 
proposed a cybernetic theory of normativity.
26  von Weizsäcker (1977b), ‘Heidegger und die Naturwissenschaft,’ p. 429.
27  von Weizsäcker (1977b), ‘Heidegger und die Naturwissenschaft,’ p. 431.
28  von Weizsäcker (1977b), ‘Heidegger und die Naturwissenschaft,’ p. 429.
29  von Weizsäcker (1977b), ‘Heidegger und die Naturwissenschaft,’ pp. 428, 429.
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Although von Weizsäcker comments that Heidegger had never tried 
to dissuade him from his interest in cybernetics, Heidegger did, in fact, 
otherwise express clear scepticism about cybernetics in his later work, 
especially in respect of what he understood to be that theory’s account 
of subjectivity. In an essay from the late 1960s, Heidegger writes that 
‘the new fundamental science that is called cybernetics […] corresponds 
to the determination of man as an acting social animal [handelnd-
gesellschaftliches Wesens].’30 The translation of this passage could be 
misleading. The word ‘acting’ possesses a more neutral connotation 
than does handelnd. It simply means to take action, without specifying 
the nature of that action. Hence, it is closer to the German word tätig. 
The word handelnd, in contrast, also carries connotations of ‘dealing’ 
and ‘trading,’ and thus may carry a distinctly economic hue. The word 
‘social,’ in turn, can mean ‘gregarious’ or ‘sociable,’ much like the German 
word gesellig. The word gesellschaftlich, on the other hand, may also be 
translated as ‘societal’ or ‘corporate.’ It thus suggests an organised 
body of individuals, rather than an individual who is simply disposed 
to engage with others. In Heidegger’s view, then, cybernetics begins 
with an inappropriately narrow conception of the human being, one 
seemingly influenced by economic and corporate models of rationality 
and exchange. He was especially concerned about the influence 
of cybernetics on prevailing conceptions of language: ‘Cybernetics 
transforms language into an exchange of news.’31 In 1975, the year before 
his death, Heidegger wrote that ‘[t]he ascending dominion of linguistics 
and of the information sciences threatens to drive the efforts of thinking 
and poetizing and their great traditions out of human eyesight.’32 Hence, 
for Heidegger, cybernetics offered little hope for salvation in the face of 
30  Martin Heidegger (1993c [1969]), ‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,’ 
trans. by Joan Stambaugh, in Basic Writings, revised and expanded edn, by Martin 
Heidegger, ed. by David Farrell Krell (New York: HarperCollins), pp. 431–49 (p. 
434); my brackets. Cf. Martin Heidegger (1969), ‘Das Ende der Philosophie und die 
Aufgabe des Denkens,’ in Zur Sache des Denkens, by Martin Heidegger (Tübingen: 
Max Niemeyer Verlag), pp. 61–80 (p. 64).
31  Heidegger (1993c [1969]), ‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,’ p. 64.
32  Heidegger, Martin (1987/88), ‘Brief an Jean Beaufret / Letter to Jean Beaufret,’ 
trans. by Steven Davis, Heidegger Studies 3/4, 3–6 (p. 5). Similar statements about 
cybernetics may also be found in Martin Heidegger (1998), ‘Traditional Language 
and Technological Language,’ trans. by Wanda Torres Gregory, Journal of 
Philosophical Research 23, 129–45.
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the perceived threat of enframing. Indeed, by apparently eclipsing the 
poetical and contemplative aspects of human experience — by blocking 
poiēsis — cybernetics seemed, for Heidegger, to powerfully exemplify 
the very phenomenon of homogenous revealing characteristic of 
enframing.33
Whereas von Weizsäcker’s theory of normativity puts the system at 
its centre, Heidegger’s theory puts the subject at its centre. Nevertheless, 
the root difference between their respective theories lies in their 
contrasting interpretations of the subject. In my view, von Weizsäcker 
implicitly advances a theory of the subject which makes necessary a 
systems-theoretic account of normativity. Heidegger, in contrast, does 
not. In order to more clearly understand this difference, it will be useful 
to revisit two concepts introduced in Chapter Six, those of the Galilean 
First Thing and of the world picture.
33  Andrew Pickering consistently obscures Heidegger’s identification of enframing 
with homogenous revealing, first by claiming that Heidegger actually draws 
a sharp distinction between the two, and then by identifying enframing with 
‘asymmetric domination’ and revealing with ‘performative and open-ended 
dances of agency’ (Andrew Pickering (2009), ‘The Politics of Theory: Producing 
Another World, With Some Thoughts on Latour,’ Journal of Cultural Economy 2(1/2), 
197–212 (pp. 205, 204)). On this infelicitous base, Pickering introduces labels for 
two distinct kinds of cybernetics: ‘authoritarian enframing,’ on the one hand, and 
‘liberal democratic revealing,’ on the other (Andrew Pickering (2010), The Cybernetic 
Brain: Sketches of Another Future (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), passim). 
He then promotes the second as a politically attractive alternative to the first. This 
uneven conceptual terrain makes it difficult to properly address, in a short space, 
the relation of Pickering’s account to the present discussion. Suffice to observe 
that, whatever the attractions of Pickering’s alternative, his description of liberal-
democratic cybernetics as the ‘levelling of power relations’ and the placement 
of all subjects ‘metaphysically […] on a single and level playing field’ seems to 
suggest the homogenous revealing of enframing (Pickering (2010), The Cybernetic 
Brain, pp. 384, 393). On this view, swapping one uniform political blueprint for 
another, whatever the benefit, reshuffles the deck of enframing rather than rejects 
it. Note that the distinction between authoritarian and democratic technology 
has a long history in technology studies (Andrew Feenberg (1992), ‘Subversive 
Rationalization: Technology, Power, and Democracy,’ Inquiry 35(3/4), 301–22; 
Otto Mayr (1986), Authority, Liberty & Automatic Machinery in Early Modern Europe 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press); Lewis Mumford (1964), ‘Authoritarian 
and Democratic Technics,’ Technology and Culture 5(1), 1–8; and Langdon Winner 
(1980), ‘Do Artifacts Have Politics?,’ Daedalus 109(1), 121–36). Carol Steiner has 
staged an imaginary dialogue between Pickering and Heidegger (Carol J. Steiner 
(2008), ‘Ontological Dance: A Dialogue between Heidegger and Pickering,’ in The 
Mangle in Practice: Science, Society, and Becoming, ed. by Andrew Pickering and Keith 
Guzik (Durham: Duke University Press), pp. 243–65).
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Recall that the Galilean First Thing is a thing left entirely to itself, to 
be at rest, or to move uniformly in a straight line, without interference 
from without. Newton formalised this concept in the First Law, which 
interprets the thing, fundamentally, as a law-abiding thing. Note that this 
image, of a thing left entirely to itself, negates the necessity of a system 
to which that thing belongs as a constituent part. This situation changes, 
however, when seventeenth-century experimental philosophers 
begin to consider the thing as existing in a world also inhabited by 
other things. Robert Boyle and his colleagues, as we saw, viewed the 
experimental thing as endeavouring to beat back its neighbours, so as to 
open up around itself an autonomous space, a space in which to achieve 
its native independence. One puzzle which seems to arise from such 
a conception of things is that of the order among things: if things are 
fundamentally disposed to seek their independence from one another, 
then why are we not now faced with a world of disjointed chaos? I 
want to suggest that the concept of system emerged as an answer to 
this question. The order we observe is not to be explained in terms of 
individuals, but in terms of an organised whole in relation to which 
those individuals stand as constitutive parts. Order is a property of the 
whole, irreducible to the part. This ordered whole is a system. Insofar 
as this system possesses the principle of its own organisation, it is a self-
organising system. While the individual strives to move itself towards 
autonomy, the system strives to move itself towards order, equilibrium. 
Autonomy and equilibrium thus figure as the respective final causes of 
the individual thing and the system. The latter explains the presence 
of order left unaccounted for by the former. The world pictured as a 
self-regulating system thus offsets the threat of world disorder implied 
in the thing conceived as an autonomous individual.34
If, however, one conceives of the thing in a different manner, one 
suggesting relative order among things rather than potential chaos, 
34  Mayr notes that the idea that the ‘discord of individuals […] contribute[s] to a 
concord of the whole’ was already much discussed in the seventeenth century, but 
only acquired an adequate explanation a century later with the concept of the self-
regulating system (Mayr (1986), Authority, Liberty & Automatic Machinery, p. 185). 
According to Mayr, ‘[w]hat won the concept such popularity was its promise of 
linking the values of equilibrium and liberty’ (p. 188). The concept would reach full 
development only in the twentieth century, with the arrival of cybernetics theory (p. 
187).
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one will then require no additional concept of system to explain order. 
Order among things will instead be the result of things regulating 
themselves, rather than of things being the constituents of a discrete, 
self-regulating system. Indeed, in 1950, three years before presenting 
‘The Question Concerning Technology,’ Heidegger presented to the 
same audience a lecture entitled ‘The Thing,’ which was published 
together with the later lecture in 1954. He was evidently involved in 
a further reconceptualisation of the thing during the same period in 
which he was developing his critique of enframing.35
Heidegger’s alternative conception of the thing is a strange one. 
He grounds it in an old Germanic meaning for ‘thing’ as ‘gathering.’36 
Furthermore, when a thing ‘does its thing,’ that is, when it subsists as a 
gathering, we may say — employing an obsolete English usage, meaning 
‘to reconcile’ — that the thing things, that it brings reconciliation in the 
form of a gathering. What does the thing, by thinging, gather together? 
According to Heidegger, it gathers together earth, sky, gods, and 
mortals in a unitary ‘fourfold.’ This gathered fourfold, in turn, makes 
a ‘world’ possible. Heidegger writes: ‘The thing stays — gathers and 
unites — the fourfold. The thing things world.’37
In developing this self-consciously poetical account of the thing, the 
later Heidegger uses the example of a wine jug — a vessel or ‘stowage’ 
(Gefäß) in which to ‘stow’ (fassen) wine.38 To pour wine for someone is 
to ‘bestow’ (schenken) it on them, and the result of this bestowing is a 
‘bestowal’ (Geschenk, or ‘gift’). This bestowal lets the jug be what it is qua 
jug. The bestowing of wine gathers together, in the same moment — in 
35  See Martin Heidegger (1971b [1954]), ‘The Thing,’ in Poetry, Language, Thought, by 
Martin Heidegger, trans. by Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row), pp. 
165–86. The audience for the two lectures was the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts. 
In fact, earlier versions of both lectures were presented together, on the same day, 
in 1948, to the Club at Bremen. See the introductory note in Heidegger (1977b), ‘The 
Thing,’ pp. ix–x.
36  Heidegger (1971b), ‘The Thing,’ p. 177.
37  Heidegger (1971b), ‘The Thing,’ p. 181. Cf. the original German: ‘Das Ding verweilt 
das Geviert. Das Ding dingt Welt’ (Martin Heidegger (1954b), ‘Das Ding,’ in Vorträge 
und Aufsätze, by Martin Heidegger (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske), pp. 157–79 
(p. 173)). The normally intransitive verb verweilen is put to unconventional transitive 
use in this passage, thus exacerbating attempts at translation. In this context, the 
word also suggests ‘temporalises’ and, translating more freely, ‘harbours.’
38  Heidegger (1954b), ‘Das Ding,’ pp. 158–66; my translations. Cf. Heidegger (1971b), 
‘The Thing,’ pp. 166–74.
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one bestowal — the earth and sky, gods and mortals. In this moment, 
with the bestowed wine, one experiences the earth’s nutrients and the 
sky’s sun and rain. One also experiences the mortals whose thirst the 
wine slakes, and, when it is offered as a libation, the gods whom it 
honours. Crucially, Heidegger argues that the bestowing of wine as a 
libation is the ‘true’ (eigentliche) bestowal.39 Through this act the jug is 
let be what it essentially is. The gods are apparently the fundamental 
for-the-sake-of-which of the wine jug in the context of use, the principal 
reason for the jug’s being what it is.
This claim may be more fully unpacked by returning to ‘The Question 
Concerning Technology,’ where Heidegger discusses a ceremonial bowl. 
Drawing on Aristotle’s doctrine of the four causes in order to explain 
the whatness of the bowl, Heidegger writes the following.
But a third cause remains above all responsible for it. It is that which 
limits the bowl beforehand within a realm of dedication and offering. 
Through this, the bowl is defined [umgrenzt] as a sacrificial implement. 
That which defines brings the thing to an end. With this end the thing 
does not finish, but rather, from it, the thing begins to be what, following 
its manufacture, it will be. Bringing-to-an-end, consummation, in this 
sense, is what the Greeks called telos, which one all too often translates, 
and thus misconstrues, as ‘goal’ and ‘purpose.’40
Just as the jug is truly let be what it is in the act of pouring a libation 
for the gods, so too the bowl is, above all, let be what it is in an act 
of dedication and offering, presumably also directed towards the gods. 
That for the sake of which a thing is enrolled in a practice is the final 
cause, the ultimate meaning and end, of that thing. As I argued in 
Chapter Five, this end is the norm governing the thing’s proper usage. 
A thing is thus defined by its directedness towards that end.
Yet, as I furthermore argued in Chapter Six, the experimental 
thing is also defined by its directedness towards an end, namely, the 
state of pure autonomy represented by the Galilean First Thing. In 
my view, the difference between the two conceptions lies in the fact 
that this autonomy, as an end, stands as the only end, the singular 
basic blueprint, for the thingness of things in general. In contrast, on 
39  Heidegger (1954b), ‘Das Ding,’ p. 165. Cf. Heidegger (1971b), ‘The Thing,’ p. 173.
40  Heidegger (1954a), ‘Die Frage nach der Technik,’ p. 13; my translation. Cf. Heidegger 
(1977b), ‘The Question Concerning Technology,’ p. 8.
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Heidegger’s alternative conception the final cause according to which 
the thingness of things is determined is presented as plural — ‘the 
gods’ — rather than as singular. It is, in other words, a heterogeneous 
rather than a homogenous conception. Furthermore, Heidegger’s 
alternative is couched in terms which seem to resist formalisation, in 
much the same way as the term ‘heap,’ which we considered at the 
beginning of Chapter Five.41 Although a plurality of gods may be 
thematised as a mytho-poetical pantheon, it will nevertheless resist 
formalisation as a system. Heidegger presumably felt that a Newtonian 
rationalisation of the fourfold is not possible, because rationalisation 
demands homogenisation (in this case, monotheism) in order to avoid 
contradiction. Viewed through the lens of Heidegger’s late reflections, 
one might see the Galilean First Thing as a god which has successfully 
beaten back the other gods, thereby establishing itself as an autonomous 
and uniform measure for the mathematicisation of nature.
But let us bring Heidegger’s mytho-poetical phenomenology back 
down to a more concrete level. I suggest that it may still be possible to 
proceed scientifically on the basis of Heidegger’s comments. My proposal 
involves reading Heidegger’s late reflections in light of his earlier views 
on final causation and the subjectivity of the subject, as discussed in 
Chapter Five. Recall Heidegger’s claim that the final causes guiding and 
regulating practice ultimately bottom out in the existential possibilities 
of the subject, possibilities which comprise its historical tradition. I 
propose to view Heidegger’s concept of the gods as a mytho-poetical 
thematisation of these basic existential possibilities, and I wish to argue 
that these possibilities — this tradition — may instead be thematised 
in terminology more suited to historical and sociological analysis.42 In 
41  Indeed, as Miles Burnyeat has shown, the paradox of the heap has been also used 
to undermine the attempted rationalisation of conceptions of the gods (Miles F. 
Burnyeat (1982), ‘Gods and Heaps,’ in Language and Logos, ed. by Malcolm Schofeld 
and Martha Craven Nussbaum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 
315–38). Note, also, Heidegger’s 1962 comment that ‘a poem does not […] let itself 
be programmed’ (Heidegger (1998), ‘Traditional Language and Technological 
Language,’ p. 141).
42  For arguments that Heidegger’s concept of the gods can be reinterpreted in 
sociological terms, see: Jeff Kochan (2010b), ‘Latour’s Heidegger,’ Social Studies of 
Science 40(4), 579–98 (p. 592); Charles Spinosa (2000), ‘Heidegger on Living Gods,’ 
in Heidegger, Coping, and Cognitive Science: Essays in Honor of Hubert L. Dreyfus, ed. 
by Mark A. Wrathall and Jeff Malpas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 
pp. 209–28 (p. 216); and Julian Young (2006), ‘The Fourfold,’ in The Cambridge 
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this regard, it is important to also recall the normative role played by 
final causes: such causes provide the measure by which practitioners 
distinguish proper from improper action, thereby giving order and 
direction to their activities. Hence, to respect the rules governing one’s 
actions means to respect the existential possibilities comprising one’s 
shared historical tradition. By respecting these possibilities, as manifest 
both in one’s own actions as well as in the actions of others, one sustains 
and gives shape to the tradition. In this way, the subject is its possibilities. 
Moreover, as being-in-the-world, as one who historically constructs and 
experiences meaning in the world, the subject also always experiences 
and pursues its possibilities in conjunction with others, as being-with-
others. Meaning-constitutive action is thus, necessarily, both social and 
historical action, because the source and cause of that action — the 
subject — is social and historical.
Heidegger’s gods may thus be viewed in terms of the historical 
possibilities for meaning-constitutive action available to persons who 
share and sustain a tradition. Furthermore, these possibilities are 
experienced as more or less compelling. We feel compelled to follow 
certain possibilities for action, rather than others, because they have 
normative force for us, because we view them as good rather than 
bad, proper rather than improper. As I argued above, this feeling of 
compulsion is the existential condition of possibility for understanding 
as such. We understand because we can be affected, and thus also 
guided, by the rules which structure that understanding. As I also 
argued above, as well as earlier in Chapter Four, according to both 
Heidegger and SSK, our receptivity to rules, in particular, and a 
tradition, more broadly, is, at base, a receptivity to each other. As Bloor 
says, ‘[w]e are compelled by rules in so far as we, collectively, compel 
one another.’43 Within this phenomenological constellation, which 
determines the subjectivity of the subject, being-in-the world, being-
with-others, and understanding combine with affectivity in order to 
produce an experience of intelligibility, or cognitive order. Heidegger’s 
gods are thus a mytho-poetical marker for the affective component of 
human subjectivity. Indeed, Heidegger describes the gods as providing 
Companion to Heidegger, 2nd edn, ed. by Charles B. Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), pp. 373–92 (p. 375).
43  Bloor (1997b), Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions, p. 22.
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the basis for ‘every affective disposition [wesentliche Gestimmtheit] 
from respect and joy to mourning and terror.’44 The affectivity and the 
sociality of the subject combine in a mutual receptivity which enables it 
to projectively understand its environment as an ordered world.
For both Heidegger and SSK, cognitive order is grounded in social 
order, and social order is, in turn, produced in micro-social interactions 
between mutually receptive subjects who both compel and defer to 
one another in (and often by manipulating bits of) a common material 
environment. We might call this an ‘interactionist theory of normativity,’ 
in contrast to von Weizsäcker’s cybernetic theory of normativity. The 
norms governing behaviour are not, finally, to be located in a system, 
of which each person is a constitutive part, but in the often mundane 
interactions between persons who, to a greater or lesser extent, share 
a history and culture. Whether or not these interactions achieve a level 
of consistency and stability allowing for their reification as a ‘system’ 
will be a matter for empirical investigation. But, if such were the case, 
then it would be important to remember that this system is, in fact, a 
simplification, a reification, a matter of conceptual art and convenience, 
rather than a fundamental statement about the nature of normativity, 
much less the ontology of groups.
Interactionism is SSK’s social theory of choice, and has been discussed 
at length by Barry Barnes.45 An interactionist social theory puts the 
individual subject at the methodological centre of explanations of social, 
and thus also of cognitive, order. According to this theory, the subject 
does not eschew interaction, beating away its neighbours in pursuit of 
its own autonomy, but instead seeks to interact with them as a matter 
of natural necessity. This is the sociological equivalent of Heidegger’s 
claim that being-with-others is a fundamental characteristic of the 
subjectivity of the subject. A natural disposition to interact with others 
is, however, not yet an explanation of social order. Barnes argues that 
44  Martin Heidegger (1992 [1982]), Parmenides, trans. by André Schuwer and Richard 
Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), p. 106, my brackets. Cf. 
Martin Heidegger (1982b), Parmenides (Gesamtausgabe, vol. 54) (Frankfurt: Vittorio 
Klostermann), p. 157.
45  Barry Barnes (1995), The Elements of Social Theory (London: UCL Press), chpt. 3; Barry 
Barnes (2001), ‘Practice as Collective Action,’ in The Practice Turn in Contemporary 
Theory, ed. by Theodore R. Schatzki, Karin Knorr Cetina and Eike von Savigny 
(London: Routledge).
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this disposition is accompanied by ‘the readiness of the individual to 
align her cognition with that of others and co-ordinate her activities 
with theirs.’46 This is an innate orientation towards cooperation with 
others, but not towards conformity to rules. According to Barnes, a 
person’s natural gregariousness does not constrain her to a fixed social 
order, but rather facilitates her participation in a ‘form of life.’47 This is 
the sociological near equivalent of Heidegger’s claim that being-with-
others is a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition of the subject’s being 
able to make sense of things, to project a space of intelligibility — a 
world — in which things may be encountered as what they are. Put 
another way, gregariousness plays a necessary role in revealing, in 
opening up a world of understanding.
From this it follows that enframing — homogenous revealing — may 
be experienced as the opening up of a world within which action becomes 
possible, rather than as an external constraint on action. However, so 
Heidegger worries, the existential basis for this freedom to act, its 
condition of possibility, is ontologically limited. From an interactionist 
perspective, in such a world, the subject’s natural gregariousness is 
increasingly guided into an intersubjective alignment of cognition and 
co-ordinated action which may allow for considerable freedom, but 
only within a limited cognitive and material domain, a domain in which 
alternative existential possibilities have been blocked or suppressed. 
Heidegger’s later work thematises, or topicalises, the phenomenology 
of this situation. SSK provides the resources by which to explain it.
On an interactionist account, the homogenising impulse of enframing 
is to be explained by reference to the micro-social interactions through 
which enframing is produced and sustained. Enframing does not have 
46  Barnes (1995), The Elements of Social Theory, p. 102.
47  Barnes (1995), The Elements of Social Theory, p. 103. In a welcome step beyond his 
earlier work, discussed in Chapter Two, Joseph Rouse now defends an account 
of normative practice which appears, in its essentials, very similar to Barnes’s 
older and sociologically more detailed account: ‘a practice is […] held together 
by the interactions among its constitutive performances’ (Joseph Rouse (2015), 
Articulating the World: Conceptual Understanding and the Scientific Image (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press), p. 163). Note, however, Rouse’s reference to 
interacting performances, not performers, a difference in focus reflecting his 
continuing attempt to neutralise the subject as an explanatory resource. It is a small 
intellectual tragedy that Rouse’s earlier misreading of SSK should now blind him to 
the benefits of positively enrolling SSK in the elaboration of his own interactionist 
theory of normativity.
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a life of its own, existing independently of people, and exercising an 
external power over them, but must instead be explained reductively 
in terms of the interactions of those people. As Barnes notes, this 
methodological point may be difficult to square with immediate 
personal experience.
For a single involved individual, norms may still be experienced as 
having a fixed meaning beyond her own discretion and as pressing on 
her judgement like an external force. This is just one of many instances 
of the fact that what is created and controlled collectively may be 
experienced as given and coercing individually, and what is actually 
the power of many other people may be experienced individually as a 
power external to people altogether.48
The basic idea is that enframing ‘does not carry us along but rather […] 
we carry it along.’49 The same insight may also be applied to systems: 
the system does not carry us along, we carry it along. We are compelled 
by the system only insofar as we, collectively, compel one another.50
On this basis, an interactionist theory of normativity turns a systems 
theory of normativity on its head. Von Weizsäcker proposed that a 
systems-theoretic deconstruction and reconstruction of ‘reality’ would 
yield the ‘fundamental laws’ which govern the ecological conditions of 
possibility for conceptual thinking. He thus characterised the subject 
as being carried along in a system whose law-like regularities enable 
conceptual understanding. The interactionist account reverses this, 
arguing that the aligned cognition and co-ordinated action — that is, the 
co-understanding — of subjects may enable a shared experience of the 
world as a single, integrated system, a coherently organised reality. If 
a person experiences this world picture as compelling, it is not because 
the picture itself is compelling, but because the person is aligned with 
others who deem it a good thing to feel compelled by that picture, and 
so actively encourage the person to feel so compelled. The community 
48  Barnes (1995), The Elements of Social Theory, p. 75.
49  Barnes (1995), The Elements of Social Theory, p. 112.
50  In a discussion of Heidegger and science studies, Steiner reads the later Heidegger 
as claiming that ‘when we understand Being as the nil source of our knowledge, 
[…] then what we know is no longer under our control. […] All that remains to 
move on to the path to primordial Being is to embrace the mystery’ (Carol J. Steiner 
(1999), ‘Constructive Science and Technology Studies: On the Path to Being?,’ Social 
Studies of Science 29(4), 583–616 (p. 589)). I will reserve judgement on whether this 
fairly represents Heidegger’s later views. My task here is to use SSK to demystify 
explanations of this kind, a task I view as compatible with Heidegger’s earlier work.
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compels the person to feel compelled by the picture. In so doing, the 
community carries the picture along.
This attention to feelings of compulsion evinces the deep relationship 
between co-understanding and co-affectivity. Von Weizsäcker viewed 
the systems-theoretical reassembly of subjectivity as an ‘obligation.’ For 
him, the path of science must be pursued to its end. Such statements tell 
us something about the particular mode of co-affectivity characteristic of 
von Weizsäcker’s own scientific community. In these final paragraphs, I 
want to suggest that much exciting work could still be done investigating 
such modes of scientific co-affectivity.
Here, too, SSK can offer guidance, with Barnes’s interactionist 
elaboration of Max Weber’s concept of ‘status groups,’ an elaboration 
which puts at its centre the emotional susceptibility to one another 
of group members.51 A status group arises when a number of people 
come together on the basis of a characteristic, or ‘good,’ which they 
share in common, and which they simultaneously use to exclude 
from membership those who fail to uphold that good. This dynamic 
of inclusion and exclusion defines a field of legitimate competition: 
group members may compete with one another for status within the 
group, while those excluded are disqualified from such competition. 
The criterion which determines inclusion in and exclusion from the 
group will be a matter of historical contingency. However, the dynamic 
holding group members together, in accordance with the relevant, 
contingent criterion, is, Barnes suggests, a matter of necessity.52 Indeed, 
this fundamental dynamic forms the basis of human sociality; it is a 
necessary characteristic of the subjectivity of the subject, comparable to 
Heidegger’s being-with-others.
Moreover, also in step with Heidegger, Barnes argues that the 
sociality of the subject necessarily combines with affectivity: ‘we convey 
to each other signals of praise and blame, approval and disapproval, 
recognition or rejection, honour or contempt, socially organised to 
sustain the collective good, and our susceptibility to these signals is what 
51  Barry Barnes (1992b), ‘Status Groups and Collective Action,’ Sociology 26(2), 259–70; 
see also Barnes (1995), The Elements of Social Theory, chpt. 5. Cf. Max Weber (1968), 
Economy and Society, trans. by Günther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University 
of California Press). Note that there is an established and growing body of literature 
addressing the topics of scientific emotion, in particular, and epistemic emotion, 
more generally. See the Appendix at the end of this chapter for an incomplete 
overview (p. 381).
52  Barnes (1992b), ‘Status Groups and Collective Action,’ pp. 260, 266, 263.
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encourages collective action.’ Our conveyance of, and susceptibility to, 
these signals — our co-affectivity — ‘is the basis of our sociability, and 
may be taken as given in accounting for any particular manifestation 
or consequence of that sociability.’53 This is a description of social order 
in terms of the emotionally infused interaction of individuals who 
are biologically so predisposed. Barnes credits Thomas Scheff with 
having ‘systematized’ this description under the rubric of a ‘deference-
emotion system.’54 This is an interactive system in which ‘the individual 
constantly monitors how he or she stands in the eyes of others, and 
experiences feelings of pride or shame accordingly.’ However, it is 
difficult to thematise and articulate these interactions: ‘cultural taboos 
often prohibit explicit recognition of the system in everyday discourse, 
because the system is everywhere operative and hence not totally under 
the conscious, calculative control of members themselves.’55 Once we 
accept the existence of this emotion-based dynamic — including 
its cognitive importance — then a largely uncharted research area 
opens itself up for exploration by science studies scholars. This is an 
opportunity not only to discover new facts about the way science is and 
has been done, but also to develop new sociological and historiographic 
methods by which to discover those facts.
Status groups are formed and sustained by members’ elicitation 
of feelings of pride and shame in one another. One’s behaviour will 
attract deference, on the one hand, or disregard, even disdain, on the 
other, depending on whether or not it promotes the collective good. 
This collective good will vary between groups on the basis of their 
contingent social and historical circumstances. In Chapter Four, we 
saw that, historically, the idea of the good has played an essential role 
in organising understanding, enabling intelligibility, by allowing for 
normative distinctions to be made between epistemically good and bad 
phenomena. We saw, furthermore, that Heidegger reinterprets Plato’s 
idea of the good in terms of the for-the-sake-of-which, that is, the 
53  Barnes (1992b), ‘Status Groups and Collective Action,’ p. 263.
54  Barnes (1995), The Elements of Social Theory, p. 72. Cf. Thomas J. Scheff (1988), ‘Shame 
and Conformity: The Deference-Emotion System,’ American Sociological Review 
53(3), 395–406. Both Barnes and Scheff acknowledge their debt in this context to 
Goffman’s work on ‘interaction rituals’ (Erving Goffman (1967), Interaction Ritual 
(New York: Anchor)).
55  Barnes (1992b), ‘Status Groups and Collective Action,’ p. 263.
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existential possibilities available to an engaged subjectivity. In Chapter 
Six, I read Heidegger as arguing that the collective good around which 
the subjectivity of seventeenth-century experimental philosophers 
organised itself was the autonomous First Thing. In the dispute between 
Robert Boyle and Francis Line, the Galilean First Thing served as the 
measure according to which Boyle successfully excluded Line from the 
community of experimentalists. Yet, I said nothing about the emotional 
dynamics which — on the present account — must have played a 
fundamental role in this dispute and its resolution. As a consequence, 
the story remains half-told. More work still needs to be done in order to 
complete the historical picture.56
In his later writings, Heidegger argued, with von Weizsäcker’s 
agreement, that the collective good around which the community of 
modern physics organises itself is enframing. We should expect, on this 
argument, that the social interactions of modern physicists will be such 
that they defer to those who promote enframing and disregard those 
who do not. This is a sociological conjecture which requires empirical 
testing in order to determine its truth value. Nevertheless, it suggests 
an explanation for the difference in attitude between Heidegger and 
von Weizsäcker vis-à-vis enframing. It suggests that von Weizsäcker’s 
professed ‘obligation’ to carry the systematisation of natural philosophy 
through to its end was, tacitly, an affective response to the deference-
emotion dynamic characteristic of the status group to which he belonged. 
By manifesting this feeling of obligation in his behaviour, he showed 
himself to be an honourable member of his community.
The later Heidegger, in contrast, by failing to promote enframing, 
signalled his distance from this community, his relative immunity to 
its internal emotional dynamic. Indeed, for him, this dynamic, and 
the collective good it sustains, were a topic, rather than a resource, 
for investigation. In his earlier work, on which this book has chiefly 
focussed, Heidegger addresses that topic from the standpoint of a 
scientific philosophy, employing the methods of phenomenology. Like 
56  A natural departure point for this would be Steven Shapin’s work on trust and 
honour in seventeenth-century experimental philosophy (Steven Shapin (1994), A 
Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press)). See also Steven Shapin (2012), ‘The Sciences of 
Subjectivity,’ Social Studies of Science 42(2), 170–84, and a discussion thereof in 
Kochan (2013), ‘Subjectivity and Emotion in Scientific Research.’
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SSK, he sought, in part, to develop a scientific account of science, an 
account based on an analysis of the subjectivity of the scientific subject. 
In this analysis, the deference-emotion dynamic of modern science 
is treated as the combined result of the subject’s affectivity and its 
being-with-others — as co-affectivity. The collective good sustained 
by co-affectivity is, in turn, treated as the combined result of the 
subject’s understanding, or projectivity, and its being-with-others — as 
co-understanding. Yet, the collective good can be experienced as 
‘good’ only with the support of co-affectivity. Without co-affectivity, 
by which the collective good is constituted as good, co-understanding 
will project only an image, absent the normative force necessary for it 
to be experienced as a compelling image. Hence, on this account, the 
compelling nature, the goodness, of the mathematical projection of 
nature, of mathēsis — indeed, of enframing — entails co-affectivity. 
Without co-affectivity, co-understanding will lack normative weight.
Inversely, without co-understanding, co-affectivity will lack order 
and direction. We saw the extreme consequence of this in Chapter Three, 
with Heidegger’s discussion of anxiety. Anxiety arises in the face of 
unintelligibility, a global breakdown in meaning, our failure to make 
sense of, to understand, the things around us. I argued that, in such rare 
situations, we experience the thing as a thing-in-itself: we know that it 
is, but not what it is.
Heidegger argues that the thing in the face of which we feel anxiety 
is ‘completely indefinite’; it is a thing ‘essentially incapable of having 
an end-directedness [Bewandtnis].’57 In other words, without the 
benefit of projectivity, we lack a final cause, an image by which to let 
things be what they are, by which to get our bearings in the world. 
Co-understanding gives us a collective image, co-affectivity lends that 
image normative weight, turning it into a measure. Hence, co-affectivity 
grounds the normativity of a practice, and co-understanding grounds 
the intelligibility, or order, of that practice. This reprises a key claim 
from Chapter Five, that a practice stripped of the final cause which 
gives it order and direction will amount to no more than random 
behaviour. Thus, on its own, the deference-emotion dynamic produces 
only random behaviour, never practice. Only when that dynamic 
57  Heidegger (1962a), Being and Time, p. 231 [186]; translation modified, my brackets. 
Cf. Martin Heidegger (1927), Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag), p. 
186.
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coalesces around and affirms an end, giving that end weight, will it 
produce collective practice and social order. Enframing, as a normative 
force, a collective good, is thus constituted, on Heidegger’s account, in 
the interactive, emotion-infused group dynamic of the modern physics 
community. By carrying enframing along in this way, the community 
becomes what it is. Indeed, on this account, every community becomes 
what it is by so affirming and carrying along the collective good, or 
goods, which give it its characteristic shape. These are the conditions of 
possibility for social identity and order as such. The virtue of SSK and 
Heidegger’s existential conception of science, indeed, the virtue of the 
two combined, is that they equip us with fundamental tools by which 
to topicalise and examine those conditions. In so doing, they promise to 
throw new explanatory light on the workings of society, in general, and 
the sciences, in particular.
The pursuit of this exciting research prospect has been, and will 
continue to be, met with resistance. Paradoxically, as we have seen, 
some of the strongest criticism has come from those who themselves 
promote a practice-based theory of science. For them, a turn to 
practice entails the rejection of the scientific subject as an explanatory 
resource. Because SSK practitioners and the early Heidegger do not 
reject the explanatory importance of the subject, these critics conclude 
that neither account is compatible with a practice-based theory. As 
I have argued, this conclusion is false, and the evidence educed in 
its favour collapses under scrutiny. This suggests that the critics’ 
motivation may be not so much to champion the practice-based study 
of science, as to ensure that such studies proceed without critical 
attention to the contribution of the subject. The subject has not been 
eliminated in these studies, but suppressed. Hence, subjectivity 
continues to circulate, tacitly and obscurely, in these practice-based 
accounts of science, while inquisitive scholars are denied the critical 
tools by which to address, analyse, and understand its role. To pinch 
a phrase from Charles Baudelaire, under such circumstances, the 
scientist — including the social scientist — becomes ‘a prince who 
everywhere rejoices in his incognito.’58
58  Charles Baudelaire (1964 [1863]), ‘The Painter of Modern Life,’ in The Painter of 
Modern Life and Others Essays, by Charles Baudelaire, trans. by Jonathan Mayne 
(London: Phaidon Press), pp. 1–40 (p. 9).
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Yet, what good is this incognito? I suggested earlier that the 
suppression of inquiry into subjectivity may, in effect, grant free licence 
to an unrestrained constructivity, a subjectivity which knows neither 
social nor historical limits, even while it remains (perhaps unwittingly) 
conditioned by those limits. This amounts to a particular conception 
of human freedom, one challenged by SSK practitioners and the early 
Heidegger alike, both of whom, as we saw in Chapter Three, emphasise 
the finitude of human cognition, and so espouse a policy of epistemic 
humility. We might now say that, in challenging this conception of human 
freedom, SSK practitioners and the early Heidegger signal their distance 
from a scholarly community in which that conception has acquired the 
normative weight of a collective good. Their challenge displays their 
relative immunity to the deference-emotion dynamic characteristic of 
that community. But another, deeper observation can also be made. 
Through the suppression of subjectivity, critical attention is deflected 
from the emotion-infused interactions by which knowledge is generated 
and sustained. Indeed, as noted earlier, Barnes argues that ‘cultural 
taboos’ may prevent explicit recognition of the largely non-deliberative, 
but nonetheless pervasively present deference-emotion dynamic of a 
community. These taboos against thematising co-affectivity would seem 
stronger than similar taboos against thematising co-understanding. 
With the suppression of subjectivity, co-affectivity seems to have been 
buried more deeply than co-understanding, perhaps because we are 
taught that feelings are more private than thoughts. This may help to 
explain why SSK practitioners and the early Heidegger both give more 
attention to thinking than to feeling, even as their respective accounts 
directly challenge this very distinction. As a consequence, the work of 
both remains incomplete. This is good news for us, as it means there is 
still much work left to be done. Instead of maintaining the established 
architecture of a familiar intellectual territory, we have a chance to 
explore new ground, to build new structures within fresh horizons, to 
come together around these still largely unarticulated possibilities in 
our irrepressibly motley social existence.
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